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ΜΕΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ

4

M. B. SAKELLARIOU

THE POLIS-STATE DEFINITION AND ORIGIN

ATHENS 1989

DIFFUSION DE BOCCARD - 11, RUE DE MEDICIS, 75006 PARIS

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Φ. Παναγόπουλος & Σία Ο.Ε.

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To my collaborators

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS	15
PREFACE.....	19
PART ONE	
WHAT WAS THE POLIS?	
Chapter One	
HOW CAN THE <i>POLIS</i> BE DEFINED?.....	27
<i>THE DEBATE</i>	27
<i>A NEW INVESTIGATION</i>	58
I. <i>POLIS</i> IN RELATION TO 'CONSTITUTION', 'STATE', 'COMMUNITY'	59
A. <i>POLIS</i> : NOT A KIND OF CONSTITUTION	60
B. <i>POLIS</i> : A KIND OF STATE	66
C. <i>POLIS</i> : NOT A KIND OF 'COMMUNITY'.....	77
II. <i>POLIS</i> : WHAT KIND OF STATE?	78
A. THE <i>POLIS</i> -STATE NOT TO BE DEFINED WITH REFERENCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA	79
B. <i>POLIS</i> -STATE, TERRITORY, <i>POLIS</i> -SETTLEMENT	80
1. <i>POLIS</i> -STATE AND TERRITORY.....	80
2. <i>POLIS</i> -STATE AND <i>POLIS</i> -SETTLEMENT	86
C. THE <i>POLIS</i> -STATE DEFINED BY ITS CONNECTION WITH A HUMAN GROUP	92
1. THE <i>POLIS</i> -STATE NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH ITS CITIZENS ..	94
2. <i>POLIS</i> -STATE AND A KIND OF COMMUNITY	111
a. Polis-State: not to be defined as the Community of its Citizens-Landowners 111	
b. Polis-State and Polis Community 124	
D. ARE THERE OTHER DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE <i>POLIS</i> -STATE?	136
<i>A SYNOPSIS OF THE CONCLUSIONS</i>	152

Chapter Two

EXCURSUS ON THE ANCIENT MEANINGS

OF THE WORD <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i>	155
1. <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i> : A CITADEL	155
2. <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i> : A SETTLEMENT	156
3. <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i> : A STATE	159
a. <i>Πόλις</i> : A State with a City at its Heart 159	
b. <i>Πόλις</i> : A State which had no Polis-Settlement 162	
c. <i>Πόλις</i> : A State Differing from the Ethnos and the Koinon 163	
d. The Extension of the Term <i>Πόλις</i> to <i>Ethne</i> and <i>Koina</i> 172	
e. <i>Πόλις</i> : A State with a Monarch 175	
f. Dyarchy of <i>Polis</i> and King 181	
g. <i>Πόλις</i> : A State Compatible with all Constitutions 182	
h. <i>Πόλις</i> : A State without a Monarch 184	
i. <i>Πόλις</i> : Any Kind of State 185	
4. <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i> : A HUMAN GROUP	185
a. <i>Πόλις</i> : A Community 185	
b. <i>Πόλις</i> : The Citizens 191	
5. <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i> : THE POPULAR ASSEMBLY	197
6. <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i> : POLITICAL RIGHTS	204
7. <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i> : PUBLIC LIFE	204
8. <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i> : THE TERRITORY OF A STATE	205
9. <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i> : A COUNTRY IN GENERAL	206
10. <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i> : A SOCIAL CLASS	207
11. <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i> : THE LEGAL EMBODIMENT OF PUBLIC LAW AS DISTINCT FROM THE PHYSICAL INDIVIDUALS, THE CITIZENS	208
A SYNOPSIS OF THE CONCLUSIONS	208

Chapter Three

EXCURSUS ON THE ANCIENT DEFINITIONS

OF THE <i>POLIS</i>	213
I. THE CONCEPT OF <i>POLIS</i> IN ARISTOTLE	214
A. DEFINITIONS OF THE <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i>	215
B. THE PARTS OF THE <i>POLIS</i>	242
1. THE <i>ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΙ</i> OF INFERIOR RANK	244
2. THE CITIZENS	246
3. PROFESSIONAL GROUPS, SOCIAL CLASSES, STATE ORGANS	266
4. STATE FUNCTIONS	268
C. <i>POLIS</i> AND <i>POLITEIA</i> (CONSTITUTION, FORM OF GOVERNMENT)	268
1. THE RELATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF <i>POLIS</i> AND <i>POLITEIA</i> . . .	269
2. ASSOCIATIONS OF THE <i>POLIS</i> WITH VARIOUS CONSTITUTIONS ..	273

D. THE <i>ΠΟΛΙΣ</i> IN RELATION TO THE OTHER <i>ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΙ</i>	278
1. THE <i>POLIS</i> : <i>ΓΕΝΕΣΕΙ ΥΣΤΕΡΟΝ, ΦΥΣΕΙ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ</i>	278
2. <i>POLIS</i> AND <i>ETHNOS</i>	280
3. THE <i>POLIS</i> OUTSIDE THE GREEK WORLD	282
II. THE <i>POLIS</i> ACCORDING TO PROTAGORAS, PLATO AND THE STOICS	282
<i>A SYNOPSIS OF THE CONCLUSIONS</i>	287

PART TWO

WHENCE, WHEN AND HOW DID POLIS-STATES RISE?

Chapter One

THE ORIGINS OF THE POLIS-STATE	293
<i>THE DEBATE</i>	293
<i>A NEW INVESTIGATION</i>	302
A. POLIS-STATE FOUNDED BY AN INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY	302
1. POLIS-STATE FROM A UNITARY COMMUNITY	302
2. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF DEMES	316
3. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF 'PARTS' (<i>ΜΕΡΗ</i>)	320
4. POLIS-STATES FROM THE DEMES OF A CONFEDERACY THAT BROKE UP.	321
5. POLIS-STATES FROM A POLIS-SETTLEMENT THAT BROKE AWAY FROM AN <i>ETHNOS</i> -STATE.	322
B. POLIS-STATES FORMED ALONGSIDE A CONFEDERACY	323
1. FROM VILLAGE TO POLIS-STATE WITHIN A CONFEDERACY	324
2. THE CONFEDERACY AND THE POLIS-STATES OF THE IONIANS OF ATTICA, EASTERN BOEOTIA AND CENTRAL EUBOEA.	325
3. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF DEMES	329
C. DISSOLUTION OF CONFEDERACIES INTO POLIS-STATES — SECESSION OF POLIS-STATES FROM CONFEDERACIES	330
1. DISSOLUTION OF CONFEDERACIES INTO POLIS-STATES	330
2. SECESSION OF POLIS-STATES FROM CONFEDERACIES	331
<i>A SYNOPSIS OF THE CONCLUSIONS</i>	332

Chapter Two

WHEN AND WHERE WERE POLIS-STATES

FOUNDED?	335
<i>THE DEBATE</i>	335

A NEW INVESTIGATION	344
I. GENERAL DATA	346
A. DATING OF THE POLIS-STATE WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONDITIONS OF ITS EMERGENCE	346
B. DATING OF THE POLIS-STATE WITH REFERENCE TO THE HOMERIC POEMS	349
1. EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE IN THE HOMERIC POEMS	356
2. TYPES OF STATE IN THE HOMERIC POEMS	378
II. DATA RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL POLIS-STATES	393
A. POLIS-STATE FOUNDED BY AN INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY	394
1. POLIS-STATE FROM A UNITARY COMMUNITY	394
2. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF DEMES	405
3. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF 'PARTS' (<i>MEPH</i>)	406
4. POLIS-STATES FROM THE DEMES OF A CONFEDERACY THAT BROKE UP	406
5. POLIS-STATE FROM A POLIS-SETTLEMENT THAT BROKE AWAY FROM AN ETHNOS-STATE	408
B. POLIS-STATES FORMED ALONGSIDE A CONFEDERACY	408
1. FROM VILLAGE TO POLIS-STATE WITHIN A CONFEDERACY	408
2. THE CONFEDERACY AND THE POLIS-STATES OF THE IONIANS OF ATTICA, EASTERN BOEOTIA AND CENTRAL EUBOEA	411
3. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF DEMES	414
C. DISSOLUTION OF CONFEDERACIES INTO POLIS-STATES — SECESSION OF POLIS-STATES FROM CONFEDERACIES	415
1. DISSOLUTION OF CONFEDERACIES INTO POLIS-STATES	415
2. SECESSION OF POLIS-STATES FROM CONFEDERACIES	418
A SYNOPSIS OF THE CONCLUSIONS	418
Chapter Three	
PRE-CONDITIONS, CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE GENESIS OF POLIS-STATES	421
THE DEBATE	421
A NEW INVESTIGATION	436
A. POLIS-STATE FOUNDED BY AN INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY	436
1. POLIS-STATE FROM A UNITARY COMMUNITY	436
2. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF DEMES	444
3. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF 'PARTS' (<i>MEPH</i>)	454
4. POLIS-STATES FROM THE DEMES OF A CONFEDERACY THAT BROKE UP	456

5. POLIS-STATE FROM A POLIS-SETTLEMENT THAT BROKE AWAY FROM AN ETHNOS-STATE	457
B. POLIS-STATES FORMED ALONGSIDE A CONFEDERACY.....	458
1. FROM VILLAGE TO POLIS-STATE WITHIN A CONFEDERACY	458
2. THE CONFEDERACY AND THE POLIS-STATES OF THE IONIANS OF ATTICA, EASTERN BOEOTIA AND CENTRAL EUBOEA.....	461
3. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF DEMES	462
C. DISSOLUTION OF CONFEDERACIES INTO POLIS-STATES — SECESSION OF POLIS-STATES FROM CONFEDERACIES.....	463
1. DISSOLUTION OF CONFEDERACIES INTO POLIS-STATES	463
2. SECESSION OF POLIS-STATES FROM CONFEDERACIES	465
<i>SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS.....</i>	<i>466</i>
 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS	
 A SYNTHESIS OF CONCLUSIONS AND SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS.....	 473
 ADDENDUM	 495
INDICES.....	497

ABBREVIATIONS

AA	<i>Archaeologischer Anzeiger</i>
AAASH	<i>Acta Archaeologica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</i>
ABSA	<i>Annual of the British School at Athens</i>
ACUSD	<i>Acta Classica Universitatis Scientiarum Debrecen</i>
AeR	<i>Atene e Roma</i>
AfAW	<i>Anzeiger für Altertumswissenschaft</i>
AHR	<i>American Historical Review</i>
AISS	<i>Annali dell'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici</i>
AION (arch.)	<i>Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli. Sezione dell'Archeologia</i>
ALG	H.Diehl, <i>Anthologia Lyrica Graeca</i>
ANCCCP	<i>Akademija Nauk CCCP</i>
ANL	<i>Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei</i>
AOeW	<i>Abhandlungen der Oesterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften</i>
ASAA	<i>Annuario della Scuola Archeologica di Atene e delle missioni Italiane in Oriente</i>
ASNSP	<i>Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa</i>
ASWSP	<i>Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik</i>
AuA	<i>Antike und Abendland</i>
AUCPhH	<i>Acta Universitatis Carolinae Philosophica et Historica, Graecolatina Pragensia</i>
BCH	<i>Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique</i>
BIFG	<i>Bollettino dell'Istituto di Filologia Greca</i>
CA	<i>Current Anthropology</i>
CAF	Th. Kock, <i>Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta</i>
CAH	<i>The Cambridge Ancient History</i>
CIJ	<i>The Classical Journal</i>
CIPh	<i>Classical Philology</i>
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
CSHS	<i>Comparative Studies in History and Society</i>

<i>CSSH</i>	<i>Comparative Studies in Society and History</i>
<i>DHA</i>	<i>Dialogues d'Histoire Ancienne</i>
<i>DGEEP</i>	E. Schwyzer, <i>Dialectorum Graecarum Exempla Epigraphica Potiora</i>
<i>EI</i>	J.M. Edmonds, <i>Elegi et Iambi</i>
<i>EA</i>	Ἐφημερίς Ἀρχαιολογική
<i>FGrH</i>	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker</i>
<i>FHG</i>	C. Müller, <i>Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum</i>
<i>HSCP</i>	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
<i>HZ</i>	<i>Historische Zeitschrift</i>
<i>IA</i>	<i>Die Inschriften von Assos (= Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien)</i>
<i>IAOSPE</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graescae et Latinae</i>
<i>IC</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Creticae</i>
<i>ICHS</i>	<i>International Congress of Historical Sciences</i>
<i>IE</i>	<i>Die Inschriften von Ephesos (= Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien)</i>
<i>IEG</i>	M.L. West, <i>Iambi et Elegi Graeci</i>
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
<i>IGIDS</i>	F. Solmsen, <i>Inscriptiones Graecae ad illustrandas dialectos selectae</i>
<i>IMM</i>	<i>Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander</i>
<i>IMS</i>	<i>Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Sipylos (= Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien)</i>
<i>JClPh</i>	<i>The Journal of Classical Philology</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>The Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
<i>KIP</i>	<i>Der kleine Pauly</i>
<i>LCM</i>	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly</i>
<i>NAWG</i>	<i>Nachrichten von der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen</i>
<i>NGWG</i>	<i>Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen</i>
<i>NJADB</i>	<i>Neue Jahrbücher für Antike und Deutsche Bildung</i>
<i>NJKADL</i>	<i>Neue Jahrbücher für das Klassische Altertum (Geschichte und Deutsche Literatur)</i>
<i>OeAW</i>	<i>Oesterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften</i>
<i>PBA</i>	<i>Proceedings of the British Academy</i>
<i>PCPhS</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
<i>PdP</i>	<i>La Parola del Passato</i>

<i>PLF</i>	E. Lobel, D. Page, <i>Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta</i>
<i>PM</i>	<i>Peuples Méditerranéens</i>
<i>PMG</i>	D. Page, <i>Poetae Melici Graeci</i>
<i>POxy</i>	P. Grenfell – A.S. Hunt, <i>Oxyrhynchus Papyri</i>
<i>PRIA</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy</i>
<i>QS</i>	<i>Quaderni di Storia</i>
<i>RE</i>	Pauly – Wissowa, <i>Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
<i>REA</i>	<i>Revue des Etudes Anciennes</i>
<i>REG</i>	<i>Revue des Etudes Grecques</i>
<i>RH</i>	<i>Revue Historique</i>
<i>RhM</i>	<i>Rheinisches Museum</i>
<i>RIJC</i>	R. Dareste, B. Haussoullier, Th. Reinach, <i>Recueil des Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques</i>
<i>RSJB</i>	<i>Recueil de la Société Jean Bodin</i>
<i>SBBAW</i>	<i>Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften</i>
<i>SBHA W</i>	<i>Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften</i>
<i>SBPAW</i>	<i>Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften</i>
<i>SCI</i>	<i>Studi Classice</i>
<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
<i>SGHI</i>	R. Meiggs, D. Lewis, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i>
<i>SIFC</i>	<i>Studi Italiani de Filologia Classica</i>
<i>SIG</i>	W. Dittenberger, <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , 3rd edn
<i>SMEA</i>	<i>Studi Micenei ed Egeo-Anatolici</i>
<i>SVA</i>	H. Bengtson, <i>Staatsverträge des Altertums</i>
<i>SVF</i>	J. von Arnim, <i>Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta</i>
<i>TAM</i>	<i>Tituli Asiae Minoris</i>
<i>TGF</i>	A. Nauck, <i>Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta</i>
<i>VDI</i>	<i>Vestnik Drevnei Istorii</i>
<i>WG</i>	<i>Die Welt als Geschichte, eine Zeitschrift für Universalgeschichte</i>
<i>WJAW</i>	<i>Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft</i>
<i>WS</i>	<i>Wiener Studien</i>
<i>ZA</i>	<i>Ziva Antika</i>
<i>ZSS</i>	<i>Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung</i>

PREFACE

This monograph was planned and written as a contribution to the study of that ancient Greek political formation which is referred to in the sources by the term *polis*, and which is today rendered by a variety of terms, such as 'city-state' and 'polis-state' in English, 'Cité', 'état-cité', and 'état-ville', 'polis' in French, 'città-stato' in Italian, and 'Stadtstaat', 'Polisstaat' and 'Polis' in German.

The terms containing *cit(t)-* are related etymologically and conceptually to the Latin word *civitas*, which meant 'organized community', 'members of an organized community', 'citizens', 'state', 'the rights of a citizen'. Already in antiquity the Greeks used the word *polis* to render the Latin term *civitas*, and the Romans did the converse. This tradition was then continued by Thomas Aquinas, who used *civitas* as a translation for *polis*. Since that time *civitas* has been used regularly to render *polis* in the scholarly literature written in Latin.¹ This same Latin word acquired the additional sense of 'urban settlement', which is retained in the derivatives *cit  *, *city*, *citt  *. The Greek language has kept the word $\rho\acute{o}\lambda\iota\varsigma$, $\rho\acute{o}\lambda\eta$ to the present day, in the sense of 'urban settlement'.

The French began to use the word *cit  * with a political content as early as 1583, but it was Fustel de Coulanges, in 1864, who firmly established the identification of *polis* with *cit  *.² On the other hand, the Germans, who had cities that were also states within their empire, accordingly coined the term *Stadtstaat*, which distinguishes the city-state from the city-settlement (*Stadt*). Herder was the first to use this term to render the Greek word *polis*, in 1765.³ The German word

¹ W.Gawantka, *Die sogenannte Polis* (1985) 48, 51 and n 43, 52, 55, 56, 72ff with n 17, 86, 111, 125, 152, 166.

² W.Gawantka, *op. cit.* 46, 73, 199–200.

³ W.Gawantka, *op. cit.* 10, 73–75 and n 17, 166, 168, 185, 204–206.

served as the model on which was formed the English term *city-state*, which was first used, or at least firmly established by W.W.Fowler, in 1893.¹ The English term in turn inspired the Italian *città-stato* and, at a later date, the French *cité-état*, *ville-état*, which did not succeed in displacing the earlier *cité*. The modern Greeks, who still used the term *polis* in the sense of urban settlement, translated the English city-state as *πόλις-κράτος*, out of a desire to distinguish between the urban settlement and the state that was connected with an urban settlement.

E.Kuhn, in 1845, was the first to think of using the term *polis*, since he felt that the ancient *polis* was not precisely the same phenomenon as the German *Stadtstaat*, a consideration that had already been advanced by K.F.Hermann and B.J.Niebuhr. He was followed by J.Burckhardt in a book published in 1898. Since then, *polis* has been the preferred term amongst the Germans.² It is used less frequently in other languages.³ The terms *polis* and *polis-state* are clearly coined in order to stress that they referred to the *polis* as a state, and not as a settlement.⁴

The term *polis* was censured en passant by W.Vischer and H.Schaefer, and systematically by W.Gawantka. W.Vischer adopted a negative view towards the use of the term by E.Kuhn (1849=1877).⁵ H.Schaefer followed his example in his criticism of a book by V. Ehrenberg (1960=1963). The use of the term *polis* today, he claimed, implies the belief that the ancient *polis* was a distinct phenomenon, and this belief requires proof. In passing, he also cast doubt on the view that the ancient *polis* was a kind of state. He declared, furthermore, that the use of the term *polis* in the book by Ehrenberg is rather ossified and unproductive.⁶ W.Gawantka made an extensive study of the history of the term *polis* in the light of certain methodological considerations (1985). His entire argument may be summarized under four basic points: (a) Today the term *polis* is a word that has no real counterpart; the scholars who use it have failed to demonstrate what its

¹ W.Gawantka, op. cit. 205.

² W.Gawantka, op. cit. passim.

³ W.Gawantka, op. cit. 9.

⁴ For this term, v. i., p. 22.

⁵ W.Vischer, *Progr. Basel* (1849) 5ff=*Kleine Schriften* (1877) 310ff.

⁶ H.Schaefer, *ZSS* 77 (1960) 423, 433=*Probleme der alten Geschichte* (1963) 385, 395-396.

ancient content was, because they have not studied the ancient sources.¹ (b) For this same reason, the term *polis* is lacking in clarity, and its meaning varies; it cannot be used as an instrument of mutual understanding.² (c) The current meaning attached to the term reflects the ideas of Aristotle about the *polis*.³ (d) The hope that the use of the term would open up a new field of study and a new area of debate has proved vain; its use has proved to be not only unproductive but also damaging to other concepts, which have been neglected.⁴ Gawantka is also critical of the use of the modern terms *Staat* (state) and *Stadt* (city) to denote the ancient *polis*.⁵ In his opinion, no other term can render the ancient word if it has the same weaknesses exhibited by *polis*, *Staat* and *Stadt*. A term can be used to comprehend an entire field of study of the ancient world only under two conditions: if it is preceded by research into the field, and if a positive answer has been given to the question whether it is possible to work with general propositions that are valid only for this field. Until the content of the ancient term *polis* is determined, which can only be done after study of the sources and the data, in accordance with scientific methods of enquiry into the ancient world, it may only properly be used when it is being quoted as a term found in the ancient sources, and when it is cited as a concept to be defined.⁶

Gawantka's conclusions accord with his observations, and his methodological suggestions are all justified. During the composition of the present monograph, before I had read Gawantka's important book, I myself had arrived at similar statements regarding the results of the attempts so far to establish a definition of the *polis*. I have set them out in the first chapter of Part One, in the form of an account of the various attempts to define the *polis*.⁷ They coincide in substance with those of Gawantka: the majority of the definitions of *polis* are not supported by any arguments, and if any evidence is adduced it ranges

¹ W.Gawantka, op. cit. 12, 23–24, 190 and passim (critique of other writers on the subject).

² W.Gawantka, op. cit. 11, 55, 187, 191.

³ W.Gawantka, op. cit. 191.

⁴ W.Gawantka, op. cit. 162–163.

⁵ W.Gawantka, op. cit. 27–29.

⁶ W.Gawantka, op. cit. 27, 43–45, 50, 53.

⁷ See pp. 27–57.

from the invalid to the disputed. On the contrary, I had not become aware before reading Gawantka that the use of the term *polis* as a term of modern scholarship is not logically justifiable, unless it has been demonstrated that it indicates a distinct feature of ancient reality. Having formed this awareness, I made the modifications needed so as to use the term *polis* under the conditions suggested by Gawantka: thus, I use it (1) in an ancient Greek context, (2) when it indicates a concept under definition, and (3) when it indicates an aspect of ancient reality that has already been defined and has been seen to be *sui generis* so that only this term can give expression to it. To make the difference even clearer, I write πόλις for the first case, πόλις or *polis* for the second and *polis-state* for the third, reserving the term *polis-settlement* for the kind of settlement which was described by the ancients as a πόλις and which, as we shall see, is not the same as the modern city.

What is the *polis*? This question is asked by any student when he first comes to those branches of knowledge concerned with the ancient world. For the mature scholar, the *polis* is connected, in differing degrees, with many other questions, relating to the economy, society, political organization, political life, inter-state relations, thinking, art of all kinds, religion, ways of thought, and private life. For this reason, it has been the subject of scholarly investigation and debate from the end of the sixteenth century to the present day. The investigation and debate have involved historians, sociologists, economists, students of the theory and history of the state and of public right, and political scientists. The scope is very wide. It can be divided into the following groups: (1) the definition of the *polis*; (2) the 'essence' of the *polis*; (3) the origins of the *polis*; (4) the date and place of the rise of the *polis*; (5) the causes of and preconditions for the rise of the *polis*; (6) the structure of the *polis*; (7) the functions of the *polis*; (8) the historical consequences of the *polis*; (9) the decline of the *polis*, the superceding of it and the formations that succeeded it; (10) survivals of the *polis* in the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman Empire.

The present monograph examines only the definition of the *polis*, its origins, the date and place of its formation, its causes and preconditions. This limitation is dictated by the need to study the subjects chosen to the entire range and depth permitted, and indeed demanded by the evidence on the one hand, and the state of research and the possibility of and need for further investigation on the other.

The monograph is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the definition of the *polis*, the second with its origin, date and causes. On methodological grounds, I begin with the section dealing with the definition of the *polis*. Obviously, if we do not establish clearly what the *polis* was, we cannot answer the questions: Where did it come from? Where and when was it created? What were the causes and preconditions for the creation of the *poleis*?¹ The different ideas of the nature of the *polis* all lead to differing views as to its origins, the date and place of its creation, and the causes of and preconditions for its creation.² The contrary view, that the definition of the *polis* should arise from the history of the phenomenon,³ was undermined by the very scholar who asserted it: he immediately felt obliged to outline the differences between it and the modern European states, and consequently presented some of the elements in the definition of the *polis* in an unorthodox manner; and having set out the history of the *polis*, he failed to offer the definition of it that he had promised. Other scholars have dealt with the origins of the *polis*, the date, place, causes and preconditions involved in its creation, while at the same time asserting the impossibility of arriving at a definition; or have failed to make clear what they meant by *polis*; or have formed some idea of it without due examination; or have defined it while they were dealing with problems of a different nature, which have in consequence affected the definition.

¹ cf. F.Gschnitzer, *WS 68, NF 18* (1955) 120–121: ‘Ich glaube, es gibt einen Weg, zunächst zu einer strengeren begrifflichen Scheidung (sc. between *Polis* and *Ethnos*) und weiter zu einer kläreren Anschauung von Ursprung, Wesen und Entwicklung der engeren und weiteren staatlichen Gemeinschaften der Griechen fortzuschreiten. Kein geringerer als Eduard Meyer hat ihn einst gewiesen;...’ Also H.Marrou, *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques I* (1950) 328: ‘Il suffit de voir l’embarras que nous éprouvons pour répondre à une question aussi simple, aussi nécessaire que celle-ci: à quelle date est donc apparue cette fameuse cité antique?’

² v. i., Part Two.

³ W.W.Fowler, *The City-State of the Greeks and the Romans* (1893 and reprints), 6–7: ‘What then was this *πόλις*, this form of political union...? Our modern notions of a state hamper us much in our effort to realize what the *πόλις* was; nor is it possible to do so completely until we have gained some knowledge of the conditions under which it arose, of its constituent elements, of its life in its best days, and of the causes which sapped its vitality and finally let it be swallowed up in a vast political union of a totally different kind.’

PART ONE

WHAT WAS THE *POLIS*?

Chapter One

HOW CAN THE *POLIS* BE DEFINED ?

THE DEBATE

Discussion about the description of the *polis* has revolved around its definition as well as about its 'nature' or 'ideal type'. In connection with this discussion the position of the *polis* within Greek lands or outside them has also been debated.

I. THE DEFINITION OF THE *POLIS*

A. DEFINITIONS OF THE *POLIS* AND THEIR CRITICS

1. *POLIS*: FORM OF CONSTITUTION

G.Glotz (1928) defined the *polis* ('Cité') as a form of constitution without further determining this form.¹

F.Gschnitzer associated the *polis* with a particular form of constitution. Initially, in a review (1959), he divided the 'ancient Greek systems of political co-existence' into two kinds: the 'community' (*Gemeinde*, *Gemeinwesen*, *Gemeinschaft*) and 'domination' (*Herrschaft*). *Polis* and *ethnos* were variants of the community, domination was the power exercised by tyrants, but also by those *poleis* which held sway over others.² In a monograph published a little later (1960) the author characterized community and domination as the fundamental forms of state-order in ancient Greece (*Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung*) or as types of state (*Staatstypen*). He ranged *polis*, *ethnos* and *koinon* within the concept 'community'; under the holders of domination he placed the kings and the dynasts of the Hellenistic period as also the kings and tyrants of the Classical. In the community 'all the state arrangements and actions emanate in the last resort from the body of the citizens, that is from the community itself: in this everything is valid and takes place, if not always in accordance with its real will, then certainly in its name'. By contrast, those who

¹ G.Glotz, *La cité grecque* (1928) 108–109.

² F.Gschnitzer, *AfA W 12* (1959) 37–38.

wielded despotic authority 'were either not at all, or were only up to a point, representatives or plenipotentiaries of a state independent of themselves'. The kings of the Persians, the Thracians and the Sidonians, as well as the Greek tyrants were autocrats; all authority resided in their person. The kings of the Macedonians and of the Molossi were an exception; they existed alongside a national community which they represented; in other words they were not a part of it but contracted to it. The community was one body of people, specifically the citizens; domination was identified with one person, the absolute monarch. In the first case law sprang from the body of the citizens, in the second from the autocrat.¹ Gschnitzer had already written (1955) that the definition of *polis* also required a constitutional content.² But he later (1971) described the *polis* as a basic form, no longer of government, but of the state, of the Greek state.³

V.Ehrenberg (1960) criticized Gschnitzer's basic points and much of the evidence he adduced. Here we shall note only his remarks on the former which we shall collect together from scattered observations and expound in a way we find more systematic. (a) Gschnitzer arbitrarily limited his research to the Classical period. (b) The terms 'community' and 'domination' are inadequate; the first does not have a political content for the same word is also applied to non-political societies. As for the second, Gschnitzer overlooked the fact that there is no political formation in which someone is not a ruler; even communities of citizens were dominated by one stratum or by several groups or by a majority. (c) A wealth of evidence attests the compatibility of *polis* and monarchy. Gschnitzer himself was forced to recognize that the principles of 'community' and 'domination' are not mutually exclusive but can co-exist within the framework of the same constitutional order; this observation he made, however, only in passing, in a footnote. Traditional kingship was maintained at Sparta, at Cyrene and elsewhere; the authority of the kings of the Macedonians and the Molossians was limited by assemblies of warriors. Of course in these states the king was distinguished from the people, but he was not separated from it, and was not a monarch. But tyranny also seems not to have been separated from the *polis*. Even Isocrates who opened the theoretical way to the Hellenistic monarchy, believed that the good monarch was an element in the perfect constitution within the *polis*.⁴

In a reply to Ehrenberg, Gschnitzer (1963) observed that his critique

¹ F.Gschnitzer, *Gemeinde und Herrschaft: von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung* (OeAW, Phil.-Hist.Kl. 235, fasc.3, 1960).

² F.Gschnitzer, *WS* 68 (n. s. 18) (1955) 123.

³ F.Gschnitzer, *Chiron* 1 (1971) 1ff.

⁴ V.Ehrenberg, *Von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung* (SBHAW, Hist.-Phil. Kl. (1961) Abt. 3), 9-13, 16-28=*Polis und Imperium* (1965), 105-108, 119-122.

interpreted certain fundamental terms in a different light. Thus, whereas Gschnitzer followed Gierke in his use of the idea of domination, that is with his stress on formal right, which contrasts the principle of 'domination' with that of 'companionship', Ehrenberg understood it in the practical sense of government and authority. Similarly Ehrenberg's understanding of the term 'fundamental forms of state-order' is as removed from Gschnitzer's as sociology from constitutional law or, more broadly, human relations from their legal expression.¹

Gschnitzer's distinction of ancient Greek states into dominations and communities has recently been rejected by implication, but nonetheless clearly, by M.I. Finley (1983=1985) as irrelevant. An indirect argument against Gschnitzer is Finley's comment that there is no significant difference between the state and the government of the state; he added that this was even more true in the antiquity.²

The view that the *polis* was a kind of constitution has also been criticized by D. Nörr (1966) who emphasized that the concept *polis* appears consistently in ancient practice and theory at a level superior to that of constitution and that juridical notions are not compatible with the character of the *polis*.³

2. *POLIS*: FORM OF STATE

The majority of scholars define the *polis* as a form or type of state (*forme d'état*, *type d'état*, *Staatsform*, *Staatenform*, *staatliche Organisationsformen*, *Staatstyp*),⁴ sometimes associating it with some determining elements on which we shall comment later.

This view is explicitly or implicitly rejected by all scholars who define the *polis* as a community.⁵ It has been also criticized by H. Krüger, U.v. Lübtow, and W. Gawantka on the ground that the Greeks did not possess the idea of 'state'.⁶

¹ F. Gschnitzer, *AfAW* 12 (1959) 37–38, *ZSS*, Röm. Abt. 80 (1963) 401.

² M.I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (1983) 32 = *L'invention de la Politique* (1985) 30.

³ D. Nörr, *Der Staat* 5 (1966) 360, 368.

⁴ For instance: G. Jellinek, *Das Recht des modernen Staates* I (1900) 259ff (elsewhere he takes the *Polis* to be a kind of the form of state described as the city-state: v. i., p. 35 n 5); B. Borecký, *Eirene* 12 (1964) 84; D. Nörr, *Der Staat* 5 (1966) 353; Cl. Mossé, *Les Institutions politiques grecques à l'époque classique* (Coll. U 2) (1967) 5; F. Gschnitzer, *Chiron* 1(1971) 1, cf. *Gemeinde und Herrschaft* (see p. 1 n 3), where the *polis* is ranged amongst the 'state types' and amongst the 'basic forms of the structure of a state'.

⁵ v. i., pp. 46–47.

⁶ H. Krüger, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (1964) 8ff; U.v. Lübtow, *Festschrift für E. Heinitz*

(a) DEFINITIONS BASED ON CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA

Several definitions of the *polis* as a state contain constitutional criteria and therefore approach the definition of the *polis* as a form of government.

(i) *Definitions which exclude monarchic forms of government*

J.Kaerst expressed the opinion (1901=1916=1927) that the *polis* had started as an aristocratic state (*Adelstaat*).¹ B.Keil (1912) described the *polis* as a 'Stadtrepublik'.² Ehrenberg (1929) maintained that the *polis*, a *Staatstyp*, was expressed in three forms of government – aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy – and that the tendency to democracy preexisted in every *polis*, even in the most reactionary. The *polis* was a 'non-monarchical state' even if it had as monarchs both a guardian deity and the people. God and people together were sources of law, which on the one hand excluded theocracy and on the other contained democracy.³ S.Mazzarino (1947) considered that the *polis* might co-exist with aristocracy and democracy and be synonymous with the participation of the full citizens in public life; the *polis* was the ultimate stage of constitutional development.⁴ According to F.Schachermeyer (1953) the absence of a ruler was one of the characteristics of the *polis*.⁵ His definition of the *polis* as a state of citizens is related to this standpoint.⁶ C.G.Starr (1957, 1961) maintained that the *polis* was a city-state in which collective action was predominant, not the authority of one man. The *polis*, being a union of humans and a firm communal entity, came into existence with the abolition of kingship and was held in check by tyrannies.⁷ G.Pugliese Carratelli (1961) discerned three characteristics of the *polis*: the equality of full citizens, a written body of law, and self-sufficiency. He stressed that landowners had been the first citizens and stated clearly that the *polis* came into being from the moment that the aristocratic form of government gained the upper hand.⁸ S.Deger (1970) said that the birth of the *polis* coincided with the decline of kingship and the

(1972) 89–109; W.Gawantka, *Die sogenannte Polis* (1985) 24, 27, 107, 110, 190, 204–206.

¹ J.Kaerst, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (1901) 2, and 4–5=3rd edn (1927) 2 and 4.

² B.Keil, *Griechische Staatsaltertümer*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft*² III 3 (1912) 304.

³ V.Ehrenberg, *Gnomon* 5 (1929) 4.

⁴ S.Mazzarino, *Fra Oriente e Occidente* (1947) 208.

⁵ F.Schachermeyer, *Diogène* 4 (1953) 30ff.

⁶ v. i., p. 41 n 2.

⁷ Ch.G.Starr, *PdP* 12 (1957) 102ff; idem, *Historia* 10 (1961) 129, 130ff, 134, 135, 137; idem, *The Origins of Greek Civilization 1100–650 B.C.* (1961) 324.

⁸ G.Pugliese Carratelli, *ANL Quad.* 54 (1962) 183, 185, 188.

ascendancy of the aristocracy.¹ E.Lepore (1972) linked kingship with the *ethnos*, and the *polis*, 'a community of citizens', with the collective exercise of authority.² P.Lévêque (1981) defined the *polis* on the basis of two qualitative and one quantitative criteria: the existence of a kingless government, functional clarity, and a stronger state-structure.³

I too (1970,1974,1979) have associated the *polis* with the existence of citizens, a fact which has a constitutional colouring.⁴

It is to be noted here that according to H.Berve (1967), D.Lanza (1977), M.I.Finley (1985) and others, the tyrants did not constitute part of their own *poleis*.⁵

(ii) *Definitions which exclude both monarchy and aristocracy*

In 1921 Ehrenberg defined the *polis* as a political community (*politische Gemeinschaft*) which came into being when the distinction between a ruling aristocracy and ruled non-aristocratic classes ceased to exist; the state got stronger than the estate of the hereditary nobility; *dike*, i.e. justice for the weakest, became a leading principle; and collective will was raised above the personal. The idea of *dike* makes its first appearance in Hesiod and then in Solon. Its pursuit went hand in hand with social and moral aims. The *polis* was based on the common interest. The first form of government in the *polis* was a non-aristocratic oligarchy. Later the *polis* widened to encompass all free men within the citizenry. The state which is glimpsed in the Homeric poems is still not a *polis*. Sparta was neither an aristocratic state nor a democratic community of citizens; it stood between the aristocratic regime which appears in Homer and the *polis*.⁶ Ehrenberg maintained his view that the *polis* could not exist under aristocratic rule when he later defined it as a state based on law (1932=1957=1960=1976, 1961)⁷ or emphasized that it was governed by law and

¹ S.Deger, *Herrschaftsformen bei Homer* (1970) 135, 181.

² E.Lepore, in R.Bianchi Bandinelli (ed.) *Storia e civiltà dei Greci I* [1978] 183–184.

³ P.Lévêque, *La Pensée* 217/218 (1981) 24–25; idem, *PM* 14, janvier–mars (1981) 8–9.

⁴ M.Sakellariou, in 'Ιστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους Β' (1971) 48=A *History of the Hellenic World II* (1975) 56; idem, in *Terre et paysans dépendants dans les sociétés antiques, Colloque International tenu à Besançon les 2 et 3 mai 1974* (1979) 145; idem, *ASAIA* 59 (1981) 20.

⁵ H.Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* (1967) passim; D.Lanza, *Il tiranno e il suo pubblico* (1977) 163–164; M.I.Finley, op.cit. 34 n 3.

⁶ V.Ehrenberg, *Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechenland* (1921) 126–139.

⁷ V.Ehrenberg, *Der griechische und der hellenistische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft III* 3 (1932) 35ff=Der Staat der Griechen I (1957) 58ff=The Greek State (1960) 77ff=L'état grec (1976) 135ff; idem, *Von den*

not by privilege (1937),¹ or identified it by the following features (1954): a limited *Gemeinschaft* of men devoted to their gods; the economic unity of a small territory with a city as its centre; a constitution based exclusively on the rights and duties of the citizens; the predominance of the law which expressed both the tradition and the desire of the citizens for justice; the liberty of the individual, but only applied to the citizens as faithful servants of the state.²

Ehrenberg was closely followed by H.Berve, H.Bengtson, G.Pugliese Carratelli, E.Will, D.Kagan and A.Snodgrass. The first dated the emergence of the fully-fledged *polis* to the laws of Solon (1931);³ in other words to the triumph of a timocratic regime separated from hereditary privilege. Bengtson claimed (1950=1960=1960=1969=1976) that the *polis* existed as the oldest state of law in western history.⁴ Will (1962) and Kagan (1965) adopted this description.⁵ Similarly Snodgrass stressed (1986) that 'an essential principle of the polis system was the existence of codified law'.⁶

The correlation between *polis* and the state based on law was rejected by H.Schaefer in a review of Ehrenberg (1960=1963). This relationship, he observed, did not become clear even with the wealth of material Ehrenberg adduced to show the working and consequences of law: in reality law was the triumph of aristocratic convention.⁷ Ehrenberg's position was attacked by D.Nörr, too (1966). He stressed that the idea of the 'state based on law' was formed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries A.D., in context of two movements, for the protection of the citizen by the law and for social security, whereas the ancient formulation 'The Law is King' denoted not a fundamental principle of the polis-state, but a demand of a political and social-ethical character.⁸

Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung (SBHAW (1961) Abh. 3) 17=*Polis und Imperium* (1965) 111.

¹ V.Ehrenberg, *JHS* 57 (1937) 148, 150 = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 84–85, 87. Before V.Ehrenberg, the idea that the *polis* was a state governed by the law had been expressed by Fr.Mone (1958), U.v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (1880), G.Jellinek (1900), R.Pöhlmann (1902): see W. Gawantka, op. cit. 206–209.

² V.Ehrenberg, *Sophokles und Perikles* (1954) 202.

³ H.Berve, *Griechische Geschichte* I (1931) 174, 176.

⁴ H.Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte* (1950) 72 = 5th edn (1977) 80.

⁵ E.Will, in *Deuxième Conférence Internationale d'Histoire économique 1962* (1965) 59; D.Kagan, *The Great Dialogue* (1965) 16.

⁶ A.Snodgrass, in C.Renfrew, J.F.Cherry (eds), *Peer Policy Interaction and Socio-political Changes* (1986) 52.

⁷ H.Schaefer, *ZSS, Röm. Abt.* 77 (1960) 430–431=*Probleme der alten Geschichte* (1963) 393–394.

⁸ D.Nörr, op. cit. 364.

(iii) *Limitation of 'polis' to democracy.*

In works later than those noted above H. Berve (1936, 1937) identified the birth of the *polis* with the emergence of democracy, on the grounds that the aristocrats had links and interests which extended beyond the bounds of their *poleis*.¹

This view received adverse criticism from V. Ehrenberg (1937) and H. Bengtson (1939). The former noted that Berve was confusing *polis* and democracy and that outstanding personalities, such as Miltiades and Themistocles, though in Berve's sense they might have lived in a *polis*, paid it no more than lip-service.²

B. Borecký too confused the concepts of *polis* and democracy (1953). Discussing the view of Plato and others that the citizen body should be fully homogeneous he noted that this was put into practice in a number of historic *poleis*, in particular Athens and Sparta. In Athens it was made possible by democratization and the participation of the poor citizens in the exploitation of slaves, foreigners and subject-allies. The crisis of the *polis* began as soon as the Athenian Empire was shaken during the Peloponnesian War (revolts of allies, escape of slaves).³

(iv) *Against the use of constitutional criteria*

Though V. Ehrenberg first maintained (1921) that the *polis* began to exist after the fall of the aristocracy, and later (1929) that the aristocracy was compatible with the *polis*,⁴ he rejected (1932=1957=1960=1976, 1961=1965) the conceptual correlation of *polis* and form of government on the grounds that the *polis* was a kind of state and thus open to all forms of government.⁵

H. Schaefer (1960=1963) referring to Tyrtaeus' characterization of Sparta as a *polis*, said that this did not imply any special form of government.⁶

¹ H. Berve, *Antike* 12 (1936) 1ff=*Gestaltende Kräfte der Antike*, 2nd edn (1966) 232–267, Miltiades (*Hermes*, Einzelschriften, 2) (1937) 1.

² V. Ehrenberg, *JHS* (1937) 147, 157–159=*Polis und Imperium* (1965) 83, 95–97; H. Bengtson, *SBBAW*, Hist.–Phil. Kl. (1939) I, 7–28.

³ B. Borecký, op. cit. 81ff.

⁴ v. i., pp. 30, 31.

⁵ V. Ehrenberg, *Der griechische und der hellenistische Staat*, in A. Gercke, E. Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* III 3 (1932) 10=*Der Staat der Griechen* I (1957) 18ff=*The Greek State* (1960) 24ff=*L'état grec* (1976) 53ff; idem, *Von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung* (*SBHAW*, Hist.–Phil. Kl. (1961) 3) 20=*Polis und Imperium* (1965) 120; idem, *Sophokles und Perikles* (1954) 202.

⁶ H. Schaefer, op. cit. (1960) 425=(1963) 388.

(b) *POLIS*: STATE RELATED TO A PLACE OR SPACE

(i) 'Polis': city-state

Many authors note, or even stress, the fact that the ancient term *πόλις*, in the sense of 'state', directly declares a firm connection of a type of Greek state with a city in the sense of state and express this type of state as *city-state*, *cit *, *Stadtstaat*. Some have gone further: W.W.Fowler (1893) distinguished the concepts 'city-state' and 'territorial state' and stressed that the ancient Greeks and the Romans understood their states to be cities; the territory was only an adjunct. 'The Athenian State comprised all the free people living in Athens, and also those who lived in the Attic territory; but these last had their political existence, not as inhabitants of Attica, but as Athenians, as citizens of the *πόλις* of Athens.'¹

G.Busolt (1920) observed that every *polis* had an *ἄστυ*, urban settlement, at its heart; the existence of villages in addition to a city had no effect. The government of the state was in the hands of the inhabitants of the city who alone were citizens.²

F.Tritsch (1929) emphasized that the city was the most characteristic element of the ancient Greek state. Without a city there was no state, only a people (in ancient Greek: *ἔθνος*) or, earlier still, primitive stateless societies. Within an urban settlement all public acts were carried out and all public matters were despatched in the presence of all who had political rights. Thus the city was at the head of the public organization. Even the physical appearance of the city decisively characterized the state to which it belonged; every type of city corresponded to a type of state.³

V.Ehrenberg, having recognized the *ethnos* as a type of ancient Greek state parallel to the *polis* (1932=1957=1960=1976) based his distinction between the two on the absence or presence of an urban centre.⁴ This idea was briefly expressed by M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet (1972=1977).⁵

In conflict with this are the views of R.P hlmann (1901), U.v.Wilamowitz-M llendorff (1910=1923), M.Gelzer (1924), H.Bengtson (1950=1960=1960=1969=

¹ W.W.Fowler, *The City-State of the Greeks and the Romans* (1893) 8.

² G.Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde* I (1920) 263, cf. 153, 163 n 1.

³ F.Tritsch, *Klio* 22 (1929) 1ff.

⁴ V.Ehrenberg, *Der griechische und der hellenistische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* III 3 (1932) 10=*Der Staat der Griechen* I (1957) 18=*The Greek State* (1960) 24=*L'  tat grec* (1976) 53; idem, *Von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung* (SBHAW, Hist.-Phil. Kl. (1961) 3) 14 = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 109.

⁵ M.Austin, P.Vidal-Naquet, *Economies et soci t s en Gr ce antique* (Coll. U 2) (1972) 92-93= *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece* (1977) 50.

1977), D.Kagan (1965), U.v.Lübtow (1972), W.Gawantka (1985). Wilamowitz denied that the ancient Greeks had a kind of state which could be called a city-state. He claimed that this was a mistaken idea of modern times, people having failed to understand that the ancients had no special term for 'state', but rendered it by the word *πόλις*. As we shall see below, he also maintained that there was no essential difference between *polis* and *ethnos*. Bengtson endorsed Wilamowitz's view and accordingly rejected the rendering of the ancient Greek term *πόλις* by *Stadtstaat* (= city-state). Kagan emphatically distinguished the city-state from the *polis*. A city-state exists where a city governs an agricultural land. 'The central idea of the *polis* is that life suitable for men must be based on justice.' 'Ur, Lagash, and Kish were city-states, but they were not *poleis*. They had the institutions of urban life, agricultural domain, and government, but lacked the ideological kernel of the *polis*.' Lübtow and Gawantka have shown that the ancients did not have the concept of 'city-state' and stressed that the term *πόλις* meant neither 'city' nor 'state'.¹

Ch.G.Starr on the one hand declares himself against linking the *polis* or city-state with the development of an urban centre (1957, 1977, 1986)² but on the other hand uses the terms *polis* and *city-state*.³

Two other historians, J.Kaerst (1901=1916=1927) and F. Gschnitzer (1955) suggested that the essential distinguishing feature of the *polis* was not the existence of an urban settlement, but the concentration of public life in a definite centre.⁴

On the other hand there are instances of the use of the term 'city-state' with a shade of meaning which does not correspond to the type of state the ancients meant when using the word *πόλις*. Thus G. Jellinek described the 'Greek State' (i.e. the *polis*) as a kind of city-state,⁵ V.Ehrenberg (1921) confined the term *city-state* (*Stadtstaat*) to states in which only those resident in the city had

¹ R.Pöhlmann, *Geschichte des antiken Sozialismus und Kommunismus* 2 (1901) 97 n 1; U.v.Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen und der Römer*, in P.Hinneberg (ed), *Die Kultur der Gegenwart* II 4, 1 (1910) 42 = 2nd edn (1923) (non vidi). M.Gelzer, *Gemeindestaat und Reichstaat in der römischen Geschichte* (1924) (non vidi); H.Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte* (1950) 72 n 1 = 5th edn (1977) 80 n 3; D.Kagan, *The Great Dialogue* (1965) 16; U.v.Lübtow, in *Festschrift für E.Heinitz* (1972) 90ff; W.Gawantka, op. cit. passim.

² Ch.G.Starr, *PdP* 12 (1957) 98–102; idem, *The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece, 800–500 B.C.* (1977) 98.

³ Ch.G.Starr, *The Origin of Greek Civilization* (1962) 324–337.

⁴ J.Kaerst, op. cit. (1901) 3 n 1 = 3rd edn (1927) 2 n 1; F.Gschnitzer, *WS* 68 (n.s. 18) (1955) 124 n 8.

⁵ G.Jellinek, op. cit. 271.

political rights: the states of the cities of Asia Minor whose (Greek) citizens resided in the city and exercised authority over the (non-Greek) population of the countryside.¹ S.Deger defined (1970) as *poleis* the mature forms of the ancient Greek state, and as city-states some of the states which were depicted in the Homeric epics.² One expression used by C.S.G.Thomas (1965) assumes that the city-state developed into a true *polis* by acquiring additional characteristics.³

It should be added that a number of authors do not distinguish the polis-state from the polis-settlement but talk about them as though they were the same thing.⁴

(ii) '*Polis*': state of a city and of its territory

E. Barker (1918) and M.I.Finley (1973=1975) noted that the *polis* embraced both town and country.⁵ Others added certain details to this view. Thus in a collective Greek History edited by H.Kreissig (1981) we read that the citizen body was composed not only of the aristocrats dwelling in the town but also the peasants of the countryside so far as they belonged to the same race.⁶ Claude Mossé stressed (1984) that the Greek *polis* ('cité') cannot be understood without its territory, its *khora*.⁷ P.Musiolek (1985) paid attention to the fact that the polis-state not only comprised a rural area but also included the peasantry, which almost always⁸ constituted the greater part of its population.

(iii) '*Polis*': territorial state, possibly with a town

F.Kolb (1984) attributed more importance to the territory than to the town, maintaining that the term *πόλις* was used for states that might, but did not necessarily, have a town in their territory.⁹

¹ V.Ehrenberg, *Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum* (1921) 132–133.

² S.Deger, op. cit. 184.

³ C.S.G.Thomas, *Early Greek Kingship* (1965) 16.

⁴ For example F.Schachermeyr, *Diogene* 4 (1953) 22ff; C.Ampolo, in C.Ampolo (ed.), *La città antica* (1980) xiiiif.

⁵ E.Barker, *Greek Political Theory* (1918, 1970) 24; M.I.Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (1973) 123=L'économie antique (1975) 165.

⁶ H.Kreissig (ed.), *Griechische Geschichte* (1981) 72.

⁷ Cl.Mossé, *La Grèce archaïque* (1984) 30.

⁸ P.Musiolek, *Zur Bedeutung der Stadt als Voraussetzung für die Höhepunkt der griechischen Poliskultur = Kultur und Fortschritt in der Blütezeit der griechischen Polis: Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur der Antike* 24 (1985) 43.

⁹ F.Kolb, *Die Stadt im Altertum* (1984) 58ff.

(c) *POLIS*: STATE OF A HUMAN GROUP(i) '*Polis*': state of a tribe or part of a tribe

U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, having criticized, as we have seen,¹ the idea that the *polis* was a city-state, maintained in the self-same work (1910=1923) that the ancient Greek state was identifiable either with an integral Greek tribe or with a section of a tribe. In either case the citizens were linked together by the natural bond of common descent. The *ethnos* was a state before it had established itself permanently. The states which were formed from sections of tribes, around a city, did not impose any strain on the structure or organs they had inherited from the corresponding *ethne*. The Greeks established themselves by tribes and clans in villages (some of which bore the name of the clans) or confined themselves to settlements with a citadel, leaving the earlier inhabitants to their villages. Thus there came into being the distinction between *astoi* or *politai* on the one hand and *perioikoi*, *metoikoi* on the other. When the *perioikoi* or *metoikoi* acquired equal political rights with the *astoi* or *politai* these two terms acquired the meaning of 'citizens'. There could be other cases where conquerors were transformed into an aristocratic class concentrated in an urban settlement.²

This position was criticized by G. Busolt, J. Kaerst and V. Ehrenberg. The first (1920) observed that there were different types of Greek states, but did not name them.³ According to Kaerst (1901=1916=1927) the *polis* was not characterized by the identification of citizens as residents of a city; the concentration of public life in a definite centre did not create political rights. He also recognized that the full citizens made up a community of individuals; he noted, however, that the cohesion of the community derived from the fact that its members lived in the same place. He also stressed that the *polis* preserved many organizational features of the tribe, without ignoring the fact that the *polis* also developed many new features under the long-term influence of permanent settlement and of new economic conditions.⁴ Ehrenberg (1921) attributed Wilamowitz's idea to an over-estimation of the fact that the *polis* was not a mere city-state; he censured him for overlooking the differences between *poleis* and the states which were created by the western Greeks. In contrast to him he adopted the view that the division of the citizens of various *poleis* into *phylai* or tribes did not have a tribal origin, but occurred after the rise of the *polis*.⁵

¹ See p. 35.

² U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *op. cit.* 41-42.

³ G. Busolt, *op. cit.* 263 n 1.

⁴ J. Kaerst, *op. cit.* (1901) 2=3rd edn (1927) 2 n 1.

⁵ V. Ehrenberg, *op. cit.* 134 n 2.

H.Berve (1938) took the same line as Wilamowitz. He maintained that the Greek state was based not on territory but on kinship; families belonged to clans, clans to phratries, phratries to tribes which formed an *ethnos*. The *polis* never became a '*res publica*'; it continued to be a *Gemeinschaft* (community of people linked by ties of blood and common culture). Hence the *poleis* were called by names of the type 'Athenians', 'Corinthians', 'Lacedaemonians'. In most cases they were parts of ancient *ethne*; the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians were parts of the Ionians and the Dorians.¹ F.Schachermeyr (1953) denied that the *polis* was a local community; and he maintained that it preserved the original character of a personal union inherited from the Indo-European tribes. The same was true of the states of the Italian peoples. In contrast, tribal communities were changed into local communities in the East.²

Adopting a position opposed to Berve, F.Gschnitzer (1955) invoked the fact that common ethnic descent did not hinder enmity between the Argives on the one hand and the Sicyonians, Corinthians, Epidaurians and Spartans on the other.³

(ii) '*Polis*': state of a local community

This viewpoint was foreshadowed by F.Kortüm, W.W.Fowler, B.Keil, E.Barker and J.Kaerst before it was emphatically advanced and maintained with a wealth of supporting evidence by F.Gschnitzer.

F.Kortüm (1821) regarded the *polis* as a state and as a 'städtische Genossenschaft'.⁴ As we have seen, W.W.Fowler (1893) considered the essential component of the *polis* to be the urban settlement; however, he noted the fact that the Attic state, for example, embraced the entire free population living in Attica, which formed the Athenian citizen body.⁵ We also have noted earlier that according to J.Kaerst (1901=1916=1927), the *polis* was a community of persons which inherited much from the *ethnos*, but which was reshaped under the influence of the new ties generated and strengthened by cohabitation.⁶ B.Keil maintained (1912) that there was a difference between ancient tribal law and the new law of the *polis* and that this difference was due to the replacement of the blood tie by contiguity. The *polis* was a realm of law; this law derived from a definite locality; the unified law of the polis-state was due to the fact that all the legislative and executive organs of the state were concentrated in the

¹ H.Berve, *NJADB* 1 (1938) 3-4.

² F.Schachermeyr, *op. cit.* 31ff.

³ F.Gschnitzer, *op. cit.* 122 n 6.

⁴ Fr.Kortüm, *Geschichte Hellenischer Staatsverfassungen* (1821) 1 and 129.

⁵ See p. 34.

⁶ J.Kaerst, *op. cit.* (1901) 3=3rd edn (1927) 2.

polis-settlement. The *polis* as a realm of law embraced citizens, metics and slaves of various origins.¹ E.Barker (1918), having noted that for the Greeks the *polis* ('city') was a community of persons rather than an area of territory, then asked whether these people were linked by kinship or contiguity. His reply to this question was that the *state* originated in Greece, as elsewhere, as an association united by blood relationship, but he denied that the polis-state retained this characteristic, as Wilamowitz believed and whom Barker had censured. But as soon as blood-related societies established permanent dwelling places, then contiguity began to have a stronger influence than kinship. Settlements, walled or unwalled, were built, and these came together to form larger groups. These groups acquired a political existence while ties based on kinship grew weaker. Thus it was that the city-state came into being. Nevertheless, the principle of kinship was still strong enough to be the basis on which political rights and the divisions of the citizen body were founded.²

We have already noted F.Gschnitzer's distinction of ancient Greek 'systems of political co-existence' into 'communities' and 'dominations' (1959, 1960, 1963) and have noted the constitutional content of the terms.³ Earlier, Gschnitzer (1955) had made use of the term 'community' for the ancient Greek state or a variant thereof. He said that the ancient Greek state was definable objectively and subjectively not as a sovereignty over territory but as a unity of individuals. This same fact was observed by others (Gschnitzer listed a few) whom we have noted earlier. Gschnitzer went further than those before him by dividing the ancient Greek states of the 'community' type into two kinds: a 'stem community' ('Stammesgemeinde') and a 'place community' ('Orts-gemeinde'). States in the first class were called after the names of the constituent tribes; states in the second class were called by ethnic names derived from place-names (of mountains, rivers, cities etc.). The people who took the common name of either kind constituted a conceptual, legal and political entity; the Athenian state had its roots in the city of Athens. The inhabitants of the town and the countryside were on an equal footing. Membership of the community was derived from connection to a place. Contiguity created a new type of community in comparison with the *ethnos*. Parts of *ethne* that broke away were transformed into local groups and became conscious of their new personality. Thus for example we find states of the Lacedaemonians, Argives, Corinthians, but not of the Dorians in Lacedaemon, Argos, Corinth; states of local communities and not of *ethnos* communities.⁴

¹ B.Keil, op. cit. 304, 306-308.

² E.Barker, *Greek Political Theory* (1918, 1970) 28-31.

³ v.s., pp. 27-28.

⁴ F.Gschnitzer, op. cit. 120-144.

The views of F.Taeger and E.Kirsten also belong here. The first (1939=1958) described the *polis* as a 'community state' (*Gemeindestaat*). Yet he maintained that it was inseparable from its urban centre (with the exception of Sparta which was a cluster of villages). Conversely, the *ethnos*, an earlier form of state, was based on personal links and had no territorial foundation.¹ For Kirsten (1956) the *polis* was a 'community state' (*Gemeindestaat*) because the statehood (*Staatlichkeit*) and the sovereignty belonged to an autonomous and self-sufficient community, and the citizens formed a union of persons (*Personalverband*). The polis-settlement could be a rural one, a town-village (*Stadtdorf*); it was only because it was sovereign that it was not a mere village.²

(iii) '*Polis*': state of a community of citizens-landowners

K.Marx defined the *polis* as a kind of state distinguished by the fact that it had as its ruling class a community of citizens-landowners, the members of which were citizens by virtue of being, and so long as they were landowners, and were landowners by virtue of being citizens. This idea is repeated by the Marxist historians, usually in the form of a brief statement; it is more rarely developed with the aid of evidence not available to Marx.³

(iv) '*Polis*': state of a community which occupies land around a town

L.H.Jeffery (1976) defined the *polis* (or 'city-state') as a unit of people which (1) occupied an area around a town, the seat of government, and (2) was autonomous, because the government was chosen by the citizens and from within their ranks.⁴ A.Snodgrass (1980) accepted the first half of this definition.⁵ But he recently declared (1986) that 'the Greek term *polis*, in its strict sense' denoted 'a polity consisting of a settlement and its territory, politically united with one another and independent of other polities'.⁶

R.Hägg described (1979) the *polis* on the one hand as a state (*Polisstaat*) and on the other as an autonomous community related to a city (*Stadt-gemeinde, Siedlungsgemeinschaft*) and ruling over a rural territory.⁷

¹ F.Taeger, *Das Altertum I* (1939) 148–150=6th edn (1958) 150–151.

² E.Kirsten, op. cit. 112–113.

³ v. i., pp. 111–124.

⁴ L.H.Jeffery, *Archaic Greece* (1976) 39.

⁵ A.Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece* (1980) 28.

⁶ A.Snodgrass, in C.Renfrew, J.F.Cherry (eds), *Peer Policy Interaction and Socio-political Changes* (1986) 47.

⁷ R.Hägg, in D.Papenfuss, M.Strocka (eds), *Palast und Hütte, Beiträge zum Bauen und Wohnen im Altertum von Archäologen, Vor- und Frühgeschichtlern, Tagungsbeiträge*

Other authors, on the other hand, do not believe that territory is an element of the *polis*.¹

(v) 'Polis': 'personal' state identified with its citizens

Most scholars agree that the state that is called *πόλις* by the ancient Greeks is identified with the body of its citizens; some, indeed, describe it as a 'community of citizens', or as a 'communal entity' or as 'human community'.² This view has sometimes been supported by the arguments which we recapitulate here: (a) the city-state was called by the name of its citizens.³ (b) Some texts imply the identification of the *polis* with the assembly, which at the same time was the holder of state sovereignty, and a community of citizens.⁴ (c) The 'rhetra' (=decree) of the Chaladrians 'opposes, as partners in a bargain, the

eines Symposiums der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung veranstaltet vom 25.-30. November 1979 in Berlin, 297.

¹ v. i., p. 42.

² E.Szanto, *Das griechische Bürgerrecht* (1892) 5; U.von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, op. cit. 43; B.Keil, op. cit. 337; G.Busolt, op. cit. 220ff; P.Vinogradoff, *Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence* (1922) 106; V.Ehrenberg, *Der griechische und der hellenistische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft III* 3 (1932) 11, 16, 19, 20, 41=*Der Staat der Griechen I* (1957) 21, 28, 32, 33, 60=*The Greek State* (1960) 28, 38, 43, 44, 88=*L'état grec* (1976) 59, 75, 85, 86, 151; idem, *JHS* 57 (1937) 147, 150=*Polis und Imperium* (1965) 82, 87; idem, *Von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung (SBHAW, Hist.-Phil. Kl. (1961) 3)* 12-13, 20-21=*Polis und Imperium* (1965) 107-108, 114, 116; E.Kornemann, *Staaten, Völker, Männer* (1934) 5; F.Hampl, *Klio* 32 (see p. 14) (1939) 56; Ernst Meyer, in *Eumusia, Festschrift für E.Howald* (1947) 33-35; S.Mazzarino, *Fra Oriente e Occidente* (1947) 207; K.Latte, *NAWG, Hist.-Phil. Kl. (1948)* 64-75; A.Aymard, *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques II* (1951) 183; idem, *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin* 6 (1954) 52-53=*Etudes d' Histoire ancienne* (1967) 275; J.A.O. Larsen and F.W.Walbank, *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques II* (1951) 183-184; F.Schachermeyr, *Diogenes* 4 (1953/1954) 30; Ch.G.Starr, *PdP* 12 (1957) 102; idem, *Origins of the Greek Civilization* (1961) 342; M.Sordi, *La lega tessala fino ad Alessandro Magno* (1958) 314; F.Gschnitzer, *Abhängige Orte im griechischen Altertum* (1958) 165ff; C.S.G.Thomas, *Early Greek Kingship* (1965) 5; eadem, *PdP* (1966) 6; J.Gaudemet, *Institutions Politiques* (1967) 146; Cl.Mossé, *REA* 65 (1968) 92; M.Austin, P.Vidal-Naquet, *Economies et Sociétés en Grèce ancienne* (Coll. U 2) (1972) 66=*Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece* (1977) 52; O.Longo, *BIFG* 1 (1974) 219ff; C.Ampolo, op. cit. xxx; P.Lévêque *PM* fasc. 14 (1981) 3-12; H. Van Effenterre, *La Cité grecque* (1985) 41-46.

³ V.Ehrenberg, 11.cc.; A.Aymard, loc. cit.; F.Schachermeyr, loc. cit.; F.Gschnitzer, loc. cit.

⁴ V.Ehrenberg, *Polis und Imperium* 86-87, 114.

whole of the members of a community to the newly-received individual. In a form recalling a private lawsuit, the many recognize the one as their equal and possessed of equal rights'.¹ (d) Public oaths were administered by the body of the citizens or by their representatives.² (e) Until the Archaic period there was no distinction between state property and private property held in common: there are examples of distribution amongst the citizens of public revenues from confiscations, fines or mines.³ (f) The citizens were jointly responsible for the payment of public debts.⁴ (g) They were also held jointly responsible for wrongs committed by their fellow citizens.⁵ (h) The ancient Greeks did not have the concept of state territory.⁶ (i) Certain *poleis* did not even have territory.⁷ (j) Some ancient passages record for us the idea that the *polis* was identified with its men.⁸

(vi) '*Polis*': *state of citizens*

A.Heuss advanced (1946=1969) a description of the *polis* slightly different from the preceding: in his opinion it was a citizen state (*Bürgerstaat*).⁹

(vii) '*Polis*': *state of an autonomous community of citizens inseparable from its territory*

H.Van Effenterre added (1985) the following element to the preceding definition of the *polis*: the autonomous community of citizens was inseparable from its territory.¹⁰ At this point Van Effenterre comes close to L.H.Jeffery and A.Snodgrass.¹¹

¹ V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. 87.

² P.Vinogradoff, op. cit. 107.

³ P.Vinogradoff, op. cit. 109–112; V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. 112; F.Gschnitzer, *WS* 68 (n.s. 18) 121 n 4.

⁴ K.Latte, op. cit. 64ff.

⁵ K.Latte, op. cit. 73–74.

⁶ K.Latte, op. cit. 73–74.

⁷ F.Hampl, loc. cit.; F.Gschnitzer, loc. cit.; A.Aymard, loc. cit.; J.A.O.Larsen, loc. cit.; F.Walbank, loc. cit.

⁸ V.Ehrenberg, *Der griechische und hellenistische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* III 3 (1932) 119=*Der Staat der Griechen* I (1957) 21=*The Greek State* (1960) 28=*L'état grec* (1976) 59; G.Daux, loc. cit.; C.S.G.Thomas, loc. cit.; Cl.Mossé, loc. cit.; C.Ampolo, loc. cit.

⁹ A. Heuss, *AuA* 2 (1946) 29ff =F.Gschnitzer (ed), *Zur griechischen Staatskunde* (1969) 58ff.

¹⁰ H.Van Effenterre, op. cit. 24–25.

¹¹ v. s., p. 40.

(viii) 'Polis': state of a community (without additional characteristics)

In contrast to the preceding definitions of *polis* as the state of a tribe or part of a tribe or of a community locally formed (possibly linked to territory) or a community of citizens the *polis* was defined simply as the state of a community (*Gemeindestaat*) for instance by K.Hildenbrand (1860), M.Gelzer (1924), H.Bengtson (1950=1960=1960=1969=1977), R.Müller (1985).¹

(ix) 'Polis': state of confederated groups

According to Fustel de Coulanges (1864) and L.Gernet (1917) the *polis* ('Cité') was the sum total not of individuals but of groups.² The same view was expressed en passant by A.R.Burn (1936) in a comment stressing that the Athenians belonged primarily to a phratry.³ In the meantime (1924) P.Vinogradoff described Athens as a confederation of phratries and γένη (clans).⁴

G.Glotz went further (1926). The *polis* ('cité') was made up of tribes which consisted of phratries which in their turn embraced γένη; there continued to be a steady association of groups which retained a large share of their independence and hence came into conflict with the *polis* to which they belonged.⁵ V. Ehrenberg (1932=1957=1960=1976) emphasized that an Athenian was only a citizen by virtue of his membership of a family, phratry, deme and φυλή (tribe). He did not maintain, however, like the above scholars, that the *polis* was a sum total of groups rather than of individuals.⁶

J.Hasebroek (1931) and D.Roussel (1976) expressed themselves clearly

¹ K.Hildebrand, *Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie* I (1860) 392; M.Gelzer, *Gemeindestaat und Reichstaat in der römischen Geschichte* (1924); H.Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte* (1950) 72 n 1=5th edn (1977) 80 n 3; R.Müller, in H.Kreissig, F.Kühnert (eds), *Antike Abhängigkeitsformen in den griechischen Gebieten ohne Polis-Struktur, Actes du Colloque sur l'esclavage* (1981) (=Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur der Antike, 25) (1985) 49. cf. J.Burckhardt, *Griechische Kulturgeschichte* I (1898) 61, describing the *Polis* both as 'Stadtgemeinde' and 'städtisches Staatswesen'.

² Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité antique* (1864) 145; L.Gernet, *Recherches sur le développement de la pensée juridique et morale en Grèce* (1917) 79.

³ A.R.Burn, *The World of Hesiod* (1936) 121 n 1.

⁴ P.Vinogradoff, *Principes historiques du droit* I (1924) 309.

⁵ G.Glotz, *Histoire grecque* I [1926] 225-226.

⁶ V.Ehrenberg, *Der griechische und der hellenistische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* III 3 (1932) 41=Der Staat der Griechen I (1957) 66=The Greek State (1960) 88=L'état grec (1976) 151.

against this idea, maintaining that the *polis* was the sum total of individuals and not of groups.¹

(x) '*Polis*': state identified with the whole society

V.Ehrenberg (1929) stressed that the *polis* was 'not a mere organization but a living community (*Gemeinschaft*) in every aspect: a community of law, economy, thought and belief'. Later (1932=1957=1960=1976) he described the *polis* as a kind of state identified with the whole society 'at least as far as the citizens alone were concerned'. The *polis* 'was built up on individuals through the medium of subdivisions' of the citizen body, and the society was based on the same groups, 'in which the same men were united for worship and social intercourse'.²

The same basic idea was later expressed by E.Barker (1951). The *polis* 'was something more than a political system; and it went far beyond the legal purpose of declaring and enforcing a body of rules for the control of legal relations. It was State and Society in one without distinction or differentiation; it was a single system of order, or fused "society-state". Therefore it was simultaneously a religious confession, an ethical society, an economic concern, and a cultural association'.³

The coincidence of *polis* and society has also been maintained by F.Jonas and M.I.Finley. The former wrote (1966) that modern society has no political dimension, as was the case with the ancient Greek and the Italian city-states; modern states are held together by means other than common political will or common religion.⁴ The latter ranked (1983=1985) the ancient *poleis* ('city-states') with the societies *face-à-face*, because their members lived together in small units, like villages or neighbourhoods; thus every citizen was continuously in contact with public life.⁵

Differing from the above mentioned historians who identified *polis* and society, P.A.Rahe (1984) described the *polis* as a political community, which was both state and society, where there was no distinction between governors

¹ J.Hasebroek, *Griechische Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (1931) 98–100, 157; D.Roussel, *Tribu et Cité* (1976) 39ff.

² V.Ehrenberg, *Gnomon* 5 (1929) 4; idem, *Der griechische Staat und der hellenistische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft III* 3 (1932) 41–42=Der Staat der Griechen I (1957) 89–90=The Greek State (1960) 66–68=L'état grec (1976) 152–154.

³ E.Barker, *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (1951) 5–7 (cf. 42–44).

⁴ F.Jonas, *Die Institutionslehre Arnold Gehlens* (1966) 30.

⁵ M.I.Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (1983) 59–60 = *L'invention de la Politique* (1985) 57.

and governed; citizens were permanently united by a common way of life.¹ H. Van Effenterre, too (1985), associated state and society in the predicate of *polis* or city-state.²

Objections have been raised by H. Schaefer and D. Nörr to the idea that the polis-state was a state whose characteristic feature was that it coincided with society. The former replied to Ehrenberg (1960=1963) that (1) his view idealized the conditions which prevailed in Athens during the time of Pericles; (2) furthermore these conditions are not well known; (3) he had not correctly weighed the evidence of Aristophanes; (4) he had not taken proper account of the position of the metics in Athens and of the ousted citizens of Sparta; (5) in an aristocratic regime the members of noble families cultivated relations outside the boundaries of the state and formed a special kind of community. Nörr (1966) stated emphatically that the polis-state was not identical with society at any period of its history. It is possible to discern influences exercised by social forces, or negative positions adopted by these forces towards political life; but these did not affect the polis-state. Within the polis-state, social forces were tamed, or at the most existed in an unstable equilibrium with the state; they were never amalgamated with it.³

(d) *POLIS*: STATE LINKED TO TERRITORY AND TO A HUMAN GROUP

As we have seen, V. Ehrenberg on the one hand stressed that the *polis* was a (political) union of persons resembling in this respect an *ethnos*;⁴ but on the other hand argued that the *polis* differed from an *ethnos* in that it had an urban centre.⁵

C.S.G. Thomas (1965, 1981) regarded both place and community as constituting basic characteristics of the *polis*.⁶

Claude Mossé (1963) wrote that the *polis* was simultaneously a territorial state and a group of men which was governed according to a constitution and laws. This group was identified with the citizens of the *polis*.⁷

¹ P.A. Rahe, *AHR* 89 fasc. 2 (1984) 268–269.

² H. Van Effenterre, *op. cit.* 25.

³ H. Schäfer, *ZSS*, Röm. Abt. 77 (1960) 428 = *Probleme der alten Geschichte* (1963) 390–391; D. Nörr, *op. cit.* 364–365.

⁴ *v. s.*, p. 41.

⁵ *v. s.*, p. 34.

⁶ C.S.G. Thomas, *Early Greek Kingship* (1965) 15 = *PdP* 21 (1966) 6; eadem, *Minos*, n.s. 16 (1977) 207; eadem, 'The Greek Polis', in R. Griffith, C.S.G. Thomas (eds), *The City-State in Five Cultures* (1981) 31, 43, 45, 50–51.

⁷ Cl. Mossé, *REA* 65 (1963) 292.

We earlier noted that the importance of territory as an element of the *polis* is contested.¹

(e) *POLIS*: A POLITICAL ENTITY RECOGNIZED AS A *POLIS*

For G.E.M. de Ste Croix (1981) 'it is hardly possible to give a general definition of a *polis* that would hold good for all purposes and all periods'. His view, therefore, was that 'the best we can do is to say that a political entity was a *polis* if it was recognized as such'.²

3. *POLIS*: NOT A STATE BUT A COMMUNITY

Several authors, avoiding or expressly criticizing the definition of the *polis* as a kind of state, describe it as a 'community'. This tendency is represented mainly by Max Weber (1922), J.Hasebroek (1931), H.Berve (1931), H.Schaefer (1960=1963), W.Suerbaum (1961), D.Nörr (1966), M.I.Finley (1973), J.Bordes (1982), Chr.Meier (1984). Max Weber called the *polis* 'a community related to a settlement and composed of warriors' (*Siedlungsgemeinschaft von Kriegerern*). Behind this description lies Weber's own opinion that the *polis*-settlement was essentially a garrison. J.Hasebroek used the formula *Gemeinde von Individuen* (and, accordingly, the terms *Stadtgemeinde* and *Siedlungsgemeinschaft*). Schaefer explained that he preferred the term 'community' (*Gemeinde*) which he regarded as synonymous with the Greek term *κοινόν*, since it was conceptually neutral. For Suerbaum and Nörr, the *polis* was primarily a 'Personnengemeinschaft' and only secondarily an organization, or *Anstalt*. Finley defined it as a community (or a *κοινωνία*, in the sense of this term in ancient Greek), 'living in a space divided into a civic-religious centre (...) and the countryside'. According to Bordes, *polis* was a territorial, religious and warrior community. C.Meier maintained that the *polis* was identifiable as the totality of a community and therefore a political entity different from the state. He eventually made it clear that he takes the concept of 'state' in the sense of modern state; this also emerges from the context.³

The definition of the *polis* as a *Gemeinde* rather than a state was sharply

¹ v. s., p. 41.

² G.E.M. de Ste Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient World* (1981) 9.

³ Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (1922) 558; J.Hasebroek, *Griechische Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (1931) 95, 117; H.Berve, *Griechische Geschichte* I (1931) 176; H.Schäfer, op. cit. (1960) 423=(1963) 385; W.Suerbaum, *Vom antiken zum frühmittelalterlichen Staatsbegriff* (1961); D.Nörr, op. cit. (1966) 365; M.I.Finley, in M.I.Finley (ed), *Problèmes de la terre en Grèce ancienne* (1973) 10; J.Bordes, *Politeia dans la pensée grecque jusqu'à Aristote* (1982) 43; Chr.Meier, *Introduction à l'anthropologie politique de l'antiquité classique* (1984) 11, 22-25.

rejected by V.Ehrenberg (1962=1965). He stressed that *Gemeinde* is not a political concept. This term is correctly used in compounds such as *Dorfgemeinde*, *Kirchengemeinde* (village community, church community), etc. Ehrenberg also criticized Schaefer for his view that *Gemeinde* can be taken as the equivalent of the Greek *κοινόν*, since the latter term had many meanings.¹ In place of *Gemeinde* Ehrenberg consistently uses the term *Gemeinschaft*, denoting a cultural community.

4. CITY-STATE: THE GOVERNMENT OF A CITY-COMMUNITY

M. Hammond who has studied not only the Greek city-states in particular (and that of Rome) but all the city-states of the Mediterranean and of Asia in antiquity, defined (1972) the city as a community and the city-state as the government of this community. More particularly he attributed to the city-state the following characteristics: (1) its members lived in a settlement, frequently enclosed by walls and ruled by only one government; (2) a significant proportion of its members worked productively within the city, pursuing non-agricultural activities; (3) it influenced and controlled an area wider than that which would have sufficed for the assurance of its existence. As for the form of government associated with the city-state, M.Hammond observed that (1) this was not influenced by the constitution and (2) conversely it had to have the usual pattern of Greek, and also of Roman, governments, i.e. magistrates, a deliberative body and a popular assembly.²

5. VARIOUS DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE *POLIS*

Some of the definitions of the *polis* or city-state referred to above also contain certain elements which are regarded as distinguishing features of the concept. Let us recapitulate. B.Keil (1912) and F.Schachermeyr (1953) noted the absence of a ruler as one such feature of the *polis*.³ Ch.G.Starr (1957, 1961) and E.Lepore (1972) suggested collective action by the citizen body or collective exercise of authority by that same body.⁴ P.Lévêque (1981) posited three simultaneous characteristics: the absence of a ruler, functional clarity, strengthened political structure, all of them from the sphere of public life.⁵

¹ V.Ehrenberg, *Von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung* (SBHAW, Phil.-Hist. Kl. (1962) Abh. 3) 12–13=*Polis und Imperium* (1965) 107. cf. above p. 43.

² M.Hammond, op. cit. 2, 6–8.

³ v. s., p. 30

⁴ v. s., pp. 30, 31.

⁵ v. s., p. 31.

G.Pugliese Carratelli (1961) mentioned the equality of citizens, written laws and self-sufficiency.¹ Other scholars noted non-political elements: G.Busolt (1920), F.Tritsch (1929), V.Ehrenberg (1932=1957=1960=1976), M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet (1972) the existence of an urban settlement;² J.Kaerst (1901=1916=1927) and F.Gschnitzer (1955) the concentration of public life in an urban centre.³

Opinions concerning the distinguishing features of the *polis* have also been expressed outside the context of definitions of the phenomenon.

G.Glotz (1928) mentioned as 'éléments and distinguishing features of the *polis* (Cité)': (1) the means of defence (citadel walls); (2) the public hearth; (3) the public buildings (*prytaneion*, *bouleuterion* etc.); (4) the agora, in which the assembly held its meetings; (5) the countryside from which the *polis* drew its means of survival; (6) the division of the population into tribes and phratries. The author stressed this last element as being the most striking distinguishing feature of the ancient *polis*.⁴

V.Ehrenberg (1932=1957=1960=1976) attributed the following features to the *polis*: (1) Basic facts: (a) territory, (b) population (but he means the social classes). (2) Politeia: (a) citizenship, (b) forms of constitution. (3) Political structure: (a) the assembly of the citizens, (b) the council, (c) the officials, (d) the popular courts. (4) Functions of the State: (a) religion and cult, (b) law, (c) armed forces, (d) finance.⁵

Ch.G.Starr having defined the *polis* or city-state as a union of human beings (1957), added that to fulfil its mission the *polis* had certain political organs including an assembly of its full citizens, a council and elected public officials.⁶

B.Borecký (1964) regarded the characteristics of the *polis* (*Stadtstaat*) as (1) the division of the inhabitants into citizens and non-citizens (foreigners and slaves); (2) the participation of the citizens in a closed and privileged group; (3) economic inequality between citizens; and (4) a tendency towards democracy.⁷

C.S.G.Thomas (1965) suggested (1) the existence of a town; (2) the existence of political organs (as had Starr); (3) the classification of religion as a public affair rather than a private matter; (4) the pursuit of war not by individuals but by the state; (5) the existence of public buildings (the same idea as Glotz') and

¹ v. s., p. 30.

² v. s., p. 34.

³ v. s., p. 35.

⁴ G.Glotz, *La Cité grecque* (1928) 21–28.

⁵ V.Ehrenberg, *Der griechische und hellenistische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* III 3 (1932) 11–41=*Der Staat der Griechen* I (1957) 21–68=*The Greek State* (1960) 28–88=*L'état grec* (1976) 59–150.

⁶ Ch.G.Starr, *PdP* 12 (1957) 103, 107.

⁷ B.Borecký, *Eirene* 2 (1964) 82–83.

of public monuments, both architectural and sculptural; (6) class divisions.¹

According to W.K.Lacey (1968) the *polis* was characterized by its tendency to be independent, self-sufficient and responsible for its own defence and to live under its own code of laws. This last thought was subsequently developed but also invalidated by the sentence 'many communities, even *poleis*, continue to exist without a unifying legislature for long periods of time'.²

S.Aisaka stressed (1983) that the characteristic feature of the polis-state lay in the fact that for the Greeks it meant their independence and their liberty.³

We may add here the characteristics attributed by J.A.O.Larsen (1966) and D.Roussel (1976) not to the *polis* but to the *ethnos*. According to the former these characteristics were: (1) the large area occupied by the tribe; (2) open villages; (3) unrecorded law; (4) self-defence and reliance on kinship; (5) little government; (6) the carrying of weapons.⁴ Thus Larsen attributed implicitly to the *polis*: (1) a small expanse of territory; (2) a fortified town; (3) written laws; (4) a prohibition on taking the law into one's own hands in connection with protection of the individual by the state; (5) strong administration (cf. Lévêque); (6) the abandonment of the carrying of weapons. According to Roussel the *ethnos* was a community without centralization;⁵ consequently the *polis* would be for him a centralized community.

B. APPLICATIONS OF 'IDEAL TYPES' IN THE CASE OF THE *POLIS*, AND ITS CRITICS

Some of the historians who have formulated definitions of the *polis* seem to have been influenced by Weber's theory and practice of the 'ideal type'. Of those, however, only V.Ehrenberg explicitly declared that he was following Max Weber, and did so at length.

The theory of the 'ideal type' is a product of Max Weber's view of culture, and of the way in which it is perceived by men. According to Weber, empirical reality does not have objective form and meaning. Culture is that part of reality that we relate to values to which we attach meaning. Weber denied the neo-Kantian theory of objective cultural values and asserted that values are freely chosen by the human intellect. More specifically, Weber taught that the intellect selects from the host of empirical data the things that it considers to be

¹ C.S.G.Thomas, *Early Greek Kingship* (1965) 15–16=*PdP* 21 (1966) 6–7; eadem, *Minos*, n.s. 16 (1977) 207–208.

² W.K.Lacey, *The Family in Classical Greece* (1968) 51.

³ S.Aisaka, *Die Staatsidee der griechischen Polis* (1983) 1.

⁴ J.A.O.Larsen, *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History* (1966) 22.

⁵ P.Roussel, *op. cit.* 162.

representative, over-emphasizes and stresses them, and finally synthesizes them. Thus the 'ideal type' acts as a filter that sifts out the elements that are not subject to the intellect and maximizes those that are. The 'ideal type' is a concept. It differs from the concept of 'species', which is the object of the definition, in two points: it is formed in an arbitrary manner and it gives expression to the particular character of a cultural phenomenon. Just like the concept of 'species', the 'ideal type' acts as a tool for acquiring knowledge, but it is in addition a tool for the evaluation and interpretation of social phenomena.

Ehrenberg proclaimed: ' "Polis" is to some extent an abstraction: it will be our task to describe what is typical or what Max Weber called the "ideal type" (*Idealtypus*).'¹ And it was indeed in this spirit that he composed that section of his book about the ancient Greek state in which he deals with the polis-state. More specifically, he imposed two limitations on the empirical data: he concentrated his attention on classical Athens and he selected and stressed within this field those facts that in his judgement constituted the specific character of the polis-state. Ehrenberg's structure reached its culmination in the final sub-chapter of the section on the polis-state, which in the German editions has the title 'Vom Wesen der Polis', and in the English edition 'The Nature of the Polis'.¹

In evaluating this book by Ehrenberg, G. De Sanctis expressed the opinion (1934) that a definition of the *polis* which would embrace such differing realities as Athens, Sparta, Marseilles, Parrhasia and Athamania would have to be so general and abstract that it would deprive the meaning of πόλις of all concrete content. It would reduce it to the level of the description of matter given by St. Augustine: *prope nihil*.²

H. Marrou (1950) emphasized that the discussions about the *polis* ('cité') which had taken place since the time of Fustel de Coulanges did not encourage the hope that eventually its essence would be isolated. *Polis* is a historical concept. It is not an idea in which the historic *poleis* had a share, and from which they drew their being; neither is it an aristotelian abstraction derived from generalization. Nor is it an *Idealtypus* in the sense intended by Max Weber – a *schema* elaborated by the historian which he then projects onto an elusive and complex reality. It suffices to note the perplexity of historians when they attempt to date the first emergence of the *polis*. The *polis* – a type of state to which the citizen was completely subordinate – never existed: Greek history is bedevilled by strong personalities who were not caught up in the *polis*. The 'idea' of the ancient *polis* is an imperfect tool which, however many elaborations it undergoes, will essentially remain useless. Weber's ideal types

¹ V. Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1957) 1 = (1960) 3 = (1976) 12.

² G. De Sanctis, *RFC* 62 (1934) 96.

can be applied only during the first two stages of the work of the historian; in the first stage it helps him to conceptualize the variety of aspects of the object he is trying to understand; in the second the ideal type is compared with the historic *poleis* and then its limits can be examined and checked. Thus the 'idea' is outstripped without having been exactly defined while the term continues to be used to denote a collection of facts, some of which match the 'idea' while others do not. In the end, historical knowledge proves to be radically nominalistic; the technical terms it employs are not properly speaking concepts, but are mere labels without any correspondence to the complex, even heteroclitic object.¹

Marrou's view was immediately praised by A.J.Toynbee and W.Tritsch (1950). Toynbee added the comment that the use of 'ideas' in history misrepresents reality because it is an academic and static practice whereas the real course of affairs is practical and dramatic; the *polis* is not a concept, but a social tool. Tritsch stressed that the ideal types are not essences, whereas civilizations evolve and change with time; he commended Marrou because he underlined the dynamism of political development.² But Ehrenberg, replying to Marrou, stressed again (1950) that there exists an 'ideal type' of *polis* which embraces the essential properties of every historic *polis*.³

Ehrenberg's attempt seems to be the implicit target of the following statement by C.Bradford Welles (1956). 'We must be careful not to let the historical Athens of the Classical period, or, still less, our reconstruction of that Athens assume an undue importance in our conceptualization of the Greek *polis*.' Many Greek cities were not like Athens at all, and many Greeks were highly critical of Athens.⁴

H.Schaefer, too, criticized Ehrenberg (1960=1963) and consequently formulated the opinion that we are not able to grasp the essence of the Greek state, whether *polis* or *ethnos*; and that, therefore, is preferable to study the history of ancient constitutions.⁵ As a result Ehrenberg admitted (1961) that some of the objections concerning the possibility of defining the *polis* were justified; but he insisted that other were not serious.⁶

¹ H.Marrou, *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques I* (1950) 328–331.

² A.J.Toynbee, *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques II* (1951) 154–155; W.Tritsch, *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques II* (1951) 157–158.

³ V.Ehrenberg, *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques II* (1951) 157.

⁴ C.Bradford Welles, *Studi in onore di A.Calderini e R.Paribeni* (1956) 83.

⁵ H.Schaefer, *ZSS, Röm. Abt. 77* (1960) 426, 427, 431=*Probleme der alten Geschichte* (1963) 389, 390, 394.

⁶ V.Ehrenberg, *Von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung* (SBHAW (1961) Abh. 3) 4=*Polis und Imperium* (1965) 108–109.

D.Nörr (1966) does not deny the validity and the usefulness of the 'ideal type'. He does, however, note how many sources of error there are to undermine the formulation of an 'ideal type' of polis-state, and criticizes some of the mistakes made by Ehrenberg. The historian, he argues, runs the danger of failing to distinguish in his sources between reality on the one hand and ancient ideological constructions on the other. Ancient utopias of the *polis* help us to understand the phenomenon, of course; but they must be faced and used as utopias. If the historian nonetheless succeeds in distinguishing between realities and ideas in the case of the *polis*, he will then be obliged to formulate at least two ideal types: one for the democratic *polis*, and the other for the aristocratic. Nörr recognizes that some of the essential characteristics of the polis-state, such as the supremacy of the law, the existence of a central settlement, and the co-operation of the citizens, are common to both democratic and aristocratic polis-states. He appreciates, however, that a single ideal type embracing all the Greek polis-states can only be static, and will tend to level out the differences and to idealize. Nörr accepts that it is legitimate for scholars to make use of the concepts of modern scholarship. He advises, however, that this should be done with care, and criticizes Ehrenberg for projecting onto the polis-state the modern concept of 'state of law', without noticing that it does not have the same content as the ancient idea expressed by the phrase 'The Law is King'. Nörr also censures Ehrenberg for focussing his attention in a one-sided fashion on law and institutions, ignoring the social side of the polis-state. Nörr stresses that the 'essence' of the polis-state can only be comprehended when the polis-state becomes a meaningful object of knowledge. To this end, he demands that it be studied from every aspect – not merely formally – through the prism of modern concepts, and as the living experience of the ancients through their ideas.¹

II. THE *POLIS* WITHIN GREEK LANDS AND OUTSIDE THEM

A. THE *POLIS* WITHIN GREEK LANDS

(i) '*Polis*': the Greek state

J.Kaerst (1901=1916=1927) wrote that the Greek state was a city-state.² B.Keil (1912) described the *polis* as the main form of Greek state.³ V.Ehrenberg

¹ D.Nörr, *Der Staat* 5 (1966) 363–368.

² J.Kaerst, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (1901) 3=3rd edn (1927) 2.

³ B.Keil, *Griechische Staatsaltertümer*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* III 3 (1912) 304.

(1932=1957=1960=1976) and H.Berve (1938) stressed that the *polis* was the essential Greek state. However, the former, in another passage of the same work, let it be understood that the *polis* was no more than the most widely found and most politically effective type of Greek state and the sole disseminator of Greek civilization.¹ H.Schaefer (1960) and F.Gschnitzer (1959, 1963) objected that Ehrenberg had ignored the other form of Greek state, the *ethnos*.² According to F.Taeger (1939=1958) the *polis* was the Greek state of the Classical period.³

(ii) '*Polis*': *kind of ancient Greek state*

This view has been accepted by the majority of scholars. Most distinguish two kinds of ancient Greek state; the *polis* and the *ethnos*. The *koinon* is counted not as a kind of unitary state, but as a confederation of unitary states. Amongst these scholars is V.Ehrenberg (1932=1957=1960=1976),⁴ despite the fact that, as we have seen, he described the *polis* as the essential Greek state.

Differing from all the other supporters of the idea that the types of unitary Greek state were the *polis* and the *ethnos*, H.Berve (1931) distinguished three types; the *polis*, the *kosmos* and the *koinon*. The *polis* was created by the Ionians, the *kosmos* by the Dorians, the *koinon* by the North-Western Greeks. However, the author observed that these types of ancient Greek states were rarely found clear and unadulterated; it is more common to find a variety of divergences from the ideal type as well as cross-connections.⁵

(iii) '*Polis*': *exclusively Greek type of state*

J.Burckhardt (1898) stressed that the Greek *polis* differed both from the Phoenician city-states and the European city-republics. The Greeks added to the former a new element: the predominance of the whole over the individual.

¹ V.Ehrenberg, *Der griechische und der hellenistische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft III 3* (1932) 10, 12, 47 = *Der Staat der Griechen I* (1957) 18, 20, 77 = *The Greek State* (1960) 24, 27, 102 = *L' état grec* (1976) 54, 57, 170; H.Berve, *NJADB I* (1938) 4.

² H.Schaefer, *op. cit.* 423, 426 = 386, 388. F.Gschnitzer, *AfAW* 12 (1959) 36, *ZSS, Röm. Abt.* 80 (1963) 400–401.

³ F.Taeger, *Das Altertum I* (1939) 145 = 6th edn (1958) 146.

⁴ V.Ehrenberg, *Der griechische und der hellenistische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft III 3* (1932) 10 = *Der Staat der Griechen I* (1957) 18 = *The Greek State* (1960) 24 = *L' état grec* (1960) 53; *idem*, *Von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung (SBHAW, Hist.-Phil. Kl. (1961) 3)* 9, 13 = *Polis und Imperium* 105, 108–109.

⁵ H.Berve, *Griechische Geschichte I* (1931) 176.

The European cities had belonged to already existing states and had the Church above them.¹ According to R.Pöhlmann, the Greeks founded the state of law and introduced the principle of political freedom.²

S.Mazzarino (1947) wrote 'the *polis* is a Greek organization and only Greek; its entire history and development go hand in hand with the political and social history of the Greeks'. He added that city-states were also found in the East; simultaneously, however, he noted that these had a territorial basis while the Greek *poleis* were states made up of individuals. Lastly, he emphasized that the citizen is the unrepeatable and entirely original element of the Greek concept about the state.³ According to D.Kagan (1965), the oriental city-states were not *poleis*, because they lacked the ideological kernel of the *polis*, justice.⁴

B. *POLIS* OUTSIDE GREEK LANDS

W.W.Fowler (1893) and E.Barker (1918) discussed not only the Greek but also the Italian city-states. E.Barker was undecided as to whether the City was or was not the only type of Greek and Italian state. He wrote 'the tribe (*ethnos*) is not a state, but at most the primitive rudiments of a state; and the aggregation of cities in a federal form is not a state, but a sum in addition badly done'. However, he later recognized the *ethne* as states. 'The Greek state first appears in history as a tribe... It is difficult to speak of the Greek state as if it were a single type... Not to speak of the difference between aristocracy and democracy ... there is the great difference between the stem-state or tribal-state and the city.'⁵

F.Schachermeyr on the one hand stressed the existence of city-states both in Greece and Italy, and on the other denied that this type of state ever emerged in the rest of Europe or in Asia in ancient times. The ancient peoples of Europe, he added, were not familiar with urban life, the division of labour or a dynamic development in the cultural sphere. The peoples of the East were conservative in their religious conceptions and were never able to achieve democracy. Only Jerusalem was imbued with a more progressive spirit, but this took a different turn. The Greek and Italian cities were citizen-states, more generally associations of individuals. Such associations ceased to exist in the East once

¹ J.Burckhardt, *Griechische Kulturgeschichte* I (1898) 61, 79.

² R.Pöhlmann, *Reden der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (1902) 21.

³ S.Mazzarino, op. cit. 206, 208, 211.

⁴ D.Kagan, *The Great Dialogue* (1965) 16.

⁵ W.W.Fowler, *The City-State of the Greeks and the Romans* (1893); E. Barker, *Greek Political Theory* (1918) 19, 23, 32.

nomadic life had been abandoned; hence eastern city-states differed from the Greek and Italian. The Etruscans and the Carthaginians created cities under the influence of the Greeks.¹

J.Gaudemet (1967) recognized Rome as a state similar to the Greek *polis*. So far as the East is concerned he said that there had been cities but not city-organization.² G.Buccellati (1967) refused to accept any parallel between the Greek and the Syrian city-state.³ C.Ampolo (1984) distinguished the Greek cities, a world of citizens, from the eastern cities, a world of vassals.⁴

In contrast J.Burckhardt (1898) had compared the Greek cities with the Phoenician;⁵ C.G.Starr (1961) advanced the view that Mesopotamia had city-states like those of Greece.⁶

Along with them we can rank M.Hammond, who studied the ancient city and city-state from the Mediterranean area to the Indus-Valley (1972). Having described the city-state as the government of a community concentrated in a city, as we have already noted, he recognized such city-states not only in historical Greece but also in Italy, Phoenicia and the Phoenician colonies and earlier Mesopotamia.⁷

Comments

1. The spectrum of the definitions of the *polis* proposed so far is impressively wide. They are summarized here.

I. The *polis* was a form of constitution.

II. The *polis* was a form of state:

(a) a form of state which can be defined by constitutional criteria:

- (1) excluding monarchy;
- (2) excluding monarchy and aristocracy;
- (3) excluding monarchy, aristocracy and timocracy;

(b) a form of state which is related to a place, which can be:

- (1) a town;
- (2) a town and its territory;

¹ F.Schachermeyr, *Diogène* 4 (1953/1954) 32.

² J.Gaudemet, *op. cit.* 146, 148.

³ G.Buccellati, *Cities of Ancient Syria* (1967).

⁴ C.Ampolo, in C.Ampolo (ed), *La Città antica* (1980) xxxvii.

⁵ J.Burckhardt, *op. cit.* I (1898) 61=(1970) 57.

⁶ Ch.G.Starr, *The Origins of Greek Civilization* (1961) 324.

⁷ M.Hammond, *op. cit.*

- (3) a territory possibly with a town;
- (c) a form of state related to a human group, which can be:
 - (1) a tribe or part of a tribe;
 - (2) a local community;
 - (3) a community of citizens-landowners;
 - (4) a community which occupies land around a town;
 - (5) a community of citizens identified with the state;
 - (6) a community of citizens inseparable from its territory;
 - (7) a community without additional characteristics;
 - (8) a confederation of groups;
 - (9) the whole society;
- (d) a form of state linked to territory and to a human group;
- (e) a political entity recognized as a *polis*.

III. The *polis* was not a form of state, but a community.

IV. The *polis* was the government of a city.

There are thus twenty definitions of the *polis*.

2. Some of these definitions can be reconciled with each other, others cannot. The latter are based on criteria which are mutually exclusive. Definitions incompatible with each other are:

(i) Each definition of a group (I to IV) with a definition of another ($I \neq II \neq III \neq IV$). It is in fact impossible for a *polis* to be both a form of constitution and a state, a state and not a state, a state and only a government.

(ii) Each definition of sub-group IIa with a definition included in the same sub-group ($IIa1 \neq IIa2 \neq IIa3$).

3. Some authors have expressed views incompatible with each other in the same work or on different occasions. Thus Glotz, in one of his books defined the *polis* both as a form of government¹ and as a form of state;² furthermore, he attributed to the *polis* elements and characteristics which are peculiar either to the concept of 'government' or to the concept of 'state'.³ V.Ehrenberg in 1921 defined the *polis* as a form of state which came into being after the fall of aristocratic rule.⁴ In 1929 he again used a constitutional criterion, but one different from

¹ v. s., p. 27.

² v. s., p. 43.

³ v. s., p. 48.

⁴ v. s., p. 31.

that put forward in 1921: on this occasion he declared the *polis* to be compatible with aristocracy.¹ In 1932 he condemned the use of constitutional criteria and defined the *polis* as a state which had an urban centre, was identified with its citizens and comprised the entire society;² but at the same time he regarded the *polis* as a state based on law, assigning to it a feature that he himself recognized to be opposed to aristocratic rule.³ In 1957, 1960 and 1976 he still retained this ambiguous position. Meanwhile, in 1937 and 1956, he reiterated the definition of the *polis* as a state governed by law and not by privilege. In 1961 he expressed the view that it was compatible with monarchy.⁴ H.Berve in 1931 matched the birth of the *polis* with the rise of timocracy;⁵ in 1936 he limited the *polis* to democracy;⁶ in 1938 he abandoned the constitutional criterion and used a tribal one instead.⁷ F.Gschnitzer in 1955 saw the *polis* as the state of a community which had been formed in one place and which was defined with reference to it;⁸ in 1959 he added a criterion of constitutional colouring in defining the *polis* as a community and not as a domination.⁹

4. Most definitions have been very dogmatically formulated, or the proofs which have been offered to support them have no foundation. Only one definition of the *polis* is accompanied by sound evidence: as the state of a local community.¹⁰

5. The above observations are linked together. Indeed the wide spectrum of views, the incompatibility of some of them, and the shifts of opinion reflect the use of invalid arguments or the lack of any proof.

¹ v. s., p. 30.

² v. s., p. 33.

³ v. s., pp. 31–32.

⁴ v. s., pp. 31–32.

⁵ v. s., p. 32.

⁶ v. s., p. 33.

⁷ v. s., p. 36.

⁸ v. s., p. 39.

⁹ v. s., pp. 27–28.

¹⁰ v. s., pp. 36–40.

A NEW INVESTIGATION

Our exposition and assessment of the definitions of the *polis* formulated hitherto has demonstrated just how unsatisfactory have been the results in this area of research. It is therefore worth making a fresh attempt, on condition, of course, that the errors, confusions and deficiencies of earlier investigations will be avoided, that stricter methodological standards will be employed and that more extensive, and more trustworthy evidence will be examined and evaluated.

The correctness of a definition depends on how far it conforms with the rules of formal logic, and on how far use is made of adequate and sound data. We may remind ourselves of these rules: (1) the definition must designate the *proximum genus* and the *species specifica*; (2) the *species specifica* must contain only essential distinguishing features, and these must be clearly formulated. The distinguishing features are inferred from by the data. If the data are adequate and sound, but the rules of logic are not applied, the definition will be erroneous from a formal point of view; if the definition is formally correct, but the data are defective or irrelevant, then the definition will be incorrect from the point of view of its content.

The appropriateness of the data used in the definitions of the *polis* has been contested by H.Krüger, U.v.Lübtow and W.Gawantka. As we saw above, they were critical of the way ancient ideas about the *polis* are used as if these constituted objective evidence, and of the projection into the ancient world of the concept 'state', which is a modern one.¹ According to W.Gawantka, following G.Jellinek, it is necessary to establish to what the ancient term *πόλις* corresponded, and this can be done only by using empirical methods, that is, by considering the facts. Gawantka added a second prerequisite, when he criticized V.Ehrenberg for failing to investigate the meanings of the term *πόλις* in antiquity.

This censure of the use of ancient ideas concerning the *polis* as if they were testimonia or evidence is fully justified. Whereas a piece of evidence is objective, and testimonia refer to real events, an idea goes beyond reality; the extent to which it does so is less when it assesses or interprets reality, than when it is extrapolating from it. Many scholars

¹ v. s., p. 29.

have committed the error of using Aristotle's ideas as a basis for their description of the thing 'polis'; some have even confined themselves to paraphrases and explanations of, or comments upon passages of Aristotle. There is no justification for the wholesale rejection of the ancient texts as sources, however. Ancient literature transmits to us not only ideas, but testimonia, not only testimonia, but objective evidence.

The criticism directed against Ehrenberg, that he did not study the meanings attaching to the term *πόλις* in antiquity, applies to all who have dealt so far with the question. The need for as complete a conspectus as possible of the meanings of the term *πόλις* appeared also to me as soon as I began to study the *polis*, in 1964.¹

I also agree with the view that a knowledge of the phenomenon that was called *polis* can only be achieved through observation of the data. Which data? W.Gawantka did not define them, manifestly because he adopted a negative stance towards the question, restricting himself to pointing out the weaknesses in the definitions of the *polis* on which he was passing judgement. Certainly, the *polis* cannot be observed directly. It is possible, however, to observe the behaviour and the characteristic properties of the *polis* through well-documented historical events, without the interference of ancient judgements or idealizations. Such data should be studied separately and assessed exclusively in terms of what they really have to convey.²

Bearing in mind all the prerequisites that we have defined, formal and essential, general and specific, we may proceed to attempt to define the *polis*.

I. POLIS IN RELATION TO 'CONSTITUTION', 'STATE', 'COMMUNITY'

We have seen that the *polis* has been regarded by some scholars as a kind of constitution, by others as a kind of state, and by yet

¹ v. i., p. 73.

² cf. D.Nörr, *Der Staat* 5 (1966) 363, 368; idem, *Imperium und Polis in der Hohen Prinzipatzeit* (= *Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte*, 50) 2nd edn (1969) 1, 6-7.

others as a kind of community. We shall begin, therefore, by examining these propositions.

A. *POLIS*: NOT A KIND OF CONSTITUTION

The concept 'constitution' existed in ancient Greece; it was rendered by the term *πολιτεία*. Moreover, we are acquainted with the constitutions of a large number of Greek *poleis* (and with some of them very well indeed). Thus we are quite able to ascertain whether the definition of the *polis* as a kind of constitution is or is not well-founded.

G. Glotz did not supply any evidence to support his classification of the *polis* as a constitution;¹ moreover, such evidence does not exist. On the contrary there are arguments against Glotz' view. On the one hand no ancient treatise nor any reference to Greek constitutions mentions the *polis* as one of them;² on the other we modern observers of the phenomenon *polis* are in a position to note that it neither preferred nor precluded any particular constitution.³

F. Gschnitzer assigns the *polis*, the *ethnos* and the *koinon* to the genus 'community' (*Gemeinde, Gemeinwesen, Gemeinschaft*), which he uses in contradistinction to 'domination' (*Herrschaft*). The same scholar defines 'community' and 'domination' both as independent concepts, and at the same time by reference to a common *genus proximum*. 'Community' is a self-governing union of persons, and 'domination' the wielding of authority by a single person. Gschnitzer regards both as 'systems of political coexistence', 'fundamental forms of state order', 'types of state', and 'principles of formal right'.⁴ This construction suffers (a) from the fact that it is based exclusively on data from the Classical and post-classical periods and ignores preclassical texts and indications,⁵ and (b) from conceptual deficiencies. These can be detected (I) in his description of the *proximum genus* and (II) in his analysis of the concepts 'community' and 'domination'. (I) Gschnitzer classifies the concepts 'community' and 'domination' under not one,

¹ v. s., p. 27.

² References collected by J. de Romilly, *REG* 72 (1959) 81–99.

³ D. Nörr, *Der Staat* 6 (1966) 360.

⁴ v. s., pp. 27–28.

⁵ v. s., p. 28.

but three kinds of genus: (1) 'system of political coexistence' or 'political order'; (2) 'state'; (3) 'formal right'. The concepts 'system of political coexistence' or 'political order' (in other words 'constitution') and 'state' are not synonymous, but intersect each other. The state is the setting in which constitutions are created, implemented and contested. Some types of constitution were found in *poleis*, *ethne*, *demoi* and confederacies of *poleis* or *demoi*.¹ From another point of view we also call 'state' the apparatus by which a society is ruled. A constitution is not the same thing as this apparatus but a part of its legal system. By contrast, the concepts 'constitution' and 'formal right' can be related in the sense indicated by the author: when the principle of 'community based on kinship, common culture and feelings' (*Gemeinschaft*) or 'companionship' (*Genossenschaft*) is involved, the result is the 'community' (*Gemeinde*) – a self-governing group of people; when the principle of 'domination' (*Herrschaft*) is involved, the result is monarchy. Nonetheless, these two principles can co-exist within the same state, producing situations intermediate between the two: such situations are seen by Gschnitzer in the states of the Molossi, the Macedonians, the Sidonians, the Halicarnassians and the Salmakitae. He did not realize, however, that this fact argues against the perception of the 'community' and the 'domination' as forms of state. Gschnitzer found no difficulty in this perception, since he believed that the various kinds of 'community', the *polis*, the *ethnos* and the *koinon*, were not consistent with the 'domination'. (II) Gschnitzer classifies states that had no ruler as 'communities' and states ruled by traditional kings or by tyrants, and the Hellenistic monarchies, as 'dominations'. In this he completely overlooks his other view that 'community' and 'domination' were kinds of state. If he still held the view that the 'community' and the 'domination' were systems of political coexistence or political order, he should have claimed that both could be found in the *polis*, the *ethnos* and the *koinon*, and should have investigated the problem of whether in fact there were similarities between kings, tyrants and the Hellenistic monarchs. To deal with this problem, however, would have meant extending the investigation to the preclassical period, which, as we have noted, is not covered by Gschnitzer. Our review of

¹ For the types of state described by the ancients as *ethnē*, *dēmoi* and *systemata dēmōn*, see pp. 75–76, 132, 135, 138, 163, 316–320; cf. index ss. vv.

Gschnitzer's position must therefore continue by taking into account data from before the classical period, as well as data from the classical and post-classical periods that escaped his attention.

(1) The ancient Greek distinction between *poleis*, *ethne* and *koina* ignores kingship and tyranny as a criterion for this division. The *polis*, the *ethnos* and the *koinon* are contrasted with the Hellenistic monarchy, not with traditional kingship or tyranny.

(2) By contrast, the *polis* was consistent both with traditional kingship and with tyranny. The *polis* is subject to the authority of a monarch in many passages: in the *Odyssey*, in Alcaeus, Sophocles, Euripides, Creophylus, Isocrates, Plato, Hyperides, Aristotle, Lycurgus, Ephorus, Memnon, Diphilus and Pseudo-Herodes. It is distinguished from the tyranny (not from the traditional kingship) in only three passages from the fourth century B.C.¹ Besides, in a passage of Aristotle, the *πολιτεία* (=constitution) is identified with the *πολίτευμα*, which is explained as 'the sovereign element of the *polis*' (*τὸ κύριον τῆς πόλεως*), which is said to consist either of a single person, or of a few, or of many: the view is formulated, that is, that the wielder of authority in the *polis* is sometimes a king or tyrant, sometimes a narrow group of citizens and sometimes a broad group.² Aristotle expresses this view in other passages, too.³ The number of people who wield power, however, is a characteristic of the type of constitution, not of the form of state – in this case the *polis*, whether it is a monarchy (with a king, or tyrant), or an oligarchy (an aristocracy or timocracy), or a democracy.

(3) There is also specific evidence that militates against Gschnitzer's division into 'dominations' and 'communities', the latter also including the *poleis*, the *ethne* and the *koina*. Gschnitzer himself acknowledges, as we have seen, that a number of states ruled by a king or a tyrant had features both of the 'domination' and of the 'community': the *ethne* of the Molossi and of the Macedonians, the *polis* of the Syracusans under Dionysius I and that of the Sidonians under Straton.

(a) In the case of the Molossi, the intermediate position adopted by Gschnitzer was influenced (i) by the existence of elected magistrates alongside the hereditary king, (ii) by the functioning of a popular

¹ v. i., pp. 175–181.

² v. i., p. 271.

³ v. i., pp. 65, 108, 250, 271–272, 288.

assembly (one of its competences being the awarding of political rights), and (iii) by the exchange of oaths between king and people.¹

(b) As for the Macedonian state, Gschnitzer bases his case not on facts, but on the view that in Macedonia there was some constitutional role for an assembly consisting of men liable to military service.² This view is not well founded.³ We may conjecture, on the basis of other evidence, however, that the Macedonian kings were not absolute monarchs. (i) The ancient texts draw a distinction between Philip or Alexander, and the state, which is referred to by the ethnic name Μακεδόνες: Diodorus states that Philip obliged the Paeonians to obey the Macedonians, and in another passage that he compelled the Thracians, the Paeonians and the Illyrians to join forces with the Macedonians; Arrian recalls Alexander's prayer for concord between and shared rule by the Macedonians and Persians.⁴ These authors are preserving formulae that they found in their sources, which were contemporary with Philip and Alexander. If people of Philip's time had identified the state with the kings, they would have said that Philip compelled the nations in question to obey himself; and Alexander would not have spoken of shared rule by the Macedonians and Persians. (ii) Philip acquired personal dominions on territory that he captured in the Chalcidice and in Thrace, and settled things south of Olympus according to his own will, but did not act in this way within Macedonia: it seems, therefore that sovereignty there belonged to the *ethnos* of the Macedonians.⁵ The fact that it was the kings of the Macedonians, rather than any other authority, that concluded treaties and took the oath means not that they were the state,⁶ but that they were acting as its representatives.⁷

(c) Gschnitzer's judgement in the case of the Syracusan and

¹ F.Gschnitzer, *Gemeinde und Herrschaft: von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung* (OeAW, Phil.–Hist. Kl., 235) (1960) 20–21.

² F.Gschnitzer, *op. cit.* 21–24.

³ R.M.Errington, *JHS* 94 (1974) 24ff; *idem*, *Chiron* 8 (1978) 77ff; E.Lévy, *Ktéma* 3 (1978) 201–225, esp. 213ff.

⁴ Diodorus XVI 4, 2; 22, 3; Arrian, *Anab.* VII 11, 9.

⁵ F.Hampl, *Der König der Makedonen* (1934) 22ff; F.Wüst, *Philipp von Makedonien und Griechenland 346–338* (1938) 108.

⁶ R.M.Errington, *JHS* 94 (1974) 20ff.

⁷ *v. i.*, pp. 101–108.

Sidonian states was influenced by the appearance alongside Dionysius I of magistrates and councillors¹ and alongside Straton of a citizen body of Sidonians.² It is curious that Gschnitzer does not also attribute the character of 'community' to the *poleis* of the Halicarnassians and the Salmakitae under Lygdamis, and of the Iasians and Koarendians under Maussollus, despite the fact that a popular assembly is attested there.³

(4) There are many other cases similar to those studied by Gschnitzer. (1) With regard to the relations between the king and his people, we may note the following: (1) All the Homeric societies were ruled by kings; these states, however, were known not by the name of the king, but by an ethnic name,⁴ just like the *ethne* and the *poleis* that had overthrown the monarchy.⁵ (2) A passage in the *Iliad* depicts a king being given an official domain by the people:⁶ this implies that the territory of the state belonged not to the king but to the community.⁷ (3) According to tradition, the Aenianes put one of their kings to death, before they arrived at Aenis, because they were suffering from a drought:⁸ implicit in this is the idea that it was the king's role to protect his people from disaster and, consequently, that the people could, and should, rid itself of a king who had lost the power to do so.⁹ It follows that the people owed allegiance to the king only so long as he fulfilled his obligations. The exchange of oaths between king and people, as does the exchange of oaths between the Molossi and their king referred to above seems to be a survival of this contract between king and people, as does the exchange of oaths between the kings of Sparta and the ephors, acting as representatives of the people. (4) The *polis* of the Idalians in Cyprus was governed by a diarchy consisting of the king and the citizens¹⁰ and Aeschylus projected a similar situation into the

¹ F.Gschnitzer, op. cit. 32-36; v. i., p. 103.

² F.Gschnitzer, op. cit. 25.

³ F.Gschnitzer, op. cit. 37-40.

⁴ v. i., pp. 378-392.

⁵ v. i., pp. 92ff.

⁶ *Iliad* VI 194.

⁷ v. i., p. 361.

⁸ Plutarch, *Qu. Gr.* XIII 294 A, XXVI 297 C.

⁹ M.B.Sakellariou, in *Aux Origines de l'Hellénisme, Hommage à Henri van Effenterre* (1984) 176.

¹⁰ v. i., pp. 181-182.

mythical past.¹ (5) The people of Delphi were also familiar with the idea of a diarchy of king and people: this may account for the fact that, in return for gifts offered to them by Croesus, they accorded privileges not only to Croesus himself, but also to his subjects,² as if the latter had been involved in the gifts. (II) In addition to the examples cited by Gschnitzer of the existence alongside a tyrant of elected magistrates, popular assemblies and other features of an ordinary 'community', we may cite the following: (1) In the treasury of the Sicyonians at Olympia Pausanias saw an inscription naming as dedicators the tyrant Myron and the Sicyonian people (middle of the seventh century B.C.).³ (2) Many tyrants retained the structure and the machinery of the *polis* and some of them respected the judgements of the courts; these facts demonstrate that they looked upon the 'community' as something to be reckoned with. (3) The tyrants did not detach themselves from their *poleis*:⁴ those of the Archaic period, in particular, and also the majority of the later tyrants wielded personal power within the *polis*, but did not create personal states.

(5) The most important, and most frequent, criterion used by Gschnitzer as a basis for classifying the *ethnos* and the *polis* ruled by a king or tyrant as a 'domination' rather than a 'community' is the fact that political societies governed by a ruler were referred to by his name in contrast to the ones under republican regimes which were referred to by the ethnic name of their citizens.⁵ This fact is open to a different interpretation, however. The state is represented both internally and externally by that element which the ancient Greeks called a *πολίτευμα*, and which Aristotle referred to as 'the sovereign element of the state', commenting at the same time that in some places this was confined to a single person (the king or tyrant), while in others it included a few

¹ v. i., p. 182.

² Herodotus I 54.

³ Pausanias VI 19, 4.

⁴ V. Ehrenberg, *Von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung* (SBHAW (1961) Abt. 3) 4, 27, 31f = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 120, 124ff.

⁵ F. Gschnitzer, op. cit. passim. There are many other examples: H. Bengtson, *Die griechischen Staatsverträge*, with a king (nos. 234, 236, 237, 249, 264, 275, 277, 298, 300, 315, 318, 327, 329, 336) or with a tyrant (nos. 240, 260, 281, 288).

people (the citizens of the oligarchies), and in yet others it embraced many (the citizens of the democracies).¹

B. *POLIS*: A KIND OF STATE

The definition of the *polis* as a state has the support of the great majority of scholars.² Some, however, have adopted an indirectly negative stance towards it, by counter-proposing that the *polis* should be assigned to the genus 'community',³ and others have objected to it explicitly; the latter are distinguished from the former by the fact that they do not make any positive proposal.⁴ Since the indirectly negative stance can only be discussed in terms of its positive aspect, we shall examine it later from this perspective.⁵ In contrast, the objections to the idea that the *polis* was a kind of state can only be discussed in the present context. We may first recall the essential points of the arguments that have been advanced in support of this criticism. (a) The concept expressed by the term *state* and its equivalent in other languages is not an ancient one. It was invented by Macchiavelli (1469–1527), who used the word *stato* to give expression to it. This word is descended from the Latin *status*, from the verb *stare*, 'to stand'.

¹ v. s., p. 62. F.Gschnitzer, op. cit. 21, commenting of the accession of Alcetas, king of the Molossi, to the second Athenian Confederacy, wonders if the necessary decision had also to have the approval of the assembly of the Molossi. The reasons he gives, however, to explain the lack of any reference to this body are incorrect. He claims that the community of the Molossi took no part in the taking of the decision, either because it would have taken time to summon the assembly, and there was no time to do so, or because Alcetas wanted to become a member of the confederacy as an individual – in order, for example, to acquire possessions outside the land of the Molossi, or in order to have the protection of the confederacy against rival claimants to his throne or against his subjects, should they rebel against him. But this treaty was not a secret, and would therefore have become known to the Molossi, who would have learnt that Alcetas had not acted in conformity with the laws of the state, to which he had sworn loyalty, in order to secure the allegiance of the Molossi to himself. It would thus have weakened rather than strengthened his position.

² v. s., pp. 29ff.

³ v. s., pp. 46–47.

⁴ v. s., p. 29.

⁵ v. i., pp. 77–78.

The word *status* was never used by the Romans in the sense of 'state', a concept that was unknown both to them and to the ancient Greeks. Words in other west European languages were formed on analogy with the Italian *stato*, such as *state* in English, *Staat* in German, and *état* in French.¹ (b) Modern writers use words such as *civitas* (in the Latin scholarly literature), *cit  *, *city*, *citt  *, etc., *city-state*, *  tat-cit  *, *citt  -stato*, *Stadtstaat*, etc., and even *polis*, *Polisstaat*, as the equivalent of the ancient Greek term $\pi\acute{o}\lambda\iota\varsigma$. Proof has never been supplied for this equivalence of meaning, however, either because it was regarded as self-evident, or because it was based on ancient texts that give expression to ideas about the *polis* and not to the reality.² (c) It follows from the above that: (i) the modern terms referred to do not reflect any historical reality; (ii) because of this, they do not mean the same thing for all the modern writers who use them; (iii) they are unproductive and damaging to the investigation of the question;³ (iv) there is a gap between the concept and the reality intended by the Greeks when they used the term $\pi\acute{o}\lambda\iota\varsigma$, on the one hand, and the concept and reality expressed by the modern terms *status* (in the Latin scholarly literature), *stato*, *state*, *Staat*, *  tat*, etc.⁴

Nonetheless, these observations were occasionally accompanied by an admission that it would be possible to arrive at an idea of the concept and reality designated by the term $\pi\acute{o}\lambda\iota\varsigma$ in antiquity, by applying the empirical method, which consists of the observation of facts. As I said before, I agree with this view, and am of the opinion that, in the present case, the required facts are those that compose the characteristic features of the phenomenon that was called $\pi\acute{o}\lambda\iota\varsigma$ by the ancient Greeks.⁵ These characteristic features should be compared with the characteristic features of the 'state'. If this comparison reveals essential similarities between the ancient *polis* and the modern 'state', there will be no further justification for doubting the actual and conceptual relationship between *polis* and 'state'. It is in precisely this way that the existence or not of states is inferred in regions and in

¹ H.Kr  ger, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (1964) 8ff; U.v.L  btow, in: *Festschrift f  r E. Heinitz* (1972) 89–109; W.Gawantka, op. cit. 24, 27, 107, 110, 190, 204–206.

² v. s., pp. 20–21.

³ v. s., p. 21.

⁴ v. s., p. 20.

⁵ v. s., pp. 20–21.

periods other than Greek antiquity that also lacked the concept 'state'. Otherwise we would not be able to speak of the ancient Egyptian state, the state of the Achaemenids, the Roman state, Arabic states, Far Eastern states, and many others.

It is worth recalling that Ehrenberg, Glotz, Starr, Borecký, Thomas and Lacey used characteristics associated with the concept 'state' to describe the *polis* (*Polis, cité, city-state, Stadtstaat*).¹ Gawantka inaccurately referred to Ehrenberg and Glotz amongst the writers he was censuring as having accepted without question that the *polis* was a state, and overlooked Starr, Borecký, Thomas and Lacey.²

Now that Gawantka has drawn attention to the problem, we must compare systematically the characteristic features of the 'state' with those of the ancient *polis*, in conformity with the requirements formulated by him. To this end, we shall first (i) recall the most important, and generally accepted features of the 'state'; then, (ii) agree as to what *polis* we are discussing, since the ancients used this term to refer to a variety of historical realities; and finally, (iii) describe its empirical characteristics, so as to be able to compare them with those of the 'state'.

(I) The concept 'state' has been defined in very different ways. Some of the characteristics attributed to it, however, have met with the agreement of all, or at least the majority, of scholars. The most concise definitions concentrate on three features: organized society, sovereignty and territory. These elements are combined in two different ways, producing two versions of this concise definition. According to one, the state is a human society connected with a territory and united under a common sovereignty. According to the other, the state is a territory, within which a single sovereignty is exercised over a human society. In each version, the predominant characteristic is the one that plays the role of the *proximum genus*: the concept of the 'human society' in the first, the concept of the 'territory' in the second.

The following features are attributed to the concept 'state' in the more extensive definitions. Sovereignty is exercised by an authority,

¹ v. s., pp. 48-49.

² v. s., pp. 48-49.

whether this consists of a single person or derives from an oligarchic or democratic body. The authority takes decisions, issues commands, and ensures that its commands are executed. To this end, it has at its disposal an institutional infrastructure and a legal system that extends into both public and private life. Legal system is understood in its broadest sense, so that custom law is included. The authority also determines, to a greater or lesser extent, the allocation of roles in the productive process (private or public ownership of the means of production), and of the distribution of the goods produced and the national income in general. In consequence, it becomes involved in the stratification of society by classes. In order to be able to fulfil all these functions and to have legal recourse to force, it makes use of ideology. In this way, it justifies its legitimacy, links the state with religion and cult, determines the orientation of education, etc.

It is further stated that, as a consequence of the exercise of authority and the fact that it is contested by groups who do not have access to it, the state is a space for class struggle and political action; it is also the setting for changes of regime, which give expression to the prevailing relations between the socio-political forces.

Finally, it is frequently noted that the state asserts itself to the outside world, as it strives for its existence. To this end it makes use of diplomatic and military means.

In terms of the dilemma whether the human society or the territory is the *proximum genus* of the concept 'state', I believe that only the former can be maintained logically. The true relationship between territory and state is this: the territory is the space within which the functions of the state are carried out and the sovereign authority holds sway.

The term 'state' is also used with the meanings of 'government of a state', 'state organization', 'instrument for the exercise of authority'.

(II) At this stage of the investigation, we are attempting to establish the definition of the ancient *polis*. It is therefore taken as an unknown. Consequently we cannot proceed to make comparisons between the ancient *polis* and the 'state'. This method would make use of the concept '*polis*' as a means of defining the content of the same concept – it would, in other words, lead us into a circular argument. It is legitimate, logically, however, to compare the concept 'state' separately

with each of the societies that the ancient Greeks called *πόλεις*. The vast amount of information at our disposal concerning some of these societies, and this kind of society in general, enables us to detect some of their real properties, without depending on ancient judgements or interpretations. We shall therefore investigate whether some of these common properties of the individual societies called *poleis* are the same as the properties exhibited by individual states, which form the concept 'state'. So we arrive at the third stage of our enquiry.

(III) We have already made an empirical observation: each of these *poleis* constitutes a separate society. They thus possess the feature that constitutes the genus of the concept 'state'. In addition, they have all the following features that distinguish 'state' from 'society'.

(1) Each of the ancient Greek *poleis* in this category had a single locus of power, whether of royal or tyrannical or aristocratic or timocratic character. Authorities invested with power made decisions, issued commands, and enforced the implementation of them, having at their disposal the means to achieve this peacefully and, should the need arise, by compulsion.

(2) The view according to which the ancient *poleis* did not really possess state territory, but merely land that they exploited economically, was based on a misinterpretation of the data.¹ An examination of the facts reveals that the *χώρα* of every ancient *polis* played precisely the same role as that played by territory in modern states: it was the space within which the *polis* exercised its sovereignty, whatever form this took. The laws and other decisions of the *polis* were valid throughout the *χώρα*.

(3) Each *polis* had its own economic framework, which eventually extended outside its *χώρα*: this happened when commodities and services were exported and imported. The *poleis* intervened in the most important sectors of the economy. We know of measures passed by a variety of *poleis* relating to landowning; the distribution of plots to members of the community; attempts to keep up the number of plots; rules governing the assigning of them; the forbidding of the ownership of land by foreigners, or the awarding to them of the right of ownership in exceptional cases. We also know of measures passed by *poleis*

¹ v. i., pp. 80–86.

relating to the distribution of income. Some of these measures regulate the distribution of agricultural produce between the owner of a plot of land and its cultivators. Others indirectly concerned the redistribution of national income by drawing on the savings of the rich (liturgies) and allocating money to the poor (*μισθοί, θεωρικά*). Finally, we know of various examples of *poleis* intervening in the internal market: imports of foreign goods, the forbidding of the export of domestic goods, regulation of prices, control of weights and measures, other market regulations, and also the existence of bodies charged with the implementation of the relevant legislation.

(4) The *poleis* took over from the private sector the avenging of murder. They also undertook the adjudication of disputes between private individuals who demanded the judgement of public justice. Other areas in which the *poleis* intervened in private life include sumptuary laws, laws regulating the morals and behaviour of individuals, and the protection of privately owned slaves against their owners.

(5) The *poleis* also had class divisions, with the attendant social, legal and political discrimination. Two primary economic classes may be distinguished, on the basis of the ownership or non-ownership of the means of production. Within the class that owned the means of production there gradually developed qualitative and quantitative differences: qualitative, in that to the landowners were added craftsmen, merchants, shipowners and bankers; quantitative, in that significant gradations of property arose. The class of the non-proprietors also became a composite one, including on the one hand the thetes, who were members of the community to which the local proprietors also belonged, and on the other those 'between free and slaves' (helots etc.) who were elements foreign to the community. Three basic and a greater number of secondary categories can be distinguished in terms of discrimination in the area of human rights. The basic categories are the free, those 'between free and slaves', and the slaves; to the original free men, i.e. the members of the community, were added the metics and the freedmen (formerly slaves and 'between free and slaves'), who though they were free enjoyed fewer rights and had greater obligations than the members of the community. The simplest pattern of political discrimination demarcated those who had political rights from those who did not. The *politai* ('the men of the polis') had rights that make them resemble the citizens of modern

states. In democratic regimes, the citizens consisted of all the adult men of the community, except those who had been deprived of their political rights by a judicial decision, and of all others (metics, other foreign residents, and freedmen) who had been granted citizen rights. In aristocratic or timocratic regimes a distinction was drawn between full, or active citizens, and others, who possessed reduced political rights. In the *polis* of the Lacedaemonians the full citizens were those called 'homoioi', while the citizens with reduced rights included various categories: the 'neodamodeis' (former helots), and the 'hypomeiones' (former citizens who had lost their rights, or individuals who would have become citizens on attaining maturity, had they been accepted by one of the clubs labelled 'phiditia' or 'sysstia'). The corresponding clubs in the Cretan *poleis* were called 'hetaireiai'. The men who, while members of the community, were excluded from these clubs were called 'apetairoi'. Some scholars believe that this term also included perioeci. The tyrants deprived the citizens of the real content of the rights they had enjoyed under the regimes they had abolished, leaving only their external appearance. Earlier, when the *poleis* were still headed by kings, the adult members of the nobility, or some of them, had some share in public affairs.

(6) All the regimes or constitutions associated with the ancient Greek *poleis* are to be found in modern states.

(7) The basic functions of the state – legislative (in the broadest sense of the word), executive and judicial – are also found in the ancient *polis*.

(8) Politics, too, were first practised in the ancient *poleis*, in which certain procedures were instituted for the first time, such as voting, control over the administration and systems of representation.

(9) The *poleis* behaved as states in conducting aggressive or defensive wars and entering into alliances.

Generally speaking each *polis* appears to us to have been a highly organized society based on class division and relationships of command and obedience: it was dominated by a privileged element and ruled by a government interlinked with this element.

Thus, in observing exclusively the properties, functions and behaviour of the ancient Greek *poleis*, we have recognized not only the basic, but also many of the secondary properties, functions and behaviour of modern states. It follows that the ancient *poleis* were the

same as states. And, to move from the level of the individual *poleis* to the level of the concept expressed by the term *πόλις*, we may claim that this has the main, and the most definitive of the secondary, features characteristic of the modern concept 'state'.

Gawantka also adduced the following argument in support of his view that the ancient Greek term *πόλις* should not be used by modern scholars: 'Da sich das Wort *πόλις* in den griechischen Quellen in sehr verschiedenen Bedeutungen findet – einen Traditionsbestand philologisch-historischer Forschung seit spätestens der Renaissance, den auch Ehrenberg nicht in Abrede gestellt hat – lässt sich durch das bloße Unterlassen, es zu übersetzen, notwendig gar nichts begrifflich (oder sonstwie) "festlegen", sondern es entsteht dann, wie bereits Bengtson treffend notiert hat, nichts weiter als ein neuer Name für die bis dahin geläufigen Begriffe, der um nichts weniger beliebig ist als diese.'¹ This argument of Gawantka's is completely justified in the light of the state of research at the time he articulated it. In fact, although it had been noticed that the term *πόλις* had many meanings in antiquity, no thorough study of the question had been undertaken. I too became aware of this need from the time I began to study the ancient polis-state, many years ago (in 1964). I therefore began to compile a compendium of the Greek sources with this purpose in mind. And I composed the section dealing with this problem before writing the rest of the present book. Since this section is too extensive to be incorporated here, it is presented separately as an excursus.² Here, I give a résumé of the conclusions reached there that contribute to the solution of the problem whether the word *πόλις* in antiquity also possessed the meaning of the modern word *state*.

Unfortunately, there is a gap in my evidence, which is due to the fact that I collected it before the publication of Gawantka's book: at the time, I considered it unnecessary to keep a record of the passages in which the term *πόλις* means 'state' in general, the more so as, in the beginning, I came across dozens of such references. I thus eventually recorded only passages of specific interest: those in which the polis-state is connected with a polis-settlement, and vice versa; those in which the

¹ W.Gawantka, op. cit. 24.

² v. i., pp. 161–211.

term *πόλις* is differentiated from the terms *ἔθνος* and *κοινόν* or is used instead of these terms; those in which the *πόλις* is linked with particular constitutions or with all of them. If I had foreseen the objections raised by Gawantka, I would also have kept a record of the passages in which the term *πόλις* means 'government', 'state organization' or 'state machine'.

However, many of the other meanings of the term *πόλις* that I noted presuppose the meaning of 'state'. I refer to the concepts 'citizens',¹ 'popular assembly',² 'political rights',³ 'land subject to some authority' (whether *polis* or ruler), and 'an organization distinct from its citizens'.⁴ All these concepts are undoubtedly connected with the concept 'state'. The fact that the ancients attached these meanings, too, to the term *πόλις* indicates that they felt that there was some relationship between the *polis* and these concepts. This relationship constituted a reality that was reflected in the minds of the ancients. Given this provision, the above meanings of the term *polis* are consistent with their having arisen from an extension of the concept 'state'.

Aristotle's *Politics* contains many observations of a factual nature, while others are indicated in its generalizing and theoretical passages. The reader will find an extensive treatment of the idea of the historical *πόλις* that is reflected in the *Politics* in an excursus.⁵ Many of the features that we moderns attribute to the concept 'state' can be recognized in his idea. Thus, the *πόλις*: (1) is described as the 'most sovereign *κοινωνία*' (=a sovereign association); (2) has *πολίται* who are defined as those who share in *πόλις* either as rulers or as ruled; (3) has a dominant element at the top of its social system (a monarch, an oligarchy or a broad body of citizens); (4) has authorities at its helm: a king or tyrant, a popular assembly, a council, courts, magistrates; these exercise authority and their jurisdiction covers three areas: deliberative, judicial and executive; (5) has a military force; (6) is an economically independent territory; (7) is also an area within which there is social

¹ v. i., pp. 191–197.

² v. i., pp. 197–203.

³ v. i., p. 204.

⁴ v. i., p. 205.

⁵ v. i., pp. 213–282.

stratification. Finally, we have definitions of the *polis* coined by the Stoics. They are essentially couched in these terms: (a) 'a system of humans', (b) 'dwelling in one place', (c) 'governed by law'.¹ All these terms are currently recognized as essential characteristics of the modern state.²

The *polis* thus emerges as having the features of a state from three different viewpoints: from the direct ancient evidence for the structure, properties and functions of the historic *poleis*; from the ancient meanings of the term *πόλις* that have a political content; and from the definitions of the *πόλις* formulated by Aristotle and the Stoics, as well as from many real features that helped to form the idea of the *πόλις* in the mind of Aristotle.

The *polis* was not the only kind of ancient Greek state. The ancient Greeks used the term *ἔθνος* to designate a second, and the term *δῆμος* a third. Moreover, the ancients had confederacies of *poleis*, for which they used the words *κοινόν*, or *ἔθνος*, and confederacies of *δῆμοι*, which they called *συστήματα δήμων*.

The idea that the term *ἔθνος* indicated, amongst other things, a kind of ancient Greek state could be disputed by adapting the argument advanced against the classification of the *polis* under the concept 'state' since the ancients did not have a word for 'state'; and since, although the ancient Greek word *ἔθνος* survives, its content is not political, it is impossible to bridge the conceptual gap between the ancient term *ἔθνος* and the concept 'state'. This argument can be countered, however, in the same way that it was countered in the case of the *polis* – that is, by comparing the properties and functions of organizations that are called *ἔθνη* in the sources with the properties and functions of the state. This comparison yields positive results in the case of the Macedonians, the Molossi, the Thesproti, the Chaones, etc. All these peoples are described as *ἔθνη*,¹ and all of them are represented as organized societies, under a central authority, with a class stratification and other hallmarks of the state. This is why they are generally considered to be states.

It is only a political society that can have citizens and bestow political rights on foreigners. These two features were exhibited by the

¹ v. i., pp. 285–287.

² v. s., p. 68.

Chaladrians when they issued the well-known decree in the first quarter of the fifth century B.C.¹ The name Chaladrians was an ethnic based on the name of a village in Elis. We know from another source that the city of Elis resulted from a synoecism after the Persian Wars, and that the corresponding *polis* was composed of demes.² It follows that the Chaladrians were a deme before the synoecism. A treaty between the Eleans and the Heraeans, of about 500 B.C., provides for measures to be taken against any private individual, or magistrate, or deme that violated it.³ Two conclusions may be drawn from this document: (1) The Eleans and the Heraeans were federations of demes; (2) the Eleans and the Heraeans could take decisions that were binding on their demes which, for their part, might disobey them. A further conclusion would be that at the date of this document and of the decree issued by the Chaladrians, which were contemporary, certain powers resided with the Eleans and the Heraeans, and certain others with their demes. In sum, we see that the relationship between a confederacy of demes and the demes themselves was similar to the relationship between a confederacy of *poleis* and the member *poleis*. The term *σύστημα δήμων*, known from Strabo,⁴ will clearly have meant a confederacy of demes. No independent states of the deme type are known in the historic period.

The coming together of demes into confederacies was obviously dictated by defensive considerations. The unification of a number of demes in a confederacy, of course, was not enough to secure their defence. At least one citadel would be needed, near a settlement or other site that could be used as a refuge.⁵ The settlement with the citadel would be called *πόλις*, to be sure, but the state would not be referred to by the same name, because it was not defined with reference to the polis-settlement.⁶

Just as the polis-settlements of the first centuries of the last millenium B.C., and a good many of those of historic times, were indistinguishable from the villages in terms of their population,

¹ *DGEEP*, no. 415.

² Strabo VIII 3, 2.

³ *SGHI* I, 17, 8-9: 'αἱ τε Φέτας αἱ τε φελεστά αἱ τε δᾶμος'.

⁴ Strabo VIII 3, 2.

⁵ V. Ehrenberg, *Der Staat der Griechen* I (1957) 18 = *The Greek State* (1960) 24 = *L'état grec* (1976) 54.

⁶ v. i., pp. 86-92.

productive activity and ekistic organization, so the corresponding polis-states were indistinguishable from the demos-states in terms of their demography, economy, social structures, state organization and public life.¹

C. POLIS: NOT A KIND OF 'COMMUNITY'

As we saw in the introduction to this chapter, some scholars, namely Max Weber, J.H.Hasebroek, H.Berve, H.Schaefer, W.Suerbaum, D.Nörr, M.I.Finley, J.Bordes, and Chr.Meier suggested that the *polis* should be assigned to the genus 'community' (*Gemeinschaft*, *Gemeinde*, *community*, *communauté*). Max Weber stressed, more precisely, that the community was composed of warriors dwelling in a settlement, which he himself described as a city with military functions. Yet, firstly, the adult residents of the polis-settlement did not constitute a class of warriors and, secondly, no distinction was drawn, with regard to their military obligations, between them and people living in other settlements of the same state. H.Schaefer and Chr.Meier have explicitly cast doubt as to whether the view that the *polis* was a kind of state is well founded. The former specifically criticized the rendering of the term *πόλις* by terms that expressed the modern concept 'state', and also the use of the word *πόλις* itself, which he described as unproductive. Chr.Meier strongly denied any connection between the *polis* and the 'state', stressing that the latter concept was valid only for modern times. H. Schaefer was the only one to justify his preference for the concept 'community': he considered it a neutral term, less loaded with conceptual implications. He himself claimed that the ancient term *κοινόν* was equivalent to 'community' in the sense that he meant it. M.I.Finley used the ancient Greek term *κοινωνία* for the same purpose.²

This view was rebutted by V.Ehrenberg who commented that the rendering of the ancient Greek term *πόλις* by the German *Gemeinde* was misleading, since the latter had no political content – hence its use in compound nouns such as *Dorfgemeinde* ('village community') and

¹ v. s., pp. 132ff.

² v. s., p. 46.

Kirchengemeinde ('church community') – and was better used in the sense of the ancient Attic *δῆμοι*. He also criticized the comparison between the German term *Gemeinde* and the ancient Greek term *κοινόν*, on the grounds that the latter has a variety of meanings.¹

At first sight, Ehrenberg's comment seems to be wide of the mark: merely to note the fact that a community does not have a political nature does not constitute a refutation of the position he is criticizing, since this position consists precisely of a denial that the *polis* has the character of a state, and the parallel between *polis* and community was drawn in order to prove that the *polis* did not have a political character. In fact, however, Ehrenberg has not committed the error he appears to have committed – that of assuming what is to be proved (*petitio principii*). In his book on the Greek state, as we have seen, Ehrenberg assigned to the *polis* many features which are characteristic of the state.² His observation therefore implies, as a given, that the *polis* should be classified as a 'state'. We have seen above in a more systematic fashion that the ancient Greek *poleis* had the properties and functions of a state.

Ehrenberg's admission that the concept 'community' was valid as a description of the entire citizen body of a *polis* is of relevance not to the problem of the genus to which *polis* belongs but, as he himself said, to a property of the *polis*. In other words, it deals with the level of the *species specifica*, to which we now turn.

II. *POLIS*: WHAT KIND OF STATE?

Having established that the ancient Greek *polis* had the structures, properties and functions of a state, we must now proceed with our investigation in order to formulate the definition of the term as precisely as possible. To this end we shall trace those features of the *polis* that distinguish it from the general concept 'state' and from parallel concepts of other kinds of state.

¹ V. Ehrenberg, *Von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung* (1961) 12–13= *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 107–108.

² v. s., p. 48.

We shall continue to apply the empirical method used above: that is, we shall observe phenomena that reveal the structures, properties and functions of particular *poleis*; whenever it proves necessary to refer to ancient judgements or ideas about the *polis*, these will be presented as such, and not as objective evidence or testimonia. We shall also continue to discuss the views that have been expressed on general or specific subjects that fall within the question of the definition of the *polis*.

We begin by recalling that the definitions of the *polis* as a kind of state may be divided into numerous groups and sub-groups.¹

(a) *Definitions based on constitutional criteria:*

(1) definitions that exclude constitutions with monarchs; (2) definitions that exclude both monarchies and aristocracies; (3) definitions that confine the *polis* to democracies.

(b) *Definitions that relate the polis to:*

(1) a polis-settlement; (2) a polis-settlement and the surrounding region; (3) a region that possibly had a polis-settlement.

(c) *Definitions that relate the polis to a group of people:*

(1) a tribe or a section of a tribe; (2) a community formed and defined with reference to locality; (3) a community of citizens-landowners; (4) a community that possessed territory around a polis-settlement; (5) the citizen body; (6) the citizen body inseparably connected with the territory; (7) a community without specification; (8) federated groups; (9) the entire society.

(d) *Definition that relates the polis to a place and a human group.*

(e) *A political entity recognized as polis.*

We shall examine the validity of these positions.

A. THE POLIS-STATE NOT TO BE DEFINED WITH REFERENCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA

All the definitions of the *polis* that take into account constitutional criteria² are erroneous, since they introduce into the concept 'state' elements that are foreign to it.³ But there are other objections, too.

¹ v. s., pp. 34–36.

² v. s., pp. 30–33.

³ v. s., p. 33.

(1) The view that the *polis* was a state not ruled by a monarch, has not been substantiated.¹ It is, moreover, contradicted by the fact that we know of many ancient *poleis* that were ruled by a king or a tyrant. In the historic period the kingship survived at Sparta, Mantinea, Argos, Cyrene, the *poleis* on Cyprus, and Panticapaeum. Tyrants did not dissolve the *poleis*. These continued to retain their legal infrastructure, though real power belonged to the ruler.²

(2) Similarly, the view that the *polis* came into being with the decline of aristocracy was simply asserted dogmatically³ and is refuted by observation of the facts, as well as by the circumstance that the ancients also applied the name *πόλις* to those that were ruled by aristocrats.⁴

(3) The confining of the *polis* to democratic constitutions was based on unreliable arguments. One of them consisted of the observation that the aristocrats had ties and interests that transcended the bounds of their *polis*;⁵ this fact, however, merely reflects the attitude of the aristocrats towards the *polis*. The second argument has to do with the fact that the decline of democracy coincided chronologically with the beginning of the decline of the *polis*; but this does not indicate a conceptual relationship between *polis* and democracy.⁶

B. *POLIS*-STATE, TERRITORY, *POLIS*-SETTLEMENT

1. *POLIS*-STATE AND TERRITORY

Of the scholars who have included territory in their definition of the *polis* some have assigned the concept *polis* to the genus 'state', and have asserted that the *species specifica* was the existence of a region around a polis-settlement,⁷ others, avoiding this genus, defined the *polis*

¹ v. s., pp. 30–31.

² H.Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen I* (1967) passim; D.Nörr, *Der Staat* 6 (1966) 362.

³ v. s., p. 33, v.i., pp. 175–181.

⁴ v. i., pp. 182–185.

⁵ v. s., p. 33.

⁶ v. s., p. 33.

⁷ v. s., pp. 34–36.

as a unit consisting of a polis-settlement and the countryside,¹ or the land,² or claimed that the *polis* was at the same time a community and a place.³ Other scholars have on the contrary denied the importance of territory for the *polis*.⁴

The recognition that territory was a feature of the *polis* does not involve a step from the concept 'state' to the concept of a kind of state since, as we have noted, territory is one of the characteristic features of the state. For this same reason, if it were possible for the *polis* to exist without territory, it would not be a state. But the *polis* was a state.⁵ It follows that a view that denies to the *polis* the possession of territory cannot be valid.

The discussion could end at this point. We shall continue, however, as though it were still an open question, in order to assess the arguments advanced for and against the view which holds that the polis-state could exist even without territory.

This view was advanced by F.Hampl and F.Gschnitzer in extensive studies.⁶ Hampl's main points are: (a) the ancient Greek definitions of the *polis* do not take the concept of 'state territory' into consideration; (b) the Greek language did not even possess a term capable of conveying this concept; (c) there are numerous examples of ancient *poleis* that did not possess territory; (d) the ancients also lacked the concept of territorial sovereignty. Gschnitzer assigned the category of *poleis* without territory to the broader category of dependent communities. With regard to the specific examples, he kept some of those cited by Hampl, but added some new ones. At the same time, he stressed that under normal conditions, Greek states did possess territory. He concluded, therefore, that: (1) for the ancient Greeks, territory was not a component element of the state (its spatial aspect), but an object that it held in its possession; (2) originally, the ancient Greek communities possessed not territory, but land on which they lived and from which they procured a livelihood; this land later acquired a political dimension, though this never became the

¹ v. s., p. 36.

² v. s., p. 36.

³ v. s., p. 42.

⁴ v. s., p. 42.

⁵ v. s., p. 42.

⁶ v. s., p. 42.

predominant aspect in men's thinking, and there were exceptions. Gschnitzer added that similar conditions were also to be found in ancient *ethne*, and in western Europe during the Middle Ages.

The basic idea of Hampl and Gschnitzer was quite widely accepted. A.Aymard, with the approval of F.W.Walbank and J.A.O.Larsen, agreed with Hampl's view as consistent with the idea that the ancients perceived the *polis* as a community of people.¹ Habicht, though objecting to Gschnitzer's work at many points,² admitted that the loss of a state's territory did not affect its existence.³ H.Schaefer advanced the idea that the *polis* was a state of citizens; he regarded the *χώρα* of the ancient states as private or public property, and agreed that independent political communities could exist on foreign territory.⁴

The idea was rejected categorically by G.Daux, V.Ehrenberg and C.Ampolo⁵ using arguments that will be evaluated below.

Claude Mossé adopted an intermediate position. On the one hand, she aligned herself with the view that the *polis* was identified with a community, but on the other she asserted that for the ancients this community was connected with territory.⁶ Her arguments, too, will be evaluated.

1 We first assess the arguments put forward in support of the view that territory was not essential for the polis-state. (a) The ancient Greek definitions of the *polis* did not take territory into account (Hampl). This argument falls within the sphere of the ancient perception of the *polis*, not within the sphere of objective observation. (b) The ancient Greek language had no term to convey the concept of 'state territory' (Hampl). It is likely, however, that the idea was covered by the term *χώρα*. (c) A Spartan army passed through Thessaly without seeking the permission of the Thessalians; the latter reacted as though it were

¹ *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques II* (1951) 183–184.

² F.Habicht, *Gnomon* 31 (1959) 704–711.

³ *op. cit.* 706.

⁴ H.Schaefer, *ZSS 77 Röm. Abt.* (1960) 429 = *Probleme der alten Geschichte* (1963) 391–392.

⁵ G. Daux, in *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques II* (1951) 184; V.Ehrenberg, *Von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung (SBHA)* (1961) 3, 21ff = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 115ff; C.Ampolo, in C.Ampolo (ed), *La Città antica* (1980) xxxii–xxxv.

⁶ Cl.Mossé, *REA* 55 (1953) 293; eadem, *La fin de la démocratie athénienne* (1962) 354–357; eadem, *REA* 65 (1963) 290–297.

property boundaries rather than national boundaries that had been violated; and the Spartan leader replied that there he did not need permission, since he was a friend and had acted according to the principle that one can make use of whatever a friend possesses (Hampl). This episode is not convincing evidence that the Greeks had no concept of national territory. And even if it were, it would be evidence for ancient perceptions, not proof of the fact that the ancient Greek states did not possess national territory. (d) The Athenians and the Boeotians agreed in the sixth century not to occupy Panactum, but to exploit it jointly (Hampl). This simply means that Panactum was not annexed by either of the parties, but remained an area to be exploited jointly in economic terms; the Athenians and the Boeotians had state territory (other than Panactum) over which they exercised their sovereign rights. (e) Themistocles, as arbitrator between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans, declared that Leucas should belong jointly to both these *poleis* (Hampl). The position of Leucas was similar to that of Panactum. (f) Philip did not annex the Chalcidice and Thrace to the Macedonian state, but made them part of his personal dominion (Hampl). However, (1) the Macedonian state was not a *polis*, and (2) the events referred to do not indicate that this state did not possess national territory.¹ (g) Citizens and metics co-existed on the same territory, which belonged to a *polis* (Schaefer). The citizens and the metics were not equal communities. The territory belonged to the citizens; the metics were guests on it, and stayed on terms prescribed unilaterally by the citizens. Moreover, the same argument could be used to deny the territorial basis of all modern states in which there are foreign residents. (h) Exiles constituted a *polis* without territory (Schaefer). This is merely a manner of speaking. Moreover, in our own era there have been governments in exile, established on foreign soil, and internationally recognized, but no one has thought on this account to exclude territory from contemporary definitions of the state. (i) Nicias, addressing the expeditionary force of Athenians and allies in Sicily after the destruction of the Athenian fleet, said: 'wherever you stop, you will immediately form a *polis*,... wherever you conquer, there will be your home, and your fortress'; and Isocrates represents Archidamus III, king of Sparta, as proposing the evacuation of the

¹ As we have seen (p. 63) the contrary is more probable.

polis by the Spartans, of whom the non-combatants would be settled elsewhere, while the men of military age would fight the enemy wherever they found them, making their home whatever place they conquered (Cl. Mossé). However, Nicias was using a rhetorical figure designed to persuade his soldiers to continue the struggle in Sicily as if they were defending their native soil. As for the proposal attributed by Isocrates to Archidamus, if implemented, this would have led not to the separation of the Spartan *polis* from its territory, but to its dissolution, since the non-combatant population would be dispersed to various parts of the world (Sicily, Cyrene, Asia Minor), while the men of military age would wage war on the move. In any event, this situation was to be nothing more than a temporary solution, until the defeat of Sparta's enemies. Moreover, in this passage, Isocrates does not use the term *πόλις* to describe any of the settlements for the non-combatants or the mobile camp of the combatants. (j) As soon as they lost their leaders, the ten thousand formed an organization that, in essence, was a *polis*, with a popular assembly and magistrates, but without territory (a view expressed by many writers). We are dealing here not with a *polis* separated from its territory, but with the behaviour of a military force that found itself leaderless, and reacted in accordance with the Greek experience of the *polis*.

2 The scholars who have rejected this negative view and asserted that territory was an indispensable component of the ancient *polis* have put forward arguments just as unreliable as those of their opponents. (a) The oath sworn by the Athenian ephebes and other texts reveal the devotion of the people of Attica to their land (Daux). This evidence takes us into the sphere of the sentiments and beliefs of the ancient Athenians, and does not lead to an objective perception of the concept expressed by the term *πόλις* along the lines of our methodological requirements.¹ (b) The Greek political theorists of the fourth century B.C. regarded territory as an essential feature of the *polis*, having concerned themselves with the question of the site of the ideal *polis* and the extent of the *polis* itself (Mossé). It is quite clear, however, that these speculations have nothing to do with the scientific concept of state territory. (c) The ancient *polis* was founded on the identity of its

¹ v. s., pp. 68ff.

citizens with people owning land on its territory (Ampolo).¹ However, firstly, this identity ceased to exist with aristocracy; and non aristocratic regimes, such as timitocracies and democracies, are certainly to be found within polis-states;² secondly, it has no logical consequences for the question of state territory. (d) The importance attached to the drawing of boundaries demonstrates that territory was regarded not merely as the property of the citizens, but as the space within which the *polis* exercised its authority (Ehrenberg). This was simply the natural reaction of entities that had an interest in the fixing of the boundaries of the space in which they would exercise sovereign rights.

In reviewing the discussion as to whether or not a *polis* could exist without possessing territory we stated that the arguments put forward in support of the one view or the other are in effect inadequate. But the question may be resolved on the grounds of the definition of the *polis* as a kind of state. As we have seen, territory is one of the features of state. One of the reasons for assigning the *polis* to the concept 'state' was precisely the observation that the historical *poleis* enjoyed sovereignty within the boundaries of a region that they owned and protected from enemy attack. The written and unwritten rules of justice, and the decisions of the governing bodies, held good and were enforced throughout the entire extent of this region, which would not have been the case if it were not state territory.

The researches of Hampl and Gschnitzer have indisputably revealed a category of *poleis* that were located on territory that did not belong to them. These were (1) the colonies of *poleis* that retained sovereignty over a territory and (2) *poleis* whose territory, as a result of warfare, came into the possession of the Athenians, who settled cleruchs on it. All these *poleis* (1 and 2), however, were sovereign states. Their obligations to the *poleis* that owned the territory on which they were located (financial contributions, military assistance) meant that they were subordinate, but not that they were not states. This fact was recognized by the land-owning *poleis* that signed treaties with them (cf. the examples in the works of Hampl and Gschnitzer). The *poleis*

¹ This view has been advocated by K. Marx and is supported by all Marxists (v. i., pp. 111-116).

² v. i., pp. 116-124.

'without territory' thus enjoyed sovereign rights.¹ The cleruchies, of course, belonged not only legally and economically, but also politically, to the *polis* from which the cleruchs originated; the territory of a cleruchy formed part of the territory of this *polis*.

2. *POLIS*-STATE AND *POLIS*-SETTLEMENT

A largely admitted view maintains that the characteristic difference of the *polis* within the broader concept 'state' was its connection with a city. Marx and the Marxists directly relate the particular character of the *polis*-state (Greek and Roman) to the particular character of the central settlement connected with it. Marx described this settlement as a 'centre for the conduct of war'. Marxists have added that it was the first in history to be distinguished from the countryside on the basis of the division of the producers into peasants and non-peasants.² According to W.W.Fowler, G.Busolt, V.Ehrenberg, F.Tritsch, M.Austin and P.Vidal-Naquet the city was essential for the *polis*-state.³

Views diametrically opposed to the above position are held by other scholars, among whom Ch.Starr believes that the *polis* was formed independently of urbanization⁴ and D.Kagan holds that it was not a state defined by a city, but a state in which political life was based on justice.⁵

An intermediate opinion is that of J.Kaerst and F.Gshnitzer, stating that the decisive characteristic of the *polis* was not the existence of an urban centre, but the concentration therein of political life.⁶ This opinion in fact relates the *polis* to political life and indirectly to the urban settlement.

¹ The *polis* that did not own its territory was at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the *polis* to which the territory belonged: if it was founded on foreign territory, it was disadvantaged from the outset; if it lost the territory it owned, this occurred because it found itself in a weak position compared with the *polis* that gained control over its territory. Rights of ownership over territory meant political independence; lack of such rights went hand in hand with political dependence.

² v. s., p. 40, v. i., pp. 429-430.

³ v. s., pp. 34-35.

⁴ v. s., p. 35.

⁵ v. s., p. 35.

⁶ v. s., p. 35.

Thus, we are called upon to answer three questions: (I) Was there a relationship between polis-state and polis-settlement? (II) What was the nature of that settlement? (III) Was the relationship between the polis-state and this kind of settlement such as to characterize the polis-state and to constitute part of its definition?

(I) Was there a relationship between polis-state and polis-settlement? The fact that the ancient Greeks used the same word, *πόλις*, to indicate a kind of settlement and a kind of state demonstrates that they saw in the polis-settlement a definitive characteristic of the *polis*. We, today, quite independently of the ancients, observe that every *polis* included a settlement that was called *πόλις*. It is therefore beyond dispute that the *polis* was a state that had some connection with a settlement described by the same word, *πόλις*.

(II) What was the nature of the settlement called *πόλις* by the Greeks? The type of settlement the ancient Greeks used to call a *πόλις* is nowadays identified with a city or town. A city or town has been described in different ways, depending on the criteria being used. The criteria amount to about a hundred.¹ But every definition involves a selection of them.

The economic criteria are by far the most common, and there is perhaps no definition in which they are not present. Moreover many scholars have restricted themselves to the economic criteria. It is at this point that K.Marx, R.Sombart, Max Weber, and later the Marxists and many non-Marxist scholars find common ground. Marx declared that the division of labour into three branches, agriculture, manufacturing and commerce, led to the creation of cities in which the people involved in manufacturing and commerce concentrated, while the countryside remained the area of agricultural production.² Sombart defined the city as a settlement whose inhabitants lived on agricultural goods produced by others.³ Weber on the one hand made the economic criteria stricter, adding that the city satisfies a large proportion of its needs by means of

¹ M.I. Finley, *CSSH 19* (1977) 307–308 = *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* (1981) 5–6.

² v. i., pp. 429–430.

³ W.Sombart, *Der moderne Kapitalismus II* (1902) 222–233 = 2nd edn, I (1916) 142–143.

a local market, which is supplied with agricultural goods produced solely in order to be sold; on the other hand, he conceded that the city can exist without a market if it has politico-administrative functions, or fortifications or a garrison.¹ The formulations of the economic criteria by modern sociologists, historians and economists agree on the following points: the city is a centre of secondary and tertiary activities and a consumer of the products of primary production, which is carried on outside it.

Social, in addition to the economic, political and legal criteria appear in definitions of the city less often than the economic ones. The Marxist school lays stress on the transfer of surplus value from the countryside to the city and the consequent conflict of interests between the inhabitants of the one and the inhabitants of the other. Both Marxists and non-Marxists take into account the political and legal inequality between the one group and the other.

The next most common criteria for the city are the size of the population, the existence of town planning, a technical infrastructure – roads, water-supply, drainage and public works.

These hallmarks, however, are not all of equal importance. The city begins to be distinguished from the village when it becomes a centre for distinct productive functions. Social and political inequalities reflect economic ones. The remaining features affect the quality of life, which improves thanks to the wealth accumulated in the city in general and amongst certain elements of the population in particular.

Research into the urban phenomenon in antiquity has adopted an approach that either explicitly or implicitly makes use of modern criteria, and that takes no account of facts implying that the modern city is not always the same thing as the ancient Greek polis-settlement. Indeed, the ancient Greeks used the word *πόλις* not only of settlements in which activities and functions associated with modern cities were to be found, but also of settlements which were not cities according to our criteria, but townships or villages; on the other hand, they did not call the Peiraeus a *πόλις* though it was a centre of secondary and tertiary activities.

What was it that made the ancient Greeks call some settlements

¹ Max Weber, *ASWSP* 47 (1921) 621ff = Haase (ed), *Die Stadt des Mittelalters*, 3rd edn, I (1978) 41–66.

πόλεις rather than *δῆμοι* or *κῶμαι*? What distinguishes the settlement that was called *πόλις* by the ancients from the settlement that we call city? These two questions may be answered by taking into account: (1) the original meaning of the word *πόλις* and (2) empirical observations.

(1) The word *πόλις* originally meant a naturally protected site where the population of a region could take refuge in time of danger; it was then used to refer to a fortified site; and later still to a settlement protected by a naturally or artificially defended site, even if the settlement itself was not surrounded by a defensive wall. This evolution in the meaning of the word took place at an early date: it is attested in certain passages in the Homeric poems.¹

(2) It is empirically observable that a common feature of the settlements that were called *πόλεις* was the existence of a citadel. But not all settlements displaying this feature were so called. This was true of Peiraeus and of some other agglomerations in Attica. This merely indicates that in these cases at least the word *πόλις* was eventually confined to the settlement that was, additionally, also the political centre of the state.² It would be advisable not to include here the cases of Megara, Aegium and Patrae in some passages of Strabo. All three were situated beneath a citadel; yet Strabo reports that the polis-state of the Megarians had been preceded by a confederacy of *mere*, one of which was Megara, and that the polis-states of the Aegieis and of the Patreis had been constituted by the fusion of a number of previously federated *demoi*, among which were Aegium and Patrae.³ The fact that Strabo used here the terms *μέρος* and *δῆμος* does not permit the inference that Megara, Aegium and Patrae were not called *poleis* in these early days, although they were protected by citadels, for he had in mind not settlements but members of federations. In such cases a settlement could very well be called a *πόλις* on account of its association with a citadel, although being a *δῆμος* or *μέρος* in other respects. The same is true of Helisson after its *sympoliteia* with Mantinea: in political terms, it became a *κῶμη*; in terms of ekistics, it remained a *πόλις*.⁴

¹ v. i., pp. 155–159.

² v. i., pp. 159–162.

³ v. i., pp. 317, 320–321.

⁴ v. i., pp. 159, 321.

Nor did the polis-settlements of ancient Greece that had secondary and tertiary production always resemble settlements that are today regarded as cities. The city that evolved in western Europe during the late Middle Ages and in modern times, and which has been used as a model for the understanding of the urban phenomenon in other civilizations, enjoyed an advantaged position *vis-à-vis* the countryside economically, socially, and sometimes also politically. For it has been observed that: (a) the exchange of commodities and services between the city and the countryside was in favour of the former; (b) the upper social classes were concentrated in the cities, while the peasants were counted amongst the lower classes; (c) some cities exercised political domination over the countryside. In ancient Greece, however, these phenomena were rarely found together in the same society before the Hellenistic era. Two other cases were far more common. The great majority of polis-states had all their population concentrated in a single settlement regardless of their legal, economic and social position. In the remainder, the population was spread over the whole territory again without legal, economic and social distinctions.¹ Similarly the view that *poleis* generally came into being as a result of the differentiation of social classes attendant upon urbanization and the subsequent predominance of one of these classes, is implied by what actually happened in western Europe during the Middle Ages and at the dawn of modern times. Here, at this time, the cities arose from villages, and some of them became states, detaching themselves from feudal masters. These two processes also occurred in ancient Greece, but they are confined geographically to Thessaly and Macedonia and chronologically to the fifth and fourth centuries.² The Greek world was much more familiar with states centred on settlements which were called *πόλεις*, but which did not necessarily have an urban character. These states were created as a result of the stratification of society into classes that preceded urbanization.

There were polis-settlements in Greece even before the period with which the present study is concerned. Only one of these early settlements survived until this period without a break, and became the

¹ M.B.Sakellariou, *A Contribution to the Study of the City in the Greek Commonwealth to 330 B.C.* (forthcoming).

² v. i., pp. 322–323, 325, 408, 410, 457–460.

seat of a polis-state: Athens. The groups of Dorians who established themselves in polis-settlements in the NW Peloponnese, in Rhodes and in Crete, and the groups of Ionians and Aeolians who founded similar settlements on the islands and along the continental coastline of the eastern Aegean subjected earlier populations to their rule and compelled them to surrender part of the product of their labour. Similar conditions led to the creation of states by groups of migrants or refugees, who established themselves not in polis-settlements but in villages or demes.¹ The earliest of the settlements founded by migrants – invaders, refugees or colonists – go back to the eleventh century B.C.² But the process of proto-urbanization only began in the ninth century, and even then in very few polis-settlements. The beginnings of this process are marked by the appearance of the first indications of secondary production and commerce. The commencement of urbanization proper may be assigned to the sixth century, when permanent markets began to operate, wider use was made of slaves in the production of artefacts and in the service sector, and the use of money became general.³

Thus, it is true neither that the polis-state was characterized by the existence of an urban centre, nor that the absence of such a settlement constituted a feature of the ethnos-state, as V.Ehrenberg believed.⁴ Not only ethnos-states and as yet unurbanized polis-states, but also demos-states and archaic *mere* lacked an urban centre.⁵

(III) The connection between the polis-settlement and the polis-state can be seen by taking into consideration the fact that the polis-states did not have the names of polis-settlements (e.g. Ἀθῆναι, Κόρινθος), but were referred to by an ethnic derived from a name of such a settlement (e.g. Ἀθηναῖοι, Κορίνθιοι). The same fact can be observed apropos of an ethnic name such as Χαλάδριοι. The polis-states and the demos-states were, then, connected directly with a human group and indirectly with a polis-settlement or a demos-settlement. The polis-

¹ v. i., pp. 302–316.

² v. i., pp. 402–403.

³ M.B.Sakellariou, op. cit.

⁴ v. s., p. 34.

⁵ Herodotus I 145.

settlement or the demos-settlement defined not the polis-state or the demos-state, but the human group connected with the polis-state or the demos-state. We now turn to the question of the nature of this group and its precise relationship to the polis-state or the demos-state.

C. THE POLIS-STATE DEFINED BY ITS CONNECTION WITH A HUMAN GROUP

A large number of scholars are of the view that the specific feature that distinguished the concept of *polis* within the broader concept 'state' was its connection, or identification, with a human group. They disagree, however, as to the extent of this group: some think that it consisted of the citizens,¹ others include in it the members of their families,² and a third position extends the *polis* to the entire population,³ going so far as not to exclude the slaves.⁴

From another viewpoint, the *polis* has been regarded as a community deriving from an *ethnos* which carries the implication that it did not include foreign elements.

The idea that the *polis* consisted of a human group is an ancient one, as is the disagreement as to the extent of the group. (1) The term *πόλις* occurs in many ancient texts with the same force as the term *πολίται* (citizens)⁵ but there are also passages, especially in the tragedians, where the *πόλις* appears to extend to the families of the citizens.⁶ (2) Aristotle, too, gave varying degrees of width to the concept expressed by the term *πόλις*: in some passages he confines the *polis* to the citizens alone;⁷ in others he widens it to encompass the women,⁸ in others he includes the children of the citizens;⁹ in others he adds all free individuals;¹⁰ and in yet others he admits even the slaves within the

¹ v. s., pp. 41–42.

² v. s., pp. 38–39, 43.

³ v. s., pp. 39, 44–45.

⁴ v. s., p. 37.

⁵ v. i., pp. 191–197.

⁶ v. i., pp. 185–191.

⁷ v. i., p. 269.

⁸ v. i., p. 270.

⁹ v. i., p. 270.

¹⁰ v. i., p. 270.

polis.¹ (3) There is a corresponding fluctuation in the extent of the term *πολιται* (citizens): sometimes this refers only to those who possessed political rights, and sometimes it also includes their wives (who are called *πολίτιδες*).² (4) Finally, the ethnic names Ἰθηναῖοι, Κορίνθιοι, Μιλήσιοι, Μασσαλιῶται etc., refer specifically to the citizens of the states in question only in texts that have a political content.³ Elsewhere they refer to a broader group, to which the wives and children of the Ἰθηναῖοι, etc., belonged; this is the case, for example, in formulations in which names of this kind occur as the subjects of verbs meaning ‘recount’, ‘believe’, ‘are accustomed to’, ‘worship’ etc.

As we saw above, however, direct observation of the particular characteristics and functions of several *poleis* demonstrates that they included the entire population that dwelt on their territory, without reference to age, origin and class. Citizens with full or reduced rights, perioeci, metics, freedmen, helots, slaves, and the wives and children of men in each of these categories, were subject to the laws of the *polis*, and those members of them that were in a position to work contributed to the process of production within the framework of the economy of the *polis*.⁴ It is thus only the broadest of the ancient and modern views as to the extent of the *polis* that receives confirmation. How is it, then, that the ancient Greeks also gave narrower meanings to the *polis*? The

¹ v. i., pp. 270–271.

² v. i., pp. 270–271.

³ In Syria the state was designated by the ethnic name in the singular, as if it were a person: G. Buccellati, *Cities and Nations of Ancient Syria* (1967) 97. The same idea finds expression in two Greek inscriptions, though in a different fashion: the *koinon* of the Oreioi and the *koinon* of the Achaeans take the oath in the first person singular (H. Bengtson, *SVA* nos. 468 and 499).

⁴ cf. E. Will, *Le monde grec et l’Orient* (Peuples et civilisations, II) (1972) 432: ‘Une saine compréhension de la *polis* grecque à l’époque classique exige donc que l’on distingue soigneusement entre les *structures politiques*, qui n’impliquent que les citoyens, et les *structures socio-économiques*, qui les incluent mais les dépassent’; C. Nenci, *ASNSP*, ser. III, vol. IX 2 (1979) 462–463: ‘E se la città è apparentemente un insieme coerente di cittadini teoricamente uguali, di fatto una città, e soprattutto una grande città greca, è un insieme incoerente di abitanti niente affatto uguali’; G. E. M. de Ste Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (1981) 281: ‘What we call “the state” was for the Greeks the instrument of the *politeuma*, the body of citizens who had the constitutional power of ruling’; F. Kolb, *Die Stadt im Altertum* (1984) 59–60: The polis was a ‘sich selbst verwaltende Bürgergemeinde’; H. Van Effenterre, *La Cité grecque* (1985) 251: ‘les Inférieurs... sans être vraiment de la Cité, sont tout de même dans la Cité’.

reason is the same one that leads us today, when we use the term 'state', to mean sometimes an organized society under a single authority, sometimes the dominant element within this society, sometimes the bearers of authority, sometimes the state machine, and sometimes something more abstract and transcendental.

Despite the evident fact that the extent of the *polis* is necessarily implied by its very character as a kind of state, it is worth examining the arguments adduced in support of those views which restrict the *polis* to a community from which the metics, the freedmen and others were excluded, or to the citizens alone.

1. THE *POLIS*-STATE NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH ITS CITIZENS

The view that the *polis* was identified with its citizens is the most widely held, and is supported by more, and more extensive, arguments than the others. Let us examine them carefully.

(I) *The Names of the Polis-States*

It has been asserted that ethnic names such as *Ἀθηναῖοι*, *Κορίνθιοι*, *Μιλήσιοι*, *Μασσαλιῶται* were used exclusively to refer to the citizens of the respective *poleis* collectively or as a body, while they were engaged on some political function.¹ This view is erroneous for the following reasons. (a) As we have just seen, names of this type were sometimes used with reference also to the members of the families of the citizens.² (b) Even in those cases where such names have a political content, this does not imply that the *polis* was to be equated with its citizens. In ancient Greek inter-state treaties the contracting parties are referred to sometimes by names of the type just mentioned,³ and sometimes by the names of kings or tyrants.⁴ It follows that if the ethnic names indicate an identity between the state and its citizens, the personal names should indicate an identity between the state and the

¹ v. s., p. 41.

² v. s., p. 93.

³ H.Bengtson, *SVA* nos. 186, 231, 238, 242, 249, 257, 260, 264, 275, 277, 298, 300, 301, 303, 306, 307, 308, 309, 314, 315, 318, 319, 327, 329, 330, 333, 336, 402, 403 etc.

⁴ H.Bengtson, *op. cit.*, nos. 239, 240, 246, 247, 249, 257, 261, 276, 280, 281, 286, 288, 322 etc.

king or tyrant. But even Philip II and Alexander the Great, the two most powerful kings in the Greek world before the Hellenistic period, were never represented as being the Macedonian state. This was always indicated by the name of the Macedonians. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that Philip and Alexander were not absolute monarchs within the boundaries of Macedonia.¹ The ethnic or personal names in inter-state treaties indicate not the state, but the highest authority in it, which is acting in this capacity to bind the state.² (c) According to Aristotle, the citizens constituted not the *polis* but the 'dominant element of the *polis*' (τὸ κύριον τῆς πόλεως) under republican regimes.³ The concept of 'dominant element of the state' corresponds to the modern concept 'element that is in control of the state'. (d) As we have seen, the perioeci, the metics, the freedmen, the serfs, and the slaves formed part of the *polis*,⁴ and they will certainly not have been included in the ethnic names *Ἀθηναῖοι* etc.

(II) *The Distribution of Public Revenues amongst the Citizens*

There is a considerable body of evidence demonstrating that the ancient Greeks used to distribute amongst the citizens the public revenues deriving from confiscations, fines and the mines.⁵

The verbs used to express the concepts of confiscation and the fine are instructive in this respect: *δημεύειν*, *δάσσασθαι*, *παματοφαγεῖσθαι*. The first of these, which passed from the Attic to the Doric dialects of the northern Peloponnese⁶ and to Locrian,⁷ before spreading to other dialects of the Doric group and to Aeolic, clearly means 'hand over to the people'. The third verb, which is attested in an Archaic inscription from Naupactus,⁸ is a compound of the plural of the word *πάμα*

¹ v. s., pp. 69, 83.

² The regime involving a dyarchy between king and citizens does not fall in the category of monarchy.

³ v. s., p. 62. G.F.Schömann, *Griechische Alterthümer*, 3rd edn I (1871) 106 and W.L. Newmann, *The Politics of Aristotle*, I (1887) 230, mistakenly believed that the monarch was the only citizen in a monarchy: he was in fact the 'dominant element of the city'.

⁴ v. s., pp. 71–72.

⁵ K.Latte, *NAWG*, *Phil.-Hist. Kl.* (1946–1947) 64–75.

⁶ *DGEEP*, no.78; *IvO*, no. 22 (from Megara?).

⁷ *IGIDS* no. 46.

⁸ *SIG*, no. 47 (fifth century).

‘property’, and the stem of *φαγεῖν*: it thus means ‘to give things (to the people) to eat’. The second verb, which occurs in an early inscription of Mantinea¹ has a more general meaning than the previous two: ‘to distribute’.

In the second half of the sixth century, the Siphnians discovered gold and silver mines on the island: nine tenths of the annual income from these mines was distributed amongst the Siphnians, and the remainder was devoted to the construction of a splendid treasury at Delphi.² In 484/3 the Athenians discovered a great quantity of silver at Laurium. Their original intention was to distribute it amongst themselves, and it was only the war with Aegina that made them agree to Themistocles’ proposal and use it to build a fleet.³ In the light of these two events, Theognis’ meaning becomes clearer when he complains that after the fall of the aristocracy, there was no longer a ‘fair distribution in the midst of the polis’.⁴ The Athenians reverted to this method of disposing of state funds towards the end of the fourth century: the proposal came from Lycurgus, and the revenues in question derived from a fine.⁵ A law of the Drerians (late third - early second cent. B.C.) ordained that the income raised from a particular fine should be distributed between the *hetaireiai* of the *polis*, and also amongst the citizens who were away from the city carrying out their military service on the borders.⁶ Since all the citizens were members of *hetaireiai*, it has properly been observed that the distribution of this income amongst the *hetaireiai* was tantamount to its distribution amongst the citizens.⁷ Another document from Crete, a treaty between

¹ *DGEEP* no. 661. cf. K. Latte, *op. cit.* 66.

² Herodotus III 57.

³ Herodotus VI 144; Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 22, 7; Polyaeus, *Them.* 4; Cornelius Nepos, *Them.* 4.

⁴ Theognis 678: ‘δασμός δ’ οὐκέτ’ ἴσος γίνεται ἐς τὸ μέσον’.

⁵ Pseudo-Plutarch, *Vitae decem oratorum* 843d: ‘καὶ θανάτου ὄντος ἐπιτιμίου ἀλῶναι ἐποίησε καὶ πεντήκοντα δραχμὰς ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ἐκάστω τῶν πολιτῶν διένειμε, τῶν πάντων συναχθέντων ταλάντων ἑκατὸν ἐξήκοντα ἤ, ὡς τινες, μῶν’. cf. comments of K. Latte, *op. cit.* 72.

⁶ *IC*, I, no. 1 line 123ff: ‘ὄ,τι δὲ κα πράξον|τι, ταῖς ἑταιρείαισιν | δασσάσθωσαν ταῖς | ἐμ πόλει καὶ αἱ πεῖ | τινεν οὐρεῦων(τι) Δρήριοι. | αἱ δὲ μὴ πρά[ξαι] | ἐν ἁ βωλά, αὐ[τοῖ] | τὰ διπλόα ἀ[ποτεῖ] | σάντων, πρα[ξάν] | των δὲ οἱ ἐρευται οἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων | καὶ δασσάσθωσαν | ταῖς ἑταιρείαισιν | κατὰ ταῦτά’.

⁷ K.Latte, *op. cit.* 68.

the Gortynians and the Rhizenians (late fifth cent.), contained a provision for the distribution of fines during a military undertaking amongst the men of the expeditionary force and the Rhizenians.¹

Whereas the Spartan citizen contributed produce from his own plot to the *syssition* (mess) to which he belonged, the *syssitia* of the Cretan polis-states fed their members from the produce of land and flocks that belonged to the community.² In one of the Cretan polis-states, Lyttos, however, there had been a distribution of plots of land, as at Sparta: the Lyttioi accordingly supplied their *syssitia* from private produce, but nonetheless continued to distribute the revenues of the *polis* amongst the families.³

The distribution amongst the citizens of the income of the *polis* derived from public property, confiscations and fines has been seen as an indication that the *polis* was not regarded as distinct from its citizens, and that public property was reckoned to be the common property of all.⁴ This latter idea seems to be expressed concisely in a passage of Andocides: 'For since the polis belongs to all the citizens, the goods acquired by the polis also belong to them'.⁵

In all the cases referred to above, however, it is difficult to distinguish the citizens from the families, since the wealth or provisions distributed were consumed by all of them; in fact, in these circumstances, the citizens were acting as heads of households. Moreover, the distribution of some of the income of a *polis* to its members appears to

¹ IC, IV no. 80 lines 6–7: 'δαμιῶμεν δὲ δαρκνὰν καὶ κατακρῆθ(θ)αὶ πεδὰ τε τὸ σταρτὸ καὶ πεδὰ τὸν Ριττενίῳν' cf. K. Latte, op. cit. 67.

² Aristotle, *Pol.* 1272 a 17: 'ἀπὸ πάντων... τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημάτων δημοσίων καὶ ἐκ τῶν φόρων οὓς φέρουσιν οἱ περίοικοι, τέτακται μέρος τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς κοινὰς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ τοῖς συσσιτίοις, ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεσθαι πάντας'. cf. K. Latte, op. cit. 68–72.

³ Dosiadas 458 *FGrH* 2 = Athenaeus IV 143a: 'Οἱ δὲ Λύττιοι συναγόουσι μὲν τὰ κοινὰ συσσίτια οὕτως· ἕκαστος τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν ἀναφέρει τὴν δεκάτην εἰς τὴν ἑταιρείαν καὶ τὰς τῆς πόλεως προσόδους δὲ (Latte ἄς cod.) διανέμουσι οἱ προεστηκότες τῆς πόλεως εἰς τοὺς ἑκάστων οἴκους'. cf. K. Latte, op. cit. 68.

⁴ K. Latte, op. cit. 75; F. Gschnitzer, *WS* 68 (n. s. 18) (1955) 121 n 4; V. Ehrenberg, *Von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsformen* (SBHAW, Hist.–Phil. Kl. (1961) Abt. 3) 17 = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 112. The last named, however, rejects the opinion of the first that the community as a group did not coincide with the sum of its members.

⁵ Andocides II 1: 'εἴπερ γὰρ ἡ πόλις ἀπάντων τῶν πολιτευομένων κοινὴ ἐστὶ, καὶ τὰ γινόμενα δήπου ἀγαθὰ τῇ πόλει κοινὰ ἐστὶ'.

be a relic of the primitive communism found in pre-political societies. What was said above about the Cretan *poleis* attests to the survival of this type of communism in the archaic phases of the *polis*. It seems that after it was abolished, consumer goods continued to be distributed to the households through their heads.

(III) *The Responsibility of the Citizens for the Discharge of Public Debts*

‘Since public property belongs indivisibly to each citizen, each citizen is jointly responsible for the obligations of the state and its subjects.’¹ The evidence cited in favour of this view may be divided into three groups.

Only the first of these offers any indication that the citizens were collectively responsible. The *polis* of Coresia, on Ceos, borrowed money from the temple of Apollo, with the estates of the citizens as security (fourth century).² Two inscriptions from Arcesine on Amorgos (end of the fourth century, beginning of the third) are also indicative: each of them refers to an individual loan and an individual creditor, but both permit the creditors to exact their demands from the public and private property of the people of Arcesine, and of the metics, ‘both from each individually, and from all’.³ A fourth document from Crannon (between 179 and 142 B.C.) may be added here: in this

¹ K.Latte, *op. cit.* 73.

² *IG*, XII 5, suppl. 236: ‘ἑδάνεισεν ὁ θεὸς τῷ πόλει... ἐπὶ ὑποθήκει τοῖς κτήμασι τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν’. cf. Latte, *op. cit.* 74; R. Bogaert, *Banques et banquiers dans les cités grecques* (1968) 197; P. Vinogradoff, *Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence* (1922) 108 n 1, suggested that similar collateral should be assumed in the case of a debt owed by the people of Ioulis to the Athenians, *SIG*³, no. 173, from the year 363/2 B.C.

³ L.Migeotte, *L’emprunt public dans les cités grecques* (1984), no. 49, lines 7–9: ‘Υπέθετο δὲ Πραξικλῆς τὰ τέ| [κ]οινὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἅπαντα| κ|αὶ [τ]ὰ ἴδια τὰ Ἄρκεσινέων καὶ τῶν οἰκούν|των ἐν Ἄρκεσίνῃ ὑπάρχ|οντα| ἔγγαια καὶ ὑπερπόντια.’, lines 59–62: ‘καὶ ἐξέστω πράξασθαι Πραξικλεῖ ταῦτα τὰ χρήματα| πράξει πάσῃ ἔ[κ] τε τῶν κοινῶν τ[ῶ]ν Ἄρκ[ε]σινέων πάντων καὶ ἐκ τῶν | [ἰ]δίων τῶν Ἄρκεσινέων κ|αὶ ἔ[κ] τῶν οἰκούντων ἐν Ἄρκεσίνῃ καὶ ἐξ ἐνόσ| [ε]καστοῦ ἅπαν τὸ ἀργύριον [κ]αὶ ἐξ ἀπάντων’. no. 50 lines 26–29: ‘καὶ ἐξέστω πράξασθαι Ἀλεξ|άνδρῳ ταῦτα| τὰ χρήματα πράξει πᾶσαι ἐκ τε τῶν κοινῶν τῶν Ἄρκεσινέων πάντων καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων τῶν Ἄρ|κεσινέων καὶ ἐκ τῶν οἰκούντων ἐ|ν Ἄρκεσίνῃ καὶ ἐγγαίων καὶ ναυτ|ικῶν οὐ ἂν [ὑ]πάρχῃ κατακείμενα, καὶ ἐξ ἐνόσ| εκαστοῦ ἅπαν τὸ ἀργύριον| κα(ι) ἐξ ἀπάντων’. P.Vinogradoff, *op. cit.* 108–109; K.Latte, *op. cit.* 74; L.Migeotte, *op. cit.* 168–183.

document there is no question of citizens-guarantors but of a decision that all citizens contribute to the acquittance of a public debt.¹

The second group comprises cases of guarantees being given not by the entire citizen body, but by some of the citizens. An inscription from Miletus (282 B.C.) refers to the selection by the popular assembly of seventy five men to act as guarantors of a loan.² Nicarete, who made a loan to the *polis* of the Orchomenians, secured it against the property of the magistrates, who acted as borrowers, and of ten guarantors appointed from amongst the other citizens (223–170 B.C.).³

The third group includes a case where the names of the guarantee and the guarantors are missing: creditors of Delphi arrested a metic and obliged him to discharge the debt of the *polis*; he laid claim to the money he had paid and withdrew his demands when the *polis* exempted him from the payment of taxes.⁴

However, even the collective responsibility of the entire citizen body, attested in the documents in the first group, does not support the view that the Greek *polis* was identified with its citizens. If a *polis* was required to produce guarantors in order to secure a loan, its citizens were the most suitable people for this purpose. In addition, it should be noted that there was no standing practice whereby guarantees were provided by the entire citizen body; the duty sometimes fell on the shoulders of a small group of citizens, if the particular circumstances required it. There are even some cases in which the provision of guarantees fell on the shoulders of the citizens of another state. The Athenians lent the people of Chalcis a number of triremes in 334/3 and 323/2 B.C. against the guarantees of some Athenian citizens, who were

¹ L.Migeotte, op. cit. 113ff, no. 32, lines 15-20: 'πρέπον<τον> ἔμμεν καὶ ἐπιτάδει|ον τοῖς πολίταις ἕκαστον ἐξ τοῦν κα|θ' ἰδίαν ἀντιβαλλέσθαι τὰς πόλλι|ος οὔστε μάλιστα μὲν ἐς πάντων ἐ|γλυθεῖ τοῦν δ[α]νείουν, εἰ δὲ μὲι γε ἐς| τοῦν πλείστον, etc.'

² *Milet*, I 3, no. 138 lines 25–27: 'ὅπως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσφάλεια γίνηται τοῖς δανειζοῦσιν, ἐλέσθαι τὸν δῆμον ἑβδομήκοντα πέντε ἄνδρας τοὺς ἀναδεξομένου[ς] καὶ τὰ βέβαια δώσοντας τοῖς δανεισταῖς ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου'. K.Latte, op. cit. 74; L. Migeotte, *L'emprunt public dans les Cités grecques* (1984) 299–304, no. 97.

³ *RIJG*, p. 276–303, especially VI(A) lines 106–112: 'ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις ἔστω ἕκ τε αὐτῶν τῶν δανεισαμένων καὶ ἕκ τῶν ἐγγύων καὶ ἕξ ἐνός καὶ ἕκ πλείονων καὶ ἕκ πάντων καὶ ἕκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς πραττούσης ὃν ἂν τρόπον βούληται'. P.Vinogradoff, op. cit. 109; L. Migeotte, op. cit. 53–69.

⁴ *SIG*, no. 437. K.Latte, op. cit. 74.

doubtless selected from amongst those who had proposed and supported this course of action.¹

(IV) *The Equation of the Polis-State with the Popular Assembly*

An Athenian decree from the end of the sixth century begins as follows: ‘ἔδοχσεν τῷ δέμοι’,² whereas the formula that became established later was ‘ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ’. The earlier formula has been regarded as asserting ‘that the Demos decrees as holder of the State sovereignty and as a community of citizens, that the State speaks as a unity’. The meaning of the term *δήμος* in archaic Sparta, and the use of *δημόσιον* as a specialized term to mean ‘the public treasury’ have both been cited as evidence in support of the same view, and more generally in support of the idea that the polis-state was to be identified with the *demos*.³

But, firstly, however true it may be that the *demos* in the Athenian decree is acting as the holder of the state sovereignty and as the community of the citizens, it by no means follows from this that the *demos* is to be identified with the polis-state: in fact, we are dealing here with what Aristotle called ‘τὸ κύριον τῆς πόλεως’, a concept of which we should not lose sight.⁴ Secondly, there is no evidence that the Spartan *demos* was identified with the polis-state. Finally, with reference to the term *δημόσιον* it should be remembered that the word *δήμος* meant ‘people, population, community’ (and ‘the country of a people, or a community’), before it acquired the meaning of ‘the people active politically’.

(V) *The Decree of the Chaladrians Concerning Deucalion*

The decree of the Chaladrians by which they accord political rights to Deucalion and his descendants (early fifth century)⁵ has also been

¹ *SIG*, no. 962 B, 161ff, C 516ff. = L.Migeotte, op. cit. 238–242, no. 69.

² *SGHI*, I no. 14.

³ V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. 150–151 = 86–87.

⁴ v. s., pp. 62, 65–66, v. i., pp. 175–181.

⁵ *DGEEP*, no. 415: ‘Ἄ Φράτρα τοῖρ Χαλαδρίορ | καὶ Δευκαλιῶνι· Χαλαδρίορ ἔμεν αὐτὸν | καὶ γόνον, Φισοπρόξενον, | Φισοδαμοργόν· | τὰν δὲ γὰν ἔχεν | τὰ ἐν Πίσαι· αἱ δὲ | τις συλαίῃ, Φέ(ρ)ρεν αὐτὸν | πο(τ) τὸν Δία, αἱ μὲ δάμοι δοκεοί’.

advanced as evidence for the equating of the polis-state with the citizens. This conclusion is based on the assumption that this document 'opposes, as partners in a bargain, the whole of the members of the community to the newly-received individual' in terms 'almost recalling a private lawsuit'.¹ But, firstly, the Chaladrians were not a polis-state but one of the demes that were members of the deme confederacy of Elis, which was transformed into the *polis* of the Eleans in 471 B.C. Secondly, the document under consideration does not represent Deucalion as a partner in a bargain with the Chaladrians. Only the Chaladrians, as the givers, play an active role; Deucalion has the passive role of receiver.

(VI) *The Swearing of an Oath by the Entire Citizen Body or its Representatives in Inter-State Agreements*

The hypothesis that the polis-state coincided with its citizens was also based on the fact that the inter-state obligations undertaken by polis-states were guaranteed by an oath of the whole body of citizens or its representatives.²

The evidence adduced so far consisted of three inscriptions, each of which involves two parties. In all three, one party, the Athenians, swears the oath through its representatives (council and judges; generals, council and knights; generals, trierarchs, hoplites and citizens who happened to be in Selymbria), while for the other party to the agreement, the oath is taken by all the citizens (Chalcidians, Eretrians, Selymbrians). We can now study thirty six decrees in which the parties taking the oath are named.³

(1) B 134 (after 465 B.C.): Attic decree concerning the constitution of the Erythraeans. Provision is made for an oath to be taken by the Athenian assembly (line 20). The text of the oath sworn by the council of the Erythraeans is set out (lines 21ff). It has been suggested that another inscription (*IG I* 12-13) gives us the oath sworn by the Erythraean assembly. The oath therefore was taken by the council and

¹ V.Ehrenberg, *JHS* 57 (1937) 150 = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 87.

² P.Vinogradoff, *op. cit.* 107-108.

³ The numbers that follow (B 134ff) are those of H.Bengtson, *SVA*.

the assembly on the Erythraean side; on the Athenian side by the assembly and, probably, the council.

(2) B 145 (c. 450 B.C.): Attic decree concerning Colophon. The oath taken by the council of the Colophonians is possibly set out in lines 42ff. It should be assumed, on the analogy of other Attic decrees of the same period, that the oath was also sworn by the Colophonian assembly.

(3) B 155 (446/5 B.C.): Attic decree concerning Chalcis. On the Athenian side the oath is taken by the council and judges (lines 3–4); on the side of Chalcis by all those who had reached maturity (line 32).

(4) B 154 (446/5 B.C.): Attic decree concerning Eretria. The surviving fragment has been restored along the lines of document B 155, in which it is stated (line 42) that it was modelled on the decree for Eretria.

(5) B 159 (439 B.C.): Capitulation of the Samians to the Athenians. It has been suggested that the oath was taken on the Athenian side by the generals on the spot, and on the Samian side by the magistrates.

(6) B 184 (424/3 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and Halieis (424/3). The oath is taken for the Athenians by the councillors and the generals (line 28).

(7) B 186 (423/2 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and Perdiccas II of Macedon. On the Macedonian side, the oath is taken by Perdiccas himself and a number of nobles (lines 16–18, 52ff).

(8) B 187 (422 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and the Bottiaean. On the Athenian side the oath is taken by the council, the generals and other magistrates.

(9) B 188 (421 B.C.): Peace treaty between the Athenians and the Spartans. The oath is taken by proxy on both sides.

(10) B 189 (421 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and the Spartans. The oath is taken by proxy on both sides.

(11) B 204 (after 411 B.C.): Treaty between the Thasians and the people of Neapolis in Thrace. The oath is taken by proxy on both sides.

(12) B 207 (409? B.C.): Treaty between the Athenians and the Selymbrians. On the Athenian side the oath is taken by 'generals, trierarchs and εἰ τις ἄλλος Ἀθηναίων π[α]ρῆν' (lines 24–26); on the other side, by 'all the Selymbrians' (lines 26–27).

(13) B 229 (394 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and the Eretrians. On the Athenian side the oath is taken by the generals, the

councillors and the knights; on the other side by the generals, the councillors, other magistrates and the knights (b lines 3–7).

(14) B 238 (389 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and the Thracian kings Medocus I and Seuthes II. On the Athenian side the oath is taken by generals, hipparchs, taxiarchs and phylarchs (lines 11–12).

(15) B 248 (384 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and the Chians. On the Athenian side the oath is taken by the councillors, the generals and the taxiarchs; on the other side by councillors and other magistrates (lines 31–33).

(16) B 256 (378 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and the people of Byzantium. On the Athenian side the oath is taken by the councillors, the generals and the hipparchs (lines 8–10).

(17) B 258 (377 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and the people of Methymna. The oath is taken by the Athenian generals and hipparchs, the *synedroi* of the Athenian Alliance, and the ambassadors of the Methymnaeans (lines 11ff).

(18) B 260 (377/6–353/2 B.C.): Treaty between the people of Phaselis and Maussollus. The oath is taken by the people of Phaselis and by Maussollus.

(19) B 262 (365 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians, the Corcyraeans, the Acarnanians and the Cephallenians. On the Athenian side the oath is taken by the councillors, the generals and the knights (lines 15–18).

(20) B 264 (375 or 373 B.C.): Treaty between the Athenians and Amyntas III of Macedon. It is stated that Amyntas swore the oath to Athenian envoys (lines 1–2).

(21) B 280 (367 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and the Syracusans. On the Athenian side the oath is taken by the councillors, the generals, the hipparchs and the taxiarchs; on the Syracusan side by Dionysius I, the magistrates, the councillors, the generals and the trierarchs (lines 32–37).

(22) B 289 (362 B.C.): Treaty between the Athenians and the people of Ceos. On the Athenian side the oath is taken by the generals (lines 57–58).

(23) B 293 (361/60 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and the Thessalians. On the Athenian side the oath is taken by the generals, the councillors, the hipparchs and the knights (lines 14–16); on the

Thessalian side by the archon, the polemarchs, the hipparchs, the knights, the hieromnemes and other magistrates of the Thessalian Confederacy (lines 23–25).

(24) B 300 (359–356 B.C.): Oath sworn by Philip II of Macedon to the Potidaeans.

(25) B 304 (357 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Carystians and Histiaeans. On the Athenian side the oath is taken by the generals and the councillors (lines 6–7).

(26) B 308 (357/6 B.C.): Alliance between Philip II and the Chalcidian Confederacy. On the side of the Confederacy the oath is taken by the magistrates and the ambassadors, and on the Macedonian side it is taken by Philip and any others requested by the Chalcidians (lines 2–5).

(27) B 322 (350 B.C.): Treaty between the Erythraeans and Hermias, tyrant of Atarneus. Oath taken by Hermias himself and his 'companions'.

(28) B 329 (346 B.C.): Treaty between the Athenians and Philip II. Oath taken by Philip.

(29) B 336 (342 B.C.): Treaty between Philip II and the Aetolians. Oath taken by Philip.

(30) B 340 (341 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and the Eretrians. For the Eretrians the oath is taken by the council and the generals (lines 3ff).

(31) B 409 (330 B.C. or earlier): Treaty of *isopoliteia* between Miletus and Cyzicus. The oath is taken by proxies for both cities (lines 15ff).

(32) B 476 (267 or 266 or 265 B.C.): Alliance between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians. On the Athenian side the oath is taken by the generals, councillors, magistrates, phylarchs, taxiarchs and hipparchs (line 85); on the Spartan side by the kings, ephors and members of the gerousia (line 90).

(33) B 492 (after 243 B.C.): Treaty of *sympoliteia* between Smyrna and Magnesia ad Sipylum. On the side of the Magnetes the oath is taken by the knights and the hoplites who dwelt in the city and those who were encamped in the countryside, and by all others who had full political rights (lines 59–60).

(34) B 499 (c. 234 B.C.): Entry of the Orchomenians into the Achaean Confederacy. The oath is taken on the side of the

Orchomenians by the magistrates, and on the side of the Achaeans by the syndedroi, the general, the hipparch and the navarch (lines 6ff).

(35) B 545 (205–201/200 B.C.): Treaty of *homopoliteia* between the people of Cos and the people of Calymna. The oath is taken for the Calymnians by those who had reached manhood (*ἡβηδόν*) (lines 2 and 10).

(36) B 553 (beginning of the third century): Treaty between the Praesians and the Stalians. On the side of the Praesians the oath shall be taken every year by the kosmoi and twelve citizens (A, lines 20ff); these shall put the other citizens on oath (B, line 5).

In these documents there are fifty two references to the swearing of the oath by the contracting parties. Of these, forty relate to republican polis-states, two to polis-states ruled by tyrants, seven to monarchs and three to confederacies. The oath is taken on behalf of polis-states by the assembly and the council (134, 145), or by the assembly alone (154, 155, 207, 492, 545), or by a variety of representatives of the citizen body – the council, judges, magistrates, proxies, ambassadors, and various categories of citizens (154, 155, 184, 187, 188, 189, 206, 207, 229, 248, 256, 258, 262, 280, 289, 293, 304, 308, 340, 476, 499, 553). In the cases where a king is involved, the ruler himself takes the oath in person, either along with a few other individuals (186, 308) or alone (260, 264, 300, 329, 336). The two tyrants also take the oath in person, but not alone: the magistrates, the councillors, the generals and the trierarchs swear the oath along with Dionysius I of Syracuse (280); and Hermias is accompanied in the taking of the oath by his companions (322). For the confederacies, it is always the magistrates that bind themselves (293, 308, 499).

Thus, the earlier observation that the contracting polis-states were bound by an oath taken either by the entire citizen body or by its representatives has been confirmed, despite the fact that the available evidence has multiplied sevenfold (the parties have increased from six to forty). However, the further conclusion that, accordingly, the *polis* was identified with its citizens must be reviewed in the light of the following observations and considerations.

(I) The taking of an oath by representatives of the citizen body was, of course, tantamount to its being taken by the whole body. But when did all the citizens take the oath, and when was it sworn only by a number of representatives? It has been suggested that the swearing of

an oath by all the citizens was the rule for the polis-states with a small citizen body, and that the oath sworn by representatives was the rule for the polis-states with a large number of citizens.¹ But there are many examples of medium-sized or small polis-states that bound themselves through representatives (159: Samians; 204: the people of Neapolis; 229: Eretrians; 248: Chians; 258: the people of Methymna; 340: Eretrians; 409: Milesians and the people of Cyzicus; 499: Orchomenians; 553: Praesians), and one example where the oath was taken by the entire Athenian assembly (134). This is the earliest example of all (shortly after 465 B.C.). In the second document, chronologically (145, c. 450 B.C.), the section referring to the taking of the oath by the Athenians has not been preserved. The immediately following documents (154 and 155, from 446/5 B.C.) are the first in the long series in which the oath for the Athenians is normally taken by representatives. The Lacedaemonians also act through representatives in all the surviving examples (188, 189, 476). Let us now compare the procedure for the oath for both the contracting polis-states, where it is indicated. (1) Treaties between the Athenians and small cities: (a) in the earliest treaty (134, after 465 B.C.), the Athenians and the Erythraeans swear on equal terms, through the assembly and the council; (b) the Athenians take the oath through representatives, while in the case of the Eretrians or the Chalcidians, it is sworn by all the citizens (154 and 155, both from 446/5 B.C.); (c) the Athenians and the Samians, or the people of Neapolis swear on equal terms, through representatives (159, from 439 B.C., 204, after 411 B.C.); (d) the Athenians again take an oath through representatives, while the entire citizen body acts for the other party (207, from 409 B.C.); (e) throughout the fourth century, the cities that enter into agreements with the Athenians swear the oath through representatives (229, from 394 B.C., 248 from 384 B.C., 258 from 377 B.C., 340 from 341 B.C.). (2) Treaties between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians: both parties swear the oath by proxy (188 and 189, from the year 421 B.C., 476 between 267 and 265 B.C.). From these examples it appears that: originally, the practice was for the oath to be taken by all the citizens (134, shortly after 465 B.C.); then the Athenians

¹ P. Vinogradoff, loc. cit.

began to swear by means of representatives,¹ while the other cities, or at least the smaller ones, continued the earlier practice. It is likely that the Athenians successfully demanded that the oath be taken by all the citizens of the other state contracting the treaty, in the belief that this would ensure a greater degree of reliability: this hypothesis gains some support from the circumstance that this inequality is not the case in treaties between Athens and Sparta, nor in the treaties concluded between Athens and other city-states in the fourth century.

(II) We have already observed that in the nine cases in which a king or a tyrant is involved in an inter-state treaty, the ruler takes the oath in person. In five of these cases, it is enough for him to take the oath alone. In the remaining four, others also swear it. Why the difference? One of the texts in question notes that these were present at the request of the other contracting party: 'to be sworn by himself (Philip II) and as many as be requested by the Chalcidians' (308, line 4, from the year 357/6 B.C.). The same explanation may be presumed for the involvement of 'other Macedonians' alongside Perdikkas II in the treaty of alliance between him and the Athenians (186, from the year 423/2 B.C., lines 18 and 52ff).² By contrast, the appearance alongside Hermias of his *hetairoi* (companions) (322, from the year 350 B.C.) is satisfactorily accounted for by the view that we are dealing here with government by a *hetaireia*.³ The taking of the oath by Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse, and also by the magistrates, councillors, generals and trierarchs of the *polis* (280, from the year 367 B.C.) may be attributed either to a demand on the part of the Athenians, or to a practice of Dionysius designed to camouflage his tyrannical regime beneath a cloak of democracy.⁴ In the final analysis, it appears that the swearing of an oath by a ruler, whether he was king or tyrant, was sufficient; when others also took part, this was due either to a demand by the other contracting party, which considered that in this way it was

¹ The composition of the Athenian representation varies (154, 155, 159, 184, 187, 188, 189, 207, 229, 238, 248, 256, 258, 262, 280, 289, 293, 470).

² The 'other Macedonians' could certainly not have been an administrative body of the state.

³ V.Ehrenberg, *op. cit.* 32 = 124–125; H.Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen I* (1967) 333.

⁴ H.Berve, *op. cit.* 237.

better secured, especially in the event of the death of the monarch, or to internal political expediency.

Do the preceding observations (I and II) not suggest that states ruled by a king or a tyrant were identified with the monarch, while states that were republics were identified with their citizens? The answer must be in the negative. The oath is demanded by the other contracting party for its own security. This is achieved if the person on whom it depends to keep the agreements is bound by oath. This is the ruler in regimes governed by kings or tyrants, and the citizen body in oligarchic or democratic regimes.¹

(VII) *The Responsibility of the Citizens for Offences Committed by their Fellow-Citizens*

It has been asserted that in antiquity, citizens were held responsible for offences committed by their fellows against citizens of other states, and this position has been used to support the idea that the polis-state was identified with its citizens.² The passages cited, however, illustrate nothing more than the exacting of reprisals by the wronged, or by their fellow-citizens, against the fellow-citizens of the culprits, without this involving an agreement between the two polis-states in question.³

¹ That is, the group that was called *πολίτευμα* by the ancients and was defined by Aristotle as τὸ κύριον τῆς πόλεως or κύριον τῶν πόλεων (cf. *infra* pp. 250, 271–272, 288). The fact that those who were obliged to swear the oath, to bind a state, were identical with the *πολίτευμα* is in any event explicitly attested by the following provision in a treaty between the people of Smyrna and the people of Magnesia ad Sipylum, which has been dated to shortly after 243 B.C. (B 492, lines 59–60): ‘ὁμόσαι δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐμ Μαγνησίᾳ κατοίκους τῶν τε κατὰ πόλιν ἰππέων καὶ πεζῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις τασσομένους κα[ι] τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς καταχωριζομένους εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα’. It is clear that the categories of people who are described as ‘ἐν Μαγνησίᾳ κάτοικοι’, ‘κατὰ πόλιν ἰππεῖς καὶ πεζοί’, ‘ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις τασσόμενοι’ and ‘ἄλλοι’ constituted ‘those assigned to the *politeuma*’ and that it was in this capacity that they were obliged to take the oath.

² K.Latte, *op. cit.* 73–74.

³ Demosthenes XXIII 82: ‘Νόμος· Ἐάν τις βιαίῳ θανάτῳ ἀποθάνῃ, ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῖς προσήκουσιν εἶναι τὰς ἀνδροληψίας, ἕως ἂν ἡ δίκας τοῦ φόνου ὑπόσχωσιν ἢ τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας ἐκδώσι. τὴν δὲ ἀνδροληψίαν εἶναι μέχρι τριῶν, πλέον δὲ μή.’ XXXV (*In Lacr.*) 13: ‘ὄπου ἂν μὴ σύλαι ὦσιν Ἀθηναίους’. LI 13: ‘Ἐπειδὴν γάρ τις μισθωσάμενος τριηραρχίαν ἐκπλεύσῃ, πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἄγει καὶ φέρει καὶ τὰς μὲν ὀφελίας ἰδίᾳ καρποῦται, τὰς δὲ δίκας τούτων ὁ τυχὼν δίδωσιν ὑμῶν, καὶ μόνοις ὑμῖν

(VIII) *Territory*

The hypothesis formulated by Hampl that territory was not a necessary component of the ancient *polis* was used by Hampl himself, and by other writers to support the view that the *polis* was identified with its citizens.¹ We have seen, however, that this hypothesis is not valid.²

(IX) *'The Polis Consists of Men'*

Some scholars believe that the ancient idea that the polis-state consisted of men was tantamount to the equating of the polis-state with its citizens.³ This view is not soundly based, however, as emerges from a careful reading and correct interpretation of the texts in question.

The idea that the polis-state consisted of men was expressed by Alcaeus. One of his verses runs: 'for men are the tower (or towers) of the polis in war'.⁴ Another version has been handed down through paraphrases in prose, two by the orator Aristides and one by the orator Nicolaus of Pergamon. The former writes: 'The polis is not houses with fine roofs or the well-jointed stones of walls, nor is it narrow streets and shipyards, but men capable of seizing every opportunity.' 'The polis is not stones and wood and the art of builders; but wherever there are men who know how to save themselves, there are [polis]-walls and a polis.'⁵ The latter paraphrased Alcaeus as follows: 'A polis is composed not of timber and stone but of men.'⁶

οὐδαμῶσε ἔστιν ἄνευ κηρυκείου βαδίσαι, διὰ τὰς ὑπὸ τούτων ἀνδροληψίας καὶ σύλας κατεσκευασμένας'. Other passages of Demosthenes (*Olynth.* II 28 and *De Chers.* 24) refer to improper exactions of money by Athenian trierarchs from Greeks in Asia Minor. *IG*, IV, no. 268, line 64 prohibits raids and seizure of persons without even making it clear that there will be reprisals. The passages from the Homeric poems cited by K.Latte attest to nothing more than ordinary reprisals, and in any case refer to communities that are not *poleis*.

¹ v. s., pp. 81–82.

² v. s., pp. 82–86.

³ e.g., V.Ehrenberg, *Der Staat der Griechen* I (1957) 66 = *The Greek State* (1960) 88 = *L'état grec* (1976) 151; G.Daux, *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques* II (1951) 184; C.S.G.Thomas, *Early Greek Kingship* (1965) 15 = *PdP* 21 (1966) 6; Cl.Mossé, *REA* 65 (1968) 292; O.Longo, *BIFG* 1 (1974) 219, 237; C.Ampolo, in C.Ampolo (ed), *La Città antica* (1980) xxx.

⁴ Alcaeus *PLF* 112, 10: 'ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλι]ος πύργος ἀρεύ[ιος'.

⁵ Aristides I 821; II 273.

⁶ Nicolaus Pergamenus I 277 Walz.

Justin has preserved to us the information that Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to abandon their city by using the argument that one's mother city consists of *municipes* and not of the polis-walls, the *civitas* relies on the citizens (*in civibus*), not on the buildings.¹

Nicias repeated this argument to encourage the Athenian soldiers after their defeat by the Syracusans: 'Men constitute the polis, not polis-walls, nor warships devoid of men.'²

Finally, Stobaeus has preserved to us a clearly corrupted verse from a lost tragedy of Euripides: according to Stobaeus' text, the verse said that cities were men, not a wilderness (ἐρημία).³ A felicitous amendment, however, restores the meaning: 'cities are men, not buildings (οἰκήματα)'.⁴

None of these passages, however, gives expression to the idea that the polis-state was identified with its citizens. In all the Greek texts it is clearly stated that the πόλεις are men (ἄνδρες), and by men are implied warriors. The identification of men with warriors is clear from the negative way in which the πόλις is defined: πόλεις are not city-walls, buildings, warships without men. The Latin text uses the term *civis*, which means 'citizen', but this is balanced by the statement that the *civitas* relies on the citizens (not that it consists of citizens); moreover, in this text we again meet the contrast between men and city-walls or buildings. The term *civis* is thus used as equivalent to 'man' ('warrior'). The sense of all these passages is: 'πόλεις are preserved, or, if defeated, restored, not thanks to their walls and ships, but thanks to their soldiers: the evacuation of cities and the destruction of fleets are not fatal events, if the military force factor is preserved.' There is no hint at any identification of the polis-state with its citizens.

In short, none of the arguments put forward in support of the view that the polis-state was a state identified with its citizens has proved to be valid.

¹ Justinus II 12–14.

² Thucydides VII 77,7.

³ Euripides *TGF* 828 = Stobaeus, *Flor.* 43, 4.

⁴ Nauck, *TGF* ad. loc.

2. POLIS-STATE AND A KIND OF COMMUNITY

The term 'community' (*communauté, Gemeinde, Gemeinschaft* etc.) has been used by various scholars in their definition of the *polis* either as the *proximum genus* (the *polis* was a community, not a kind of state), or in the *species specifica* within the *proximum genus* 'state' (the *polis* was a kind of state identified with a community).

The former view was discussed above, in the context of the attempt to establish the *proximum genus* of the concept *polis*. We shall now discuss the latter.

According to this, the *polis* is defined as a community of individually connected persons,¹ and more specifically as a community formed in a place and defined with reference to it.² Sometimes it is not described.³ Those scholars who identify the *polis* with a tribe or a fragment of a tribe,⁴ or with a group of individuals,⁵ mean the same thing without using the term 'community'.

Only one of these views includes a definition of the character of the community to which it refers. The others remain vague on this point, and it is for this reason that it is impossible to discuss them. We shall therefore deal only with the first view: the one that connects the *polis* with a community of citizens-landowners.

(a) POLIS-STATE: NOT TO BE DEFINED AS THE COMMUNITY OF ITS CITIZENS-LANDOWNERS

Marx defined the *polis* in general terms as a state, and more specifically as a *Gemeinwesen, Gemeindewesen, or Gemeinde*. The first of these terms is also used by him with reference to modern states: the other two are restricted to the *poleis* of the Greco-Roman world.⁶ The first two terms refer to the state as an organization,⁷ and the third denotes the

¹ v. s., pp. 39, 40, 41, 42.

² v. s., pp. 38–40.

³ v. s., p. 43.

⁴ v. s., p. 37.

⁵ v. s., pp. 43–44.

⁶ Passages quoted by E.Ch.Welskopf, *Die Produktionsverhältnisse im Alten Orient und in der griechisch-römischen Welt* (1957) 352–376.

⁷ This conclusion inevitably derives from the meanings in German of compound nouns

community as a union of natural persons. Thus *Gemeindewesen* is the state, or the state organization, of the community; *Gemeinwesen* is the same thing, while at the same time it stands in the relationship of genus to *Gemeindewesen* denoting state organization more generally.

The community (*Gemeinde*) is defined by Marx both directly and indirectly. Directly, the community is defined as a group of people connected in the following manner: the community is the owner of land, and its members are the owners of plots within the community territory: being a member gives to him the right to be a landowner; and, conversely, ownership of land is a necessary condition for the retention of membership in a community. The preservation of the members preserves the existence of the community.¹

Amongst the Marxist historians who have studied antiquity, four tendencies may be distinguished; these were confronted at the conference 'The Rise and the Features of the Greek Polis', held at Liblice in Czechoslovakia in 1957.²

The first tendency remains faithful to Marx's own formulation. Amongst those who have given recent expression to this view, mention may be made of G.A. Koshelenko and C.Ampolo. The former set out the conclusions resulting from discussions between Soviet historians, which may be summarized as follows: In the *polis* (state) the citizens coincided with the landowners. Being a citizen depended on the ownership of land; the right to own land depended on being a citizen. The loss of citizen rights was attended by the loss of the right to own land; the loss of one's plot of land was attended by the loss of citizen rights.³ Ampolo wrote that the *polis* was a community organized so as to ensure the participation of its members in all aspects of social life –

whose second component is *-wesen*. It is confirmed in the present instance, however, by the following passage of Marx and Engels: 'Mit der Stadt ist zugleich die Notwendigkeit der Administration, der Polizei, der Steuern u.s.w., kurz des Gemeinwesens und damit der Politik überhaupt gegeben' (quoted by E.Ch.Welskopf, op. cit. 362). In other passages, however, *Gemeinwesen* clearly means the 'community'. e.g. 'in der modernen Welt ist jeder zugleich Mitglied des Sklaventums und des Gemeinwesens' (quoted by E.Ch.Welskopf, op. cit. 368).

¹ Passages quoted by G.A.Koshelenko, *VDI* 151 (1980) 5.

² J.Pečírka, in *Γέραç*, *Studies Presented to G.Thomson, Acta Universitatis Carolinae Philosophica et Historica*, I. Graecolatina Pragensia II (1963) 183ff.

³ G.A.Koshelenko, loc. cit. He refers to a large number of other Soviet authors (p. 4ff).

political, military and religious – and that, as a result of the division of labour, the citizens were landowners and vice versa.¹

E.Ch.Welskopf differs in two respects from Marx's formulation. The first lies in the fact that she substituted for the concept 'landowning' the more general concept 'property owning', in which she included slave-owning as well as landowning.² In a number of passages she even identifies the citizens with the slave-owners.³ The second respect in which she differs from Marx is that she conceded that the wage-labourer was also a citizen,⁴ though she later retreated from this position when she noted that the citizen took part in politics because he had the leisure to do so, and that whoever did not have the leisure to take part in politics was not a *full* citizen: this is based on the view held by Marx and Engels that the ancient proletariat occupied an intermediate position between free and slaves.⁵ The reasons that led Welskopf to depart from the original teaching of Marx are clear. She could not overlook the fact that in the classical Greek *poleis*, the citizens were not only the landowners, but included non-landowners as well, and even wage-labourers.

G.Thomson broadened the basis of the *polis* still further, asserting that it covered not only land tenure and slave-ownership, but also commodity production.⁶ J.Pečirka agreed, on the one hand, that 'the concrete shape of the individual city-state was conditioned above all precisely by the mutual relationship between the above-mentioned three main elements – land tenure, slave owning, commodity production – which determined the mutual relations between the social groups, i.e. the class structure and the political form of the individual city-state'.⁷

At the Liblice conference, this view was supported by S.L.Utshenko, who, while recognizing the importance of commodity production, suggested by G.A.Thomson stressed that the Polis-state cannot be understood 'without investigating the character of ownership in the classical City-state, chiefly of the forms of land tenure' (quoted by J.Pečirka, op. cit. 185).

¹ C.Ampolo, in C.Ampolo (ed), *La Città antica* (1980) xxxi–xxxii.

² E.Ch.Welskopf, op. cit. 117, 358, 370–372.

³ E.Ch.Welskopf, op. cit. 371.

⁴ E.Ch.Welskopf, op. cit. 368.

⁵ E.Ch.Welskopf, op. cit. 372.

⁶ G.A.Thomson, *Studies in Ancient Greek Society, II: The First Philosophers* (1955) 14; cf. a quotation of the same author by J.Pečirka, op. cit. 184.

⁷ J.Pečirka, op. cit. 184 n 3.

On the other hand, he stressed that Marxist historians have spent much energy on the study of the slave owning base of the *polis* and emphasized the need to pay greater attention to land tenure. Although he thus brought the debate back to its starting point, Marx's view that the *polis* was a community of citizens-landowners, he was obliged by the sources he studied to concede that this idea was not generally valid. In fact he discerned from Attic inscriptions that 'the principle that land in Attica could only be owned by an Athenian citizen either by birth or by naturalization' broke down in the fifth century and that from this period onwards, at least, the *polis* did not grant a specific plot of land to new citizens or to foreigners, but merely the right to acquire and own land.¹

Marx also defined the *polis*-community in an indirect way, when he contrasted the *polis* with the capitalist state. There are three crucial passages. In one, the ancient *polis* is described as a 'genuinely democratic community (*Gemeinwesen*), which rested on the basis of real slavery'; while the modern state is described as 'a nominally democratic representative state that rests on emancipated slaves, the citizen body'. The second passage states that 'in the modern world, one is at once a member of the slave body and of the community (*Gemeinwesen*)'; this suggests that in the ancient *polis* the slaves did not belong to the *Gemeinwesen*, which here clearly means *Gemeinde* (community). In the third passage the view is expressed that the modern state is a mere abstraction, a thing external to the individuals, who use it as means for satisfaction of their personal needs and wishes, whereas the ancient community assumed a completely different relationship between itself and the individuals.² The *polis* is thus conceived of as a concrete entity and the citizen is regarded as an element of the state, and not an exploiter of it. Again the underlying idea is that the *polis* was the state of a community of citizens that rested on a genuinely democratic basis, and excluded the slaves.

Welskopf contrasted the *polis* with the eastern despotism stressing that the essential difference between them lay in the private ownership of land. 'The actual political relations are essentially the relations between the private property owners in the *polis*, i.e. those who were

¹ J. Pečírka, *VDI* 129 (1958) 230–237 and op. cit. 194–201.

² Passages quoted by E.Ch. Welskopf, op. cit. 368, 370.

able to own slaves, but were themselves free. Political relations, relations between those who owned slaves, on the basis of private property, with the purpose of preserving and advancing their *polis*, 'dominated' the economic relations between masters and slaves in the *oikia*, the household, insofar as the political union of the private landowners secured the slave relationship and reproduced it by the agency of state coercion including the use of arms. Politics, however, were separated from economics in antiquity: politics concerned the affairs of the *polis*, economics were conducted in the *oikos*. It was for this precise reason that the *polis* was not a despotism, a domination over slaves, as the *oikos* was. Political relations only existed between the members of the *polis*. A slave was not a *polites* and therefore could not practise politics.¹ In this order of ideas there appears, besides the opposition of *polis* to despotism, a clear distinction, inside the *polis*, of the community of the citizens from the slaves. The community excludes the slaves: relations within the community are exclusively relations between free men. The relationship between free men and slaves is located at the level of the household. In the despotism, by contrast, the relationship between freedom and slavery is located at the level of the state. The view of C. Ampolo is very similar to this: he believes that the Greek *polis* is the world of citizens, while the eastern state is the world of subjects.²

Finally, Marx proclaimed that the community of the *polis* was marked by its cohesion and exclusivity, and reproduced its functions as a military and war machine. With regard to the cohesion and exclusivity of the community, Marx stated that the owners of equal plots of land banded together to confront 'foreigners': the community thus protected its members.³ Marx is clearly assuming that the possession of equal plots of land was a general phenomenon, though it was the rule only in very archaic societies and did not survive even at Sparta. As for the 'foreigners' against whom the community banded together, it is clear that he meant the metics and the slaves who lived alongside the community, rather than neighbouring communities. G.A.Koshelenko believes that the tendency of the community to

¹ E.Ch.Welskopf, op. cit. 366–367.

² v. s., p. 55.

³ Passage quoted by G.A.Koshelenko, op. cit. 6.

preserve its cohesion gave rise to four other properties: the formal equality between the members of the community; the sovereignty of the popular assembly; democratic tendencies; and the halting of endogenous slavery.¹ The reproduction of the community was described and interpreted by Marx in the following manner. The members of the community were not concerned to enrich themselves, but attempted to preserve their status as members of the community by remaining landowners. The community, for its part, was concerned to maintain and reproduce its members in their twin capacities as citizens and landowners. It was a necessary condition for the survival of the community that equality between the landowners be preserved; and the necessary condition for the continued ownership of property was their personal labour.² The only danger to the community was from other communities, which either coveted territory owned by it, or were defending territory occupied by them, to which the community laid claim. For the community, war was thus a major collective duty, and an important collective operation. By extension, the community was organized from the beginning as a military machine, and this circumstance was one of the preconditions for maintaining itself. Since the community was concentrated upon a polis-settlement, the latter formed the basis for the military organization. The polis-settlement was thus a centre for military enterprises.³

Let us now examine these views of Marx and his followers.

I We may begin with the basic view, according to which the *polis* was a community of citizens-landowners, or, more broadly speaking, of citizens-proprietors (landowners and slave-owners); the possession of political rights depending on landownership, or more broadly, property ownership, and inversely landownership or, more broadly, property ownership, depending on the possession of political rights.

Marx formulated this view during the years 1857–1858,⁴ basing himself on a work dealing with Roman history published in 1811–1812 and later from 1827 to 1832.⁵ It seems, however, that he was also aware

¹ G.A.Koshelenko, loc. cit.

² Passages quoted by G.A.Koshelenko, op. cit. 7.

³ Passages quoted by E.Ch.Welskopf, op. cit. 355–356.

⁴ In *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*.

⁵ B.G.Niebur, *Römische Geschichte* I–II (1811–1812), 2nd edn I–III (1827–1832).

of the social and political organization of Sparta. The Marxist historians have furnished Marx's view with the supporting evidence not available to him. What is this evidence? (a) Testimonia concerning the distribution of land to members of communities that consisted of colonists; (b) the decree of the Chaladrians, which grants political rights to a foreigner, and at the same time confirms his right to own property; (c) testimonia relating to the demotion of Spartans who had lost their property from the rank of citizens to the rank of *hypomeiones*; (d) testimonia relating to the grading of political rights according to agricultural income; (e) testimonia relating to the exclusion of metics from the ownership of land and a house.

On the other hand, however, J. Pečírka has assembled a number of Attic texts from both the classical period and later, which demonstrate that the Athenians sometimes granted to metics and other foreigners political rights accompanied by the right to acquire land and a house (though they never actually granted land and a house), and sometimes gave them the right to acquire land and a house, without political rights. He therefore quite properly asserted that the principle by which political rights depended on landownership and landownership on political rights was not generally valid.¹

The ancient evidence invoked by Marxist historians to support Marx's position, is reliable, with the exception of the decree of the Chaladrians. In fact, this community did not grant land to Deucalion, the new citizen, but merely recognized his title to land already in his possession.² It seems, therefore, that the Chaladrians had given Deucalion land without political rights at a first stage, and granted him political rights as well at a second stage. We thus have another example of the dissociation of landownership from political rights, and this time not from Attica, but from Elis, and earlier than the Attic texts, since it dates from the beginning of the fifth century.

There exists a much larger body of evidence, however, from which the dissociation of political rights from the right to own land may be conjectured on a much wider scale, both in Athens and in other polis-states from the beginning of the sixth century. This evidence relates to:

¹ J. Pečírka, *op. cit.* 194–201. G.E.M. de Ste Croix, too, recognized, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient World* (1981) 94–95, that metics were, exceptionally, given the right to own land.

² *DGEEP* no. 415: 'τὰν δὲ γὰρ ἔχεν τὰν ἐν Πίσαι'.

(a) mass enrollments of metics into the citizen body, without grants of land; (b) mass enrollments of thetes into the citizen body without grants of land; (c) the ranking of non-landowners who had a cash income of more than 500, 300 and 200 drachmas together with landowners who had an agricultural income of 500, 300 and 200 *medimnoi*.

(a) The mass enrollments of metics into the citizen body, which are cited just below, were on such a large scale that they could not possibly have been accompanied by a grant of land to the new citizens. (1) In the sixth century B.C., the Ephesians granted political rights to metics who originally came from Teos and Cyrene; there were twice as many new citizens as old.¹ (2) The citizen body of Ephesus was broadened for a second time, again with the inclusion of metics, and also with other elements. The metics were assigned to a new tribe (Bembineis) and to two new *chiliastyes*. A large number of *chiliastyes* was created for the other elements. The new citizens were many times greater in number than the old.² (3) In the sixth century, the Sybaritae were so generous with their granting of political rights to foreigners that the number of citizens was said to have reached 300,000.³ The number is undoubtedly exaggerated, but we may assume that it reflects the impression formed by observers who were familiar with Greek citizen bodies of the usual size.

(b) In Athens, men with an agricultural income below 200 *medimnoi* were called thetes. Consequently, the property assessment of the thetes included both the very small property owners and those Athenians who owned no property. According to the ancient sources, the Athenian thetes gained access to the popular assembly under Solon (594/3 B.C.).⁴ Some modern historians do not dispute the authenticity of this statement,⁵ while others attribute the development to Peisistratus (561/60, 558/7–556/5, 546/5–528/7 B.C.)⁶ or even to Cleisthenes

¹ M.B.Σακελλαρίου, 'Ελληνικά 15 (1957) 220–231; idem, *Europa, Festschrift für E. Grumach* (1967) 294–302.

² M.B.Sakellariou, ll. cc.

³ Diodorus XII 9,2: 'πολλοῖς δὲ μεταδιδόντες τῆς πολιτείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο προέβησαν ὥστε δόξαι πολὺ προέχειν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν οἰκούντων, πολυανθρωπία τε τοσοῦτον διηγέγκαι, ὥστε τὴν πόλιν ἔχειν πολιτῶν τριάκοντα μυριάδας'.

⁴ Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* VII 3; Plutarch, *Solon* 8.

⁵ Most recently: H.Volkman, *KIP* 5 (1975) 766.

⁶ C.Highnett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (1952) 117–119.

(508/7).¹ The right to attend the popular assembly was the minimum political right, especially in an oligarchy. One ancient source also states that Cleisthenes enrolled foreigners, i.e. metics, in the citizen body.² The Athenian thetes acquired higher political rights during the fifth century. The numbers, both absolute and relative, are of interest here: in 430 B.C. the Athenian thetes numbered 20,000 out of a total of 42,000 citizens – that is, they formed 43 per cent of the citizen body; in 322 B.C. there were 12,000 thetes and 9,000 other citizens – that is, the proportion had risen to 57 per cent of the total number of citizens.³

(c) At an unknown date, which is sought in the period from Solon to the fourth century, the property assessment ceased to be calculated solely on the basis of agricultural produce, and account also began to be taken of income in drachmas.⁴ Those who had an income, derived from sources other than farming greater than 500, 300 and 200 drachmas acquired the rights earlier restricted to the *pentakosio-medimnoi*, the *triakosio-medimnoi* and the *zeugitae*.

Taking into account all the evidence referred to so far, we can say that at least from the sixth century onwards the dependence of political rights on the possession of land ceased to be a rule not only in Athens but in other Greek *poleis* as well, and that at least from the fifth century onwards it became possible to grant to metics and other foreigners land, or the right to acquire land, without at the same time according them political rights.

This conclusion is still partial, however. It will be completed by further evidence, which indicates the existence of land-owning members of the community who were not also citizens. Who was a citizen in a polis-state? One who at least had the right to attend the assembly, although he was not himself eligible for a magistracy. Yet several polis-

¹ H.Schaefer, *Staatsformen und Politik* (1937) 113.

² Aristotle, *Pol.* 1275 b 36.

³ A.W.Gomme, *The Population of Ancient Athens* (1933).

⁴ Under Solon: L.Braccisi, in R.Bianchi Bandinelli, *Storia e civiltà dei Greci* I 2 (1972) 540. Under Cleisthenes: G.Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde* II (1926) 880. During the Persian Wars: K.J.Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* II 1, 2nd edn (1913) 89. No later than the fourth century: C.Highnett, *op. cit.* 143, 225–226. U.Kahrstedt, *Studien zur öffentlichen Recht Athens* I (1934) 251–252, stressed that the census in kind was never replaced by a census in drachmas, but fell into disuse when the money economy came into being.

states had assemblies, or citizen bodies, narrower than the total number of the landholders. We may distinguish two cases: (a) either the fundamental rights were restricted to a definite group of men; or (b) the number of the citizens was fixed. Both cases involve the exclusion from the citizen body, or the assembly, of people who, although they owned land, did not belong either to that group or that fixed number.

(a) The first case makes its appearance in our actual evidence earlier than the second. At Corinth soon after the middle of the eighth century a constitutional change took place. Following the murder of the king, the Bacchiadae, i.e. the royal family in the broader sense, seized power. They decided to replace the hereditary monarchy by an elected magistrate, chosen annually. This office was to be exclusively reserved to the Bacchiadae, who were also the electors. The Bacchiadae persecuted other aristocrats, including members of related families. It is also reported that they only married within their own ranks.¹ This regime lasted until about 620 B.C. It has been suggested that the same constitutional situation might have prevailed with the royal families of the Basileidae at Erythrae and Ephesus and of the Penthilidae at Mytilene.² The Bacchiadae, the Basileidae, and the Penthilidae then constituted a body which distinguished itself sharply even from the rest of the aristocracy, thus forming a 'dynastic' oligarchy.³

(b) The fixed number of citizens emerges in our sources in the seventh century B.C. The earliest examples are to be found in Opus, Locri and Colophon. A body called the 'Thousand' and acting like an assembly functioned in Opus, the most important *polis* of eastern Locris, in the fifth century B.C. A similar body with the same name is referred to in the case of Locri, a colony of Eastern Locrians in south Italy, in a text dated to the seventh century B.C. It seems then that the 'Thousand' of Opus existed before the foundation of Locri, in 673 B.C. Still in the seventh century, a thousand Colophonians luxuriously dressed, joined the assembly. Civic bodies of the same size are also reported from Cuma, in Aeolis, Rhegium and Croton (end of the sixth century B.C.). Acragas had its own 'Thousand' after the overthrow of

¹ Herodotus V 92; Aristotle, *Pol.* 1292 b 4ff; Diodorus VII 9, 3 and 6; Nicolaus Damascenus 90 *FGrH* 57 = *Exc. de Ins.*, 20, 6; Strabo VIII 6, 20; Pausanias II 2, 4.

² G. Busolt, *op. cit.* 347.

³ G. Busolt, *loc. cit.*

the tyranny, in 472/1. The 'Thousand' of Cuma had to raise horses. Accordingly, those of Opus have been identified with the people referred to by a source as being able to do the same. Assemblies of 600 people are reported from Heraclea in Pontus (fourth century B.C.), and Massalia (from the third century onwards). Finally we know of the civic body of 180 people in Epidaurus. Similar situations are mentioned, without any further details, by Aristotle. He describes one kind of oligarchy in which landholders richer and stronger than the others seize the right to select those among the rest of the people who are to be members of the dominant element in the state and also another, narrower, kind of oligarchy, in which the holders of the larger properties keep the offices in their own hands under the protection of a law enacting that they are to be hereditary. Even the Athenian assembly was once persuaded, in special circumstances, in 411 B.C., to pass a law proposed by the moderate oligarchs, restricting the citizen body to 5,000, thus excluding not only the thetes, but also the owners of small plots.¹

As we shall see, Marx and Engels and also their followers share the view that the Homeric poems do not depict political societies in general or the *polis* in particular. Accordingly, they place the birth of the *polis* and of the community of citizens-landowners after the composition of these poems. But our investigation regarding the date of the appearance of the first *poleis* has led us to the conclusion that Homer did have experience of this kind of state.² We need then to continue our present topic by asking whether the Homeric evidence in some way reflects the community of citizens-landowners presumed by Marx. The answer is negative, for the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* directly and indirectly depict relations of land-holding, of thetes and of slaves,³ but exclude the existence of citizenry. We reach this last conclusion by applying the criterion for a citizen used above, that is his participation in the assembly of his *polis*. What do we see? The Homeric *agora* did not have the powers of an assembly. The *agora* met only when it was summoned by the king and the elders, in order to hear and approve their decisions. Yet, already in the aristocracies, the assembly met on a

¹ G. Busolt, *op. cit.* 355–357.

² *v. i.*, pp. 387–390.

³ *v. i.*, pp. 374–378.

regular basis, discussed and voted, thus taking part in the making of important decisions; decrees of polis-states are prefixed by a statement that they were decided by the council and the assembly. One Homeric passage implies that the elders were appointed by the people.¹ Yet the political assembly elected magistrates who had a fixed term of office, which quickly became annual. The strengthening of the role of the assembly and consequently the emergence of citizenry coincided with the rise of aristocracy. The assembly was originally aristocratic in composition, while the Homeric *agora* had been open to non aristocrats. The aristocratic assemblies acquired greater importance because the number of their members was restricted, and this occurred because they acquired greater importance. The very fact that the Homeric poems are unaware of the citizen but aware of private land-owning, of the state and even, amongst the other kinds of state, of the *polis*, leads to the conclusion that the citizen is more recent than both the *polis* and the private ownership of land.

Our conclusions can now be summarized within the chronological framework that has emerged in the course of this discussion. (1) The Homeric societies practised private land-owning and some of them constituted polis-states, but did not know the citizen. (2) From the middle of the eighth century to the Hellenistic period there were regimes in which not all landowners were full citizens. (3) From the sixth century onwards several *poleis* appear to grant civic rights to landless people (thetes, as well as metics or aliens) without at the same time giving them a plot of land. (4) From the fifth century onwards there are examples of the granting to metics or other foreigners of the right to possess land and a house, but not of citizenship. On the other hand, however, evidence known to Marx and produced by Marxists does attest to the coincidence of citizens and landholders in some polis-states and at some periods of their history. Taking into account all these data we are obliged to assume that this coincidence was a reality limited to certain polis-states, and not necessarily from the beginning to the end of their existence.

II Although it has thus been shown that the community of citizens-landholders was not a characteristic feature of the polis-state, we

¹ v. i., p. 367.

proceed with our critique, in order to assess the views expressed about the tendencies and properties of this community.

The cohesion and exclusivity of this community¹ were not absolute, since they often retreated before other forces that led to the introduction into the citizen body of large groups of non-landowners, such as thetes and metics. On the other hand, cohesion and exclusivity are also to be found within those citizen bodies that had been broadened to include thetes and metics.

Marx's theory that the community of citizens-landowners was reproduced by the citizens-landowners themselves, and the citizens-landowners by their community² is not based on ancient evidence. Today we are still unable to cite any examples of this process. The view is a theoretical construct that is valid as a formulation of the conditions under which the communities and its members might be reproduced. Marx probably formed this idea by negative inference from the Spartan and, to a lesser extent, the Athenian experience. And even if this was not the case, his construct can be confirmed by the same method. In fact, the community of Spartan citizens-landowners contracted because it violated all three of Marx's requirements: the Spartans ceased to cultivate their own plots of land; the law forbidding the possession of precious metals and money was sometimes broken; the principle of equality in the ownership of land was also infringed on a wide scale, as a small number of Spartans acquired large numbers of plots, while many of them became landless. The Athenian community of citizens-landowners underwent a crisis towards the end of the seventh century as a result of the concentration of land in the hands of a few and the expulsion from the community of its impoverished members. These events in turn presuppose that the stronger members of the community were seeking personal enrichment to an extent that breached the spirit of the community, and that some members had ceased to work on their land.

Marx's views on the military organization of the community of citizens-landowners and its function as a war machine³ are well illustrated by Sparta and the Cretan cities. But these features are not

¹ v. s., pp. 115–116.

² v. s., p. 112.

³ v. s., p. 116.

peculiar to the communities of citizens-landowners. They were inherited by the extended citizen bodies, including those of radical democracies. A good example is furnished by Athens where, from the middle decades of the fifth century until 322 B.C., it was the landless who were the bellicose element, while the landowners adopted the opposite stance.

We may close with some comments on the qualities attributed to the *polis* by Koshelenko, who derived them from the community of citizens-landowners.¹

The 'theoretical equality' of the members of the community is nothing more than the formal equality of the citizens in democracies. In antiquity, this equality is also to be found in *poleis* that had advanced beyond the stage of the community of citizens-landowners and had citizen bodies that included the landless.

The sovereignty of the assembly was more formal than factual in cities that were passing through the stage of the community of citizens-landowners (e.g. Sparta), and absolute in cities whose citizen body had been broadened to include the landless (e.g. Athens).

The tendency towards democracy is not a feature only of the community of citizens-landowners. This tendency continued to exist, and even became more pronounced in regimes where the citizen body also included the landless.

(b) POLIS-STATE AND POLIS COMMUNITY

By applying the *tabulae presentiae* method (Francis Bacon) or the method 'of agreement' (John Stuart Mill), we can establish that all polis-states, and only polis-states, stood in a definitive relationship to a group of people which it is possible to describe very precisely, firstly in terms of characteristics that individualize it, secondly in terms of features that set it apart from other entities or social phenomena, and finally in terms of its interconnections with the polis-state.

I. The individual characteristics of the group relate to its structure, cohesivity, functions and extent. (1) Its structure was based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* or the kinship. Families formed part of wider units which were called phratries (also *patrai* or *patriai*). The *gene* had no place in this structure, since they did not cover the entire group, but

¹ v. s., pp. 115-116.

were unions of aristocratic families. In the Ionian and Dorian polis-states, and only in these, the phratries formed part of even broader groups, the tribes. The institutions of the tribes and the phratries had come down from the past to the groups that we are examining.¹ This circumstance is indicative of strength of tradition within the group. Another manifestation of this strength was the survival of the principle of kinship, centuries after the group had begun to feel the pressures emanating from the evolution of territorially focussed aggregates. Despite this latter phenomenon, the phratries retained their cohesion, even when their members were scattered throughout different, geographically unconnected settlements. It was felt that no member of the group could not belong to a phratry and a tribe, wherever tribes existed. Consequently, every foreigner who was granted the rights of citizenship was at the same time enrolled in a phratry (and a tribe), to which the members of his family would also belong, and in which his descendants would later be inscribed. In the case of the mass creation of new citizens, new phratries (and tribes) were created. Clearly, with the entry of new members into the group, the principle of kinship gave way to that of locality, but this occurred *de facto*, and was eventually forgotten. The phratries (and tribes) preserved the appearances of kinship. (2) The same group also maintained traditions, manners, mentality, cults inherited from earlier generations. It was kept consolidated by a sense of identity as well as by sentimental currents and ideologies which run across it. Occasionally, differences of interest between and within social classes inside this group led to sharp confrontations that undermined its cohesion. Victors sent their vanquished opponents into exile. Worse still, creditors could go so far as to enslave the debtors who were unable to repay their debts, even to sell them outside the borders of the state. Aristocrats did not hesitate to ally themselves with aristocrats of other polis-states, while the opposing party sought the support of metics and other outsiders, to whom they favoured the granting of citizenship. Despite all this, however, the group did not disintegrate; the forces holding it together eventually proved the stronger. (3) Furthermore, the same group performed a variety of functions – social, religious, cultural – in a very intensive way. It functioned as a single association integrating all its members in

¹ v. i., pp. 301, 303.

common actions. (4) It is under regimes of unrestricted democracy that the extent of this group may be assessed in the simplest and clearest way: it then comprised all the citizens and the members of their families. In oligarchies and monarchies of whatever kind it included all those who were entitled to political rights in a radical democracy, and the members of their families. The above description of the group, especially points 1, 2 and 3, correspond with the concept of 'community' in the sense of German *Gemeinschaft*. On the other hand, this group had not administrative duties and machinery, or any other feature of 'community' in the sense of German *Gemeinde*. The latter quality can be attributed to the divisions of the group, the phratries and the tribes.

II. The polis community, as we shall henceforth call this group, was sharply distinguished from other entities. (1) Each of these communities very soon broke its bonds with its mother and sister communities. In some cases it waged war against them. (2) The polis community kept at a distance other groups dwelling within the same state territory, such as metics, freedmen, serfs, slaves. (3) The polis community did not coincide with the polis-state to which it was related. (a) As a rule it was a continuation of a community earlier than the polis-state – a community connected with a state of another kind or with a stateless society.¹ (b) Even during the course of the shared, interwoven history of a polis community and a polis-state, the two did not coincide. The community was narrower than the state, since the latter comprised in addition to the community other categories of population, i.e. the entire society. The realm of the polis-state was the conduct of power relationships. Within this realm the dominant element was always a section of the community, never the entire community;² the rest of it formed part of the dominated, along with all those who did not belong to the community. On the other hand, the polis community as a whole covered areas that fell outside the sphere of power relationships; all its members participated in its divisions, the tribes and the phratries, as equals; and all these divisions were equal between themselves. Thus the polis community retained the democratic character it had possessed during its prepolitical phase, whereas the polis-state changed its

¹ v. s., pp. 124ff; v. i., pp. 302ff passim.

² v. s., p. 108.

constitution and was sometimes dominated by aristocracies, sometimes by timocracies, sometimes by tyrannies. Although polis-states continued for centuries to make use of the traditional divisions of the community as administrative and military units, they rid away with them at an early date as intermediaries between the state and the members of the polis community in matters of public and private law. Rights and responsibilities of public interest were established by the state for individuals; and individuals owed allegiance to the state and had resource to it for legal protection.¹ (c) Moreover, the polis-state did not belong to the polis community; it belonged to a part of the community.

III. Notwithstanding all these differences, however, the polis-state had relations with the polis community which justify the introduction of the latter in the definition of the former as its *species specifica* in comparison with the genus 'state'. (1) Each polis community was connected with a single polis-state; every polis-state was connected with a single polis community; no other communities existed within the boundaries of a polis-state. Metics, freedmen, serfs and slaves did not have any of the features of a community. Metics, freedmen and slaves lacked a common origin, structures of any kind, and cultural unity. Serfs had a common origin and had possessed a cultural unity in the past, when they formed communities; their actual status prevented them from functioning as a community, however. The best known example of serfs is the helot population in Laconia. They were not permitted to meet, were carefully watched by their masters who, moreover, humiliated them and exterminated the physically and morally stronger amongst them. The perioeci constituted real polis communities, but in their own *poleis*, not in Sparta along with the Spartans. (2) Each polis community was formed or reformed in connection with the polis-settlement which constituted the unique or the main settlement of the polis-state and was individualized through its reference to the same settlement. (3) There was a continuous interplay between each polis-state and the corresponding polis community or parts of it. It was the decision making part of the community² that

¹ v. i., p. 136.

² In pre-political communities, the decision making element consisted either of the warriors or of an incipient aristocracy.

founded the polis-state, made it function and made use of it, since it everywhere and always coincided with the element that prevailed in the polis-state. The citizens of the polis-state were everywhere and always members of the polis community, since the outsiders who were given political rights were simultaneously introduced into the polis community. Decisions concerning the polis community were taken at the level of the polis-state and executed by the officials of the latter. Profits from conquests and other victorious military enterprises and from the exploitation of subject populations or of allies went exclusively to members of the polis community. Although the polis-state was under the rule of a part of the polis community, the polis community never ceased to be the ultimate *raison d'être* of the polis-state; in return, it formed the broader base for the polis-state and was the reservoir from which it drew its military and moral forces.¹ In sum, a polis-state existed through its community and a polis community continued to exist thanks to its polis-state.

The view put forward by Gschnitzer that the community with which a *polis* was connected had been formed within the bounds of a region that had a polis-settlement² implies that this settlement existed prior to the community. The reality is complex, however. In Part Two we shall meet five different sequences of events. (1) A group of migrants – invaders or refugees or colonists – founds a polis-settlement; as a result,

¹ A large section of the privileged elements in the community was aware of this fact. Accordingly, when relations between the classes reached breaking point, they intervened to prevent this. The history of Athens at the end of the seventh and beginning of the sixth centuries is a case in point. Many members of the community were obliged to contract loans on unfavourable terms and, when they were unable to pay their debts, lost their freedom; the creditors were aristocrats, who were also large landowners; these were the people who received the interest on the loans, and who became masters of the mortgaged properties and persons. Solon's legislation cancelled the mortgages, freed the enslaved debtors and forbade the contracting of loans on the security of the freedom of the borrowers and their close families. It is obvious that these measures could not have been implemented without the support, or at least the tolerance of a section of the creditors, who realized that the situation that had arisen threatened the existence of the community, which was a precondition for their privileges. That the privileged elements were aware of the fact that the other members of the community formed the broad base of the state is also clear from their use of ideology to cultivate a community spirit, though similar techniques were not directed at the metics.

² v. s., p. 39.

it is transformed into a local community related to this settlement; as soon as the proper conditions arise, the new community creates a state, a polis-state. (2) Several local communities related to deme-settlements and united in a confederacy of demes (whether of a political nature or not) eventually found a polis-state; either one of the existing settlements becomes the seat of the polis-state or a new polis-settlement is founded for this purpose; thus, the original local communities fuse into a new local community which is identified with reference to the polis-settlement (either old or new) of the polis-state. (3) Several local communities, each related to a 'part' (μέρος), that already form a confederacy, fuse into a single community and create a polis-state; one of the existing settlements becomes the polis-settlement of the new state; the new community is identified with reference to this polis-settlement. (4) A local community related to a deme that belonged to a confederacy of demes breaks away from this confederacy and creates a polis-state; it thus continues to be a local community related to the same settlement, but the settlement is now not a *deme* but a *polis*. (5) A local community related to a polis-settlement (which is, moreover, a real city) belonging to an ethnos-state breaks away from it and creates a polis-state; it thus continues to be a local community related to the same settlement, which did not change its character.¹ In all these cases there was an already existing community or independent group. There was continuity between the old community and the new, except when the new community sprang from the amalgamation of two or more groups of migrants. In most of the cases (2, 3, 4, 5) there was no intervening change in the nature of the community: it was, and continued to be, a local community. All that changed was the character of the locality. Whenever a community based on kinship turned into a local community there was no abolition of the earlier ties of kinship, or of the structure of the original community that were based upon them. It would be more precise to speak of a 'local community of kin'. Aristotle commented, with particular reference to the citizen, that being a citizen does not stem from residence in a particular place, because others who resided in this same place, such as metics and slaves, were not citizens.² In fact, being a citizen stemmed from membership of a

¹ v. i., pp. 322–323.

² *Pol.* 1275a 7ff.

community formed on the basis of kinship ties. The community only exceptionally admitted into its ranks co-residents that were not linked to them by blood. And when it did so, it assigned them to 'tribes' and phratries that were artificial imitations of models based on kinship,¹ thereby preserving the outward appearance of a kinship community.

The above description of the polis community, and the attendant observations on the relationship of the community to the *polis* render it comparable with that element called *nation* in modern definitions of the state.

However, the community of a polis-state differed in a number of points from the 'nation' of a modern state. (1) The communities of the primary polis-states were direct descendants of pre-political communities, which were themselves descended from groups of migrants. The sole exception was the polis community of the Athenians, which was formed from a population that had been settled in Attica for many centuries. The 'nations' of modern states have passed through many more stages, and have preserved no traces of their pre-political phase. (2) In normal conditions the every-day life of the 'nation' is very meagre. The 'nation' breaks up into numerous associations each pursuing its own aims, according to various principles and tastes. Individual members of the 'nation' may belong to all these associations or to some or to none of them, and share in their activities with different degrees of fervour and assiduity.² It is only in times of crisis that one sees the 'nation' of modern states strengthening their internal bonds. The ancient community was a multi-faceted association; in addition to traditionalism it covered the area of a single religious community and a single cultural club. Moreover, it was intensively and continuously active.³ The 'nation' is diluted within society; the community constituted a single body within the society and the *polis*. (3) Modern 'nations' are formed within a region, are based on the principle of territoriality, and apply the *jus loci*. The communities which constituted the core of the polis-state were also the products of a prolonged cohabitation and practised the *jus loci*, but they behaved as

¹ v. i., p. 396.

² E. Barker, *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (1951) 42-44.

³ cf. E. Barker, *op. cit.* 5-7, apropos not of the community, but of the *polis* (v. s., p. 39).

if they were entities of a tribal character. In some sectors of public and social life they assumed the appearance of groups of kinsmen. They adopted the principle of territoriality in practice when they ceased to be an offshot of an ethnos and became an entity formed within a territory and in relation to a polis-settlement. For instance the offshot of the Dorians established at Argos became the local community known as the Argives. The polis communities applied the *jus loci* when they admitted as members outsiders who had been granted civic rights by the polis-state. They did not depart from the *jus sanguinis*, however, in so far as they maintained structures inherited from their tribal past, such as the *phylae* or the phratries or replaced them by artificial ones. Cleisthenes went still further in giving the appearance of groups descended from a common ancestor to the *phylae* he organized on a territorial base (they were composed of trittyes which in their turn comprised local demes). It is also instructive to recall the decrees whereby the polis-states granted civic rights to metics or other foreigners, with the provision that the new citizen will be inscribed in a particular phratry and, occasionally, in a particular *phyle*. (4) Along with the idea that the community consisted of kinsmen went a high degree of solidarity between its members and of loyalty to it. The members lived for it and maintained their rights thanks to it. The community existed for and through its members. The community, however, was more than the sum of its members. It stood to them in the same relationship as a body to its cells, with the important difference that the members of the community, as human beings, had an independent life and reflected about themselves and their community. Individuals looked to the community for a guarantee of their physical and cultural survival, and were well aware that the realization of this demand depended on the survival of the community as a physical and cultural entity. Ancient patriotism had as its object not an abstract and transcendental state, but a living and integrating community. (5) Finally, the community had stronger mutual links with its state than had the 'nation'. The community used the state machine for conducting its religious and cultural life; the state used the phratries and the tribes, which were primarily divisions of the community, as divisions of the citizens and of the army.

Communities are also found in the other two basic types of state in

ancient Greece (before the Hellenistic period): the *ethnos* and the *demos*. This emerges from the following observations. The names *Μακεδόνες*, *Μολοσσοί*, which are used in the written sources to indicate ethnos-states, and also a constitutional body, the assembly of the warriors who were landowners, were the names of communities. The same is true of the name *Χαλάδριοι* which is used to refer to the popular assembly of a demos-state (a member of a confederacy consisting of other small states like it); this will have been called by the same name, which was the ethnic of a settlement.¹ The element 'community' is thus not a feature that distinguishes the polis-state from the ethnos-state and the demos-state, not does it distinguish these three kinds of state from the general concept 'state'. The conceptual differentiation of the *polis*, *demos* and *ethnos* depends upon the further analysis of the concept expressed by the term 'community'.

We have seen that earlier scholars divided communities into 'local' and 'tribal'. Among them W.W.Fowler, J.Kaerst and E.Barker noted that the *poleis* were identified with locally defined communities,² and F.Gschnitzer described the *polis* as a locally formed and defined community (*Ortsgemeinde*) and the *ethnos* as a tribal community (*Stammesgemeinde*).³ This is a fruitful distinction (even though the identification of the community with the state is inaccurate).⁴ It should be noted, however, that the concept of the 'local community' is broader than the concept of the 'polis community'. In fact it also covers the concepts of the 'demos community' and of the 'community related to a region'.⁵ Thus, the *polis* will be defined as a state based on a local community related to a polis-settlement.

The term *πόλις* covers settlements which, on modern criteria may

¹ v. s., pp. 76, 100–101.

² v. s., pp. 38–39.

³ v. s., p. 39.

⁴ v. s., pp. 94–110.

⁵ F.Gschnitzer (v. s., p. 39) confined his definition of the polis-state to the level of 'a locally formed and locally defined community', despite the fact that he refers to other communities at this level that were not polis-states: those of the Epirots, *Κυνοῦριοι*, *Ἀκρόρειοι*, *Πεδιῆς*, *Παραποτάμιοι*, *Παραναῖοι*. The first of these names indicated a confederacy of *ethne*, the remainder confederacies of demes or 'parts' (for these terms, cf. pp. 75–76, 132, 138, 136, 316–321, 406, 454–455).

be divided into two types: urban and non-urban.¹ The pre-urban polis-settlement did not differ from a village. Thus ancient terminology on the one hand drew a dividing line between settlements without a citadel (for which it used the terms *κώμη, δῆμος*) and settlements with a citadel (which it indicated by the term *πόλις*),² while, on the other hand, it was unaware of the modern distinction between urban settlement, with or without a citadel, and non-urban settlement. The question therefore arises whether we need to divide the communities connected with polis-settlements into two corresponding groups, the communities of pre-urban polis-settlements and the communities of urban polis-settlements, and make a similar classification of the polis-states associated with them. In this event, the polis-states with urbanized polis-settlements would be comparable with the ones which are referred to as *city-states, états-cités, Stadtstaaten* etc., while the polis-states with pre-urban polis-settlements would constitute a separate category of state.

However, the established view of the city-state, which is based on observation of the city-states of western Europe in the Middle Ages and modern times, is of a state that was formed after the urbanization of a village or the founding of an urban settlement, and never prior to the existence of an urban settlement. In Europe during this period, city-states were created by the burghers of cities. The burghers broke away from the authority of the feudal lord. In Greece, this model was to be found in Thessaly and Macedonia in the fifth and fourth centuries. Elsewhere, matters took a different course. Most of the Greek polis-states emerged before the emergence in their sole, or main, settlement of specialized crafts and of a more or less regular market. Moreover, the more developed Greek cities, in economic terms, had populations of which half and more lived off agricultural incomes. Finally, there were very few Greek polis-states that possessed another feature characteristic of the medieval European city-states – the economic, social and political predominance of the city over the countryside.³ Thus, whereas

¹ v. s., pp. 86–92.

² v. i., pp. 156–159.

³ M.B.Sakellariou, *A Contribution to the Study of the City in the Greek Commonwealth to 330 B.C.* (forthcoming).

the Greek polis-settlements began as pre-urban and evolved into proto-urban (the earliest from 850 B.C. onwards) and urban (the earliest from 600 B.C.) settlements, the polis-states associated with them did not become proto-city-states and city-states, respectively.

Furthermore, the European city-state did not have a human base comparable with that of the polis community. As a rule, this base was not a precondition but a product of the city-state and never acquired homogeneity. It was a federation of professional guilds which had different interests in various matters and were far from having equal rights and carrying equal weight. Accordingly, the citizens did not hesitate to marry foreign women or change city and citizenship.

It is worth adding that only the Italian and the Swiss city-states were sovereign both in practice and formally. The German city-states recognized the suzerainty of the Emperor; the city-states in Flanders and the Netherlands were nominally subjected to territorial princes; similarly, Danzig was subjected to the king of Poland.

The essential differences between the ancient polis-state and the European city-state of medieval and modern times is concealed by the actual terminology. The modern Latin-based languages and English apply to this type of state terms derived from the Latin *civitas*, which was used by the Romans to render the Greek word *πόλις* in the sense of 'state'. In these same languages, the use of the terms *civitas*, *cit  *, *citt  *, *city* etc., was extended beyond the designation of a kind of state to mean 'city', displacing the earlier terms *villa* > *ville*, *burgus* > *Burg*, *bourg*, *borough*. The derivatives of *burgus* retained their earlier meaning in the area of the concept expressed in the words *bourgeois*, *borghesi*, *burghers*, *B  rger*. These terms, however, describe the real character of the social group that created the states referred to as 'city-states' etc. The people called *burghers* etc. in modern terminology do not coincide from a social point of view with the people who created the Greek polis-states, or with the people who at any given time were masters of affairs within them. The German, Slavic and other languages added to the confusion of terms and concepts by indicating the Greek *πόλις* with words of their own, such as *Stadt*, *gradu*, *gorod*, which in the meantime had acquired the meaning of 'urban settlement'. Consequently, the term *Stadtstaat*, which meant city-state, was applied to the state associated with the ancient *polis*, which was not invariably a city. The 'polis-state' is therefore totally to be distinguished from the

'city-state'.¹ The prevailing confusion of the two concepts has been pernicious, and must cease.

We must not rest content with the distinction between 'stem communities' and 'local communities', or between 'local communities defined with reference to a region' and those 'defined with reference to a settlement' or between those in which the settlement was a *polis* and those in which it was a village. We must also investigate whether the communities associated with *ethne* the communities associated with local districts (confederacies of demes, confederacies of 'parts'), and the communities associated with demes, behaved in a different manner from the communities associated with polis-states. Unfortunately, we have no evidence for the other kinds of community. We can, however, make a number of conjectures, based upon what we know of the conditions under which they existed. An *ethnos*, which formed the basis for an ethnos-state like that of the Macedonians, occupied a larger area than the community of a polis-state, and the density of its population was not as great as of the population of a polis-state. The biggest part of it lived in villages, and had a closed economic system that was not favourable to the formation of contacts with other parts of the same state. These same conditions will have formed an obstacle to the participation by members of the community in religious festivals and other events involving the entire community, insofar as these events took place in the polis-settlements. The lack of any public life meant that contact between the adult males of the communities was restricted to the assemblies of warriors that met at long intervals and had only limited jurisdiction. The communities associated with confederacies of demes or of 'parts' functioned alongside the communities of the demes or 'parts'. This precluded the development of a communal life as unified and as intense as in the polis-states. Finally, the communities of independent demes were very tiny. As a result, despite their cohesion, they were slow in attracting and concentrating creative forces.

¹ Earlier scholars, too, distinguished the polis-state from the city-state. U.v.Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, H.Bengtson and Ch.G.Starr were of a generally negative view. S.Deger and G.Jellinek assigned to the polis-state a special position within the city-state: the former restricted the term *polis* to denoting the mature form of the city-state; according to the latter, the polis-state was a kind of city-state (v. s., pp. 35-36).

D. ARE THERE OTHER DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE *POLIS*-STATE?

1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE *POLIS*-STATE

We have seen that of the modern historians, some assert that the polis(city)-state was an aggregate of individuals,¹ others regard it as a federation of groups,² and yet others reconcile these two views.³ Before them, Aristotle sometimes considered the *polis* to be constituted of individuals⁴ and sometimes of groups.⁵

The problem may be approached in the light of the following facts:

(1) The citizens took part individually in political life, as members of popular assemblies, of councils, and of popular courts, and as magistrates. Moreover, laws, decrees and administrative enactments of the *polis* were applied directly to individuals – the citizens and the members of their families. The tribes, phratries and villages were not federated subdivisions of the polis-states, but played roles similar to those of the modern administrative and military districts and of electoral bodies, and in general formed a framework within which the citizens and the members of their families could serve the polis-state.

(2) In the pre-political society called an *ethnos*, by contrast, the individuals owed their allegiance in the first instance to the phratries; tribes or sub-*ethne* occasionally stood between them and the *ethnos*. This is clear from the existence throughout the Greek world of phratries, and from the division of the population into three or four tribes in the Doric and Ionic cities respectively; and also from the circumstance that the phratries and the tribes were defined not in local terms, as were the communities of the polis-states, but in terms of kinship, like the *ethne*. Evidence from a number of different Ionic polis-states in the Historic period enables us to discern different stages in the adaptation of the tribal systems to evolving local circumstances. Originally, the polis-states left untouched the tribal systems that they

¹ J.Hasebroek, P.Roussel (v. s., pp. 43–44).

² Fustel de Coulanges, L.Gernet, A.R.Burn, P.Vinogradoff, G.Glotz (v. s., p. 43).

³ V.Ehrenberg (v. s., p. 45); H. Van Effenterre, op. cit. 258.

⁴ v. i., pp. 239, 243, 246–265.

⁵ v. i., pp. 239, 242–243, 244–246, 266–268.

inherited from the *ethne* from which they sprang, but assigned new functions to them. The next step consisted of the addition of new tribes to the older ones; this occurred in cities that welcomed new citizens into their ranks: they could clearly not be assigned to the old tribes, for these were closed to foreigners, since their members were linked by ties of kinship and by common cults. When the old citizens became a minority, their tribes were amalgamated into one. A more radical measure was the replacing of the entire earlier system with a new, artificial one, which was modelled on the traditional system in appearance, but which had a local basis. Some polis-states assigned to villages the functions that had earlier been carried out by the tribes. Artificial phratries are also known.

It is clear from the foregoing that the polis-states originally had the same structure as the *ethne* – that is, they included primary kinship groups, to which individuals belonged; later individuals were related directly to them.

However, even if the polis-state had been composed of individuals from the beginning to the end of their existence, this feature would not be a diagnostic characteristic of the polis-state, since it is also found in the ethnos-state (the Macedonians and Molossi stood in a direct relationship to their kings: the kings and the people of the Molossians exchanged oaths; and there is no evidence or indication of the existence of a level of federal groupings intermediate between the national magistracies and the people).

2. POLIS-STATE AND SOCIETY

Having earlier outlined the various formulations of the view equating polis-state and society, and the arguments marshalled against one of them,¹ we proceed to the following observations.

Those who state this view either fail to analyse what is meant by 'society',² or disagree as to its content. More specifically, the society is sometimes defined vertically, as a combination of mutually interlocking organisms, pursuing different, but complementary aims,³ and

¹ v. s., pp. 44–45.

² v. s., pp. 44–45.

³ E. Barker, *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (1951, 1967) 42.

sometimes horizontally, as a hierarchy of social classes.¹ There is also disagreement as to the entity with which the society is identified. This is sometimes the *polis*² or the state,³ and sometimes only the citizen body,⁴ or the citizen body together with an undefined section of the metics.⁵ The equation 'society=hierarchy of classes=citizens+some of the metics' excludes from the society the wives and children of the citizens and some of the metics, the rest of the metics, and the slaves; but the metics and the slaves are social classes.

Society, however, cannot be viewed only vertically or only horizontally; and the horizontal perspective of it cannot be confined to some classes only. Moreover, the community which founded a polis-state and continued to constitute its core itself could eventually have the composition of a society, both horizontally, in that it included classes, and vertically, since it carried out the social functions relating to it.

All these are not distinctive features of the *polis*, however. Indeed, it can be plausibly argued that they are also to be found in other kinds of ancient Greek states: the *demoi* and the *ethne*.

3. THE HOMOGENEITY OF THE COMMUNITY

Some scholars have considered that one characteristic of the polis-state was that it consisted of a homogeneous community. Of these, W.W.Fowler suggested that it was common descent and identity of religion, laws, customs and government that constituted this homogeneity.⁶ Others have stressed the tendency of the polis-state to preserve its homogeneity, along with the causes and results of this phenomenon.⁷

¹ V.Ehrenberg, *Der griechische und der hellenistische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft III* 3 (1932) 41–42 = *Der Staat der Griechen* (1957) 67–68 = *The Greek State* (1960) 89–90 = *L'état grec* (1976) 152–154.

² V.Ehrenberg, *Gnomon* 5 (1929) 4; F.Jonas, *Die Institutionenlehre Arnold Gehlens* (1966) 30.

³ V. Ehrenberg, *op. cit.* (n 440), (1932) 41 = (1957) 67 = (1960) 152 = (1976) 152; E.Barker, *loc. cit.*

⁴ V.Ehrenberg, *op. cit.* (1932) 41–42 = (1957) 67–68 = (1960) 89–90=(1976) 152–154.

⁵ V.Ehrenberg, *op. cit.* (1932) 42 = (1957) 68 = (1960) 90 = (1976) 154.

⁶ W.W.Fowler, *The City-State of the Greeks and the Romans* (1893) 13ff.

⁷ *v. i.*, pp. 139–140.

The homogeneity of a population, however, is determined solely by common descent and the common tradition that stems from it. Customs and religion may extend later to non-homogeneous populations, especially if they live in limited, cohesive societies like the polis-states. Common laws and a common government are also to be found in states that do not have homogeneous populations; without these features, there can be no state. Countless colonial polis-states were founded by groups of differing origins, in both a geographical and an ethnic sense (many in Ionia¹ and Aeolis; also Sybaris, Zancle, Gela).² In some colonies, the population was mixed at a date later than their foundation, when the early colonists accepted as fellow citizens the descendants of metics, both Greek and non-Greek (e.g. Ephesus),³ or the neighbouring local population (e.g. Samos);⁴ or when they invited Greek settlers from other countries (e.g. Cyrene).⁵ Of the polis-states in the Greek homeland, Athens accepted into the ranks of its citizens the Eleusinians (c. 700), the Salaminians (c. 560) and elements that had presumably been settled in Attica from time immemorial (end of the sixth century).⁶ Finally we have to take account of the modifications of citizen bodies by the tyrants.

4. TENDENCY TO PRESERVE HOMOGENEITY

It has been maintained that the tendency of the polis-state to preserve the homogeneity of its population may be seen in its isolationism and

¹ M.B.Sakellariou, *La migration grecque en Ionie* (1958) passim.

² J.Bérard, *La colonisation grecque de l'Italie méridionale et de la Sicile dans l'antiquité*, 2nd edn (1957) 92ff, 140ff, 224ff.

³ M.B.Σακελλαρίου, 'Ελληνικά 15 (1957) 220–231; idem, in: *Europa, Festschrift für E.Grümach* (1967) 295.

⁴ M.B.Sakellariou, *La migration grecque en Ionie* (1958) 377, 385.

⁵ H.Schaefer, *RhM* 95 (1952) 153–155, 166–170 = *Probleme der alten Geschichte* (1963) 238–240, 251–252; F. Chamoux, *Cyrène sous les Bacchiades* (1953) 137–140, 221ff; D. Asheri, *Distribuzioni di Terre nell'antica Grecia (Memorie dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche, ser. 4, no. 10)* (1966) 28–29.

⁶ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1275 b 36, *Const. of Athens* 21, 2 and 4; cf. C.Highnett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (1952) 132ff.

introspection,¹ and also the selfish, negative attitude of the citizens to the question of awarding political rights to foreigners.² The nature of the polis-state as a community has been considered to be the source of this phenomenon – a nature always active and perceived as such by the citizens.³

It may be repeated that the polis-state could not be homogeneous, nor did the nature of the community make it likely to preserve its homogeneity. The phenomena that inclined in the one or the other direction were connected with varying local conditions.

5. SELF-SUFFICIENCY

It has also been claimed that it was a characteristic of the Greek polis-state to remain independent, to implement its own laws and to be economically self-sufficient;⁴ that, in consequence, the Greek polis-states waged frequent and fierce wars;⁵ that they were incapable of expanding beyond the geographical bounds of their territory and the human framework of their community without losing their identity as polis-states;⁶ that they were not willing to form or to join confederacies;⁷ and, finally, that they were the cause of the inability of the Greeks in the classical period to form large states,⁸ and of the fragmentation of the Greek people.⁹

But, firstly, we cannot attribute this tendency to the polis-state; elements of the polis-state like the slaves and those 'between free and

¹ V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1932) 12, 43 = (1957) 21, 70 = (1960) 28, 92 = (1976) 60, 156; H.Van Effenterre, op. cit. 206–209.

² H.Berve, *NJADB* 1 (1936) 8; Ch. G. Starr, *The Origins of Greek Civilization* (1961) 325; A.Aymard, *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques* (1950) II, 184.

³ V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1932) 42 = (1957) 70 = (1960) 92 = (1976) 157.

⁴ V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1932) 43–45 = (1957) 70–73 = (1960) 93–96 = (1976) 158–162; Ch.G.Starr, op. cit. 325; F.Taeger, *Das Altertum* I (1939) 153= 6th edn I (1958) 154–155; W.K.Lacey, *The Family in Classical Greece* (1968) 51.

⁵ E.Barker, *Greek Political Theory* (1918, 1970) 23.

⁶ V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1932) 12 = (1957) 21 = (1960) 28 = (1976) 60; H.Berve, loc. cit.; Ch.G.Starr, op. cit. 194; A.Aymard, loc. cit.

⁷ B.Keil, *Griechische Staatsaltertümer*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* III 3 (1912) 307.

⁸ H.Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte* (1950) 54 = 5th edn (1977) 50.

⁹ F.Taeger, loc. cit.

slaves' did not contribute to the tendency of the polis-state towards independence and autonomy; the helots rose repeatedly in revolt against the polis-state of the Lacedaemonians, and were its enemies even at times when they were not in arms. The tendency towards independence, autonomy and self-sufficiency was a feature only of the community that had founded and supported the polis-state. Secondly, similar tendencies can be found in any political community. If we consider only ancient Greece, we find them not only in the polis-states, but also in the ethnos-states and the *koina*. World history teaches us that peoples are reluctant to relinquish their right to self-determination in order to become part of a larger state, and resort to armed resistance if it is forced upon them. In all periods large states were formed as the result of the forcible imposition of a strong party upon those weaker than it. The fragmentation of the ancient Greeks was due not to the polis-state, but to the fact that no Greek state, whether *polis*, *ethnos*, *koinon* or, at a later date, monarchy, acquired the necessary strength to annex all the others.

6. THE LAW

According to V.Ehrenberg, one feature of the *polis* is the fact that in it laws, religion and customs constituted an entity under the unifying principle of the Law. The authority of the Law meant rather more than simply that the *polis* was based on the principle of justice. The Law was a daily reality. Moreover, it preserved tradition and secured the future; in other words, it linked the citizens with their ancestors and their descendants.¹ E.Will commented: 'The *polis* reaches its point of accomplishment the moment that relations between the members of the community, whatever its extent, are defined by written regulations that are not susceptible of arbitrary interpretation, even though this may have been preceded by long preliminary stages, some of which allow of definitions of the *polis* valid for earlier phases of its history, such as "hoplite *polis*". In other words, I retain the definition of the *polis* as a juridical state (*état juridique*).'²

¹ V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1932) 45 = (1957) 74 = (1960) 98 = (1976) 164.

² E.Will, in *Deuxième Conférence Internationale d'histoire économique 1962* (1965) 59ff.

The idea that the polis-state belonged to the category of states based on law has also been more briefly expressed by other scholars.¹

Yet the beginnings of written legislation did not coincide with the beginnings of the polis-state. It emerged within the polis-state; it is later than it. Similarly, the idea of the Law is later than the polis-state: the term νόμος first occurs in Hesiod, and with a different content.² D.Nörr, discussing Ehrenberg's view, noted that the expression 'state based on law' (*Rechtstaat*) is too strong and criticized the projection of this modern idea onto antiquity. According to him, first, the *polis* founded itself upon law to a greater extent than any state before it; secondly, it did so consciously; and thirdly, this softened the differences between the citizens as a result of the recognition of the law as the highest authority.³

7. THE MAGISTRATES

Glötz observed that, in contrast with the practice in Rome, the magistrates of the Greek *poleis* did not all have equal rank and power. V. Ehrenberg adopted this suggestion and added that the magistrate in Greece was a simple citizen who, having been chosen by election or lot, undertook certain administrative duties as the instrument of the people, who retained the real authority.⁴ This phenomenon, however, was a feature not of the polis-state, but of ancient Greek democracy – and stemmed from the fact that it was direct democracy⁵ – which also meant that the citizens were genuinely sovereign.⁶

8. THE STATE MACHINE

P. Lévêque is of the opinion that a more developed, strong and smooth running state machine and a greater number of advanced state

¹ v. s., pp. 31–32.

² J.Gaudemet, *Institutions de l'antiquité* (1967) 186; F.Quass, *Nomos und Psephisma*, (*Zetemata* 55) (1971) 14.

³ v. s., p. 32.

⁴ G.Glotz, *La Cité grecque* (1928); V.Ehrenberg, *Gnomon* (1929) 11.

⁵ Similar comments were made by A.Aymard, *RSJB* VI, 1 (1954) 60 = *Etudes d'Histoire Ancienne* (1967) 280, C.G.Field, *Political Theory* (1956, 1965) 15.

⁶ F.Schachermeyr, *Diogenes* 4 (1953) 31.

functions were characteristic features of the *polis*.¹ However, firstly, this formulation is vague (it involves comparison with a non defined standard), and, secondly, the increase and improvement of state functions and the state machine are relevant not to the nature of the state but to its level of development.

9. THE TENDENCY TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

We have seen that the concept of the polis-state cannot be defined with reference to any constitutional criterion, and is not associated with a particular constitution or constitutions.² The view that the polis-state had a tendency towards democracy³ does not run counter to this observation, since it does not exclude other constitutions.

In order to assess it, we need to take the following facts into account: (1) It is not accurate to attribute a tendency towards democracy to the polis-state; the truth is that this tendency emerged within particular polis-states. (2) Polis-states were governed by timocracies and tyrannies as well as democracies; they differed, then, from the *ethnos* (and possibly also from the *deme* and the confederacy of demes), in that they also gave rise to timocracy and tyranny. (3) Consequently, all three types of constitution, timocracy, tyranny and democracy, were the product not of the polis-state but of conditions that arose within the polis-states: Aristotle saw that they were due to different combinations of forces between the local social groups.⁴ (4) It was possible for even a democratic polis-state to offend against the principle of democracy. Athens made the requirements for citizenship more demanding and struck people from the list of citizens (451/50).⁵ She also waged war on democratic polis-states that were members of her confederacy (Naxos⁶ and others) and acted tyrannically towards others.⁷

¹ v. s., p. 31.

² v. s., pp. 60–66.

³ B. Borecký, *Eirene* 2 (1964).

⁴ v. i., pp. 262–264, 267.

⁵ Aristotle, *Const. of Athens* 26, 3; 42, 1; Plutarch, *Pericles* 37.

⁶ Thucydides I 98, 4.

⁷ Thucydides I 75–77; II 63, 2; III 37–40; V 85–113.

10. DID THE *POLIS*-STATE FOSTER OR OPPRESS THE INDIVIDUAL?

Many scholars have stressed that the *polis* helped to develop individuality and individualism,¹ while others have blamed it for oppressing the individual and restricting the realms of private life.²

I Individuality did not make its appearance in the *polis*-state from the very beginning, nor did it become a widespread phenomenon. It emerged in the Archaic period in a number of *polis*-states and only amongst the aristocratic and business classes. The tyrants were aristocrats with strong individual motives: they broke away from and turned dramatically against their own class, installed personal regimes and pursued their own aims. The aristocratic poets Sappho, Alcaeus and Theognis unhesitatingly gave expression to individual emotions (even for political reasons). The rise of individualism within the ranks of the businessmen is attested by Semonides of Amorgos³ and by Solon.⁴ Another individualist, Archilochus, was neither aristocrat nor businessman; but he was the bastard son of an aristocrat, and led an intensely personal life. The legislation of the mature aristocracy transferred responsibility from the kinship group to the individual.

On the other hand, however, the common interest, rather than that of the individual is still the theme in the works of other aristocratic poets of this same period, such as Callinus, Tyrtaeus and Solon. Sparta oppressed the individual.

A third aristocratic attitude inside the *polis* was the reaction against the unrestrained exhibition of one's emotions under the forms of appeals for self-control and of preaching the moderation. Archilochus

¹ The most recent of these, H. Van Effenterre, *op. cit.* 164ff is at the same time critical of the opposite view.

² After Fustel de Coulanges, *La cité antique* (1864) book III, ch. 18, this idea was developed dramatically, with a polemic against the *polis*, by J. Burckhardt, *Griechische Kulturgeschichte* (1898) who, amongst his other criticisms, applied to the *polis* Dante's description of the Hell: 'la città dolente'.

³ Semonides Amorginus, *IEG* 1, 7 = Stobaeus, *Flor.* IV 34,15: 'ἐλπίς δὲ πάντας κάπιπειθείη τρέφει | ἄρηκτον ὀρμαίνοντας'.

⁴ Solon *IEG* 13, 71-73 = Stobaeus, *Flor.* III 9,23: 'Πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κείται | οἱ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλεῖστον ἔχουσι βίον, | διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι· τίς γὰρ ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας;'.
.

urges himself: 'Do not give a great display of joy when you prevail, nor fall down at home wailing when you lose, but enjoy the pleasure and suffer the griefs without excess.'¹ And Theognis consoles Cyrnus: 'Do not grieve too much, Cyrnus, when the citizens are confounded but follow the middle way, as I do.'² Solon proclaimed: 'Place great faith in the average.'³ The same advice is summed up in the sayings 'nothing in excess' and 'the mean is best'. This ideology should not be regarded as a retreat of the individualism, however; in fact this is a refined and well-mannered expression of it.

Democracy struck a blow at individualism at the political level by restricting the influence of those who were powerful because of their descent and personality, and by making the common citizen dependent on the polis-state through the provision of *misthoi* (wages). At the same time, however, within the democratic polis-states themselves, the sophists strengthened individualism by asserting that man was the measure of all things, and by teaching the young how to persuade and lead others. The sophists were democrats, and their absolute subjectivism, in the spheres of both knowledge and morals, was directed against the aristocratic ideology which proclaimed the divine origin and eternal validity of existing ideas and values; those who thronged to their lessons, however, in order to equip themselves with the means to secure their individual influence within the polis-state, were young aristocrats. The 'aristocratic' philosophy of Socrates and Plato took a diametrically opposed stance: they attacked subjectivism in the spheres of knowledge and morals, reflections of eternal transcendental models, and argued for the complete equality and assimilation of the citizens so that they would form one body. From another point of view, however, the abstention of Plato and other aristocrats from politics and their turn towards a political utopia had an individualistic character. The individualistic spirit gained strength inside the polis-states in Hellenistic times: this was the result of bitter disappointments at the failure of collective political endeavours, and an

¹ Archilochus *IEG* 128, 4-7 = Stobaeus, *Flor.* III 20,28: 'καὶ μήτε νικέων ἀμφάδην ἀγάλλεο | μηδὲ νικηθεὶς ἐν οἴκῳ καταπεσῶν ὀδύρεο, | ἀλλὰ χαρτοῖσιν τε χαίρε καὶ κακοῖσιν ἀσχάλα | μὴ λίην'.

² Theognis 219-220: 'Μηδὲν ἄγαν ἄσχαλλε ταρασσομένων πολιητέων, | Κύρνε, μέσην δ' ἔρχεο δόδον, ὥσπερ ἐγώ'.

³ Solon *IEG* 4c, 3: 'ἐν μετρίοισιν τίθεσθε μέγαν νόον'.

awareness of the small role reserved for the polis-states within the new balance of power.

Individualism, however, reached its culmination outside the polis-states, within the Hellenistic monarchies. The men who founded these monarchies were strong personalities who knew no obstacles, and who proclaimed themselves kings and gods. Their successors inherited these characteristics. In these states there were no longer citizens, but only subjects. They were, nevertheless, free to grow rich and to live according to their own taste with a lessened sense of responsibility towards any collectivity.

Individuality was thus neither closely woven into the fabric of the polis-state nor restricted to it.

II The opposite idea, that the polis-state restricted the private life of its citizens and oppressed them generally has two roots. On the one hand it has been suggested by the whole attitude of Sparta, in this respect, and by the suspicious and restrictive behaviour of the Athenian people towards public men or towards citizens who exhibited non-conformist tendencies. These phenomena are not characteristics of the polis-state, however: they are associated with particular polis-states and with particular phases of their history. Moreover, in Sparta and the Cretan polis-states some archaic institutions of a collective character continued in force, while new ones were shaped, designed to serve the military character acquired by these states.¹ As to the situation at Athens, it was connected with the pathology of the Athenian democracy. The belief that the *polis* oppressed its citizens grew stronger as a result of projecting onto antiquity the criteria of nineteenth century liberal humanist ideas on the rights of the citizen, and of comparing the polis-state with the period of terror during the French Revolution.²

This view is therefore subjective, exaggerated, and unwarrantably generalized.

III There is a moderate position, consisting of a combination of both views: man did not voluntarily surrender the whole of his being to the *polis* nor did the *polis* nurture the unbridled individual. When it

¹ F. Taeger, *Das Altertum* I (1939) 155–156= (1958) 155.

² R. Stadelmann, *Die Antike* 7 (1935) 57; F. Taeger, loc. cit.

was at its best, there was no individual life in the polis-state, because it embraced every sphere of life and because, at the same time, the citizens were the sovereigns of the polis-state; hence their own interests coincided with its interests. The citizen did not govern as an individual: he was a member of various bodies that carried on the government. He was thus obliged to take a direct and personal part in the life of the *polis*. The *polis* gave birth to the autonomous individual, and the individual devoted himself of his own free will to the *polis*.¹

I believe that more gradations are required, both synchronically and diachronically. Tendencies towards individualism and the opposite trends arose in different polis-states and at different periods of their history. The conflict between these trends inclined now to one side and now to the other. Individualism was not inherent in the polis-state, nor did it develop exclusively within polis-states; it was the product of conditions that arose in certain polis-states, but which also appeared in the Hellenistic monarchies, where individualism both expanded and intensified. In the polis-states, individualism went hand in hand with the rise of aristocracy, and with the growth of the business ethos. Anti-individualistic tendencies, too, were not inherent in the polis-state. They were widely found in the polis-states prior to the aristocracies, being inherited from pre-political societies. They were particularly strong in polis-states that became militarized. In others, they took the form of a reaction against individualism, which, beyond a certain point endangered the cohesiveness of the community, which was in turn the element that caused the state to cohere. The advantaged position of the *polis* compared with the individual that can be observed in the democratic polis-states was due not to the character of the *polis* but to democracy. It was not the *polis* but democracy that made the citizens sovereigns of the state and put individual self-interest on a level with that of the state. Individualism retreated because the individual, when taking part in the government of the *polis*, felt that he was also looking after his own interests.

¹ V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1932) 42 = (1957) 69 = (1960) 91 = (1976) 155.

11. *POLIS* AND CIVILIZATION

It has been claimed that the polis-state inspired and protected civilization, of which it was the sole bearer;¹ that it was the focal point of moral, cultural, esthetic, social and practical life, which it developed and enriched more than any other society did;² and that all the arts, poetry, theatre, philosophy, moral thought, science, classicism and beauty are all creations of the polis-state.³ In addition, the influence of the polis-state on the evolution of civilization has been attributed to social life and the financing by the *polis* of religious ceremonies and buildings;⁴ to the political nature of the content and aims of the great works of art of the fifth century;⁵ and to freedom of speech.⁶

All of these propositions have been asserted dogmatically. A closer, more detailed examination of matters suggests a different picture.

Firstly, the fact that the polis-state was not detached from civilization, but was a part of it, has been ignored. When this is taken into account, the question to be asked with regard to the influence of the polis-state becomes: whether and to what extent the polis-state influenced other aspects of the civilization that produced it. Moreover, the question arises: whether and to what extent the polis-state was influenced by other phenomena created by the same civilization.

Secondly, the nature of the polis-state has been ignored. A state is, at one and the same time, an authority, a group that exercises authority, and a number of groups over which authority is exercised. The role of the polis-state as a transmitter and receiver of influences, therefore, has to be related to these facts. On no account should phenomena or tendencies that fail outside these bounds be attributed to the polis-state.

¹ V.Ehrenberg, *op. cit.* (1932) 11, 39, 44 = (1957) 20, 64, 77 = (1960) 27, 84–85, 140–141 = (1976) 57, 145–146, 160; Ch.G.Starr, *op. cit.* 325; F.Gschnitzer, *WS* 68 (1955) 140–141, *AfAW* 12 (1959) 36.

² F.Kitto, *The Greeks* (1951, 1959) 11, 75.

³ H.Berve, *op. cit.* 10; F.Schachermeyr, *Diogenè* 4 (1953) 38; A.Momigliano, *Sesto Contributo alla Storia degli studi classici* II (1980) 467.

⁴ V.Ehrenberg, *op. cit.* (1932) 39, 44 = (1957) 64, 77 = (1960) 84–85, 95 = (1976) 145–146, 160.

⁵ H.Berve, *loc. cit.*

⁶ A.Momigliano, *loc. cit.*

Thirdly, the polis-state has been accredited with phenomena that in practice were the product of individual polis-state (especially Athens or Sparta), or of a particular category of polis-states (especially republican) or of some of them. The theatre was born in a few polis-states and was fully shaped in Athens. Philosophy and science were cultivated in a limited number of polis-states. Poetry and the figurative arts evolved in many, but not in all of them. Classicism was rather the product of a social and political climate peculiar to the democratic polis-states. One of its features, the balancing of internal and external forces, appears to reflect the balancing of the opposed forces of the individuals or the social groups and the democratic polis-state. Another characteristic of classicism, the 'golden mean', is similarly a reflection of political and social behaviour and ideology in a democracy, whereas aristocratic behaviour is unrestrained.¹ Classical beauty perhaps indicates the assent of the citizen to the social and political environment of democracy. Freedom of speech was also a characteristic of democracy. It is erroneous to regard as the civilization of the polis-state what was in fact the product of a number of polis-states at a particular period, or the sum total of the creations of all of the polis-states. The contribution of the polis-state to Greek civilization should be sought at the points where all the polis-states meet, and throughout the whole period of their existence.

12. INTENSITY AND VIOLENCE

The polis-state has also been defined as the setting for intensive political and spiritual activity² and for violent conflicts.³

It cannot be claimed, of course, that intensive spiritual and political activity are to be found in polis-states ruled by monarchs. These phenomena clearly appeared with the emergence of the citizen body (which coincided with the rise of the aristocracy) and became more widespread during the crisis of the aristocratic regimes, to reach their culmination under democracy. Political activity was restricted by the tyrants. Intensive political and spiritual activity was thus a

¹ v. s., pp. 144ff.

² W.W.Fowler, op. cit. 14; V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1932) 43 = (1957) 71 = (1960) 94 = (1976) 160.

³ W.W.Fowler, loc. cit.; Ch.G.Starr, op. cit. 325; F.Taeger, ll. cc.

characteristic feature not of the polis-state but of certain conjunctures within the polis-state.

Similarly, violent clashes are not distinctive features of the polis-state. In ancient Greece they are also to be found outside the polis-states, in the ethnos-state of the Macedonians, for example, during the struggles between rival contenders for power. There are also countless examples of this phenomenon outside Greece.

13. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, RELIGIOUS AND MILITARY ACTIVITY

C.Ampolo, while accepting that the polis-state was identified with a group of people, does not consider this adequate to an understanding of its essence, and adds that these people could not, and cannot, be understood independently of their activity as a whole, which was mainly political, but also economic, religious and military. As evidence for this he cites the migration of the Phocaeans with their families, their movable property, the statues of their gods and the dedications that they had made to them.¹ During the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in the twenties, however, the communities involved, behaved in exactly the same way as the Phocaeans. Others could add many other examples of this behaviour under similar conditions. Moreover, it is not clear how the behaviour of the Phocaeans can be adduced as evidence that the citizens of a polis-state could not be distinguished from their various activities.

14. PRESTIGE OF LANDOWNERSHIP AND FARMING; DISDAIN FOR MANUAL LABOUR, AND FOR THOSE ENGAGED IN IT

G.A.Koshelenko included among the characteristic features of the *polis* the differing esteem, at both the political and the ideological level, in which were held landownership and peasant farming on the one hand, and manual work and those engaged in it on the other.² But this ideological stance, and the practical expression of it are not features of the *polis*. They are features of the aristocratic class. Moreover, the:

¹ C. Ampolo, in C. Ampolo (ed), *La Città antica* (1980) xxxiv-xxxv.

² G.A.Koshelenko, *VDI* 151 (1980) 8.

became less sharp, and finally disappeared completely at the political level, with the rise of democracy.

15. OTHER PHENOMENA

Other phenomena that are to be found in polis-states have been advanced without any justification as characteristic features of the polis-state. The inappropriateness of these arguments may be demonstrated briefly.

Most of these phenomena are to be found in all states. This applies to the political organs of government,¹ the means of defence,² public buildings,³ the deriving of resources from the countryside,⁴ the division of the residents into citizens and non-citizens,⁵ the political predominance of the citizens over the non-citizens,⁶ the lack of economic equality between the citizens,⁷ respect for the laws, and common ideals shared by the members of the community.⁸

Others are features of the mature *polis*, but at the same time of all mature states. These are: the conducting of war by the state rather than by private citizens,⁹ the prohibition of the vendetta,¹⁰ and the existence of an elaborate state machine.¹¹

The fact that religion is part of the public rather than the private sphere¹² is true of many other types of state.

The distribution of the population into tribes¹³ is a phenomenon that is not common to all the polis-states (it is found only in the Dorian and Ionian polis-states), and is in any event older than the creation of those

¹ V.Ehrenberg, Ch. G.Starr, C.S.G.Thomas (v. s., p. 48).

² G.Glotz (v. s., p. 48).

³ G.Glotz, C.S.G.Thomas (v. s., p. 48).

⁴ G.Glotz (v. s., p. 48).

⁵ B.Borecký (v. s., p. 48).

⁶ B.Borecký (v. s., p. 48).

⁷ B.Borecký (v. s., p. 48).

⁸ V.Ehrenberg (v. s., pp. 31–32).

⁹ C.S.G.Thomas (v. s., p. 48).

¹⁰ J.A.O. Larsen (v. s., p. 49).

¹¹ P.Lévêque (v. s., p. 31).

¹² C.S.G. Thomas (v. s., p. 48).

¹³ G.Glotz (v. s., p. 48).

polis-states in which it is found (it goes back to the time of the Dorian and Ionian pre-political *ethne*).¹

Finally, the communal hearth on the one hand derives from the pre-political organization, and on the other is found in groups at a lower level than the polis-state: phratries, *gene* and families.

Not one of all these suggested characteristics of the *polis*, then, is founded. Some of them fall down on account of not one, but two or even more objections. The irrelevancies which occur more frequently involve: (a) phenomena covering a sphere broader than the *polis* (some occur in other states or form part of the general concept of the state); (b) phenomena covering a sphere narrower than the *polis* (they have been taken from a limited number of polis-states, notably from Athens, and moreover from the classical period or, at the earliest, the Archaic period); (c) phenomena unrelated to the concept of the state, to which the *polis* belongs. Some of the historians who have formulated suggestions of this kind have realized at some point that they are in fact not valid.²

A SYNOPSIS OF THE CONCLUSIONS

The preceding investigation enabled us to draw certain conclusions. These need to be summarized briefly, since they were arrived at through long discussion and were formulated at some distance from each other.

1. The *polis* belongs to the same conceptual family as the 'state'. It is not subsumed directly under the concept 'state', however, and cannot therefore be defined as a kind of state.

2. The species *polis* is directly defined by the linking of the *polis* and a community, which had its own specific characteristics and had a

¹ M.B.Sakellariou, *Phratries and Tribes in Greek Polis-States* (forthcoming).

² e.g. W.Hoffmann, in *Festschr. B.Snell* (1956) 155: 'das Geschehen (in the Homeric poems) wirkt vom Stadtpunkt, etwa des 5. Jahrhunderts aus, in auffälliger Weise "unpolitisch".' Ch.G.Starr, *PdP* 12 (1957) 98: 'the city-state of the seventh century differed in several significant particulars from the tightly woven fabrics of the fifth-century state'. C.S.G.Thomas, *Early Greek Kingship* (1965) 15 = *PdP* 21 (1966) 6: 'Inasmuch as we must use the historical *polis* as our standard of reference'.

special relationship with the *polis*. The real extent of the community appears in democratic *poleis*, when it coincided with the citizens and their families. Under oligarchic regimes as well as under tyranny or the kingship, it covered those who would belong to it in a democracy, excluding the ancestors of outsiders who had been incorporated to it in the course of history. The community was formed or reformed in relation to a polis-settlement and was defined by reference to it. There was no other community in the polis-state. The dominant element in the polis-state formed part of the community. Its other members enjoyed at least human rights higher than those given to metics. The community was a cultural unity. Its relations with the polis-state can be summarized as follows. It was narrower than the polis-state which included, in addition to the community, metics, freedmen, 'between free and slaves', slaves. It constituted, however, the human base of the polis-state and its ultimate *raison d'être*. It was the equivalent of the 'nation' in modern states, but it had more functions and activities, it possessed more vigour and energy, and was more comprehensive than a modern 'nation'.

3. The *polis* is located on the same conceptual level as the *demos*, which was itself a state connected with a community. The description of the relationship between *polis* and its community may be applied to the relationship between *demos* and its community. This is also true of the definition of the extent of the community of the *demos*. The community of a *demos* is distinguished from the community of a *polis* by the fact that it is related to a demos-settlement, in the same way that the community of a *polis* is related to a polis-settlement.

4. But the polis-settlement and the demos-settlement are kinds of settlement. Thus the communities defined with reference to the *polis* and the *demos* could be described as ekistic communities. The polis-state and the demos-state are therefore states linked with ekistic communities.

5. The concept 'ekistic community' may be assigned to a broader concept: the local community. Other kinds of local community include the community related to an autonomous region in which there was no polis-settlement, but numerous villages that were not self-governing. The 'local community' stands in contradistinction to the 'ethnic community'. The ethnic community was a characteristic of an ethnos-state, as a polis community was of a polis-state and a demos

community of a demos-state. The ethnic community antedated the formation of the ethnos-state; it constituted a pre-political society which was also called an *ethnos*.

6. The local community and the ethnic community are kinds of community that in ancient Greece played the role of the 'nation' in modern definitions of the state. The scale of concepts from the state to the polis-state is thus complete. The ancient community, however, differed from the nations of the states of Europe and of other states at the same level: it was more archaic in terms of structures, morals and behaviour; and it had greater cultural homogeneity and sentimental cohesiveness.

7. The *polis* became a state before the urbanization of its only, or most important, settlement. In this it differed from the city-state. It is therefore proper to use a different name for it. And the most suitable is the ancient Greek word, which can be rendered in languages other than Greek as *polis*, or as *polis-state*, *État-Polis*, *Polisstaat*, etc.

8. The polis-state is thus fixed with great precision vertically, with reference to the *proximum genus*, which is also located at a specific point on the scale of concepts that goes up to the level of 'state', and horizontally, with reference to the parallel concept described by the term *demos* and the closely related notion of 'city-state'.

Chapter Two

EXCURSUS ON THE ANCIENT MEANINGS OF THE WORD ΠΟΛΙΣ

The term πόλις occurs on countless occasions in the ancient Greek texts which have come down to us. The word has many meanings. We shall start our examination from the earliest and proceed by following their logical order (which is also largely the chronological order).

1. ΠΟΛΙΣ: A CITADEL

One of the meanings of the word πόλις in antiquity – ‘citadel’ – goes back to the common vocabulary of the Indo-European languages. This is suggested by the fact that the Sanskrit word *pur* and the Lithuanian word *pilis*, both feminine, like πόλις, also mean ‘stronghold’.¹

Πόλις occurs 235 times in the Homeric poems. But it is only in three instances that it involves the meaning ‘citadel’. In one of them, the poet depicts Apollo exhorting the Trojans to march out against the Achaeans; he begins by stating that the god is speaking from Pergamus, the citadel of Troy, and ends with the phrase: ‘so spoke the dread god from the polis’.² In the two other instances the term πόλις is associated with the term ἄστυ in a way which clearly implies that they mean ‘citadel’ and ‘lower town’ respectively.³ In other passages of Homer the

¹ J.B.Hofmann, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des griechischen*, 239; Cl.Strunk, *Glotta* 47 (1969) 1ff; E.Benveniste, *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européens* I (1969) 367; P.Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique* (1968) 926; M.Casewitz, *Ktéma* 8 (1983) 83; M.S.Ruipérez, in: *The History of the Greek Language in Cyprus, Proceedings of an International Symposium Sponsored by the Pierides Foundation, 1986* (1988) 153-164.

² *Iliad* IV 514: ‘ὦς φάτ’ ἀπὸ πτόλιος δεινὸς θεός’.

³ *Iliad* XXII 144: ‘φράζεο νῦν, ὄππως κε πόλιν καὶ ἄστυ σαώσης’, XXII 433-434: ‘εὐχῶλή κατὰ ἄστυ πελέσκειο, πᾶσι τ’ ὄνειρα | Τρωσί τε καὶ Τρωῆσι κατὰ πτόλιν’. L.R.Ménager’s view, in *Terre et paysans dépendants dans les sociétés antiques, Colloque international tenu à Besançon les 2 et 3 mai 1974* (1979) 134, that in XXII 144 πόλις includes ἄστυ is contrary to the linguistic sense. cf. my comments in the same work, p. 145.

opposition *ἄστν* – *ἄκρα πόλις* is found.¹ The *ἄκρα πόλις* appears alone too,² as also does the *ἀκρόπολις*.³

After Homer the original meaning of *πόλις* occurs in the Homeric Hymn *ad Cerem*,⁴ in an inscription found at Mycenae dating from the sixth century,⁵ and in Pindar.⁶ Furthermore, it was the usual term for the Athenian acropolis down to the fourth century,⁷ and it is attested for the citadels of Thebes⁸ and Ialysus in Rhodes⁹ in the fourth and third centuries respectively. Even in the first century B.C. Diodorus called the strongholds of the Sicilians of earlier times *poleis*.¹⁰

2. ΠΟΛΙΣ: A SETTLEMENT

The settlements which were made up of a citadel (*πόλις*) and a lower town (*ἄστν*) at some point began to be described as *πόλεις*,¹¹ while all the others continued to be described as *κῶμαι* or *δῆμοι* (villages). For a long time those who used the word *πόλις* for a settlement with a citadel and their listeners were aware that *πόλις* really meant the citadel; in other words they were using the part to express the whole. Later the ancient significance of the term *πόλις* diminished and it was replaced by the neologism *ἄκρα πόλις* > *ἀκρόπολις* which, as we said above, is found in the Homeric epics.

¹ *Iliad* VI 256–257: ‘μαρνάμενοι περὶ ἄστν· σὲ δ’ ἐνθάδε θυμὸς ἀνήκεν | ἐλθόντ’ ἐξ ἄκρης πόλιος’, 287: ‘ταὶ δ’ ἄρ’ ἀόλλισσαν κατὰ ἄστν γεραϊάς’, 297: ‘Αἶ δ’ ὅτε νηὸν ἴκανον Ἀθήνης ἐν πόλει ἄκρη’.

² *Iliad* VI 88, 257, 297, 317, VII 345, XX 52, XXII 383. ‘Πόλις ἀκροτάτη’: XXII 172.

³ *Odyssey* VIII 494 and 504.

⁴ *Hom. Hymn. Cer.* 270–271: ‘ἀλλ’ ἄγε μοι νηὸν τε μέγαν καὶ βωμὸν ὑπ’ αὐτῶ | τευχόντων πᾶς δῆμος ὑπαὶ πόλιν αἰπύ τε τείχος’.

⁵ *IG* IV no. 492, line 3: ‘Μυκανέαθεν παρ’ Ἀθαναίας ἐς πόλιος ἰκέτας ἔγεντο’.

⁶ Pindar, *P.* IV 8: ‘κτίσσειεν εὐάρματον | πόλιν ἐν ἀργεννόνεντι μαστῶ’; fr. 119, 2: ‘ἔνθεν δ’ ἀφορμαθέντες ὄψηλάν πόλιν ἀμφινέμονται’.

⁷ See D.R.Cole, ‘Asty’ and ‘Polis’: ‘City’ in *Early Greek* (diss. Stanford University (1976) Xerox University Microfilms) 318–345, passim; P.Lonis, *Ktema* 8 (1983) 95–109.

⁸ Plutarch, *Pelop.* 18, 1: ‘οἷς ἢ πόλις ἄσκησιν καὶ διαίταν ἐν τῇ Καδμείᾳ στρατοπεδευομένοις παρείχε καὶ διὰ τοῦθ’ ὁ ἐκ πόλεως λόχος ἐκαλοῦντο· τὰς γὰρ ἀκροπόλεις ἐπεικῶς οἱ τότε πόλεις ὠνόμαζον’.

⁹ *IG* XII 1, no. 677.

¹⁰ Diodorus V 6, 2: ‘Οἱ δ’ οὖν Σικανοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν κωμηδὸν ᾤκουν, ἐπὶ τῶν οὐχωρῶν τῶν λόφων τὰς πόλεις κατασκευάζοντες διὰ τοὺς ληστὰς’.

¹¹ G.Glotz, *La Cité Grecque* (1928) 13ff.

In the 225 out of 235 passages the term *πόλις* means 'settlement with a citadel'.¹ It is, then, obvious that by Homeric times the new meaning of *πόλις* was already well established. It would seem that the citadel was the only common feature of settlements which are called *πόλεις* in post-Homeric texts, where the sense of term *πόλις* is distinguished clearly both from the meaning of countryside and from the meaning of *κώμη* or *δήμος*. Ancient Greek settlements called *πόλεις* hardly became cities before the sixth century, however.² Of course, the settlements of Attica which were protected by citadels were not called *πόλεις* but *δήμοι*.³ On the other hand, however, the settlements of Macedonia which had a citadel were called *πόλεις* even though they were not independent states, of polis-type. The earliest instances of the use of *πόλις* for settlements of the Macedonian state are in Herodotus, who described Therme, Sindos and other settlements in this way.⁴ In an inscription dated to the year 423/2 B.C. there is mention of *πόλεις* held by Perdikkas.⁵ Xenophon described Pella, the capital of the state by this same term.⁶ In a passage of Pseudo-Scylax the term *πόλις ἑλληνίς* is used for settlements which were independent and the term *πόλις Μακεδονίας* for settlements which belonged to the Macedonian state, in particular for Pella, Therme, Herakleion and Aloros.⁷ In Attica the term *πόλις* meaning a settlement below a citadel was eventually confined to Athens which was the political centre of the *polis*. In Macedonia this did not occur because the state was not a *polis*.

The citadel is not an essential element of cities in other eras or civilizations, or of the city in general. Hence those who study non-Greek cities, or who are concerned in general with the city, seek for and apply other distinguishing marks. They add up to several dozens.⁸ But

¹ Texts and comments in D.R.Cole, op. cit. 7–142; cf. E.Lévy, *Ktema* 8 (1983) 55–73.

² M.B.Sakellariou, *A Contribution to the Study of the City in the Greek Commonwealth to 330 B.C.* (forthcoming).

³ For some of these there remained the memory that they had been *poleis* in the sense of 'independent state' during the prehistoric period (v.i., p. 329).

⁴ Herodotus VII 123, 124, 127.

⁵ H.Bengtson, *SVA* 186, line 32.

⁶ Xenophon, *Hell.* V 2, 13.

⁷ Scylax 66.

⁸ M.I.Finley, *CSSH* 19 (1977) 307–308 = *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* (1981) 5–6.

many are common to all definitions. The most frequent is the economic; the city is considered to be that settlement in which the secondary and tertiary activities are carried, or, according to another view, in which the products of primary activities performed outside the city are consumed.¹ Next in importance are the criteria of urbanization and population. If we apply the economic criteria to ancient Greek settlements we shall have to recognize the Peiraeus as a city (which the ancients did not) and, on the contrary, we shall have to characterize as townlets or villages many settlements which the ancients termed *πόλεις*.² Up to a point Sparta meets this criterion; it did not have secondary or tertiary production but on the other hand it consumed part of the goods produced in the countryside by people who did not live in Sparta. Equally, the parameters of urban organization and of population do not hold good for numerous settlements which the ancients classed as *poleis*; again, Sparta was a cluster of villages. Pausanias, using the concepts and the criteria of late antiquity, hesitated to classify Panopeus as a city because it had no public buildings – gymnasia, theatres, agora, aqueducts –, because the homes of the citizens resembled huts, and because it was sited on the edge of a gorge. It was called a city, however, because it was the capital of an autonomous community.³ Nevertheless, Panopeus and the villages which constituted Sparta were to be found beneath citadels.

Since the Greeks used the term *πόλις* for settlements which from an

¹ M.I.Finley, *op. cit.* 308ff = 6ff, where he expounds and comments on the relevant ideas of Adam Smith, K.Marx–F.Engels, W.Sombart, Karl Bücher, Max Weber. M.Hammond, *City in the Ancient World* (1972) 6–8, 346–347, defined the *polis* using also features which belong to the polis-settlement.

² Ch.G.Starr, *The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece* (1977) 48, 100, noted the existence of differences between ancient, medieval and modern towns, political, economic, and in their appearance. M.I.Finley, *The Ancient Economy*, 123ff = *L'Economie grecque* (1975) 105ff and in the article noted earlier 5, 17, 2, stressed that there were no differences between town and countryside, whether economic, social or political, throughout Greek antiquity.

³ Pausanias X 4, 1: 'Πανοπέας... πόλιν Φωκέων, εἴ γε ὀνομάσαι τις πόλιν καὶ τούτους, οἷς γε οὐκ ἀρχεῖα οὐ γυμνάσιόν ἐστιν, οὐ θέατρον οὐκ ἀγορὰν ἔχουσιν, οὐχ ὕδωρ κατερχόμενον ἐς κρήνην, ἀλλ' ἐν στέγαις κοίλαις κατὰ τὰς καλύβας μάλιστα τὰς ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσιν, ἐνταῦθα οἰκοῦσιν ἐπὶ χαράδρα. Ὅμως δὲ ὄροι γε τῆς χώρας εἰσὶν αὐτοῖς ἐς τοὺς ὁμόρους καὶ ἐς τὸν σύλλογον συνέδρους καὶ οὗτοι πέμπουσι τὸν Φωκικόν'.

economic and urban point of view were villages we might reasonably suppose that they would regard as κῶμαι or δῆμοι (villages) those settlements which lacked the distinguishing feature of the *polis*, the citadel.

A recently published inscription has added valuable new evidence. It contains the text of a treaty of *sympoliteia* concluded in the early fourth century B.C. between two Arcadian polis-states. A clause of this treaty provides that the 'πόλις of the Helisseans' will both remain 'for ever just as it stands' and become a 'κώμη of the Mantineans'.¹ In this context, the term κώμη denotes the political situation of Helisson after its incorporation in the state of Mantinea, whereas the term πόλις refers to Helisson as a settlement.

3. ΠΟΛΙΣ: A STATE

(a) ΠΟΛΙΣ: A STATE WITH A CITY AT ITS HEART

The ancient Greek states which contemporaries described as πόλεις had a settlement at their centre which was considered to be a *polis*, when assessed by the standards we noted above. It is clear that the extension of the use of this term from the urban sense to the political was due to the fact that settlements below a citadel were mostly centres of government. This happened even before a given settlement had developed craft production and commerce, and while it was not very different from the village in appearance.

The oldest evidence for the use of the term πόλις in the sense of 'state' appears in the *Odyssey*. Odysseus says to Nausicaa: 'I know no one of the people οἱ τήνδε πόλιν καὶ γαῖαν ἔχουσιν· ἄστν δέ μοι δεῖξον.'² It has been most correctly observed that here the term πόλις does not mean the citadel but the state, because it is associated with the term γαῖα (country) 'and contrasted with the term ἄστν' (town).³ In another passage in the *Odyssey*, Eumaeus says of himself that he is the son of the king of an island called Syrie who ruled two *poleis* which had

¹ C.-J. and M.-J. Te Riele, *BCH* 111 (1987) 167ff, lines 6-7: 'μινόνσας τὰς [πό]λιος τῶν Ἑλισφασίων ὥσπερ ἔχε[ι] ἰν πάντα χρόνον, κώμα[ν] ἔαψαν τὸς Ἑλισφασίος τῶν Μαντινέων'.

² *Odyssey* VI 176-178.

³ cf. F.Gschnitzer, *Chiron* 1 (1971) 7.

divided everything between them.¹ The account is mythical but not, at least as far as the political content is concerned, imaginary; if not in Syrie then somewhere there would have existed kings at the head of two (or more) *poleis* like those mentioned in this passage. On the one hand we have the picture of a state with two settlements of the polis-type. On the other hand, however, the partition of Syrie (and of other islands or areas of land) between *poleis* presupposes a separate political life for each *polis*. In this passage therefore the term *πόλις* denotes simultaneously a settlement of the polis-type and a political community, *polis*. Such a situation could have come into existence as a result either of the union of two independent communities under one ruler or of the dissolution of the bonds between two polis-settlements of an once unitary state. The first case implies the existence in each polis-settlement of a council of elders and an assembly which would have taken the decision to distribute the once united land between the two towns. This machinery might have survived with only local competence, or it might have fused with the machinery of the other town.²

In other passages of Homer the concept of the state is rendered by the word *δῆμος*³ which sometimes refers particularly to the people of a state,⁴ and sometimes to its territory.⁵ Moreover, in a much discussed passage in book IX of the *Iliad* someone who stays outside the network of the established legal order is said to be ἀφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιτος, ἀνέστιος, not ἄπολις.⁶

The term *πόλις* reappears in the meaning of 'state' in passages of

¹ *Odyssey* XXIII 412–413: 'ἔνθα δὺν πόλιες, δίχα δέ σφισι πάντα δέδασται | τῆσι δ' ἀμφοτέρησιν πατήρ ἐμὸς ἐμβασίλευε'.

² Similar examples of personal unions, but from the historic period, are mentioned in Part Two, chapter 1.

³ *Iliad* III 50: 'πατρί τε σφ' μέγα πῆμα πόληϊ τε παντί τε δήμῳ', XXIV 706: 'μέγα χάσμα πόλει τ' ἦν παντί τε δήμῳ'; *Odyssey* II 291–292: 'ἀνὰ δῆμον ἐταίρους... συλλέξομαι', VII 11: 'θεοῦ δ' ὥς δῆμος ἄκουεν', VIII 150: 'γέρας... δῆμος ἔδωκεν', 157: 'βασιλῆά τε πάντα τε δῆμον'.

⁴ *Odyssey* I 237: 'Τρώων ἐνὶ δήμῳ', VI 3: 'βῆ ρ' ἐς Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν δῆμόν τε πόλιν τε', VIII 155 = XIX 105: 'εἰπέ δέ μοι γαῖάν τε τεῖν δῆμόν τε πόλιν τε'.

⁵ *Odyssey* XIII 322: 'Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν ἐν πίονι δήμῳ', XIV 329: 'Ἰθάκης ἐς πίονα δῆμον', XVII 526: 'Θεσπρωτῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν πίονι δήμῳ'; cf. *Iliad* XVI 514, 673, XX 385.

⁶ *Iliad* IX 63.

Hesiod who lived towards the end of the eighth and the beginning of the seventh century B.C. No particular *polis* is to be understood in any of them, but the type of state which was called *πόλις* is clearly envisaged there.¹

After Hesiod and down to the end of the sixth century *πόλις* increasingly means 'state'. There are many instances of this meaning for 'state' in general, all provided by poets.² In other documents *πόλις* indicates a particular state. In a decree of the Cyziceni of the sixth century we read that the *πόλις* conferred certain exemptions on some people and erected a column in their honour and that these decisions were ratified by an oath of the *δήμος*.³ Here the term *δήμος* denotes the popular assembly as an organ of the *polis*, that is, of the state. An alliance between the Sybaritae and the Serdaioi (550–525 B.C.) was concluded under the protection of some gods and of the *polis* Poseidonia,⁴ that is of the state of the Poseidonians. Many other examples of this usage occur in poetry.⁵

¹ Hesiod, *Op.* 225–227: 'Ὅτι δὲ δίκας ξείνοισι καὶ ἐνδήμοισι διδοῦσιν | ἰθείας καὶ μὴ τι παρεκβαίνουσι δικαίου, | τοῖσι τέθηλε πόλις, λαοὶ δ' ἀνθεῦσιν ἐν αὐτῇ', 267–269: 'Πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας | καὶ νυ τὰδ', αἶ κ' ἐθέλησ', ἐπιδέρκεται, οὐδέ ἐ λήθει | οἶην δὴ καὶ τήνδε δίκην πόλις ἐντὸς ἔεργει'.

² Phocylides, *EI* 5, 1 = Dio Chrysostomus XXXVI 11: 'πόλις ἐν σκοπέλω κατὰ κόσμον | οἰκεῦσα σμικρὴ κρείττων Νίνου ἀφραινούσης'; Xenophanes *IEG* 2,19–22 = Athenaeus XI 413ff: 'τοῦνεκεν ἄν δὴ μάλλον ἐν εὐνομίῃ πόλις εἶη | σμικρὸν δ' ἄν τι πόλει χάσμα γένοιτ' ἐπὶ τῷ | εἴ τις ἀεθλεύων νικῶι Πίσασο παρ' ὄχθας | οὐ γὰρ πιαίνει ταῦτα μυχοὺς πόλεως'. The meaning of the term *πόλις* is ambiguous in another passage of Xenophanes, *IEG* 45 = Erotianus 'Τῶν παρ' Ἰπποκράτει λέξεων συναγωγῆ, s.v. *βληστρισμός*: 'ἐγὼ δ' ἐμαυτὸν ἐκ πόλιος πόλιν φέρων | ἐβλήστριζον'.

³ *SIG* no. 4: '[--- τὴν δὲ στήλην τήνδε πόλις Μαῖνῆ ἔδωκε τῷ Μεδίκ[εω]... Πόλις Μηδίκεω καὶ τοῖσιν Αἰσθήπου παισὶν | καὶ τοῖσιν ἐκγόνοισιν ἀτελεῖην καὶ πρυ|τανεῖον δέδοται, παρὲξ... Τὴν | δὲ στήλην τήνδε πόλι Μ[α]νῆ ἔδ[ω]κ[ε] τῷ Μηδίκεω'.

⁴ *SGHI* I 10 lines 5–8: 'Πρόξενοι ὁ Ζε | ὕς κ' Ὀπόλον κ' ἄλλοι θ | εοὶ καὶ πόλις Ποσειδα | νία'.

⁵ Solon, *IEG* 4 = Demosthenes, *De falsa leg.* 254ff: 'Ἡμετέρη δὲ πόλις κατὰ μὲν Διὸς οὔποτ' ἀλείται... | αὐτοὶ δὲ φθείρειν μεγάλην πόλιν ἀφραδίησιν | αὐτοὶ βούλονται χρήμασι πειθόμενοι, | ... | τοῦτ' ἤδη πάση πόλει ἔρχεται ἔλκος ἀφυκτον' | ... | ὡς κακὰ πλεῖστα πόλει δύσνομα παρέχει | εὐνομία δ' εὐκοσμία καὶ ἄρτια πάντ' ἀποφαίνει'; *IEG* 9,3–4 = Diodorus IX 21: 'ἀνδρῶν δ' ἐκ μεγάλων πόλις ὄλλυται, εἰς δὲ μοναρχίαν | δήμος ἀϊδρήν δουλοσύνην ἔπεσεν'; *IEG* 36, 25 = Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 12: 'πολλῶν ἄν ἀνδρῶν ἥδ' ἐχρηθῆ πόλις'; *IEG* 36 = Plutarch, *Sol.* 19, 1: 'τὴν δ' ἄνω βουλὴν ἐπίσκοπον πάντων καὶ φύλακα τῶν νόμων ἐκάθισεν, οἴομενος ἐπὶ δυοῖ βουλαῖς

Examples of both usages of *πόλις*, the general and the particular, rapidly multiply from the beginning of the sixth century down to the end of antiquity.

(b) *ΠΟΛΙΣ*: A STATE WHICH HAD NO *POLIS*-SETTLEMENT

As early as some passages in Tyrtaeus – and later in many others – the term *πόλις* is used for both Sparta and the state of the Lacedaemonians,¹ even though Sparta was not a *polis* in the sense of a ‘settlement below a citadel’, but a cluster of villages. This use possibly derived from the fact that these villages had a common citadel.

This explication is excluded, however, when Thucydides and Isocrates use the term *πόλις* for people who dwelt in scattered villages.² Plutarch uses the word *πολίται* of the Megarians before they formed a unified state, being still divided into five ‘parts’.³ Before these authors Herodotus used the term *πολιῆται* for the inhabitants of a village of the Medes which for some reason he regarded as an independent state.⁴

ὥσπερ ἄγκυραν ὀρμοῦσαν ἤττον ἐν σάλῳ τὴν πόλιν ἔσεσθαι; Theognis, 236: ἄλλ’ ὡς πάγχυ πόλει, Κύρνε, ἄλωσομένη’, 287: ‘οὐ γάρ τοι πόλει ὤδε καλωσόγῳ ἀνδάνει οὐδέν’, 541: ‘Δεϊμαίνω μὴ τήνδε πόλιν, Πολυπαίδῃ, ὕβρις, | ἥπερ Κενταύρους ὠμοφάγους, ὀλέση’, 757–758: ‘Ζεὺς μὲν τῆσδε πόλῃος ὑπείρεχει αἰθέρι ναίων | αἰεὶ δεξιτέρην χεῖρ’ ἐπ’ ἀπημοσύνη’, 855–856: ‘Πολλάκι δὴ πόλις ἦδε δι’ ἡγεμόνων κακότητα | ὥσπερ κεκλιμένη ναὺς παρὰ γῆν ἔδραμεν’, 885: ‘Εἰρήνη καὶ Πλοῦτος ἔχοι πόλιν’, 947–948: ‘Πατρίδα κοσμήσω, λιπαρὴν πόλιν, οὗτ’ ἐπὶ δῆμῳ | τρέψας οὗτ’ ἀδίκους ἀνδράσι πειθόμενος;’ Alcaeus, *PLF* 141 = *Schol. Aristoph. Vesp.* 1234: ‘Ὦνηρ οὗτος ὁ μαιόμενος τὸ μέγα κρέτος | ὄντρέψει τάχα τὴν πόλιν· ἅ δ’ ἔχεται ρόπας’, 331 = Herphaestion 84: ‘Μέλαγχρος, αἰδῶς ἄξιος ἐς πόλιν’, 348 = Aristotle, *Pol.* 1285 a 33: ‘φῶνα δ’ ἀθρόα τὸν κακοπατρίδαν | Φίττακον πόλιος τὰς ἀχόλῳ καὶ βαρυδαίμονος | ἐστάσαντο τύραννον.’; Anacreon *IEG* 3,6 = Herphaestion, *De Poem.* IV 68: ‘ἀνδρῶν ἑσκατορᾶς πόλιν | χαίρουσ’, οὐ γὰρ ἀνημέρους | ποιμαίνεις πολιῆτας’.

¹ Tyrtaeus, *IEG* 4,4 and 10 = Plutarch, *Lyc.* 6: ‘Σπάρτης ἡμερόεσσα πόλις’, ‘Φοῖβος γὰρ περὶ τῶν ὠδ’ ἀνέφηνε πόλει;’ *IEG* 10,3 = Lycurgus, *Leoc.* 107: ‘τὴν δ’ αὐτοῦ προλιπόντα πόλιν καὶ πίονας ἀγρούς;’ *IEG* 12, 15 = Stobaeus, *Flor.* 51, 1 and 5: ‘ξυνὸν δ’ ἔσθλον τοῦτο πόλῃ τε παντὶ τε δῆμῳ’.

² Thucydides I 5, 1: ‘καὶ προσπίπτοντες πόλεσιν ἀτειχίστοις καὶ κατὰ κόμας οἰκουμέναις;’ Isocrates, *Hel.* 34: ‘τὴν πόλιν σποράδην καὶ κατὰ κόμας οἰκοῦσαν’.

³ Plutarch, *Quaest. Gr.* 17, 295 b: ‘Τὸ παλαιὸν ἢ Μεγαρίσι ὤκειτο κατὰ κόμας εἰς πέντε μέρη νενεμημένων τῶν πολιτῶν’.

⁴ Herodotus I 96.

(c) ΠΟΛΙΣ: A STATE DIFFERING
FROM THE ETHNOS AND THE KOINON

The ancient Greeks used the term *ἔθνος* to denote a state identified with an *ethnos* (a Greek tribe or a foreign people)¹ and the term *κοινόν* to denote a confederacy of *poleis*.² Sometimes these terms are applied to the same state: this happens when it refers to confederacies (*κοινά*) of *poleis* which have the same territory as that occupied by an *ethnos* (people).³ But another fact is also to be observed: *ἔθνος* may be applied to the people of a confederacy and *κοινόν* to its government (and probably also to its popular assembly).⁴ Elsewhere the term *κοινόν* seems to denote a *polis* or the government of a *polis*.⁵ More often however, the two terms *ἔθνος* and *κοινόν* are clearly distinguished.

¹ Examples of this usage are numerous. A. Giovannini, *Untersuchungen über die Natur und die Anfänge der bundesstaatlichen Sympolitie in Griechenland* (= *Hypomnemata* 33) (1971) 16, formulated the view that Greek confederacies were called *ethne*, not because they sprang from *ethne* but because they belonged to a category of states which could not be described as *poleis*. But numerous confederacies coincided with *ethne* and bore their name: thus the acquisition by the term *ἔθνος* of the meaning of 'confederacy' is due to the very coincidence of *ethnos* or 'nation' and *koinon* or confederacy including the polis-states which were formed inside an *ethnos*.

² Examples of this usage are also numerous. It should, however, be noted that the term *κοινόν* had many other applications in the spheres of public law and international relations: A. Giovannini, *op. cit.* 17–18. The latter also examines the conceptual relations of *πόλις* and *κοινόν*.

³ *SIG*, no. 554 (208/7 B.C.) lines 6–9: 'τὰν τε οἰκειότα|τα τὰν ποτι τὸ ἔθνος ἀνευέωσαντο καὶ τὰν εὐ|νοιαν ἐνεφάνιξαν, ἃν ἔχοντι ποτι τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν'; 598 D (194 B.C.) lines 10–11: 'ποτι τὸ κ[οι]νὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ δε[ῖ]δοσθαι αὐτοῖς | παρὰ] τοῦ ἔθνεος προξενίαν καὶ πολιτείαν'; 628 (182 B.C.) lines 3–4: 'τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν | ἀρετᾶς ἔνεκεν καὶ εὐεργε|σίας τᾶς ποτι τὸ ἔθνος'.

⁴ *SIG*, no. 598 C (205 B.C.) line 1; 598 (194 B.C.) line 1; 628 (183/2 B.C.) line 3; *IG*, IX 2, no. 508 (2nd cent. B.C.) line 23. See also P. Roesch, *Thespies et la confédération béotienne* (1965) 72. *Κοινόν* is sometimes used to describe the governing body of an amphictyony (Herodotus V 109) or of an alliance.

⁵ Herodotus I 67, III 8, 6, VI 14 and 50, 2, VIII 135, IX 87 and 117, Thucydides I 89, 3, II 12, 2, Aristophanes, *Eccl.* 208, Xenophon, *Hell.* VI 1, 2, Antiphon, *Tetralogia* II 3. H. Bengtson, *SVA*, no. 207 (409 B.C.) lines 8, 20; *SIG*, no. 64 (446/5 B.C.) line 10; 112 (409/8 B.C.) lines 9ff, 19; 306 (324 B.C.) line 62; 307 (before 323 B.C.) line 3; 327 (306/5 B.C.) lines 20 ff; 493 (230–220 B.C.) line 28; 613 (186 and 184 B.C.) line 23; *IG* IX 2, 460 (2nd cent. B.C.) line 3; 461 (3rd cent. B.C.) line 27; *IMM*, 31 (about 200 B.C.) lines 13ff; *IC*, I xxvi, 2 (201 B.C.) lines 4ff.

The very fact that the ancient Greeks used three terms to denote three kinds of state, two primary or unitary and one secondary or a confederacy, makes it clear that they realized the differences between them. But the distinction of the concept of the *polis* from the two others appears more sharply in the many passages in which the term *πόλις* is used either conjunctively or disjunctively along with the term *ἔθνος* or *κοινόν*.¹ In some of these passages the *poleis* are distinguished from the *koina* to which they belonged; in others there is a distinction between *poleis* and *ethne* which were not inter-related.

In a passage in Demosthenes we meet both distinctions between *polis* and *ethnos*: 'I pass over Olynthus, Methone, Apollonia and the thirty-two *poleis* on the shores of Thrace ... I say nothing of the *ethnos* of the Phocians ... But how stand matters in Thessaly? Has he not robbed them of their *poleis* and their constitutions, has he not set up tetrarchies in order to enslave them, not only *polis* by *polis* but *ethnos* by *ethnos*?² The terms *πόλις* and *ἔθνος* are twice set in contradistinction. The first distinguishes the Greek *poleis* of the north³ from the *ethnos* of the Phocians, which was also a *koinon* (a confederacy of the Phocian *poleis*). On the second occasion a distinction is drawn between the *poleis* of Thessaly and the tetrarchies understood by Demosthenes as *ethne* probably because he was confusing the tetrarchies, parts of the Thessalian *koinon*, with the *ethne* of the Perrhaebi, Magnetes, Phthiotic Achaeans and Dolopes subordinate to the Thessalians. We shall discuss the *poleis* of the Thessalians below.⁴

¹ H.Schaefer's view expressed in ZSS, Röm. Abt. 77 (1960) 426 = *Probleme der alten Geschichte* (1965) 388, that the distinction between *polis* and *ethnos* is to be dated from the Hellenistic period is mistaken. This appears from the passages which testify to the terms which are older than this period (v. i., pp. 164ff., passim).

² Demosthenes, *Phil.* III 26: "Ολυθον μὲν δὴ καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ Ἀπολλωνίαν καὶ δύο καὶ τριάκοντα πόλεις ἐπὶ Θράκης ἔδω... καὶ τὸ Φωκέων ἔθνος τοσοῦτον ἀνηρημένον σιωπῶ. Ἀλλὰ Θεσσαλία πῶς ἔχει; οὐχὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰς πόλεις αὐτῶν παρήρηται καὶ τετραρχίας κατέστησεν, ἵνα μὴ μόνον κατὰ πόλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἔθνη δουλεύωσιν;"

³ Demosthenes deliberately names the three towns whose mention would provoke feelings of fury amongst an Athenian public, whereas had he named all the Thracian towns he would have bored his audience and destroyed the psychological tension.

⁴ v. i., pp. 325, 410, 459-460.

Both instances of the distinction between *poleis* and *ethne* are to be understood in a law of the Amphictyons (590 B.C.) preserved for us by Aeschines: 'if any should violate these agreements whether polis, individual or ethnos...'.¹ It is known that the Pylaeon, later Delphic, Amphictyony was made up of *ethne*; two of these, the Ionians and the Dorians, ceased to be unitary at an early date, since they had broken up into *poleis*. This, however, did not affect the structure of the Amphictyony which continued to regard the Ionians and Dorians, not their *poleis*, as its members and thus to receive as the representatives of these *ethne* the delegates of the Ionian and Dorian *poleis*.² The *poleis* to which the law refers were of two kinds: the Dorians and the Ionians, divided into several *poleis*, and all those which continued to constitute *ethne*.

Examples of the distinction made exclusively between *poleis* and their own *ethne* are encountered in passages of Polybius and later authors, and also in inscriptions.

On two occasions Polybius records the forcible dissolution of the *ethnos* of the Achaeans into *poleis* by the Macedonian kings.³ Elsewhere he writes that the Aetolians joined hands with Antigonos Doson, king of the Macedonians, because they were jealous of the development of the Achaean *ethnos* and sought not only to disrupt it, but to take possession of certain of its *poleis*.⁴ The *ethnos* of the Achaeans had a confederate organization; in other words, it was a *koinon*.

In one clause of the treaty which the Romans concluded with the Aetolians in 212 or 211 B.C., known to us from an inscription and a few passages in narrative texts, the Romans accepted the obligation to hand over to the Aetolians the *poleis* of hostile *ethne* which they would

¹ Aeschines, *Ctes.*, 110: 'εἴ τις τάδε παραβαίνει ἢ πόλις ἢ ιδιώτης ἢ ἔθνος'.

² v. i., pp. 326-327.

³ Polybius II 40, 5: 'ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν, ἐν οἷς κατὰ πόλιν διαλυθέντος τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας βασιλέων ἀρχὴ πάλιν ἐγένετο καὶ σύννευσις τῶν πόλεων πρὸς ἀλλήλας.' IV I, 4-5: '... καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους. Ἀρξάμενοι γὰρ... τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας βασιλέων διασπασθῆναι κατὰ πόλεις καὶ κόμας'.

⁴ Polybius II 45, 1: 'Ὀλοσχερεστέρας δὲ γενομένης αὐξήσεως διὰ ταῦτα καὶ προκοπῆς περὶ τὸ ἔθνος Αἰτωλοῖ... φθονήσαντες, τὸ δὲ πλείστον ἐλπίσαντες καταδιαλέσθαι τὰς πόλεις...'

conquer.¹ We learn which these were from passages in Polybius and Livy mentioning this treaty and the war which followed:² Epirots, Thessalians, Locrians, Phocians, Boeotians and some states in the Peloponnese.³ The same authors also tell us about some of the *poleis* of the Phocians (Antikyra⁴) and of the Thessalians (Larisa Kremaste, Pharsalus, Phthiotic Thebes, Echinus⁵). All the *ethne* mentioned were *koina*.

In an inscription from Cnossos dating from the end of the second century B.C. the term *ἔθνος* is used to identify the *koinon* of the Cretans while the term *πόλις* denotes the popular assembly of the *polis*.⁶ This meaning of the term *πόλις* is also found in other sources.⁷

Strabo describes the Lyncestae, the Brygi, the Derrriopes and the Pelagones as *ethne* (= *koina* of corresponding *ethne*) with *poleis* (= confederate states) before the Roman occupation.⁸

The distinction between *ethne* or *koina* and *poleis* belonging to

¹ IG IX I², II no. 241 (212–11B.C.) = H.Bengtson, *SVA* III, no. 536 lines 4–7: ‘εἰ δὲ τινές (sic) καὶ τοῦ|των τῶν ἔθνων οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι πόλεις κατὰ κρά|τος λάβωντι, ταύτας τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰς | [χ]ώρας’. The names of the *ethne* were probably recorded in earlier lines of the inscription, now lost, since the word *ἔθνων* is qualified by the demonstrative pronoun *τούτων* and the article *τῶν*.

² cf. H.Bengtson, *SVA* III, p. 259ff.

³ Polybius XI 5, 4–5: ‘τούτῳ δὲ (= τῷ Φιλίππῳ) συμμάχων ὑπαρχόντων Πελοποννησίων τῶν πλείστων, Βοιωτῶν, Εὐβοέων, Φωκέων, Λοκρῶν, Θετταλῶν, Ἠπειρωτῶν, κατὰ τούτων πεποιήσθε τὰς συνθήκας, ἔφ’ ᾧ τὰ μὲν σώματα καὶ τὰπιπλα Ῥωμαίων ὑπάρχειν τὰς δὲ πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν Αἰτωλῶν’, XVIII 38, 7: ‘τὰς δὲ πόλεις Αἰτωλῶν’ and 38, 9: ‘ὅπερ αἰ κατὰ Θετταλίαν πόλεις’; T.Livius XXVI 24, 5ff, XXXIII 13, 7 and 12, XXXIII 34, 7, XXXIII 49, 8, XXXIV 23, 7.

⁴ Polybius IX 39, 2.

⁵ Polybius XVIII 38, 3–4, XVIII 47, 7–8; Livius XXXIII 34, 7, XXXIII 49, 8, XXXIV 33, 7.

⁶ IC I, no. 12, line 5 (*ἔθνος*), lines 1, 20 and 23 (*πόλις*). See also below, p. 201.

⁷ v. i., pp. 197–303.

⁸ Strabo VII 7, 9: ‘Ὁ δὲ Ἐρίγων πολλὰ δεξάμενος ρεύματα ἐκ τῶν Ἰλλυρικῶν ὄρων καὶ Λυγκηστῶν καὶ Βρύγων καὶ Δερριόπων καὶ Πελαγόνων εἰς τὸν Ἀξιὸν ἐκδίδωσι. Πρότερον μὲν οὖν καὶ πόλεις ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι τούτοις· τριπολίτις γοῦν ἢ Πελαγονία ἐλέγετο, ἧς καὶ Ἄζωρος ἦν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ Ἐρίγωνι πᾶσαι αἱ τῶν Δερριόπων πόλεις ᾤκητο, ὧν τὸ Θυράνιον καὶ Ἀλακομεναὶ καὶ Στύβερα.’ cf. VII 7, 8: ‘πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Λυγκησταὶ τε καὶ ἡ Δευρίοπος καὶ ἡ τριπολίτις Πελαγονία...’ An inscription of 192 B.C. (*Spomelik* 71 (1931) 339) mentions ‘Ἀλκομεναίων κῶμη’. N.G.L.Hammond, *Macedonia* I, 89 and n 3, suggested that it did not mean the *πόλις* Alalkomenai, made up *κῶμαι*, but one of them.

them continued under the Empire with the difference that these terms no longer denoted types of states; the *poleis* were not sovereign states and the *ethne* or *koina* were unions of cities of a province (this term also meant 'the body of representatives of these cities). Thus we have: πόλις Γυθεατῶν~ἔθνος [Λακόνων];¹ ἔθνος Λυγκηστῶν~πόλις [Heraikleia];² ἔθνος Ποντικόν ~ πόλις Βυζαντίων;³ ἔθνος/κοινὸν Λυκίων~various *poleis*, which are sometimes named and sometimes passed over in silence;⁴ Macedonians and other Greek *ethne* ~ *poleis* of these *ethne*.⁵ This was the type of inter-relationship that Pollux had in mind

¹ IG, V no. 1171 (early 2nd cent. A.D.): 'Ἡ πόλις ἡ Γυθεατῶν | Κλαύδιον Ἄττικὸν | τὸν ἀρχιερέα τῶν Σεβαστῶν καὶ κηδεμόνα τοῦ ἔθνους ἑαυτῆς'.

² Δήμιτσας, no. 248 line 7= P.Perdrizet, BCH 21 (1897)161ff 'καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ Λυγκηστῶν ἔθνους'. cf. N.G.L.Hammond, *A History of Macedonia I* (1972) pp. 85–86.

³ IAOSPE, I², no. 79: 'Ὁ δᾶμος ὁ Βυζαντίων. | "Ἐδοξε τᾷ βουλᾷ καὶ τᾷ δάμω[...]| σύνπαντος τοῦ Ποντικοῦ πρατιστεύσαντος | ἔθνεος... πολλὰ δὲ καὶ Βυζαντίων πόλει'.

⁴ TAM no. 15 I line 1: 'Λυκίων τ]ὸ κοινὸν ἐτειμήσεν', I line 4 and II line 8: 'κατὰ Λυκίαν πόλεσι πάσαις', III–IV lines 10–11: 'τῶι Λυκίων | [ἔθνει]'. no. 22 lines 1–3: 'Τε]λμησέων τῆς [μη]τροπόλεως τοῦ [Λυκίω]ν ἔθνους'. no. 23 lines 1–3: 'Τε]λμησέων τῆς πόλεως | μητροπόλεως τοῦ Λυκίων | ἔθνους'. no. 25: same beginning as no. 22. no. 143 a lines 5–7: 'ἐν ταῖς κατὰ Λυκίαν πόλεσι | [πάσαις], ἀρχιερατευκότα τῶν Σεβασ[τῶν] ἐ]ν τῷ Λυκίων ἔθνει', line 22: '[ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ Λυκίων] ἔ(θ)νους', b line 1: 'τετειμημένον ὑ[πὸ Λυκίων τοῦ κοινου] καὶ [κα]τὰ πόλιν'. no. 145 lines 2–6: '...πολι]τευσάμενον ἐν ταῖς κατὰ Λυκίαν | πόλεσι πάσαις, ἀρχιερατευσά]ντα τῶν Σεβαστῶν καὶ γραμματευσά]ντα Λυκίων τοῦ ἔθνους'. no. 155 lines 10–11: 'ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνους', lines 13–18: 'τῆ πατρίδι καὶ ἄ]λλαις πόλεσιν καὶ τῷ κοινῷ Λυκίω]ν ἔθνει καὶ τετειμημένον | πολλάκις ὑπὸ Λυκίων τοῦ κοινου] καὶ τῆς ἰδίας πατρίδος κ]αὶ [ἄ]λων πόλεων πλείστων'. no. 189 lines 6–9: '...γενομένου | ὑποφύλακος τοῦ ἔθνους...|...|... τε[λ]έσασαν | τῆ πατρίδει...'. nos. 189 and 615 line 1: '...πρῶ]τον τῆς πόλεως'. no. 198 lines 4–5: 'ὑποφυ]λ[ακί]αν τῷ ἔθνει'. no. 190 line 2: '[ὑποφύ]λακα τοῦ ἔθνους', line 6–7: 'καταλιπὸντ[α] | τῆ πόλει πάντα'. no. 195 line 3: 'Λυ]κίων τοῦ κοινου]', line 6: '[Λυκίω]ν τοῦ κοιν[ου] | τετειμη]μένον ὑπὸ τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἔθνους'. no. 200 lines 7–9: 'Ξανθίω]ν μητροπόλεως | τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνους τῆς δὲ πατρίδος ταύτης'. no. 206 lines 8–9: 'ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔθνους καὶ τῆς | πόλεως'. no. 261 a lines 3–11: 'ο]στεφανοῖ [Ξανθίων ὁ δῆ]μος... | πολιτευόμενον δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς κ]ατὰ Λυκίαν πόλεσι...|...|...|...|... ὑπὸ τοῦ κοινου] τῶν Λυκίων', 261 b line 4: 'πό]λεσ[...]', line 18: 'Λ]υκίων τ[ῶ]ι κο[ι]νῶι'. no. 285 lines 4–6: 'Ξανθίω]ν ἡ τοῦ Λυ[κ]ίων ἔθνεος [μη]τροπόλις'. no. 286 lines 1–3: 'Ξαν[θ]ίων ἡ τοῦ | Λυκίων [ἔθ]νους [μη]τροπόλις'. no. 287 lines 4–5: 'καὶ κοινῆ] ἐν τῷ ἔθνει καὶ κατὰ | πόλιν'. no. 288 line 6: 'ἐν ταῖς κατὰ Λυκίαν πόλεσι πάσαις', lines 11–13: 'ἐν τῷ [ἔθ]νει καὶ πολλὰ καὶ κατ' ἰ]δίαν τῆ πόλει καὶ κοινῆ] τῷ ἔθνε[ι]', line 15: 'ἐν τῷ ἔθνει'. no. 292 line 5–6: 'κοινου]...|... πόλεσιν...'. no. 302 lines 14–15: 'ἡ τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνεος [μη]τροπόλις'.

Notes 4 and 5 to page 167 (continued).

- no. 303 lines 15–16: ‘ἡ τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνος | μητρόπολις’. no. 304 lines 16–17: ‘ἡ τοῦ Λυκίων | ἔθνος μητρόπολις’. no. 307 lines 7–9: ‘κοινού Λυκίων [...] ἐν τῇ λαμπροτάτῃ Ξανθίων μητροπόλει τοῦ Λυκί[ων ἔθνος]’. no. 396 line 9: ‘ἕκ[τε τ]οῦ ἔθνος... καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Παταρέων πόλεως’. no. 408 line 6: ‘τῇ Παταρέων πόλει, τῇ μητροπόλει τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνος’, line 6: ‘ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κοινού τῶν Λυκίων’. no. 421 Bb, Bd, Ca, Cb: ‘Παταρέων ἡ μητρόπολις τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνος’. no. 422 line 5: ‘ἐν ταῖς κατὰ Λυκίαν πόλεσι πάσαις’, lines 12–14: ‘Λυκίων τοῦ κοινού, τετειμημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ | Λυκίων ἔθνος’. no. 422 b lines 3–7: ‘[...ἐν ταῖς κατὰ Λυκίαν | [πόλεσι πάσαις τετειμημένον ὑπὸ] | [τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνος πλεονάκις κοί]νῃ καὶ ἰδία ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ Λυκίαν | πόλ[εων πασῶν]’. no. 427 line 1: ‘Παταρέων ἡ πόλις, ἡ μητρόπολις τοῦ Λυκίων | ἔθνος’. no. 493 lines 4–5: ‘Ξανθίων ἡ πόλις, ἡ τοῦ Λυκίων | ἔθνος μητρόπολις’. no. 495 lines 8–10: ‘[π]όλ[ε]σι... | ... | ... Λυκίων τοῦ κοινού...’, lines 13–14: ‘τῇ πόλ[ε]ι καὶ τῷ [ἔ]θνει | ... καὶ ὑπὸ [Λυκίων τ]οῦ κοινού’. no. 496 line 4: ‘πόλεως’, lines 12–13: ‘πόλεως’, line 13: ‘πόλει’, lines 17–18: ‘Ξανθίων τῆς μητροπόλεως τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνος’. no. 517 lines 6–10: ‘Τλ[ω]έων ἡ βουλή | κα[ὶ] ἡ γερουσία καὶ | [ὁ δῆ]μος [τῆ] τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνος | [γνώμη]’. no. 573 lines 8–9: ‘Τλωέων τῆς πόλεως τῆς μητρο[πό]λεως Λυκίων τοῦ ἔθνος [ἡ...]’. no. 575 lines 1–5: ‘Λυκίων τ]ὸ κοινόν[... | ... | ...] κ[α]ὶ ἐν ταῖς κατὰ Λυκίαν πόλεσι | πάσαις, τὸν ἰπάρχη τὸ ἔθνος’. no. 576 lines 1–5: ‘Λυκίων τ]ὸ κοινόν | Ἀπολλώνιον Ἀντιγένους | Τλωέα, πολεμιζόμενον δὲ | κ[α]ὶ ἐν ταῖς κατὰ Λυκίαν πόλεσι | πάσαις, τὸν ἰπάρχη τὸ ἔθνος’. no. 579 lines 1–2: ‘Τλωέων τῆς μητροπόλεως | [τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνος ἡ βουλή]’, lines 7–8: ‘καὶ ἐν ταῖς κατὰ | [Λυκίαν πόλ]εσι πάσαις’, lines 10–11: ‘Λυκίων τοῦ κοινού... καὶ τῇ [ἡ]μέτερα πόλει’, line 20: ‘τῆν ἡμέτεραν πόλιν’. no. 580 line 5: ‘εἰς τὴν | πόλιν ἡμῶν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Λυκίων’. no. 582 lines 1–3: ‘Τλωέων τῆς μητροπόλεως τοῦ | [Λυκίων ἔθνος ἡ βουλή καὶ ὁ] | [δῆμος...], line 6: ‘τ]ῶι δῆμοι καὶ τ]ῶι Λυκίων ἔθνει’. no. 583 lines 1–3: ‘Τλωέων τῆς μητροπόλεως | τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνος... | ... λυκαρχήσαντα τοῦ ἔθνος’, line 12: ‘ταμιεύσαντα τοῦ κοινού’, line 19: ‘π[ό]λεως’. no. 586 lines 3–5: ‘ἐν τῇ λαμπροτάτῃ Τλωέων μητροπόλει τοῦ | Λυκίων ἔθνος’. no. 588 lines 1–2: ‘Τλωέων τῆς μητροπόλεως τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνος’. no. 661 lines 1–2: ‘Καδυανδέων ἡ βουλή | καὶ ὁ δῆμος’, line 20: ‘ὑποφυλακήσαντα τοῦ | Λυκίων ἔθνος’. no. 667, 668 I line 1: ‘Καδυανδέων ὁ δῆμος’, line 5: ‘ταῖς κατὰ Λυκίαν πόλεσι πάσαις, | [ἄνδρα] μεγαλόφρονα, πρωτεύοντα | [Λυκίων] ἔθνος’, II line 7: ‘Δ]υκίων τοῦ κοινού καὶ τῶν [π]λείστων πόλεων’, lines 11–12: ‘τῷ ἔθνει καὶ τῇ πόλει’. no. 671 lines 2–3: ‘ἐν τῇ [πατρίδι ἰδία καὶ] | κατὰ κοινὸν τῷ [Λυκίων ἔθνει]’, line 10: ‘πάση τῇ πόλει’, line 17: ‘τῇ [πόλει...]. no. 838 a line 17: ‘Λυκίων τοῦ κοινού’. no. 838 f line 3–4: ‘πρῶτος τῆς πόλεως ἡμῶν ἐπίσημος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔθνει’. no. 900 lines 8–10: ‘τῆν πόλιν?... τῶν Λυκίων...]. no. 901 lines 4–5: ‘δῆμον τὸν Κορμ[έ]ων καὶ εἰς | τ]ὸ κοινόν [τὸ] Λυκίων’. no. 905, *passim*. no. 915 b line 5: ‘ἐν δὲ τῷ Λυκί[ων] ἔθνει...], line 9: ‘πλείστων πόλεων ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ Λυκί[ων] ἔθνος]. no. 916 lines 4–5: ‘ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πατρίδων... | καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνος’. no. 917 lines 4–5: ‘ὑπὸ | τῶν πατρίδων καὶ τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνος’. no. 920 lines 6–7: ‘τῆς πόλεως ἡμῶν | καὶ τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνος’, line 9: ‘τῆς πόλεως’, lines 12–13: ‘τοῦ Λυκίων | ἔθνος].
- ⁵ *SIG*, no. 867 (167 A.D.) lines 39–40: ‘παρὰ δὲ Μακεδόσιν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἔθνεσιν | τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἐν αὐταῖς πόλεσιν].

when he wrote: ‘καὶ αἱ μὲν πολλαὶ πόλεις εἰς ἓν συντελοῦσαι ἔθνος, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ κῶμαι εἰς ἓν συμφέρουσαι ὄνομα πόλις’.¹

The distinction between *ethne* or *koina* and *poleis* not connected with them is equally well illustrated by numerous examples.

Some of these examples refer to *ethne* and *poleis* in a general and imprecise way. They are to be found in Herodotus,² Xenophon,³ Plato,⁴ Aristotle,⁵ Demosthenes,⁶ Dicaearchus,⁷ and Dexippus.⁸

¹ Pollux VIII 27.

² Herodotus VI 27, 1: ‘Φιλέει δὲ κως προσημαίνειν, εὖτ’ ἂν μέλλῃ μεγάλα κακὰ ἢ πόλι ἢ ἔθνεϊ ἔσεσθαι’, VII 8γ: ‘πυνθάνομαι γὰρ ὧδε ἔχειν, οὔτε τινὰ πόλιν ἀνδρῶν οὐδεμίαν οὔτε ἔθνος οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπων ὑπολείπεσθαι, τὸ ἡμῖν οἶόν τε ἔσται ἔλθειν ἐς μάχην, τούτων τῶν κατέλεξα ὑπεξαρημένων’, VIII 108, 3: ‘ἐπιχειροῦντι δὲ αὐτῶ καὶ ἔργου ἐχομένῃ πάντα κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην οἶά τε ἔσται προσχωρῆσαι κατὰ πόλις τε καὶ κατὰ ἔθνεα’.

³ Xenophon, *Anab.* VII 1, 3: ‘εἴ τις πόλις ἢ ἔθνος στρατηγοῦ δέοιτο’.

⁴ Plato, *Resp.* I, 348 D: ‘οἱ γε τελέως, ἔφη, οἷοί τ’ ἀδικεῖν, πόλις τε καὶ ἔθνη δυνάμενοι ἀνθρώπων ὑφ’ ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι’; *Leg.* III, 683 A: ‘ἔθεασάμεθα πρώτην τε καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην πόλιν, ἀλλήλων, ὡς οἰόμεθα, τοῖς κατοικίσεσιν ἐχομένας ἐν χρόνου τινὸς μήκεσιν ἀπλέτοις. Νῦν δὲ δὴ τετάρτη τις ἡμῖν αὕτη πόλις, εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε, ἔθνος ἦκει κατοικιζόμενόν τέ ποτε καὶ νῦν κατῳκισμένον’, III 697 D: ‘ἀναστάτους μὲν πόλις, ἀνάστατα δὲ ἔθνη’.

⁵ Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1094 b 10: ‘κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνεϊ καὶ πόλεσιν’; *Pol.* 1252 b 19: ‘διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλις καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη’, 1261 a 29: ‘διοίσει δὲ τῶ τοιοῦτῃ καὶ πόλις ἔθνος, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὡς κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πληθὺς’, 1276 a 31–34: ‘περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τὸ τε πόσον καὶ πότερον ἔθνος ἢ πλείω συμφέρει, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τὸν πολιτικόν’, 1284 a 38: ‘τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη ποιοῦσιν οἱ κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως’, 1285 b 30–35: ‘ὅταν ἢ πάντων κύριος εἰς ὧν, ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη τῶν κοινῶν, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἢ παμβασιλεία πόλεως καὶ ἔθνος ἐνὸς ἢ πλειόνων οἰκονομία’, 1310 b 35–36: ‘Ἄπαντες γὰρ εὐεργετήσαντες ἢ δυνάμενοι τὰς πόλις ἢ τὰ ἔθνη εὐεργετεῖν ἐτύγχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης’, 1326 b 2–5: ‘ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις ἢ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων λιαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης (ἢ δὲ πόλις αὐτάρκης), ἢ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἄγαν ἐν τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαίους αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ <δ> ἔθνος, ἀλλ’ οὐ πόλις’. cf. 1276 a 28–29: ‘Τοιαύτη δ’ ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἣτις ἔχει περιγραφὴν μᾶλλον ἔθνος ἢ πόλεως’, where *πόλις* may note a type of settlement rather than a polis-state.

⁶ Demosthenes, *De corona* 271: ‘μὴ μόνον κατ’ ἄνδρ’, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλις ὄλαι καὶ ἔθνη’.

⁷ Dicaearchus, F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* II (1940) 25 = Stephanus Byzantius, s. v. πάτρα: ‘Φυλὴ δὲ καὶ φυλῆται πρότερον ὀνομάσθησαν ἐκ τῆς εἰς τὰς πόλις καὶ τὰ καλούμενα ἔθνη συνόδου γενομένης’.

⁸ Dexippus 100 *FGrH* 24 = *Exc. de sent.*, p. 230, 4–1 Boiss.: ‘τύχαι ἀνδρῶν καὶ

Other examples concern *poleis* and *koina* to which a time and a place can be assigned. One passage from Herodotus gives us Thrace as the place and its occupation by the Persians as the time.¹ A passage in Xenophon concerns the *ethne* and *poleis* of the East at the time of the expedition of the Ten Thousand.² Isocrates noted the existence of many *ethne* and *poleis* between Attica and the territory of the Thracians immediately after the repulse of the Thracian raids into Boeotia towards the end of the Mycenaean era;³ it is, however, beyond doubt that the author was using the terms *ἔθνη* and *πόλεις* in the sense they had in his own day. He also wrote that Philip subjugated more *ethne* than ever any Greek had ruled *poleis*.⁴ However, the fact that he used a verb with the meaning of 'bring into subjection' (*καταστρεψάμενος*) for the *ethne* and a verb with the meaning 'seize' (*εἶλεν*) for the *poleis* suggests that here the term *πόλεις* means settlements. Theopompus mentions the mission of representatives of *poleis* and *ethne* of Asia to Artaxerxes III during his campaign in Egypt (345 B.C.).⁵

Examples of a distinction between unrelated *poleis* and *ethne* which are fixed not only in time and place but also by name are to be found in another passage of Diodorus concerned with the outbreak of the third Sacred War;⁶ in a decree of Antigonus and Demetrius re-establishing

καταστάσεις πόλεων τε καὶ ἔθνων νεωτερίζουσαι ἐλάττους τε ὁμοίως καὶ μείζους καὶ διαφερόντως περὶ εἰρήνην καὶ πόλεμον'.

¹ Herodotus V 2,2: 'διὰ δὲ τῆς Θρηϊτικῆς, πᾶσαν πόλιν καὶ ἔθνος τῶν ταύτη οἰκημένων'.

² Xenophon, *Anab.* III 1,1: 'κύκλω δὲ αὐτοῖς πάντα πολλὰ καὶ ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις πολέμῳ ἦσαν'.

³ Isocrates, *Paneg.* 70: 'περὶ δὲ τῶν Θρακῶν ὅτι τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ὁμοροὶ προσοικοῦντες ἡμῖν τοσοῦτον διὰ τὴν τότε στρατείαν διέλιπον, ὥστ' ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τῆς χώρας ἔθνη πολλὰ καὶ γένη παντοδαπὰ καὶ πόλεις μεγάλας κατοικισθῆναι'. *κατοικισθῆναι* has three subjects: *ἔθνη*, *γένη*, *πόλεις*. Thus, when it is linked with the two first subjects it means 'they settled', while in its third association it means 'they were founded'. The *πόλεις κατοικισθῆναι* thus matches with the foundation of polis-settlements. But the contradistinction between the term *πόλις* and the terms *ἔθνος* and *γένος* is to be understood as expressing parallel meanings and so the term acquires political nuances.

⁴ Isocrates, *Phil.* 142: 'ὅστις γὰρ ἔθνη τοιαῦτα τυγχάνεις κατεστραμμένος ὅσα οὐδεὶς πᾶποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων πόλεις εἶλεν'.

⁵ Theopompus 115 *FGrH* 263 a = Anonymus, *De subl.* 43, 2: 'Ποία γὰρ πόλις ἢ ποῖον ἔθνος τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν οὐκ ἐπρεσβεύσατο πρὸς βασιλέα;'.

⁶ Diodorus XVI 29, 1: 'Σχιζομένης δὲ τῆς τῶν ἔθνων καὶ πόλεων αἵρέσεως τῷ μὲν ἱερῷ

the 'koinon of the Greeks' in 302 B.C.;¹ in a treaty between Philip V and Hannibal (215 B.C.);² in several decrees of the Amphictyons (186–184, 182–179, 117/6 B.C.);³ in a decree of the *ethnos* (= *koinon*) of the Epirots (middle of the second century B.C.);⁴ in a decree of the *koinon* of the Acarnanians (third to second century B.C.);⁵ in a resolution of the *koinon/ethnos* of the Aetolians (second century B.C.).⁶ In other decrees of the same category *πόλις* is opposed not to *ἔθνος* but to *κοινόν*. These include the *koinon* of the Phocians (second century B.C.),⁷ that of the Achaeans (second century B.C.),⁸ and that of the Messenians (second century B.C.).⁹ All these *koina* overlapped with *ethne*.

The Seleucids did not incorporate into their state the various small states which were adjacent to, or surrounded by, their possessions, but confined themselves to controlling them under the mask of alliances.

βοηθεῖν ἔγνωσαν Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Λοκροὶ καὶ Θεσσαλοὶ καὶ Περραιβοί, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Δωριεῖς καὶ Δόλοπες, ἔτι δὲ Ἀθαμᾶνες καὶ Ἀχαιοὶ Φθιώται καὶ Μάγνητες, ἔτι δὲ Αἰνιᾶνες καὶ τινες ἕτεροι, τοῖς δὲ Φωκεῦσι συνεμάχουσαν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ τινες ἕτεροι τῶν Πελοποννησίων'.

¹ H. Bengtson, *op. cit.* III, no. 446 line 78: 'ἐξ ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως'.

² Polybius VII 9,5: 'καὶ ὄσαι πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη Καρχηδονίων ὑπήκοα', 9, 6: 'καὶ πάσαι πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη, πρὸς ἃ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἢ τε φιλία τῶν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ Κελτίᾳ καὶ Λιγυστίῃ', 9, 7: 'καὶ ὑπὸ πασῶν πόλεων καὶ ἔθνῶν ὅσα ἔστι Καρχηδονίους ὑπήκοα... καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων ἔθνῶν καὶ πόλεων ὅσα ἔστιν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ Κελτίᾳ καὶ Λιγυστίῃ', 9, 9: 'χωρὶς βασιλέων καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἔθνῶν'.

³ SIG, no. 613 (186 B.C.) lines 3–4: 'τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτονόμων ἔθνῶν | καὶ δημοκρατουμένων πόλεων'. no. 635 (182–179 B.C.) line 25: 'ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη τὰ ἴδια'. no. 704 E (117 B.C.) line 44: 'ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ἔθνη καὶ τὰς πόλεις'.

⁴ IMM, 32 lines 41–42: 'ἀξίω[ς] τᾶς τε πόλιος τῶν Μαγνήτων καὶ τοῦ ἔθνους τῶν Ἀπειρωτᾶν'. The Ἀπειρωτᾶται were not an *ethnos*, but a group of *ethne* united as a *koinon*; cf. the use of the term *ethnos* for the *koinon* of the Cretans (v. i., p. 174).

⁵ IG, IX 1² II, no. 583 line 40: 'τᾶν τε πολιῶν καὶ τῶν [ἐ]θνέων'.

⁶ IMM, 91 c line 1: 'τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν', line 6: 'τῶι ἔθνει τῶν Αἰτωλῶν', line 10: 'ποτὶ τὸ κ[οι]νὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν', line 11: 'παρὰ τοῦ ἔθνεος'. The *polis* in line 7 is Magnesia of Maeander.

⁷ IMM, 34 line 1: 'Παρὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Φωκέων', line 5: 'ποτὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Φωκέων', line 14: 'τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Φωκέων', line 28: 'τοῦ κοιν[οῦ] τῶν Φωκέων'. The *polis* in lines 12–13 and 19 is Magnesia of Maeander.

⁸ IMM, 39 lines 3–4: 'ποτὶ τὸ κοιν[ὸν] τῶν Ἀχαιῶν', line 12: 'τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν'. Here too the *polis* referred to in lines 8, 11, 19, 29, 34–35 is Magnesia of Maeander.

⁹ IMM, 43 line 6: 'κοινὸν τῶν Μεσσανίων', lines 16–17: 'τὸ κοιν[ὸν] τῶν | Μεσσανίων'. In this inscription too the *polis* in lines 10, 12, 20 is Magnesia of Maeander.

These states were generally described as *σύμμαχοι* and were divided into four categories: *πόλεις*, *ἔθνη*, *βασιλείς*, *δυνάσται*. The first category embraced both ancient Greek *poleis* and recent ones; some of the latter belonged to native tribes who adopted Greek institutions. Autonomous peoples, without a monarch, were described as *ethne*. The two other categories denoted a native ruler.¹ Thus once again we come across the distinction between *πόλεις* and *ἔθνη*, but with differences from the earlier use of the same terms, which was preserved outside the Seleucid sphere of influence: (a) both terms refer to states with limited sovereign rights; (b) the former covers both Greek and native states which had become hellenized, the latter refers exclusively to non-Greek states.

The distinction between *poleis* and *ethne* with no relationship between them continued during the Roman times.²

(d) THE EXTENSION OF THE TERM *ΠΟΛΙΣ* TO *ETHNE* AND *KOINA*

A large number of passages, in addition to those quoted above, reveal that the term *πόλις* was also used of *ethne* and *koina*.³

In Aeschylus' tragedy the *Persians*, the Persian state is repeatedly referred to by the word *πόλις*.⁴

¹ *IMS*, 1 (between 246 and 241 B.C.) line 11: 'ἔγραψεν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς δυνάστας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη'. *SIG*, no. 557 (207/6 B.C.) lines 30–31: 'ἀποδεξαμένων τῶν βασιλέων [καὶ] τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἅπαν] τῶν, πρὸς οὓς ἐπρέσβευσαν, κατὰ ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις'. no. 590 (196 B.C.) lines 11–13: 'ἔξ ὧν ἔθνη τε οὐκ ὀλίγα καὶ πόλεις καὶ τῶν βασιλέων | οἱ τετευχότες τῶν μεγίστων'; Polybius V 90, 5: 'τῆς τῶν νῦν βασιλέων μικροδοσίας καὶ τῆς τῶν ἔθνῶν καὶ πόλεων μικροληψίας', IX 1, 4: 'περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν ἔθνῶν καὶ πόλεων καὶ δυναστῶν', XVIII 1, 4: 'ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἔθνῶν καὶ πόλεων', XVIII 47, 5: 'ἐπεκαλοῦντο πάντας τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔθνῶν καὶ πόλεων παραγεγονότας', XXI 42, 24: 'ἂν δὲ τινες τῶν πόλεων ἢ τῶν ἔθνῶν'; Diodorus XIX 57, 3: 'Ἀντίγονος δὲ... τὰ τ' ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις καὶ δυνάστας προσεκαλεῖτο εἰς συμμαχίαν'; Aelius Aristides, *Rom.* 28: 'ἐκφεύγει δὲ ἡμᾶς οὐδέν, οὐ πόλις, οὐκ ἔθνος', 31: 'οἱ δὲ ἄρχοντες οἱ πεμπόμενοι ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις τε καὶ τὰ ἔθνη', 88: 'ἔθνη, πόλεις, στρατόπεδα, ἡγεμόνας αὐτούς'.

² *IE*, II, no. 206 lines 1–3: '[αἱ ἐν τῇ] Ἀσία | [πόλεις καὶ] οἱ δῆ[[μοι καὶ τὰ] ἔθνη'. no. 251 (48 B.C.) line 1: 'αἱ πόλεις αἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀσία | καὶ οἱ δῆ[[μοι] καὶ τὰ ἔθνη'. *IA*, no. 26 (Assos, 37 B.C.) lines 7–8: 'πᾶσα δὲ πόλις | καὶ πᾶν ἔθνος'. *IG*, IV 12, no. 687 (Epidaurus, 2nd cent. B.C.) line 8: 'καὶ τὰ Λιβύων ἔθνεα καὶ νησιωτέων | πόλιας'.

³ v. s., p. 163.

⁴ Aeschylus, *Pers.* 213: 'κακῶς δὲ πράξας οὐχ ὑπεύθυνος πόλει', 511–512: 'ὥς στένειν

It was probably towards the middle of the fifth century B.C. rather than later that a metrical text purporting to be a prophecy from the oracle of Delphi to the almost mythical king of the Macedonians, Perdikkas I, was composed. In it, the capital which Perdikkas would establish was described as ἄστυ and his state, or rather the state of the *ethnos* of the Macedonians, is called πόλις.¹

Euripides used the term ‘πόλις Φωκέων’ rather than ‘ἔθνος Φωκέων’, which would have been appropriate for mythical times, or ‘κοινὸν Φωκέων’, which would have been correct in the author’s own time.²

In 362/1 B.C. the Athenians, the Arcadians, the Achaeans, the Eleans and the Phliasians concluded a treaty, the considerably mutilated text of which has come down to us in an inscription. One of the gaps is plausibly restored by inserting the word πόλεις to describe the signatories,³ two of which, the Arcadians and the Achaeans, were simultaneously *ethne* and *koina*, that is confederacies of *poleis*.

In a speech which has been handed down as a work of Demosthenes, *On the Treaty with Alexander*, members of the confederacy which Philip established in 338/7 and which Alexander renewed in 336 were repeatedly referred to as *poleis*.⁴ But there were also several *ethne* amongst them, some of which were also *koina*. Even though it may not be the work of Demosthenes, the text appears to be contemporary with the events it describes.

The same thing is to be noted in a treaty of the year 267 or 266 or 265 which was signed by the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians, the

πόλιν | Περσῶν’, 682: ‘τίνα πόλις πονεῖ πόνον;’, 715: ‘λοιμοῦ τις ἦλθε σκηπτὸς ἢ στάσις πόλει;’, 781: ‘ἀλλ’ οὐ κακὸν τοσόνδε προσέβαλον πόλει’.

¹ Diodorus VII 16 = Constantinus Porph. 4, p. 274: “Ὅτι Περδίκκας τὴν ἰδίαν βασιλείαν ἀδξῆσαι βουλόμενος ἠρώτησεν εἰς Δελφοῦς. Ἡ δὲ ἔφη, “ἔστι κράτος βασιλείων ἀγανοῖς Τημενίδαισι | γαίης πλουτοφόροιο· δίδωσι γὰρ αἰγίοχος Ζεὺς, | ἀλλ’ ἴθ’ ἐπειγόμενος Βοττηῖδα πρὸς πολύμηλον· | ἔνθα δ’ ἂν ἀργικέρατος ἴδης χιονώδεας αἴγας | εὐνηθέντας ἕπ’ ἠῶ, κείνης χθονὸς ἐν δαπέδοισι | θῦε θεοῖς μακάρεσσι καὶ ἄστυ κτίζε πόλῃος”.

² Euripides, *Or.* 1209: ‘Φωκέων δ’ ἔλθοι πόλιν’.

³ SGHI, I², no. 144 = SVA 290 lines 29–30: ‘καὶ ἕαν [τις ἴη ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὸν] δῆμον καταλύει[τ]’.

⁴ [Demosthenes] XVII 15: ‘ταῖς κοινωνούσαις πόλεσι’, ‘ταῖς πόλεσι’, 16: ‘ἐκ τῶν πόλεων τῶν κοινωνουσῶν τῆς εἰρήνης’, ‘μηδεμιᾶ πόλει τῶν μετεχουσῶν τῆς εἰρήνης’, ‘ἔκσπονδον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν’.

Eleans, the Orchomenians, the Phialians, the Caphyeis, the Cretans and others. All these states are referred to as *poleis*,¹ while the Achaeans and the Cretans were *koina* (the former were also an *ethnos*).²

The πόλις τῶν Χαόνων, which sought advice from the oracle of Zeus at Dodona after the middle of the fourth century B.C.,³ was not the capital of the Chaones as was originally maintained,⁴ but the state of the Chaones which was an *ethnos*.⁵

Similarly, the πόλις τῶν Ἀργεσταιῶν which is mentioned in an inscription of the second century B.C.⁶ was not a *polis* but an *ethnos*.⁷

Diodorus, writing about the four *partes* into which Macedonia was divided by the Romans in 168 B.C., refers to the *poleis* of Amphipolis, Thessalonice, Pella and Pelagonia as the respective capitals of each *pars*. Livy adds that local authorities were established in each of the capitals of the *partes*. Strabo, however, drawing plausibly on Polybius, says that Aemilius Paulus gave the *partes* to Amphipolis, Thessalonice, Pella and the Pelagones.⁸ So Diodorus was using the term πόλις for three genuine *poleis* and one *ethnos*, while the earlier writer, Polybius, was making a distinction between the Pelagones as an *ethnos* and the three *poleis*. It is probable that Diodorus is reflecting a practice which

¹ *SVA* no. 476 line 85: 'καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ ἐκάστης] πόλεως'.

² The *koinon* of the Cretans is mentioned as *ethnos* in an inscription (*IC*, I, no. 12, line 5) even though it was not properly an *ethnos* but part of the *ethnos* of the Dorians. It is thus an example of the replacement of the term *koinon* by the term *ethnos* or of the extension of the latter into the sphere of the former's meaning. A similar case is the use of the term *koinon* of the Epirots which we have discussed already, see p. 171.

³ Δ.Εὐαγγελίδης *EA* (1953/4) 100 = *SEG*, XV no. 397: 'αἰτεῖται ἅ πόλις ἅ τῶν Χαόνων'.

⁴ *ibid.* 101.

⁵ N.G.L.Hammond, *Epirus* (1967) 539, cf. 560; *idem*, *A History of Macedonia I* (1972) 75 n 2.

⁶ *Spomenik* 71(1931) no. 88; 98 (1941-48) nos. 98, 363; *ZA* 3 (1953) 227f; 14 (1965), 117f.

⁷ N.G.L.Hammond, *A History of Macedonia I* (1972) 75 n 2, 79-80. An inscription of the second century A.D. mentions 'πόλις τῶν Δερριόπων'. Hammond, *op. cit.* 87, concludes from this that the Derrhiopes were an *ethnos* described as a *polis*.

⁸ Diodorus XXXI 8,8: 'Ἦγοῦντο δὲ καὶ πόλεις τέσσαρες τῶν αὐτῶν τεσσάρων μερῶν, τοῦ μὲν πρώτου Ἀμφίπολις, τοῦ δευτέρου Θεσσαλονίκη, τοῦ τρίτου Πέλλα καὶ τοῦ τετάρτου Πελαγονία'; Livius XLV 29, 9: 'Capita regionum, ubi concilia fuerant primae regionis Amphipolim, secundae Thessalonicens, tertiae Pellam, quartae Pelagoniam fecit'; Strabo VII fr. 47: 'εἰς τέτταρα μέρη διέταξε τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὸ μὲν προσένευμεν Ἀμφιπόλει, τὸ δὲ Θεσσαλονικίᾳ, τὸ δὲ Πέλλῃ, τὸ δὲ Πελαγόσι'.

prevailed after Polybius' time. The example of the Argestaei noted above strengthens this hypothesis.¹

The Lucani hard pressed by the Samnitae, sought help from Rome. However, because they had infringed an earlier treaty with the latter, they sent hostages along with their ambassadors. The passage in Dionysius of Halicarnassus which records this event has come down to us in this form: 'ἐὰν ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς πόλεως τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους παῖδας ὁμήρους ἅμα τοῖς πρεσβευταῖς ἀποστείλωσιν'.² Sylburg deleted the τῆς after ἀπάσης because the phrase 'ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς πόλεως' allows the characterization πόλις to be inferred for the *ethnos* of the Lucani, a fact which seemed to him unlikely. There are however so many indisputable examples of the use of the term πόλις instead of ἔθνος that this correction becomes unnecessary.

Lastly, Philostratus wrote πόλις instead of ἔθνος in a passage which refers to the prehistoric tribe of the Phlegyans.³

(e) ΠΟΛΙΣ: A STATE WITH A MONARCH

We noted earlier two passages from the *Odyssey* where *poleis* are placed under a king. The first is the state ruled by Alcinoüs; the second is the double state in the island of Syrie.⁴

In the seventh century Tyrtaeus celebrated the kings 'whose care is the polis of Sparta',⁵ whereas the poet of the Homeric Hymn to the Earth refers to the men who 'orderly rule their poleis'.⁶ Next comes Sappho's phrase 'kings of poleis'.⁷

Theognis provides the earliest instances actually known of a state continuing to be a πόλις, even though it came under the helm of a tyrant.⁸

¹ The reasoning and the conclusion are Hammond's, *Macedonia I* (1972) 74–75.

² Dionysius Hal. XVII fr. I 2.

³ Philostratus, *Imag.* II 19: 'Φλεγύαι βάρβαροι, πόλις οὐπω ὄντες'.

⁴ See pp. 159–160.

⁵ Tyrtaeus *IEG* 4, 3–4 = Strabo VIII 4, 90: 'βασιλῆας | οἷσι μέλει Σπάρτης ἡμερόεσσα πόλις'.

⁶ *Hom. Hymn. εἰς Γαῖαν*, 11–12: 'αὐτοὶ δὲ... πόλιν κάτα... | κοιρανέουσσι'.

⁷ Sappho *PLF* 44: 'πολίων βασιλῆες'.

⁸ Theognis 51–52: 'ἐκ τῶν γὰρ στάσιές τε καὶ ἔμφυλοι φόνου ἀνδρῶν, | μούναρχοί θ'· ἂ πόλει μήποτε τῆδε ἄδοι', 855: 'ἡ πόλις ἦδε δι' ἡγεμόνων κακότητα'.

In a fragment of Alcaeus, Pittacus is denounced as the tyrant of the polis Mytilene.¹ The testimony of this text should not, however, be accepted without caution. Firstly, because Pittacus was not a tyrant but an *aisymnetes*; Alcaeus' use of the word *τύραννος* leaves no doubt about the personal feelings of the poet which he expresses unreservedly in the same text, in which Pittacus receives the surname *κακοπατρίδας* (evil for his country) and Mytilene is mourned as *ἄχολος* (dishonoured) and *βαρυδαίμων* (ill-fated), and in other passages expressing great bitterness towards Pittacus.² Secondly, if despite this observation we insist on understanding the term *τύραννος* in Alcaeus' sense – in its literal meaning therefore – we shall find ourselves confronted by the following dilemma: does the term *πόλις* refer to the state of Mytilene during Pittacus' reign or before it?

From the fifth century onwards many texts testify that *polis* was compatible with kingship or tyranny. This idea is repeatedly expressed by Pindar.³ It also occurs in a passage of the *Suppliants* by Aeschylus in which the king of Argos at the time of the arrival of Danaus and his daughters is identified with the *polis* (= the state) by his subjects.⁴ In a fragment by Cratinus reference is made to a king of the *polis* of Athens.⁵ Sophocles in his *Antigone* makes Aemon stress that the *polis* does not belong to one man and Creon answer that the *polis* is generally regarded as the property of its king.⁶ There follow numerous

¹ Alcaeus *PLF* 348 (text quoted supra, p. 161, n 5).

² Alcaeus *PLF* 70, 13; 106; 119; 306 (9), 5–7; 429. cf. Strabo XIII 617.

³ Pindar, *P.* V 15–19: 'τὸ μὲν, ὅτι βασιλεὺς | ἐσσί' μεγαλᾶν πολιῶν | ἔχει συγγενής...', VIII 20: 'φιλαρμάτου πόλιος ᾤκισσεν ἀγεμόνα', XI 52–53: 'τῶν γὰρ ἄμ πόλιν εὐρίσκων τὰ μέσα μακροτέρῳ | [σὺν] ὄλβῳ τεθαλότα, μέμφοιμ' αἴσαν τυραννίδων'.

⁴ Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 370–375: 'Σὺ τοι πόλις, σὺ δὲ τὸ δῆμιον, | πρῦτανις ἄκριτος ὦν | κρατύνεις βωμόν, ἐστίαν χθονός, | μονοψήφοισι νεύμασιν σέθεν, | μονοσκήπτροισι δ' ἐν θρόνοις χρέος | πᾶν ἐπικραίνεις...'. See also passages of Aeschylus where citizens are mentioned alongside with a king (v. i., p. 182).

⁵ Cratinus *CAF* 56 = Pollux IX 98: 'Πανδιονίδα πόλεως βασιλεῦ | τῆς ἐριβώλακος, οἴσθ' ἦν λέγομεν;'. Here there is an underlying play on words: 'πόλις' was the name of a game (Pollux, *ibid.*, Zenobius V 67, Hesychius and Photius, s. v. *πόλεις παίζειν*).

⁶ Sophocles, *Antig.* 737–738: 'Αἰ. Πόλις γὰρ οὐκ ἔσθ' ἦτις ἀνδρὸς ἔσθ' ἐνός. | ΚΡ. Οὐ τοῦ κρατοῦντος ἢ πόλις νομίζεται;'

passages in Euripides,¹ Creophylus,² Isocrates,³ Plato,⁴ Hyperides,⁵

¹ For prehistoric Athens under kings: *Heracl.* 281: 'σοὶ καὶ πολίταις'; *Suppl.* 349: 'δόξα δὲ χρῆζω καὶ πόλει πάση τάδε', 353: 'ἐλευθερώσας τήνδ' ἰσόψηφον πόλιν', 403–406: 'Πρῶτον μὲν ἤρξω τοῦ λόγου ψευδῶς, ξένη, | ζητῶν τύραννον ἐνθάδ'; οὐ γὰρ ἄρχεται | ἐνός πρὸς ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἐλευθέρα πόλις, | δῆμος δ' ἀνάσσει', 418: 'ὀρθῶς δύναιτ' ἄν δῆμος εὐθύνειν πόλιν;', 429–432: 'Οὐδὲν τυράννου δυσμενέστερον πόλει, | ὅπου τὸ μὲν πρῶτιστον οὐκ εἰσὶν νόμοι | κοινοί, κρατεῖ δ' εἷς τὸν νόμον κεκτημένος | αὐτὸς παρ' αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸδ' οὐκέτ' ἔστ' ἴσον', 438–439: 'Τοῦλεύθερον δ' ἐκεῖνο· "τίς θέλει πόλει | χρηστόν τι βούλευμ' ἐς μέσον φέρειν ἔχων;"', 441: 'Τί τούτων ἔστ' ἰσαίτερον πόλει;'

For prehistoric Argos under kings: *Or.* 907–911: '[Ἦ]ταν γὰρ ἡδὺς τοῖς λόγοις φρονῶν κακῶς | πείθη τὸ πλῆθος, τῇ πόλει κακὸν μέγα· | ὅσοι δὲ σὺν νῶ χρηστά βουλευούσ' ἀεί, | κἂν μὴ παραυτίκ', αὐθῆς εἰσι χρήσιμοι | πόλει...]; *Suppl.* 410–411: 'πόλις γὰρ ἦς ἐγὼ πάρεμ' ἄπο | ἐνός πρὸς ἀνδρός, οὐκ ὄχλω κρατύνεται'; fr. 1132 *TGF*² 4–5: 'Ἀκρίσιος εἰληχεν, τύραννος τῆσδε γῆς· | Ἑλλησι δ' Ἄργος ἢ πόλις κικλήσκειται'.

For prehistoric Thebes under kings: *Phoen.* 536–538: 'Ἰσότητα τιμᾶν, ἢ φίλους ἀεὶ φίλοις | πόλεις τε πόλεσι συμμαχοῦς τε συμμαχοῖς | συνδεῖ', 560: 'πότερα τυραννεῖν ἢ πόλιν σῶσαι θέλεις;', 783: 'προσευχόμεσθα τήνδε διασφῆξιν πόλιν', 898: 'Φράσον πολίταις καὶ πόλει σωτηρίαν', 964: "Ὡστε σφαγέντα παῖδα προσθεῖναι πόλει", 1206: 'παἰδὸς στερηθεῖς, τῇ πόλει μὲν εὐτυχῶς, | ἰδίᾳ δὲ λυπρῶς', 1310–1311: 'Πότερ' ἔμαυτὸν ἢ πόλιν | στένω δακρύσας;', 1652: 'Εἶπερ γε πόλεως ἐχθρὸς ἦν, οὐκ ἐχθρὸς ὦν'.

For Troy: *Tro.* 1217–1218: 'ὦ μέγας ἐμοὶ ποτ' ὦν | ἀνάκτωρ πόλεως'.

For an unknown or for any *polis*: fr. 275 *TGF*² = Stobaeus, *Flor.* 49, 3: 'κακῶς δ' ὄλοιντο πάντες οἱ τυραννίδι | χαίρουσιν ὀλίγη τ' ἐν πόλει μοναρχία'.

Compare the use of the term *πόλις* for the ethnos of the Phocians in prehistoric times: *Or.* 1209: 'Εἰ γὰρ γένοιτο, Φωκέων δ' ἔλθοι πόλιν'.

The idea of the co-existence of kingship and *polis* is also to be inferred from the use of the term *πόλις* by Euripides and other tragedians, in the sense of 'citizens' for decision making members of prehistoric Greek communities (see below, pp. 191–202).

² Creophylus Ephesius 417 *FGrH* 3 = *Schol. B Eurip. Med.* 264: 'τὴν μὲν γὰρ Μήδειαν λέγεται διατρίβουσαν ἐν Κορίνθῳ τὸν ἄρχοντα τότε τῆς πόλεως Κρέοντα ἀποκτενεῖν φαρμάκοις'.

³ Isocrates used the term *πόλις* for (A) polis-states under kings of his own time and (B) for prehistoric states.

A

Salamis in Cyprus: *Paneg.* 141: 'ἐπ' Εὐαγόραν στρατεύσας, ὃς ἄρχει μὲν μιᾶς πόλεως'; *Ad Nic.* 2: 'ποίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὀρεγόμενος καὶ τίνων ἀπεχόμενος ἄριστ' ἄν καὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν διοικήσ', 19: 'οἶκει τὴν πόλιν ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸν πατρῶον οἶκον', 22: "Ἀπασὶ μὲν τοῖς ξένοις ἀσφαλῆ τὴν πόλιν παρέχε', 36: 'Μάλιστα μὲν πειρῶ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ σαυτῷ καὶ τῇ πόλει διαφυλάττειν'; *Euag.* 41: 'Παραλα-

Note 3 to page 177 (continued).

βῶν γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ἐκβεβαρῶμένην... οὕτως ἠῤῥησεν τὴν πόλιν', 49: 'τὴν αὐτοῦ πόλιν πλείονος ἀξίαν ἐποίησεν'.

Syracuse: *Nicocles* 23: 'τοῦτο δὲ Διονύσιον τὸν τύραννον, ὅτι παραλαβὼν τὴν μὲν ἄλλην Σικελίαν ἀνάστατον γεγεννημένην, τὴν δ' αὐτοῦ περὶ πόλιν πολιορκουμένην, οὐ μόνον αὐτὴν τῶν παρόντων κινδύνων ἀπήλλαξεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγίστην τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων ἐποίησεν'.

Several cities, not named: *Paneg.* 117: 'αἱ μὲν ὑπὸ τυράννοις εἰσὶν, τὰς δ' ἄρμωστοι κατέχουσιν, ἔνιοι δ' ἀνάστατοι γεγόνασιν, τῶν δ' οἱ βάρβαροι δεσπότηαι κατεστήκασιν', 170: 'θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι'; *Pax* 111: 'Ὅρατε δὲ καὶ τὰς μοναρχίας τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν καθισταμένας'.

General thoughts: *Ad Nic.* 9: 'σκεπτέον, τί τῶν βασιλευόντων ἔργον ἐστίν... Οἶμαι δὴ πάντας ἂν ὁμολογήσαι προσήκειν αὐτοῖς πόλιν δυστυχοῦσαν παῦσαι καὶ καλῶς πράττουσαν διαφυλάξαι καὶ μεγάλην ἐκ μικρᾶς ποιῆσαι', 13: 'οἶον ὑπεθέμεθα δεῖν εἶναι τὸν ὀρθῶς βασιλεύοντα καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὡς χρὴ διοικήσοντα', 21: 'ἅπαντα γὰρ τὰ τῶν οἰκούντων τὴν πόλιν οἰκεῖα τῶν καλῶς βασιλευόντων ἐστίν'; *Nicocles* 41: 'Καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς ὀρθῶς βασιλεύοντας μὴ μόνον τὰς πόλεις ἐν ὁμοιοῖα πειρᾶσθαι διάγειν ἂν ἄρχωσιν'.

B

Euagoras 14: 'ἦλθον οἱ προστώτες τῶν πόλεων ἰκετεύοντες αὐτόν (= Aeacus)', 17: 'Τελαμῶνος μὲν Αἴας καὶ Τεῦκρος ἐγενέσθη, Πηλέως δ' Ἀχιλλεύς, οἱ μέγιστον καὶ σφέστατον ἔλεγχον ἔδοσαν τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν πόλεσιν μόνον ἐπρώτευσαν'; *Paneg.* 56: 'οἱ δ' Ἡρακλέους παῖδες φεύγοντες τὴν Εὐρυσθέως ἔχθραν καὶ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας πόλεις ὑπερορῶντες', 57: 'Ἐκ δὴ τούτων ῥάδιον κατιδεῖν ὅτι καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ἡγεμονικῶς εἶχεν', 64: 'Τῶν μὲν γὰρ Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων χωρὶς τῆς ἡμετέρας Ἄργος καὶ Θῆβαι καὶ Λακεδαιμῶν καὶ τότε ἦσαν μέγιστα καὶ νῦν ἔτι διατελοῦσιν'; *Phil.* 111: 'Ἐκεῖνος (= Heracles) γὰρ ὀρθῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα πολέμων καὶ στάσεων καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων κακῶν μεστὴν οὖσαν, παύσας ταῦτα καὶ διαλλάξας τὰς πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας'; *Panath.* 77: 'Ταύτην δὲ λαβὼν (= Agamemnon) τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἦντινα τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων ἐλύθησεν', 79: 'Εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ μεγαλοφροσύνης ἦλθεν (= Agamemnon), ὥστ' οὐκ ἀπέχρησεν αὐτῷ λαβεῖν στρατιώτας τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὀπόσους ἐξ ἐκάστης ἐβουλήθη τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βασιλέας τοὺς ποιοῦντας ἐν ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ὁ τι ἂν βουληθεῖεν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προστάττοντας, τούτους ἔπεισαν...', 80: 'Δαναοῦ δὲ τῆς πόλεως τῆς Ἄργείων, Κάδμου δὲ Θηβῶν', 81: 'στρατόπεδον γὰρ συνελληλυθὸς ἐξ ἅπασων τῶν πόλεων', 83: 'ἀλλὰ λόγῳ μὲν πρὸς μίαν πόλιν πολεμήσας (= Agamemnon), ἔργῳ δ' οὐ μόνον πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς τῶν Ἀσίων κατοικοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα γένη πολλὰ τῶν βαρβάρων κινδυνεύων οὐκ ἀπέπειν οὐδ' ἀπήλθεν πρὶν τὴν τε πόλιν τοῦ τολμήσαντος ἔξαμαρτεῖν ἐξηνδραποδίσαστο καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἔπαυσεν ὑβρίζοντας', 119: 'ἀλλὰ μοναρχία καὶ τὰ γένη τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων καὶ τὰς πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας ἀπάσας διόφκουν', 120: 'περὶ τῶν προγόνων τῶν τὴν πόλιν κάλλιστα διοικησάντων μηδὲ μικρὰν ποιήσομαι μνεῖαν', 121: 'Τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εὐροιμεν τῶν ὑπερβαλλόντων ἀνοσιότητι καὶ δεινότητι πεπραγμένον ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις καὶ τῶν τότε νομιζομέναις καὶ νῦν δοκουσάις;', 124: 'Ὅτῳ γὰρ ὀσίως καὶ καλῶς καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν σφᾶς αὐτοῦς διάφησαν, ὥστε προσήκον ἦν

Notes 3 and 4 to page 177 (continued).

τοὺς ἀπὸ θεῶν μὲν γεγονότας, πρώτους δὲ καὶ πόλιν οἰκήσαντας καὶ νόμοις χρῆσασμένους', 128: "Ἐχὼν γὰρ βασιλείαν ἀσφαλεστάτην καὶ μεγίστην, ἐν ἣ πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ διαπεπραγμένους ἦν (= Theseus) καὶ κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ περὶ διοικήσιν τῆς πόλεως', 130: 'περὶ δὲ τῶν παραλαβόντων τὴν τῆς πόλεως διοίκησιν, ἦν ἐκεῖνος (= Theseus) παρέδωκεν', 138: 'Τοῦ μὲν οὖν διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείσθαι τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον δικαίως ἂν ἐπενέγοιμεν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῖς βασιλεύουσιν αὐτῆς', 169: 'ἰκέτης γενόμενος τῆς πόλεως ἔτι Θησέως αὐτὴν διοικοῦντος', 171: 'ἔδοσαν τῇ πόλει τὴν ἀναίρεσιν', 173: 'ὅσον δ' ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν διέφερε τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον', 174: 'τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως πεμφθεῖσιν', 191: 'τῆς δ' ἡμετέρας ἔτι βασιλευομένης', 192: 'πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι τοὺς τ' ἐπιστρατεύσαντας τῇ πόλει', 199: 'ἡ δὲ πόλις ἡμῶν ἡγεμῶν καταστᾶσα... τοσοῦτον τὰ πράγματα μετέστησεν, ὥστ' εἰθισμένων τῶν βαρβάρων τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις τῶν Ἑλληνίδων καταλαμβάνειν', 253: 'πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἄνωγες ὄντες, ἐπειδὴ κατεῖδον τὰς πόλεις τὰς αὐτῶν ἀδόξους καὶ μικρὰς καὶ πολλὰν ἔνδεεις οὖσας ὑπεριδόντες ταύτας ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πρωτεύουσας, ἐπ' Ἄργος καὶ Λακεδαίμονα καὶ Μεσσήνην', 256: 'πρὶν ταύτας ὑφ' αὐτοῖς ἐποιήσαντο πλὴν τῆς πόλεως τῶν Ἀργείων'.

I have not quoted other passages in Isocrates where the term *πόλις* means 'settlement'.

- ⁴ *Theag.* 124 C: 'οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄρχοντα (= Periander) ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει', 124 D: 'Ἰππῖαν δὲ τὸν Πεισιστράτου ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ἄρξαντα τίνας οἶει ἄρξαι; οὐ τούτων;', 124 E: 'τίν' ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει Ἰππίας καὶ Περίανδρος διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν; ΘΕ. Οἶμαι μὲν τύραννος· τί γὰρ ἄλλο; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅστις ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ξυμπάντων ἄρχειν, τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς τούτοις ἐπιθυμεῖ, τυραννικῆς, καὶ τύραννος εἶναι;'; *Politicus* 301 D: 'Νῦν δὲ γε ὁπότε οὐκ ἔστι γιγνόμενος, ὡς δὴ φαμέν, ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι βασιλεὺς...'; *Epist.* III 315 C-D: 'Φασὶ δ' οὐκ ὀλίγοι λέγειν σε πρὸς τινὰ τῶν παρὰ σὲ πρεσβευόντων, ὡς ἄρα σοῦ ποτε λέγοντος ἀκούσας ἐγὼ μέλλοντος τὰς τε Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἰκίζειν καὶ Συρακοσίους ἐπικουφίσαι, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀντὶ τυραννίδος εἰς βασιλείαν μεταστήσαντα, ταῦτ' ἄρα σὲ μὲν τότε διεκάλυσα', 316 B: 'μέλλοντί σοι κατοικίσειν Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἐμποδῶν ἐμὲ γεγενῆσθαι', 319 A-B: 'κελεύων σε τὰς πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας κατοικίσειν'; *Epist.* VII 332 C: 'Διονύσιος δὲ εἰς μίαν πόλιν ἀθροίσας πᾶσαν Σικελίαν', 334 C: 'μὴ δουλοῦσθαι Σικελίαν ὑπ' ἀνθρώποις δεσπόταις, μηδὲ ἄλλην πόλιν'; *Epist.* VIII 353 C: 'εἰ δὲ τι τὸν μετέπειτα χρόνον ἡ τυραννὶς οὐκ ὀρθῶς τῇ τῆς πόλεως δωρεᾷ κατακέχρηται τούτων τὰς μὲν ἔχει, τὰς δὲ τινέτω', 354 B: 'Λυκοῦργος, ὃς ἰδὼν τὸ τῶν οἰκείων γένος ἐν Ἄργει καὶ Μεσσήνῃ ἐκ βασιλέων εἰς τυράννων δυνάμιν ἀφικομένους καὶ διαφθείραντας ἑαυτοὺς τε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἑκατέρους ἑκατέραν, δείσας περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ πόλεως ἅμα καὶ γένους...', 356 A: 'ὃς γενόμενος τυράννου πατρὸς ἐκὼν τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθεροῖ, τιμὴν αὐτῷ καὶ γένει ἀείζωνον ἀντὶ τυραννίδος ἐφημέρου καὶ ἀδίκου κτώμενος. Τρίτον δὲ παρακαλεῖσθαι χρὴ βασιλέα γίνεσθαι Συρακουσῶν ἐκόντα ἐκούσης τῆς πόλεως'; *Gorg.* 467 A: 'Πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιτο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;', 468 D: 'εἰ τις ἀποτείνει τινα ἢ ἐκβάλλει τῆς πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ', 469 C: 'Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξείναι (sc. τυραννεῖν) ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ἀποκτινύνναι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι

Aristotle,¹ Lycurgus,² Ephorus,³ Philochorus,⁴ Memnon,⁵ and Plutarch.⁶ Some of these passages refer to specific historical situations; others to

Notes 4 and 5 to page 177 (continued).

καὶ πάντα πράττοντα κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν', 510 B: 'Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαιδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει βελτίων εἶη,...'; *Resp.* 544 C: 'τυραννίς... τέταρτόν τε καὶ ἔσχατον πόλεως νόσημα', 'εἰς τυραννουμένην πόλιν', 575 B: 'Καὶ ἂν μὲν γε... ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐν πόλει ὡσι καὶ τὸ ἄλλο πλῆθος σωφρονῆ ἐξελεθόντες ἄλλον τινα δορυφοροῦσι τύραννον ἢ μισθοῦ ἐπικουροῦσιν ἕαν που πόλεμος ἦ· ἕαν δ' ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ γένωνται, αὐτοῦ δὴ ἐν τῇ πόλει κακὰ δρῶσι σμικρὰ πολλά', 575 C: 'καὶ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πρὸς τύραννον πονηρία τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα πόλεως', 576 C-E: 'κατὰ τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν', 'ἢ τυραννουμένη πόλις... τυραννουμένη', 577 C-E: 'πόλιν... ἐλευθέραν ἢ δούλην τὴν τυραννουμένην ἐρεῖς;', 'δούλη καὶ τυραννουμένη πόλις', 'τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν', 579 B: 'λίχνη δὲ ὄντι αὐτῷ (= τῷ τυράνῳ) τὴν ψυχὴν μόνῃ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔτε ἀποδημησῆαι ἐξεστὶν οὐδαμῶσε', 579 E: 'εἴπερ τῇ τῆς πόλεως διαθέσει, ἥς ἄρχει', 560 C: 'ὅς ἂν τυραννικώτατος ὦν ἑαυτοῦ τε ὅ τι μάλιστα τυραννῆ καὶ τῆς πόλεως'; *Leg.* 709 E: 'τυραννουμένη μοι δότε τὴν πόλιν', 711 A: 'ὕμεις δὲ τάχα οὐδὲ τιθέασθε τυραννουμένην πόλιν', 711 B: 'Οὐδὲν δεῖ πόνων οὐδέ τινος παμπόλλου χρόνου τῷ τυράνῳ μεταβαλεῖν βουληθέντι πόλεως ἦθη', 713 E: 'ὡς ὄσων ἂν πόλει μὴ θεὸς ἀλλὰ τις ἄρχη θνητός', 790 A: 'τὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων ταῖς πόλεσι ἦθη', 875 B: 'μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀνυπεύθυνός τε καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ ἄρξη πόλεως, οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναίτο ἐμμεῖναι τούτῳ τῷ δόγματι καὶ διαβιῶναι τὸ μὲν κοινὸν ἡγούμενον τρέφων ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἐπόμενον τῷ κοινῷ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν καὶ ἰδιοπραγίαν ἢ θνητῇ φύσιν αὐτὸν ὀρμήσει ἀεὶ, φεύγουσα μὲν ἀλόγως τὴν λύπην, δῖόκουσα δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν, τοῦ δὲ δικαιότερου τε καὶ ἀμείμονος ἐπίπροσθεν ἄμφω τούτω ποιήσεται, καὶ σκότος ἀπεργαζομένη ἐν αὐτῇ πάντων κακῶν ἐμπλήσει πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὐτὴν τε καὶ τὴν πόλιν δλην'.

Cf. passages referring to mythical times: *Leg.* 683 D–684 B: 'Καὶ βασιλεὺς μὲν Ἄργου Τήμενος ἐγένετο, Μεσσήνης δὲ Κρεσφόντης, Λακεδαιμόνος δὲ Προκλῆς καὶ Εὐρυσθένης', 'βασιλείαι τρεῖς βασιλευόμεναι πόλεσι τριταῖς ταῖς ἐν ταῖς τρισὶ πόλεσι νομοθετουμέναις, εἴτε οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐνομοθέτουσιν εἴτ' ἄλλοι τινές;', 713 C-D: 'ὁ Κρόνος... ἐφίστη βασιλέας τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡμῶν οὐκ ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ γένους θειοτέρου τε καὶ ἀμείμονος, δαίμονας'.

⁵ *Epitaphios* 10: 'καὶ τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἡμῶν [δεο]μένην ἀνδρός'.

¹ v. i., pp. 273–274.

² *Leocr.* 62: 'τὴν Τροίαν τίς οὐκ ἀκήκοεν ὅτι μεγίστη γεγενημένη τῶν τότε πόλεων...';

³ Ephorus 70 *FGrH* 116 = Strabo VIII 7,4: "Ἐφορος δὲ τὸν Κρεσφόντην, ἐπειδὴ εἶλε τὴν Μεσσήνην, διελεῖν φησὶν εἰς πέντε πόλεις αὐτήν, ὥστε Στενύκλαρον μὲν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τῆς χώρας <ταύτης> κειμένην ἀποδείξει βασιλείον αὐτῷ, <εἰς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας> βασιλέας πέμψαι, Πύλον καὶ Ριον κ<αἰ Μεσόλαν καὶ> Ὑαμίτιν, ποιήσαντα ἰσονόμους πάντας τοῖς Δωριεῦσι τοὺς Μεσσηνίους· ἀγανακτούντων δὲ τῶν Δωριέων μεταγόντα μόνον τὸν Στενύκλαρον νομίσει πόλιν, εἰς δὲ τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς Δωριεῖας συναγαγεῖν πάντα'.

particular states, but in mythical times; others are couched in general and vague terms. The texts of the second and the third category are no less reliable than those of the first, however, since anachronisms project onto the past ideas of the present and general descriptions are mere abstractions of particular realities. Even the attribution of *poleis* under kings to a mythical past does not detract from the value of the information, because the ancients believed in their legends as if they were history. The anachronisms, no less than the other material, testify to the ideas which held sway at the time they were being used.

(f) DYARCHY OF *POLIS* AND KING

An inscription from Idalion in Cyprus has preserved for us the joint decision of king Stasikypros and the *polis* of the Idalians which dates to between 478 and 470 B.C. They jointly undertook to give a reward of one talent to Onasilos and his brothers, all physicians, for their care of the war wounded. The pair *king-polis* occurs eight times, their names being mentioned on the first occasion.¹ The entire text shows that the

Notes 4–6 to page 180 (continued).

⁴ Philochorus 328 *FGrH* 17 = Plutarch, *Thes.* 19, 7: 'ἤσθεις δὲ Μίνως... ἀπέδωκε τῷ Θεσεΐ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ ἀνῆκε τῇ πόλει τὸν δασμόν'.

⁵ Memnon 434 *FGrH* 1 = Photius, *Bibl.* 224 (1, 1): 'Κλέαρχον μὲν οὖν ἐπιθέσθαι πρῶτον τυραννίδι κατὰ τῆς πόλεως ἀναγράφει', (4, 1): 'καὶ κάθοδον καὶ τὴν τῆς πόλεως πάτριον δημοκρατίαν ἐξαιτουμένων', (5, 1): 'Κλέαρχος δὲ ἀνδρωθεὶς ἤδη τῆς τε πόλεως ἤρχε', (5, 3): 'καὶ τὴν πόλιν ποιησάμενος (= Lysimachus) ὑπὸ τὴν πρόνοιαν αὐτοῦ', (7, 3): 'οἱ τε καταχθέντες καὶ ἡ δεξαμένη πόλις', 'φιλοφρόνως τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τούτους δεξιωσαμένων', (27, 6): 'οἱ δὲ δημοσιῶναι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀφικόμενοι', 'τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει'.

⁶ *Thes.* 3, 1: 'Πιτθεύς, ὁ Θεσεῶς πάππος, πόλιν μὲν οὐ μεγάλην τὴν Τροιζηνίαν ᾤκισε', 24, 1: 'συνῴκισε (= Theseus) τοὺς τὴν Ἀττικὴν κατοικοῦντας εἰς ἓν ἄστυ καὶ μιᾶς πόλεως ἓνα δῆμον ἀπέφηνε', 25, 1: "Ἐτι δὲ μᾶλλον αὐξῆσαι τὴν πόλιν βουλόμενος', 33, 1: 'μηδὲν ἤττον Ἑρακλέους τῇ πόλει (= of the Athenians) προσήκοντες'.

¹ O. Masson, *Inscriptions chypriotes syllabiques* (1961) 217 a lines 2–7: 'βασιλεὺς Στασι-κυπρος κὰς ἂ πτόλις ἘδαλιῆΦεζ ἄνωγον Ὀνασίλον τὸν Ὀνασικύπ|ρων τὸν ἰγατῆ-ραν κὰς τὸς κασιγνήτος ἰγαῖσθαι τὸς ἀ(ν)θρώπος τὸς (ἰ)ν τᾷ μάχαι ἰκ(?)|μαμένος ἄνευ μισθῶν κὰς παι εὐΦρητάστυ βασιλεὺς κὰς ἂ πτόλις Ὀνασίλωι κὰς τοῖς κασιγνή-τοις ἀ(ν)τι τῷ μισθῶν κὰς ἀ(ν)τι τᾷ(ς) ὕχῆρων δοΦέναι ἐξ τῷι | Φοίκωι τῷ βασιλῆ-Φος κὰς ἐξ τᾷ πτόλιφι ἀργύρω τά(λαντον) I τά(λαντον) ἢ δυΦάνοι νυ ἀ(ν)τι τῷ | ἀργύρων τῷδε τω ταλά(ν)των βασιλεὺς κὰς ἂ πτόλις Ὀνασίλωι κὰς τοῖς κασιγνή-

king and the *polis* had equal authority and could not undertake legally binding decisions except in concert.¹

A dyarchy between king and *polis* is also found in passages of the tragedians with the difference that here it is set in the past. Aeschylus in the *Suppliants* makes Danaus say that he and his daughters obtained permission to settle at Argos from Pelasgus, the king of the country, and from the *polis*.² A few lines earlier Pelasgus announces to the refugees the decision of the *polis* to accept them, a decision which was taken by a vote of the *demos*.³ The inference is left open that the king's role was limited to the ratification of that decision. In the *Suppliants* by Euripides, Theseus asks Adrastus if he acted on his own initiative or in accordance with the opinion of the entire *polis*.⁴ A little later Theseus says 'I want the whole polis to agree with me; if I give the speech to the people, I shall have them more closely with me. Because I invited it to share authority, after I had liberated this polis and granted her a vote equal with mine. Since I have Adrastus as a witness to my speech, I shall go to speak to the citizens and if I can persuade them...'⁵ The children of Hercules, in Euripides tragedy of the same name, say to Theseus 'We come as suppliants to thee and to the polis'.⁶

(g) ΠΟΛΙΣ: A STATE COMPATIBLE WITH ALL CONSTITUTIONS

A passage of Thucydides states that the constitution of Thebes during the Persian expedition to Greece was neither an oligarchy under equal

τοίς', 14–15: 'Ἐφρητάσαυ βασιλεὺς κὰς ἅ πόλις δοφέναι', 16: 'ἦ δῶκοι νυ βασιλεὺς κὰς ἅ πόλις', 23: 'βασιλεὺς κὰς ἅ πόλις κατέθιγαν ἰ(ν) τὰ(ν) θιὸν τὰν 'Αθάναν'. See the editor's commentary, p. 238.

¹ F. Gschnitzer, *Abhängige Orte im griechischen Altertum* (1958) 13.

² Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 1009–1010: 'Οἴκησις δὲ καὶ διπλῆ πάρα· | τὴν μὲν Πελασγός, τὴν δὲ καὶ πόλις διδοῖ'.

³ Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 942–943: 'τοιᾶδε δημόπρακτος ἐκ πόλεως μία | ψήφος κέκρανται'.

⁴ Euripides, *Suppl.* 128: 'Ἰδίᾳ δοκῆσαν σοὶ ἢ πάση πόλει;'

⁵ Euripides, *Suppl.* 349–357: 'Δόξαι δὲ χρήζω καὶ πόλει πάση τόδε. | Δόξει δ' ἐμοῦ θέλοντος· ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου | προσδοῦς ἔχοιμ' ἄν δημον εὐμενέστερον. | Καὶ γὰρ κατέστησ' αὐτὸν ἐς μοναρχίαν | ἐλευθερώσας τήνδ' ἰσόψηφον πόλιν. | Λαβῶν δ' ἄδραστον δεῖγμα τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων, | ἐς πλῆθος ἀστῶν εἶμι· καὶ πείσας τάδε, | λεκτοὺς ἀθροίσας δεῦρ' Ἀθηναίων κόρουσ | ἦξω'.

⁶ Euripides, *Heracl.* 94: 'ἰκέται σέθεν τε καὶ πόλεως ἀφιγμένοι'.

laws nor a democracy but the πόλις was ruled by a small group of powerful men.¹ Thus it may be understood that the concept of the *polis* was compatible with these three forms of government.

Without exception, not excluding even monarchy and tyranny, the *polis* is matched with all forms of government in a passage of Isocrates,² and in several of Plato³ and Aristotle.⁴

¹ Thucydides III 62, 3: “Ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἡ πόλις ἐτύγχανεν οὔτε κατ’ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνουμον πολιτεύουσα οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν· ὅπερ δὲ ἐστὶ νόμοις μὲν καὶ τῷ σωφρονεστάτῳ ἐναντιώτατον, ἐγγυτάτῳ δὲ τυράννου, δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν εἶχε τὰ πράγματα.

² *Paneg.* 16: ‘αἱ γὰρ πολιτεῖαι, δι’ ὧν οἰκοῦσι τὰς πόλεις’.

³ *Menex.* 238 D: ‘ἐγκρατῆς δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὰ πολλὰ τὸ πλῆθος τὰς τε ἀρχὰς δίδωσι καὶ τὸ κράτος τοῖς ἀεὶ δόξασιν ἀρίστοις εἶναι, καὶ οὔτε ἀσθενεῖα οὔτε πενία οὔτ’ ἀγνωσίᾳ πατέρων ἀπελήλαται οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τετίμηται, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσιν,... αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαι πόλεις ἐκ παντοδαπῶν κατεσκευασμένα ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνωμάτων ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνώμαλοι καὶ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, τυραννίδες τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχαί’; *Erist.* VII 326 D: ‘ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι ταύτας τὰς πόλεις εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας μεταβαλλούσας μηδέποτε λήγειν, δικαίου δὲ καὶ ἰσονόμου πολιτείας τοὺς ἐν αὐταῖς δυναστεύοντας μηδ’ ὄνομα ἀκούοντας ἀνέχεσθαι’; *Resp.* 338 D: ‘εἴτ’ οὐκ οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὅτι τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν τυραννοῦνται, αἱ δὲ δημοκρατοῦνται, αἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦνται; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο κρατεῖ ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει τὸ ἄρχον’; 338 E-339 A: ‘ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι ταυτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς συμφέρον’, 463 A-B: ‘Ἔστι μὲν που καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἄρχοντες τε καὶ δῆμος, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ; Ἔστιν. Πολίτας μὲν δὴ πάντες οὗτοι ἀλλήλους προσεροῦσιν; Πῶς δ’ οὐ; Ἄλλὰ πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί ὁ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις δῆμος τοὺς ἄρχοντας προσαγορεύει; Ἐν μὲν ταῖς πολλαῖς δεσπότας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατουμέναις αὐτὸ τοῦνομα τοῦτο, ἄρχοντας. Τί δ’ ὁ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δῆμος; πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί τοὺς ἄρχοντάς φησιν εἶναι; Σωτῆρας τε καὶ ἐπικούρους, ἔφη. Τί δ’ οὗτοι τὸν δῆμον; Μισθοδότας τε καὶ τροφέας. Οἱ δ’ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἄρχοντες τοὺς δῆμους; Δούλους, ἔφη’ etc., 544 B-D: ‘Καὶ μὲν, ἢ δ’ ὅς, ἐπιθυμῶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκούσαι, τίνας ἔλεγε τὰς τέταρτας πολιτείας. Οὐ χαλεπῶς, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀκούσει. Εἰσὶ γὰρ ἄς λέγω, αἵπερ καὶ ὀνόματα ἔχουσιν, ἧ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαινουμένη, ἡ Κρητικὴ τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ αὕτη· καὶ δευτέρα καὶ δευτέρως ἐπαινουμένη, καλουμένη δ’ ὀλιγαρχία, συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία· ἧ τε ταύτη διάφορος καὶ ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένη δημοκρατία, καὶ ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννὶς καὶ πασῶν τούτων διαφέρουσα, τέταρτον δὲ καὶ ἔσχατον πόλεως νόσημα’, 552 D: ‘ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις πόλεσι’, 552 E: ‘ἡ ὀλιγαρχουμένη πόλις’, 555 A: ‘κατὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχουμένην πόλιν’, 556 E: ‘ἔξ ὀλιγαρχουμένης πόλεως... ἐκ δημοκρατουμένης’, 557 D: ‘εἰς δημοκρατουμένην... πόλιν’, 562 B: ‘ἐν δημοκρατουμένη πόλει’, 562 D: ‘δημοκρατουμένη πόλις’, 564 C: ‘δημοκρατουμένην πόλιν... ἐν ὀλιγαρχουμένη...’, 576 C: ‘κατὰ δημοκρατουμένην (= πόλιν)’; *Leg.* 710 D: ‘ΚΑ. Ἐκ τυραννίδος ἀρίστην φῆς γενέσθαι πόλιν ἄν, ὡς φαίνει, μετὰ νομοθέτου γε ἄκρου καὶ τυράννου κοσμίου, καὶ ῥᾶστά τε καὶ τάχιστ’ ἂν μεταβαλεῖν εἰς τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου, δευτερον

(h) ΠΟΛΙΣ: A STATE WITHOUT A MONARCH

In contrast with the many passages which show us that the ancients considered the *polis* to be consistent with all forms of government (g) even with monarchy and tyranny (e, f), there is a passage in Demosthenes which draws a distinction between the *poleis* and tyrants,¹ obviously meaning that a *polis* lost its character when it passed under the sway of a tyrant.

Aristotle twice refers to an opinion expressed by others, according to which no *polis* existed alongside monarchy or oligarchy. He himself did not agree. Moreover, in many passages in the *Politics* he accepts the compatibility of the *polis* and monarchic constitutions. Nevertheless, he moves away from this position when, having divided constitutions into

Notes 3 and 4 to page 183 (continued).

δὲ ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἢ πῶς λέγεις; καὶ τὸ τρίτον ἐκ δημοκρατίας. ΑΘ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ' ἐκ τυραννίδος μὲν πρῶτον, δεύτερον δ' ἐκ βασιλικῆς πολιτείας, τρίτον δ' ἐκ τινος δημοκρατίας· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον ὀλιγαρχία τὴν τοῦ τοιοῦτου γένεσιν χαλεπώτατα δύναιτ' ἂν προσδέξασθαι· πλείστοι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ δυνάσται γίνονται', 711 D: 'ὅταν δὲ ξυμβῆ, μυρία πάντ' ἐν πόλει ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται, ἐν ἧ ποτ' ἂν γένηται... "Ὅταν ἔρωσ θεῖος τῶν σωφρόνων τε δικαίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐγγένηται μεγάλαις τισὶ δυναστείαις ἢ κατὰ μοναρχίαν δυναστευούσαις ἢ κατὰ πλούτων ὑπεροχὰς διαφερούσας ἢ γενῶν', 712 C: 'ΑΘ. Ἐὰν τίνα δὴποτε πολιτείαν ἔχομεν ἐν νῶ τῇ πόλει προστάττειν; ΚΛ. Οἶον δὴ τι λέγεις βουλευθεῖς; φράζ' ἔτι σαφέστερον, οἶον δημοκρατίαν τινὰ ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ ἀριστοκρατίαν ἢ βασιλικήν, οὐ γὰρ δὴ τυραννίδα γέ που λέγοις ἂν, ὡς γ' ἡμεῖς ἂν οἰηθείημεν', 712 D: 'τὴν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι πολιτείαν οὐκ ἔχω σοι φράζειν οὕτως, ἦντινα προσαγορεύειν αὐτὴν δεῖ. Καὶ γὰρ τυραννίδα δοκεῖ μοι προσεοικέναι τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων θαυμαστὸν ὡς τυραννικὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γέγονε. Καὶ τις ἐνίστοί μοι φαίνεται πασῶν τῶν πόλεων δημοκρατουμένη μάλιστ' εοικέναι· τὸ δ' αὐτὴ μὴ φάναι ἀριστοκρατίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι παντάσῃσι ἄτοπον. Καὶ μὴν δὴ βασιλεία γε διὰ βίου τ' ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν καὶ πρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν λεγομένη', 714 A: 'Εἰ δ' ἀνθρωπος εἰς ἢ ὀλιγαρχία τις ἢ καὶ δημοκρατία ψυχὴν ἔχουσα ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὄρεγομένην καὶ πληροῦσθαι τούτων δεομένην στέγουσαν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἀνηνώτω καὶ ἀπλήστῳ κακῷ νοσήματι ξυνεχομένην, ἄρξει δὴ πόλεως', 714 C-D: 'ΑΘ. ... Τίθεται δὴπου, φασί, τοὺς νόμους ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐκάστοτε τὸ κρατοῦν. Ἦ γάρ; ΚΛ. Ἄληθῆ λέγεις. ΑΘ. Ἄρ' οὐδ' οἶε, φασί, ποτὲ δῆμον νικήσαντα ἢ τινα πολιτείαν ἄλλην ἢ καὶ τυραννίδα θήσεσθαι ἐκόντα πρὸς ἄλλο τι πρῶτον νόμους ἢ τὸ συμφέρον ἑαυτῶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ μένειν;', cf. 715 B-D.

⁴ v. i., pp. 214–278 passim.

¹ Demosthenes 21: 'οὕτω καὶ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν τυράννων'.

'right' and 'deviant', he then says that the *polis* does not go with the latter.¹

The *poleis* are clearly distinguished from tyrannies in a passage in the *Περὶ πολιτείας* attributed to Herodes.²

(i) ΠΟΛΙΣ: ANY KIND OF STATE

The extension of the term *πόλις* to cover meanings originally opposed to it and which ordinarily should have been expressed by other words such as *ἔθνος* (= a state of a Greek *ethnos* or a foreign people) or *κοινόν* (a confederacy of states, in particular of states of the polis-type) means that the term embraced the entire concept of the state.³ The same is true of one passage in the seventh letter of Plato in which Sicily under Dionysius II is called a *πόλις*,⁴ and a fragment of Ephorus where the states founded by Cresphontes in Messenia are described as *πόλεις*.⁵

4. ΠΟΛΙΣ: A HUMAN GROUP

(a) ΠΟΛΙΣ: A COMMUNITY

In a scene in the *Iliad* Hector accuses Paris of being a great misfortune for his father, the *polis* and for the whole *demos*.⁶ Conversely, when Priam brings the dead Hector back to Troy, Cassandra invites the Trojans to hurry to see the hero who was a joy for the *polis* and the *demos*.⁷ It is clear that in these passages the terms *πόλις* and *δήμος* are used collectively for units of individuals. In the first passage they are placed on the same level as the individual, Priam. In the second they are presented as capable of feelings. In both *πόλις* denotes the free inhabitants of the polis-settlement, while *δήμος* denotes the free inhabitants of the whole territory.⁸

¹ v. i., pp. 274–275.

² Pseudo-Herodes, *De republ.* 7: 'ταῖς μὲν Ἑλληνῶν πόλεσιν... τοῖς δὲ τυράννοις...'

³ The same happened to the term *κοινόν*: F.Hampl, *Hermes* 70 (1935) 195ff.

⁴ Plato, *Epist.* VII 332 C: 'Διονύσιος δὲ εἰς μίαν πόλιν ἀθροίσας πᾶσαν Σικελίαν.'

⁵ v. s., p. 180 n 3.

⁶ *Iliad* III 50: 'πατρί τε τῷ σὺ μὲγα πῆμα πολλῆι τε παντί τε τῷ δήμῳ'. cf. E. Lévy, *Ktēma* 8 (1983) 66.

⁷ *Iliad* XXIV 706: 'χάρμα πόλει τ' ἦν παντί τε δήμῳ'. cf. E. Lévy, *ibid.*

⁸ C.Bradford Welles, *Studi in onore di A.Calderini e R.Paribeni* (1956) 84, rightly

Similar situations also occur in some other Homeric passages, where *polis* is used alone. The entire polis of the Trojans, crowded onto the walls, its morale boosted, watch Hector's defeat of Patroclus.¹ This passage contains no less than four indications against the interpretation of *polis* as 'settlement' and in favour of its being understood as a 'human group connected with a settlement'. It is not a settlement but only human beings that can ascend to the battlements, watch, and have feelings; furthermore, 'entire' is something made up of individual parts. Here, then, *polis* denotes the entire community of the Trojans, men, women and children. Glaucus blames Hector for not having prevented the Greeks from taking the dead Sarpedon who in his lifetime had been useful to both the polis and Hector himself.² In this case we have two indications: *polis* is juxtaposed to a man, Hector; and both had received the same services from Sarpedon. Here again, *polis* refers to the community of the Trojans. The same poet stresses that the Trojans felt a deep and unbearable sorrow for Sarpedon's death since he was the 'stay of their polis';³ and he depicts Odysseus as saying to Telemachus after the extermination of the suitors: 'we have slain those who were the very stay of the polis'.⁴ In both cases the poet is thinking of *polis* not as of a settlement but as of a community, that of the Trojans and that of the Ithacians.

The meaning 'human group', 'community' is attached to the word *polis* in numerous post-Homeric texts.

One of them contains five indications in favour of this interpretation: *polis* (a) is synonymous with *ἔντοποι* 'natives', (b) is

diagnosed that the word *πόλις* in III 50 did not denote the settlement; however, he has been mistaken in taking it as equivalent with the *civitas*, *cives*.

¹ *Iliad* XVI 69–70: 'Τρώων δὲ πόλις πᾶσα βέβηκε | θάρσυνος'. cf. E. Lévy, op. cit. 67. C. Bradford Welles, loc. cit., interpreted this *πόλις* also as *civitas*, *cives*, as he did for *πόλις* in III 50 (see p. 185 n 8).

² *Iliad* XVII 152–153: 'ὄς τοι πόλλ' ὄφελος γένητο πτόλει τε καὶ αὐτῷ | ζῶος ἑών'. cf. E. Lévy, *ibid.*

³ *Iliad* XVI 549: "ὦς ἔφατο, Τρώων δὲ κατὰ κρηθὲν λάβε πένθος | ἄσχετον, οὐκ ἐπεικτόν, ἐπεὶ σφισιν ἔρμα πόληος | ἔσκε καὶ ἄλλοδαπός περ ἑών'. cf. E. Lévy, *ibid.*

⁴ *Odyssey* XXIII 121: 'ἡμεῖς δ' ἔρμα | πόληος ἀπέκταμεν, οἱ μέγ' ἄριστοι κούρων εἰν Ἰθάκη'.

composed of individuals, (c) is addressed, (d) is called to rescue, (e) is called to rely upon.¹

Another passage provides four indications: the *polis* (a) is composed of individuals, (b) is addressed, (c) is exhorted to proceed, (d) is capable to feel compassion.²

Two passages offer three indications. In the first the *polis* is described (a) as ‘all the people’ (πάνδαμος), (b) as stricken by an illness, and (c) as walking.³ In the other it is stressed that friendship between individuals and leagues between *poleis* depend on honesty and on similar ways of life.⁴ Obviously (a) to have relations, (b) to behave honestly, and (c) to have a similar way of life do not pertain to settlements, whereas they do to human societies.

Each of the following passages contain two indications of the use of the term *polis* in the sense of ‘human group’ or ‘community’. They can be divided into eight groups:

(i) A human group directly likened to a *polis* (a) feels dejection and (b) flees.⁵

(ii) The *polis* (a) is composed of individuals and (b) is addressed.⁶

(iii) The *polis* (a) is contrasted with one or more people in the same way as a whole with a part of it: ‘οὔτε τις ἀστῶν ~ οὐδὲ πόλις’, ‘τις ~ πόλιν’, σὺ ~ ἧ τε σὴ πόλις’, ‘σύ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις’, ‘πόλει ~ καὶ σοί’, ‘πόλις ~ μόνη’, ‘τῆς πόλεως ~ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν’, ‘φίλοι καὶ πόλις’; and (b) is presented as having human feelings or other properties: it hears, enjoys, regrets, meddles, has a moral character, receives orders.⁷

¹ Sophocles, *OC* 841–842: ‘πρόβαθ’ ᾗδε, βᾶτε βᾶτ’, ἔντοποι | πόλις ἐναίρεται, πόλις ἐμά, σθένει πρόβαθ’ ᾗδέ μοι’.

² Sophocles, *OC* 107–110: ‘ἵτ’, ᾧ μεγίστης Παλλάδος καλούμεναι | πασῶν Ἀθηναίω τιμωτάτη πόλις, | οἰκτίρατ’ ἀνδρὸς Οἰδίπου τόδ’ ἄθλιον | εἶδωλον’.

³ Sophocles, *Antig.* 1140–1143: ‘καὶ νῦν ὡς βιαίας ἔχεται | πάνδαμος πόλις ἐπὶ νόσου, | μολεῖν καθαροῖσι ποδὶ Παρνασσίαν ὑπὲρ κλιτῶν | ἧ στονόεντα πορθμόν, |’.

⁴ Thucydides III 10,1: ‘εἰδότες οὔτε φιλίαν ἰδιώταις βέβαιον γιγνομένην οὔτε κοινωνίαν πόλεσιν ἐς οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ μετ’ ἀρετῆς δοκούσης ἐς ἀλλήλους γίγνοιτο καὶ τᾶλλα ὁμοιότροποι εἶεν’.

⁵ Thucydides VII 75, 5: ‘κατήφειά τέ τις ἄμα καὶ κατάμεμψις σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλῆ ἦν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκημένη ἐφέκεσαν ὑποφευγούσῃ’.

⁶ Euripides, *Hippol.* 1094: ‘ἀλλὰ χαιρετ’, ᾧ πόλις’.

⁷ Archilochus *IEG* 13,1 = Stobaeus, *Flor.* IV 56 : ‘κῆδεα μὲν στονόεντα, Περίκλεες, οὔτε τις ἀστῶν | μεμψόμενος θαλίης τέρπεται οὐδὲ πόλις’; Simonides 137, 1–2 Diehl,

(iv) The *polis* (a) is contrasted with persons who are members of it and (b) both the *polis* and these persons are said to be increased.¹

(v) The *polis* (a) is contrasted with one person who is a member of it: ‘κάμῃ καὶ πόλιν’, ‘πόλεως μόνην’ and (b) the noun *πόλις* is accompanied by the adjective *πᾶσα* ‘entire’ which shows that it consists of individuals.²

(vi) The noun *πόλις* (a) is accompanied by the adjective *πᾶσα* or *ἅπασα* or *σύμπασα* or *συνάπασα* or *ὄλη* ‘entire’, and (b) is the subject of verbs denoting human acts or situations: it admires (θαυμάζει), regrets (κέκηδε), weeps (ἐβόησε, ἐγόησε), suffers (ἀπηύρα), is thrown into confusion (συνταράσσεται), avoids a taint (μίασμα ὑπεκφύγη), suffers a disaster (ἔρχεται ἔλκος), is fallen into servitude (ἐς κακὴν ἤλυθε δουλοσύνην), is stricken by discord and war (στάσιν ἔμφυλον πόλεμόν θ’ εὐδοντ’ ἐπεγείρει), seeks (ζητεῖ), prospers (εὐδαιμονήσει, εὐδαιμονῆ), grows (αὐξανομένης), goes into exile (ἔφυγε), makes use or avails itself of something besides (προσχρήσασθαι).³

AL: ‘Τῶν αὐτοῦ τις ἕκαστος ἀπολλυμένου ἀνιάται· | Νικόδικον δὲ φίλοι καὶ πόλις ἦδε πο<θ>εῖ’; Sophocles, *OT* 850: ‘πόλις γὰρ ἤκουσε, οὐκ ἐγὼ μόνη, τάδε’; Euripides, *Phoen.* 774: ‘πόλει δὲ καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἐπισκῆπτω, Κρέον’; *Suppl.* 576: ‘πράσσειν σὺ πολλ’ εἴωθας ἦ τε σὴ πόλις’; Plato, *Alc. I* 134 C-D: ‘Δικαιῶς μὲν γὰρ πράττοντες καὶ σωφρόνως σὺ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις θεοφιλῶς πράξετε’; Isocrates, *Ad Nic.* 31: ‘τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἦθος ὁμοιοῦται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν’.

¹ Pindar, *O.* VIII 88: ‘αὐτούς τ’ ἀέξει καὶ πόλιν’.

² Aeschylus, *Septem* 254: ‘Αὐτὴ σὺ δουλοῖς κάμῃ καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν’; Sophocles, *Antig.* 654–655: ‘πόλεως ἀπιστήσασαν ἐκ πάσης μόνην’.

³ Hesiod, *Op.* 240: ‘πολλάκι δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπηύρα’; Tyrtaeus, *IEG* 12,28 = Stobaeus, *Flor.* IV 10, 1(1–14) and 6 (15–44): ‘ἀργαλέφ δὲ πόθφ πᾶσα κέκηδε πόλις’; Solon, *IEG* 4, 17–20: ‘τοῦτ’ ἦδη πάση πόλει ἔρχεται ἔλκος ἄφυκτον | ἐς δὲ κακὴν ταχέως ἤλυθε δουλοσύνην | ἢ στάσιν ἔμφυλον πόλεμόν θ’ εὐδοντ’ ἐπεγείρει, | δς πολλῶν ἐρατὴν ὤλεσεν ἡλικίην’; Anacreon *ALG* 100, 2: ‘Ἀβδήρων προθανόντα τὸν αἰνοβῆτην Ἀγάθωνα | πᾶσ’ ἐπὶ πυρκαϊῆς ἦδ’ ἐβόησε πόλις’; Sophocles, *Antig.* 776: ‘ὄπως μίασμα πᾶσ’ ὑπεκφύγη πόλις’, 1080: ‘ἐχθραὶ δὲ πᾶσαι συνταράσσονται πόλεις, | ὄσων σπαράγματ’ ἢ κύνες καθήγνισαν | ἢ θῆρες ἢ τις πτηνὸς οἰωνός...’; Euripides, *Ion* 1225–1226: ‘πᾶσα δὲ ζητεῖ πόλις | τὴν ἀθλίως σπεύσασαν ἀθλίαν ὁδόν’; *Iph. T.* 1214: ‘ὡς εἰκότως σε πᾶσα θαυμάζει πόλις’; Plato, *Resp.* 420 B: ‘οὐ μὲν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὄπως ἔν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφερόντως εὐδαιμον, ἀλλ’ ὄπως μάλιστα ἡ ὄλη πόλις εὐδαιμονήσει’, 420 D: ‘ἴνα δὴ ὄλη ἡ πόλις εὐδαιμονῆ’, 421 D: ‘ξυμπάσης τῆς πόλεως αὐξανομένης’; *Leg.* 708 B: ‘ἦδη δὲ ποτε καὶ ξυνάπασα πόλις τινῶν ἔφυγεν, ἄρδην κρείττονι κρατηθεῖσα πολέμφ’, 757 D: ‘ἀναγκαῖόν γε μὴν καὶ τούτοις παρωνυμιοῖσι ποτε προσχρήσασθαι πόλιν ἅπασαν’.

(vii) The noun *πόλις* (a) is accompanied by the adjective *πάνδημος* ‘all the people’ and (b) is the object of a prohibition by the ruler.¹

Finally, the following passages contain a single indication, but a good one:

(i) The *polis* embraces women and children.²

(ii) The *polis* is contrasted with one or more individuals, who are its members: ‘αὐτοὺς... καὶ πόλιν’, ‘πόλιν τε κάμει καὶ σέ’, ‘ἐν ἀνδράσιν ~ πρὸς πόλιν’, ‘ἐμαυτὸν ~ πόλει’, ‘ἀνὴρ ~ κὰν πόλει’, ‘πόλει δὲ καὶ σοί’, ‘σοί τε καὶ πόλει’, ‘οὐθ’ ἐαυτῷ οὔτε πόλει’, ‘καὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν’, ‘πόλεώς τε καὶ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός’, ‘πόλεώς τε καὶ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν’, ‘πολλῶν ἀκτημόνων καὶ ἀπόρων ~ τῇ πόλει’.³

(iii) The noun *πόλις* is accompanied by the adjective *πᾶσα* or *ὄλη* ‘entire’.⁴

(iv) The noun *πόλις* is the subject of one or more verbs which denote human actions, or feelings or situations: it sees (εἶδεν), knows by hearing (ἄτει), has a tongue (παλίγλωσσος, ὁμολογέουσι κατὰ γλῶσσαν, ὁμοφωνέουσι), relates (λέγουσι), discusses (πρὸς ἀλλήλας λαλοῦσιν), bears testimony (μαρτυρήσαι), believes in gods (θεοὺς νομίζει), pays honour to the gods (δαίμονας τίει), feels awe before gods (σέβει), prays (εὐχεται), flourishes (τέθηλε), prospers (εὖ πράττει), lives softly (τρυφᾶν), rejoices (γέγαθε, χαίρουσαν), enjoys (πόλει χάρμα), is delighted (ἄγαλμα πόλεσιν), loves (ἐράσμιον πόλει), is fond of (στέργει), laughs (γελῶσι πόλεις), dances (χοροὺς ἀνῆγον), suffers (νοσεῖ, πάσχει), suffers a public disaster (ἔλκος τὸ δῆμιον), supports a hard work (ὑποστῆναι πόνον), suffers a civil war (στάσει νοσοῦσα), is enslaved (ἠνδραποδίσατο), is saved (ὀρθωθεῖσα), mourns (δδύρεται),

¹ Sophocles, *Antig.* 7–8: ‘καὶ νῦν τί τοῦτ’ αὐ φασὶ πανδήμῳ πόλει | κήρυγμα θεῖναι τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀρτίως.’

² Aristotle, *Pol.* 1260b 15–20, 1275a 14–21.

³ Sophocles, *OT* 63–64: ‘ἡ δ’ ἐμῆ | ψυχὴ πόλιν τε κάμει καὶ σ’ ὁμοῦ στένει’; *OC* 612–613: ‘καὶ πνεῦμα ταῦτ’ οὐποτ’ οὔτ’ ἐν ἀνδράσιν | φίλοις βέβηκεν οὔτε πρὸς πόλιν πόλει’; *Antig.* 655: ‘ψευδῆ γ’ ἐμαυτὸν οὐ καταστήσω πόλει’, 661–662: ‘ἐν τοῖς γὰρ οικείοισιν ὅστις ἔστ’ ἀνὴρ | χρηστός, φανεῖται κὰν πόλει δίκαιος ὢν’; Euripides, *Suppl.* 293: ‘σοί τε καὶ πόλει καλόν’; Plato, *Menex.* 235 B: ‘καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ταῦτα ταῦτα δοκοῦσι μοι πάσχειν καὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν’.

⁴ Sophocles, *Antig.* 178: ‘ὅστις πᾶσαν εὐθύνων πόλιν’; Plato, *Resp.* 421 B: ‘εἰς τὴν ὄλην πόλιν βλέποντες’.

abhors (στυγεῖ), admires (θαυμάζει), proves (ἐπαινεῖ, ξυνεπαινεῖ), exalts (μεγαλύνει), favours (εὖνους), is flattered (κολακεύσοντες), is constraint (μὴ βιάζεσθαι), is in tranquility (ἀτρεμέ' ἦσθαι), lives in villages (κατὰ κώμας οἰκοῦσαι), follows a funeral (παρεῖναι ἐπὶ τὴν παραπομπὴν καὶ τὴν κηδεῖαν τοῦ σώματος), it puts out to sea (ἐκπλευούσης).¹

¹ Hesiod, *Op.* 227: 'τέθλε πόλις, λαοὶ δ' ἀνθεῦσιν ἐν αὐτῇ'; fr. 332 *POxy.*: 'ὧς κε πόλις ρέζει, νόμος δ' ἀρχαῖος ἀριστος'; Theognis 39 = 1081: 'Κύρνε, κύει πόλις ἦδε, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ τέκη ἄνδρα | ...', 47: 'ἔλπεο μὴ δηρὸν κείνην πόλιν ἀτρεμείσθαι, | μῆδ' εἰ νῦν κείται πολλῇ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ, | εὐτ' ἂν τοῖσι κακοῖσι φίλ' ἀνδράσι ταῦτα γένηται | κέρδεα δημοσίῳ σὺν κακῷ ἐρχόμενα'; Xenophanes, *IEG* 2,7-8 and 20 = Athenaeus 413f: 'πόλει χάρμα'; Pindar, *O.* II, 93: 'τεκεῖν μὴ τιν' ἑκατόν γε ἐτέων τὴν πόλιν'; *I.* V 48: 'καὶ νῦν ἐν Ἄρει μαρτυρήσαι κεν πόλις Αἴαντος ὀρθωθεῖσα ναύταις', VI, 24-25: 'οὐδ' ἔστιν οὕτω βάρβαρος | οὔτε παλίγγλωστος πόλις, | ἄτις οὐ Πηλέος ἀΐει κλέους'; Corinna, *PMG* 2, 4 = *POxy.* 2370: 'μέγα δ' ἐμῆς γέγαθε πόλις |... ἐνοπῆς'; Aeschylus, *Septem* 77: 'πόλις γὰρ εὐ πρᾶσσουσα δαίμονας τίει (cf. E. Will, *RH* 253 (1975) 300), 156: 'τί πόλις ἄμμι πάσχει;', 1048: 'αὐδῶ πόλιν σε μὴ βιάζεσθαι τάδε', 1053: 'ὄν πόλις στυγεῖ', 1071-1074: 'καὶ πόλις ἄλλως | ἄλλοτ' ἐπαινεῖ τὰ δίκαια. | 'Ἡμεῖς δ' ἅμα τῷδ', ὥσπερ τε πόλις | καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ξυνεπαινεῖ'; *Agam.* 605: 'ἦκειν ὅπως τάχιστ' ἐράσμιον πόλει', 638-640: 'ὅταν δ' ἀπευκτὰ πῆματ' ἄγγελος πόλει στυγνῷ προσώπῳ πτωσίμου στρατοῦ φέρῃ | πόλει μὲν ἔλκος ἐν τὸ δῆμιον τυχεῖν', 647: 'ἦκοντα πρὸς χαίρουσαν εὐεστοῖ πόλιν'; Herodotus I 76, 2: 'καὶ εἶλε μὲν τῶν Περσίων τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἠνδραποδίσατο', I 142, 4: 'αὐταὶ δὲ αἱ πόλεις τῆσι πρότερον λεχθείσῃσι ὁμολογεῦσαι κατὰ γλῶσσαν οὐδέν, σφίσι δὲ ὁμοφωνέουσι', IV 15, 1: 'ταῦτα μὲν αἱ πόλεις αὐταὶ λέγουσι'; Thucydides IV 61, 2: 'χορούς τε ἀνήγον αἱ πόλεις'; Sophocles, *OC* 772-773: 'νῦν τ' αὐθις ἠνίκ' εἰσορᾷς πόλιν τέ μοι | ξυνοῦσαν εὖνουν τήνδε'; *Antig.* 693: 'δδύρεται πόλις', 1015: 'καὶ ταῦτα τῆς σῆς ἐκ φρενὸς νοσεῖ πόλις'; Euripides, *Her. Fur.* 595: 'εἶ με πᾶσ' εἶδεν πόλις'; *Suppl.* 188-189: 'πόλις δὲ σὴ | μόνη δύναται' ἂν τόνδ' ὑποστῆναι πόνον', 324: 'αἱ δ' ἦσχοι σκοτεινὰ πρᾶσσουσαι πόλεις', 373: 'Καλὸν δ' ἄγαλμα πόλεσιν εὐσεβῆς πόνος'; *Bacch.* 320: 'τὸ Πενθέως δ' ὄνομα μεγαλὴν πόλις'; Aristophanes, *Pax* 538-540: 'Ἴθι νῦν, ἄθρει | οἶον πρὸς ἀλλήλας λαλοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις | διαλλαγεῖσαι καὶ γελῶσιν ἄσμεναι'; Plato, *Apoloigia* 24 B: 'καὶ θεοῦ, οὗς ἡ πόλις νομίζει', 26 B: 'θεοῦς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν, οὗς ἡ πόλις νομίζει', 26 D: 'οὐ μέντοι γε οὔσπερ ἡ πόλις (νομίζει)'; *Alc.* I 120 B: 'ἐληλύθασιν κολακεύσοντες τὴν πόλιν'; *Resp.* 399 E: 'λελήθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ἦν ἄρτι τρυφᾶν ἔφαμεν πόλιν'; Isocrates, *Hel.* 35: 'τὴν πόλιν σποράδην καὶ κατὰ κώμας οἰκοῦσαν'; Plutarch, *Them.* 10, 5: 'ἐκπλευούσης δὲ τῆς πόλεως'; Chamaeleon of Heraclea = Athenaeus XIII, 573 c: 'ὅταν ἡ πόλις εὐχηται περὶ μεγάλων τῆ Ἀφροδίτῃ'; *IG*, XII 7, no. 239 lines 30-31: 'δεῖδ' ὄχθαι διὰ τοῦδε τοῦ ψηφίσματος πανδημὶ τὴν πόλιν παρεῖναι ἐ[πι] τὴν παραπομπὴν καὶ κηδεῖαν τοῦ σώματος'.

- (v) The *polis* is addressed.¹
 (vi) The *polis* is the object of a prohibition.²

(b) ΠΟΛΙΣ: THE CITIZENS

Just as the term *πόλις*, from having the meaning ‘settlement below a citadel’, acquired the meaning ‘inhabitants of this kind of settlement’ so from the meaning ‘a kind of state’ it came to be understood as the ‘citizens of this kind of state’.

We start with examples of *polis* in which it appears to have the meaning ‘citizens’ as well as ‘state’. Two of these have already been mentioned alongside other indications of the meaning ‘state’. The one occurs in the decree of the Cyziceni and the other in a treaty of alliance between the Sybaritae and the Serdaioi. As we have seen, the first document says that the *polis* awarded privileges and erected a stele;³ in the second the signatories are said to have agreed on the *polis* Poseidonia as the guarantor of the treaty.⁴ It is clear that in these documents the distinction between the meaning ‘state’ and ‘citizens’ is barely discernible. The same is true of a sentence in an Athenian decree of the year 450/49 B.C., where it is said that the *polis* will accord some honour;⁵ of a phrase in a decree of the Argives of 318–316 B.C., where the term *πόλις* is the subject of the participle *πρεσβεύσασα* (having sent ambassadors);⁶ and of certain other phrases such as ‘ἡ πόλις ἔδωκε’ which are encountered in many public documents.

There are, however, criteria which show us when the term *πόλις* means ‘citizens’ without any connotation of ‘state’. The meaning ‘state’ is indeed excluded in cases where the *polis* appears as an animate entity or as a group of people or as persons forming part of the *polis*. It is also excluded in cases where the *polis* is shown acting politically, but does not embrace the entire state, because it conceived as coexisting

¹ Sophocles, *OC* 833; Euripides, *Hippol.* 817 and 1094; *Andr.* 1175; *Heracl.* 763 and 901; Aristophanes, *Equ.* 373; *Vesp.* 419.

² Sophocles, *Antig.* 44: ‘ἡ γὰρ νοεῖς θάπτειν σφ’, ἀπόρρητον πόλει;’, 203–204: ‘τοῦτον πόλει τῆδ’ ἐκκεκήρυκται τάφῳ | μήτε κτερίζειν μήτε κωκυσαί τινα’.

³ v. s., p. 161.

⁴ v. s., p. 161.

⁵ H. Bengtson, *SVA* II, no. 151 line 56: ‘Ἡ πόλις ἀποδότω τὴν τιμὴν’.

⁶ Bengtson, op. cit. no. 419 lines 17–18: ‘ἅ πόλις ἁ τῶν Ἀργείων | πρεσβεύσα<σα>’.

with another state organ, the king. These criteria have many variations and frequently occur within the same passage, so that they corroborate each other.

The *polis* coexists with a monarch under three circumstances: it shares authority with him; it concedes authority to him; it exercises authority on its own.

The passages which testify to the co-rule of the *polis*, that is of the citizens, and the monarch in historical times or project such a regime onto the mythical past have already been mentioned in another context, to which they are also relevant. There is the inscription from Idalion, dated to between 478 and 470 B.C. and a number of certain passages in the tragedies. All these texts contain other criteria too which show that *πόλις* did not mean 'state' but only 'citizens' or the 'citizen body'. In the Idalian inscription the king and the *polis* are the subjects of verbs meaning 'they instigated', 'they signed an agreement', 'to give jointly', 'they deposited',¹ a fact which confers the meaning 'citizens' on the term *πόλις*.² In the *Suppliants*, Aeschylus imagined the refugees as settling in Argos after separate decisions by the king and the *polis*,³ and even wrote that the latter concurred by a vote of the *demos*,⁴ that is of the assembly. In his own *Suppliants*, Euripides attributes the adjective *πᾶσα* to the noun *πόλις* which hints at a gathering of individuals, the citizens; the same noun is the subject of various forms of the verb *δοκεῖν* (*δοκῆσαν*, *δόξαι*, *δόξει*) which is a direct reference to the conventional phrase in decrees of the Athenian assembly 'ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ'; it is also said that Theseus gave the polis a vote equal to his own.⁵ In another passage from Euripides' *Children of Hercules*, the term *πόλις* denotes a group of individuals who accept a request together with the king.⁶ In similar vein, and thus leading to the

¹ v. s., pp. 181–182.

² cf. p. 182.

³ Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 1009–1010 (text quoted p. 182 n 2).

⁴ Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 942–943 (text quoted p. 182 n 3). The simultaneous use of the terms *πόλις* and *δήμος*, the first in the sense 'citizens', the second with the meaning 'the assembly', makes this passage of Aeschylus parallel with the decree of the Cyziceni which we mentioned above (p. 161 and 182).

⁵ Euripides, *Suppl.* 129: 'Ἰδίᾳ δοκῆσάν σοι τόδ' ἢ πάση πόλει;', 349–357 (text quoted p. 182 n 5).

⁶ Euripides, *Heracl.* 94: 'ἰκέται σέθεν τε καὶ πόλεως ἀφιγμένοι'.

same conclusion, we encounter the term *πόλις* in a passage of Xenophon where he says that the ephors of Sparta took an oath on behalf of the polis and each king swore on his own account.¹

In other passages the *polis*, that is, the body of the citizens, concedes its authority to the king. Thus Creon in the *Antigone* acknowledges that the *polis* placed him at its head.² Menelaus asks Orestes in the tragedy of the same name if the polis allowed him to succeed his father.³ The hero of *Oedipus Rex* emphasizes that it is the polis which conferred authority on him, without his having requested it.⁴

Plutarch wrote that the polis transferred official domains to Theseus.⁵

In some passages the *polis* is represented as exercising authority without the collaboration of the king. His existence is, however, to be inferred. The chorus of the *Children of Hercules* advises Alcmena to let Eurystheus escape since the polis has so decided (the *polis* being the Athenians); the meaning of 'decided' is expressed by the verb *δοκεῖ* ('to seem good'), a technical term used in decrees of assemblies. Alcmena replies: 'if Eurystheus chance to die, should I obey the polis still?'.⁶ In many passages in the *Orestes* it is said that the polis of the Argives will pass judgement by voting on the punishment of Orestes and Pylades, the murderers of Clytemnestra, and at this point paraphrases reminiscent of the assembly are employed, such as *σύλλογος πόλεως, ἔκκλητος Ἀργείων ὄχλος*.⁷ In the *Wasps* we read that the *polis*

¹ Xenophon, *Resp. Lac.* 15, 7: 'ἔφοροι μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, βασιλεὺς δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ'.

² Sophocles, *Antig.* 666–667: 'ἀλλ' ὄν πόλις στήσῃ, τοῦδε χρῆ κλύειν | και σμικρὰ και δίκαια και τάναντία'.

³ Euripides, *Or.* 437: 'Ἀγαμέμνωνος δὲ σκῆπτρ' ἔῃ σ' ἔχειν πόλις;'

⁴ Sophocles, *OT* 383–384: 'εἰ τῆσδέ γ' ἀρχῆς οὐνεχ', ἦν ἐμοὶ πόλις | δωρητόν, οὐκ αἰτητόν, εἰσεχειρίσεν'.

⁵ Plutarch, *Thes.* 35, 2: 'ὄσ' ὑπῆρχε τεμένη πρότερον αὐτῷ (= Theseus) τῆς πόλεως ἐξελοῦσης'.

⁶ Euripides, *Heracl.* 1019–1020: 'ΧΟ. Τὸν ἄνδρ' ἀφεῖναι τόνδ', ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ πόλει. | ΑΛ. Τί δ', ἦν θάνη τε και πόλει πειθώμεθα;'

⁷ Euripides, *Or.* 48–50: 'κυρία δ' ἦδ' ἡμέρα, | ἐν ἣ διοίσει ψῆφον Ἀργείων πόλις, | εἰ χρῆ θανεῖν νῶ λευσίμω πετρῶματι', 440: 'ψῆφος καθ' ἡμῶν οἴσεται τῆδ' ἡμέρα', 612–614: 'Μολῶν γὰρ εἰς ἔκκλητον Ἀργείων ὄχλον | ἐκοῦσαν οὐκ ἄκουσαν ἐπισείσω πόλιν | σοὶ τῆ' ἀδελφῆ, λεύσιμον δοῦναι δίκην', 729–731: 'θᾶσσον ἢ με χρῆν προβαίνων ἰκόμην δι' ἄστρατος, | σύλλογον πόλεως ἀκούσας, τὸν ἰδὼν αὐτὸς σαφῶς, | ἐπὶ

legislates.¹ We even come across passages in which the *polis* prohibits,² gives its consent,³ banishes,⁴ declares innocent,⁵ assumes the risk of some danger,⁶ grants requests,⁷ receives suppliants,⁸ sends orders,⁹ hears,¹⁰ does not wish.¹¹ A passage in the *Antigone* should be added, where Creon refuses to accept that the polis will suggest to him what he should do.¹²

The term *πόλις* in the sense of ‘the citizen body’ occurs frequently in the works of Plato and Aristotle. The Platonic *Laws* make provision for a process of appointment of magistrates from a list of three hundred citizens which has to be brought to the knowledge of the entire polis and everyone of the polis has to vote for whom he will.¹³ The adjective *πᾶσα* which accompanies the first use of the word *πόλις* and the resolution of the *πόλις* into individuals in the second use of the word emphasizes its character as the sum total of the citizens, which is also to be understood from the fact that the *polis* takes into account the list of candidates and makes its choice. When Photius, paraphrasing a text of

σὲ σύγγονόν τε τὴν σὴν, ὡς κτενοῦντας αὐτίκα’, 1611: ‘ἡμᾶς μὴ θανεῖν αἰτοῦ πόλιν’. In other passages in *Orestes* of the same tenor, Euripides does not use the term *πόλις*, but the ethnic names *Ἀργεῖοι*, *Πελασγοί*: 799 ‘ὡς μὴ σε πρόσθε ψήφος Ἀργείων ἔλη’, 857–858: ‘ψήφω Πελασγῶν σὸν κασίγνητον θανεῖν | καὶ σ’, ὦ τάλαιν’, ἔδοξε τῆδ’ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ’, 884–885: ‘Ἐπει δὲ πλήρης ἐγένετ’ Ἀργείων ὄχλος, | κῆρυξ ἀναστάς εἶπε’

¹ Aristophanes, *Vesp.* 467: ‘τῶν νόμων ἡμᾶς ἀπειργεῖς ὧν ἔθηκεν ἡ πόλις’.

² Euripides, *Phoen.* 1657: ‘ἐγὼ σφε θάψω, κἄν ἀπεννέπη πόλις’.

³ Sophocles, *OC* 431–432: ‘εἵποισ ἄν ὡς θέλοντι τοῦτ’ ἐμοὶ τότε | πόλις τὸ δῶρον εἰκότως κατήνεσεν’.

⁴ Sophocles, *OC* 440–441: ‘τὸ τηνίκ’ ἤδη τοῦτο μὲν πόλις βία | ἤλαυνέ μ’ ἐκ γῆς χρόνιον’.

⁵ Euripides, *Heracl.* 1012: ‘πόλις τ’ ἀφῆκε σφφρονοῦσα’.

⁶ Euripides, *Heracl.* 503–504: ‘τί φήσομεν γάρ, εἰ πόλις μὲν ἀξιοῖ | κίνδυνον ἡμῶν οὐνεκ’ αἶρεσθαι μέγαν’.

⁷ Euripides, *Heracl.* 95–96: ‘τί χρέος; ἡ λόγων πόλεος, ἔνεπέ μοι, | μελόμενοι τυχεῖν’.

⁸ Isocrates, *Paneg.* 173: ‘ἰκέτην γενέσθαι τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἡμετέρας’.

⁹ Isocrates, *Paneg.* 174: ‘ἔμμεῖναι τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως πεμφθεῖσιν’.

¹⁰ Euripides, *Or.* 436: ‘ὧν πόλις τανῦν κλύει’.

¹¹ Plato, *Cri.* 52: ‘ὄπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖτε’.

¹² Sophocles, *Antig.* 734: ‘πόλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀμὲ χρῆ τάσσειν ἔρει’.

¹³ Plato, *Leg.* 733 C-D: ‘τὰ δὲ τῶν πινάκων κριθέντα ἐν πρώτοις μέχρι τριακοσίων δεῖξαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἰδεῖν πάσῃ τῇ πόλει, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἐκ τούτων φέρειν πάλιν ὃν ἂν ἕκαστος βούληται’.

Aristotle, wrote that Solon organized the polis and at the same time quoted a passage of Aristotle in which the Athenians were said to be still divided into four *phylae*,¹ it is clear that in using the term *πόλις* he was not talking about the urban settlement, but about the citizens. Aristotle repeatedly defines the *polis* as a *κοινωνία* or *πλήθος* of people² and in other passages he regards various categories of people as members of the *polis*.³ Plato and Aristotle also both talk about discord or sedition within the polis;⁴ but only a group of men can be broken up into hostile groups. Finally Plato made use of the term *πόλις* in a more specialized sense – citizens who made up the court of the Heliaia,⁵ which was, as is known, an emanation of the popular assembly.

There are many other ancient texts in which the term *πόλις* also means ‘citizens’ or, at least, ‘men of the community’. It is not always easy to distinguish between this meaning and the previous one, ‘community’.⁶ It is obvious only under very special circumstances. So we have attributed the meaning ‘citizens’ or ‘men of the community’ to the term *πόλις* where the context allows it to be understood that the *polis* was composed exclusively by men and presents it as involved in affairs reserved to men as bearers of some authority. On the contrary, in the passages we have referred to as testimonia of the term *πόλις* invested with the meaning ‘community’ we encounter clear declarations of its including women and children as well as indications of its being concerned with feelings, situations, actions, etc., which are not limited to men.

¹ Aristotle, fr. 387 Rose = Photius, *Lex.*, ναυκραρία: ‘ἐκ τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους Πολιτείας ὄν τρόπον διέταξε τὴν πόλιν ὁ Σόλων· “φυλαὶ δὴ ἦσαν τέσσαρες καθάπερ πρότερον καὶ φυλοβασιλεῖς τέσσαρες· ἐκ δὲ τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης ἦσαν νενεμημένα τριττῦες μὲν τρεῖς, ναυκραρίαὶ δὲ δώδεκα καθ’ ἐκάστην’.

² v. i., pp. 220–233.

³ v. i., pp. 246–268.

⁴ Plato, *Resp.* 470 D: ‘ὅτι ἐν τῇ νῦν ὁμολογουμένη στάσει, ὅπου ἂν τοιοῦτον γένηται καὶ διαστῆ ἡ πόλις’; Aristotle, fr. 391 Rose = Plutarch, *De sera* 4, 550 C: ‘Παραλογώτατον δὲ τὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος ἄτιμον εἶναι τὸ ἐν στάσει πόλεως μηδετέρᾳ μερίδι προσθήμενον μηδὲ συστασιάντα’.

⁵ Plato, *Cri.* 49 E: ‘ἀπιόντες ἐνθὲνδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν’, 50 C: ‘ἡδίκη γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε; ... ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις, αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζη’.

⁶ v. s., pp. 191ff.

A few passages contain two indications that the term *πόλις* denote a human group and that this group is composed of men, especially citizens:

(i) The *polis* (a) appears alongside individuals (τίς, βροτός) as (b) getting ἀρετάν from the gods.¹

(ii) The *polis* (a) is contrasted with one of its citizens (‘σὺ ~ ἡ πόλις’, ‘πόλει ~ σοί’ ‘ἑαυτῷ ~ πόλει’, ‘πόλεως ~ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός’, ‘πόλεως ~ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν’), and (b) is said to act (πράξετε), to command (ἐπισκήπτω), to secure a despotic rule (τυραννίδα παρασκευάζεσθαι), to ignore (ἀμαθίας).²

(iii) The *polis* (a) is analysed into individuals (σφᾶς) and (b) is said to complain (αἰτιᾶται).³

(iv) The noun *πόλις* (a) is accompanied by the adjective *πᾶσα* or *ξύμπασα* and (b) is the subject of verbs denoting ‘to act’, ‘to strive for glory’.⁴

The following passages contain only a single indication:

(i) A god imposes a law upon a *polis*.⁵

(ii) A citizen expresses the wish to be midmost in his *polis*.⁶

(iii) The noun *πόλις* is the subject of one or more verbs which denote more or less political acts or qualities or situations incumbent on citizens: it appoints a ruler and obeys him (ὄντιν’ ἄν τάξη πόλις; ὄν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρη κλύειν), frames laws (νόμους ὑπογράψασα), likes, is pleased (ἀνδάνει, ἄδοι), orders (τάττει), compels (ἀναγκάζει), punishes (κολάζει, δράτω), is not obeyed (δαπτέτω πόλιν), does (πράττει, ῥέζει), accomplishes (κρανεῖ), assigns honours (παραγαγεῖν

¹ Simonides, *PMG* 21, 2: ‘οὔτις ἄνευ θεῶν | ἀρετὰν λάβεν, οὐ πόλις, οὐ βροτός’.

² Euripides, *Phoen.* 774: ‘πόλει δὲ καὶ σοὶ ταῦτ’ ἐπισκήπτω, Κρέον’; Plato, *Alc. I*, 134 D: ‘Δικαίως μὲν γὰρ πράττουσαι καὶ σωφρόνως σὺ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις θεοφιλῶς πράξετε’, 135 B: ‘Οὐκ ἄρα τυραννίδα χρη παρασκευάζεσθαι οὐθ’ ἑαυτῷ οὔτε τῇ πόλει’; *Leg.* 689 B-C: ‘τοῦτο ἄνοιαν προσαγορεύω πόλεώς τε... καὶ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός... Ταύτας πάσας ἀμαθίας τὰς πλημελεστάτας ἔγωγ’ ἄν θείην πόλεώς τε καὶ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν’.

³ Plato, *Resp.* 599 E: ‘σὲ δὲ τίς αἰτιᾶται πόλις νομοθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι καὶ σφᾶς ὀφελῆκέναι;’

⁴ Pindar, *N.* V 47: ‘ἔσλοισι μάρναται πέρι πᾶσα πόλις’; Thucydides III 62, 4: ‘καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις οὐκ αὐτοκράτωρ οὐσα ἑαυτῆς ταῦτ’ ἔπραξε’.

⁵ Tyrtaeus, *IEG* 4, 10: ‘Φοῖβος γὰρ περὶ τῶν ᾄδ’ ἀνέφηνε πόλει’.

⁶ Phocylides, *EI* 12 = Plutarch, *Lyc.* 6; Aristotle, *Pol.* 1295 b 28: ‘μέσος θέλω πόλει εἶναι’.

εις τιμάς), deals out (νέμει), sends deliverance (ρύει), arms (ἐν ὄπλοις), helps (ἀμύνει), sends (πέμπει), sends out (ἐκπέμπει), bestows a grace (τεμεῖ φίλια), makes a present (δῶρον), revolts (πόλιν ἀπέστησαν, ἀποστᾶσα πόλις), brings charges (αἱ πόλεις ἐνεκάλουν), blames (καλοσόφῳ), is pregnant, gives birth (κύει, τίκτει), things rightly (εὖ φρονεῖ), esteems (ἀξιοῖ), hears discourses (μακρὰν... ρῆσιν οὐ στέργει πόλις), receives a message (ἀγγέλλωμεν εἰς πόλιν),¹ disputes (ἀμφισβητοῦσιν), states (φάσκουσαι).

(iv) The *polis* is analysed into ‘men of the polis’.²

(v) The *polis* is contrasted with one of its citizens (σαυτῷ ~ πόλει).³

5. ΠΟΛΙΣ: THE POPULAR ASSEMBLY

Above we saw many passages in which the term *πόλις* means the sum total of the citizens, especially while they are wielding authority. Thus,

¹ Alcaeus, *PLF* 117 = *POxy.* 1234 2 i a: ‘δαπτέτω πόλιν’; Theognis, 51–52: ‘ἐκ τῶν γὰρ στάσιές τε καὶ ἔμφυλοι φόνοι ἀνδρῶν | μούναρχοί θ’ ἃ πόλει μήποτε ἄδοι’, 262: ‘οὐ γάρ τοι πόλει ὄδε καλοσόφῳ ἀνδάνει οὐδέν’; Xenophanes, *IEG* 2, 7–8 = Athenaeus X 414 A: ‘καὶ κεν σῖτ’ εἶη δημοσίων κτεάνων | ἐκ πόλιος, καὶ δῶρον ὃ οἱ κεμήλιον εἶη’; Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 273: ‘μακρὰν γε μὲν δὴ ρῆσιν οὐ στέργει πόλις’; *Septem* 1072: ‘Δράτω <τι> πόλις καὶ μὴ δράτω’; Sophocles, *Antig.* 666: ‘ἄλλ’ ὄν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρῆ κλύειν’; Euripides, *Heracl.* 399: ‘πόλις τ’ ἐν ὄπλοις’; *Her. Fur.* 272–273: ‘οὐ γὰρ εὖ φρονεῖ πόλις | στάσει νοσοῦσα καὶ κακοῖς βουλευμασι’; *Suppl.* 245: ‘ὄντιν’ ἂν τάξη πόλις’, 375–380: ‘Τί μοι πόλις κρανεῖ ποτ’; ἄρα φίλιά μοι | τεμεῖ καὶ τέκνοις ταφὰς ληψόμεσθα; | Ἄμυνε ματρί, πόλις, ἄμυνε, Παλλάδος, | νόμους βροτῶν μὴ μιαίνειν. Σὺ τοι σέβεις δίκαν, τὸ δ’ ἤσσον ἀδικία νέμεις, δυστυχή τ’ αἰεὶ πάντα ρύη’, 458: ‘εἰ σὲ μὴ πέμψων πόλις’; *Or.* 153: ‘ἀγγέλλωμεν ἐς πόλιν τάδε;’; Hellanicus 4 *FGH* 164 = Plutarch, *Thes.* 17, 3: ‘Ἑλλάνικος δὲ φησιν οὐ τοὺς λαχόντας καὶ τὰς λαχούσας ἐκπέμπειν τὴν πόλιν’; Thucydides I 72, 2: ‘τῶν μὲν ἐγκλημάτων πέρι μὴδὲν ἀπολογησαμένους ὄν αἱ πόλεις ἐνεκάλουν’, I 61: ‘τῶν πόλεων ὅτι ἀφεστᾶσι’, I 66: ‘πόλιν ξυμμαχίδα καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῆ ἀπέστησαν’, III 46, 1: ‘καὶ ἀποστᾶσα πόλις’; Plato, *Lach.* 197 D: ‘ὄν ἢ πόλις ἀξιοῖ αὐτῆς προϊστάναι’; *Protag.* 326 C–D: ‘ἢ πόλις αὐ τοὺς τε νόμους ἀναγκάζει μανθάνειν καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζῆν κατὰ παράδειγμα’, 326 D: ‘καὶ ἢ πόλις νόμους ὑπογράψασα, ἀγαθῶν καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὐρήματα, κατὰ τούτους ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, ὅς δ’ ἂν ἐκτὸς βαίνειν τούτων, κολάζει’; *Leg.* 757 B: ‘τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν εἰς τὰς τιμὰς πᾶσα πόλις ἰκανὴ παραγαγεῖν καὶ πᾶς νομοθέτης’; *Alc.* I 111 C: ‘καὶ δημοσίαι αἱ πόλεις οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσι αἱ μὲν ταῦθ’ αἱ δὲ ἄλλα φάσκουσαι;’

² Sophocles, *Antig.* 841–843: ‘ὦ πόλις, ὦ πόλεως πολυκτῆμονες ἄνδρες’.

³ Plato *Alc.* I 134 C: ‘οὐκ’ ἄρα ἐξουσίαν σοι οὐδ’ ἄρχῆν παρασκευαστέον σαυτῷ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούλη, οὐδὲ τῇ πόλει.’

the next step was for the word *πόλις* to acquire the meaning of 'popular assembly' and to be established as a technical term in many *poleis*.¹ The fact that, as we shall see, the oldest evidence of this usage dates to the seventh century B.C., i.e. that it is approximately one century older than the first evidence for the identification of the word *πόλις* with its citizens, does not upset the logical chain of the development of the concepts. The first appearance in time of the evidence for each meaning is fortuitous; it reflects the gaps in our material. In reality the first testimony to the use of the word *πόλις* in the sense of 'popular assembly' is a *terminus ante quem* for the dating of the use of *πόλις* as a synonym for citizens.

A decree from the Cretan *polis* of Dreros dated to the second half of the seventh century B.C. opens with the declaration: 'ἄδ' ἔφαδε πόλι' (this has pleased the *πόλις*).² In other archaic inscriptions from Cretan *poleis* the decision is attributed to the citizens denoted by their ethnic name. One would thus expect here the formula 'ἄδ' ἔφαδε Δρηρίοις' (this has pleased the Drerians).³ It was at first believed that the term *πόλις* meant the body of the higher elected magistrates of the *polis*, the *kosmoi*, for the following reasons: (a) Later Cretan inscriptions retain the formula 'ἔδοξε τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῷ πόλει' (the *kosmoi* and the *polis* decided); (b) In Athens we have first the formula 'ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ' and subsequently the formula 'ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ'. It seems, however, that in the oldest decrees only the body of the citizens was mentioned, *δημος* in the case of Athens, *πόλις* in the case of Dreros, because the magistrates acted formally in the name and on behalf of the citizens (even if they did not consult them).⁴ It was, moreover, observed that the decree of Dreros depicts the popular assembly as superior to the *kosmoi*, since it orders that no citizen might become a *kosmos* a second time until ten years had passed; if he transgressed this law he would pay a double fine for every judicial decision he imposed, all his acts would be nullified, he would be demoted from office and he could never be re-elected. These measures, aimed at preventing those who wished to prolong their term of office or

¹ *Κοινόν* underwent similar semantic shift; see above, p. 163.

² *SGHI* I no. 2 lines 1-2: 'ἄδ' ἔφαδε | πόλι'.

³ P. Demargne, H. Van Effenterre, *BCH* 61 (1937) 238-248; 62 (1938) 194-195.

⁴ V. Ehrenberg, *CQ* 37 (1943) 15 = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 99.

to hold office over-frequently with a view to building up a position of personal power, would not have been proposed by kosmoi themselves nor by the boule which was made up of former kosmoi. They must therefore be attributed to the assembly. This then must be what at Dreros was called the πόλις.¹

A law of a Locrian polis dated to the last quarter of the sixth century B.C. prescribes voting either by the council or by a body called the πόλις or by another body called the ἀποκλήσια which seems to have been made up of chosen citizens.² The term πόλις has already been interpreted as 'the assembly',³ but this has been called into question since another Locrian inscription uses the term ἀγορά for the assembly and the term πόλις for the community.⁴ But mention of a πόλις alongside two collective organs, a boule (council) of elders and a committee of citizens, unerringly leads to the conclusion that the πόλις was also an organ of this type, as indeed was the assembly.

Above we mentioned the inscription from Idalion which attests to the equality of the prince and the πόλις, that is the citizens.⁵ However, it seems that the term πόλις has the more particular meaning of 'the assembly' on the first occasion of the eight that it is mentioned because on that occasion it is said that the king Stasikypros and the πόλις of the Idalians invited the physicians to sign an agreement with them. This invitation on the part of the πόλις, that is, of the citizens, will have been the result of their meeting in assembly.

The majority of the examples of the use of the term πόλις in the sense of 'the assembly' come from decrees of Cretan poleis dating to the Hellenistic period. These poleis are Apollonia, Allaria, Axos, Apta, Arcades, Biannos, Gortyn, Eleutherna, Elyros, Hierapytna, Istron, Cnossos, Cydonia, Lappa, Lato, Lyttos, Malla, Olous, Polyrrenia, Praesos, Priansos, Rhaucos, and Sybrita. The absence of examples between the decree from Dreros (second half of the seventh

¹ R.F.Willetts, *Aristocratic Society in Ancient Crete* (1955) 167ff. M.Tod, *SGHI* I² (1969) 3 (wavered between the views of Ehrenberg and of Willetts).

² *SGDI* I no. 13 lines 10–11: 'ἐ ψᾶφον διαφέρου ἐν πρείγοι ἐ 'ν πόλι ἐ | 'ν ἀποκλεσίαι'.

³ V.Ehrenberg, *Von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung* (*SBHAW* (1951) 3), 19–20 = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 114.

⁴ J.A.O.Larsen, *Greek Federal States* (1968) 54.

⁵ v. s., pp. 181–182, 192.

century B.C.)¹ and those of the Hellenistic period is probably due to the sporadic nature of the evidence at our disposal. Interpretation of the term *πόλις* as ‘the assembly’ is assured by similar expressions: (a) Most often the term *πόλις* appears in formulas of this kind: ‘ἔδοξε τοῖς κόσμοις οἱ τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τῇ πόλει’, ‘δεδοχθαι... τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῇ πόλει’, ‘οἱ κόσμοι καὶ ἡ πόλις’, ‘ἡ πόλις καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες’, ‘τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῇ πόλει χαίρειν’, ‘ἔδοξε τῇ πόλει’, ‘ὄσα δὲ ψηφίσεται ἡ πόλις’. (b) The words *πόλις* and *ἐκκλησία* or *δῆμος* or *κοινόν* (which properly has another meaning), or *πολιται* or the ethnic name of the citizens (for example the Ὀλούντιοι) are frequently interchanged. (c) More rarely we find added the formula ‘ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ τὰν ἐκκλησίαν’, in which the term *ἐκκλησία* denotes the place of meeting.²

¹ v. s., pp. 198–199.

² ΑΛΛΑΡΙΑ: *IC*, II, no. 1 (201 B.C.) line 5: ‘οἱ καὶ ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ | τὰν ἐκκλησίαν’, lines 17–18: ‘δεδοχθαι τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἀλλαριωτῶν’. no. 2 B (before 197 B.C.) line 1: ‘Ἀλλαριωτῶν οἱ κόσμοι καὶ ἡ πόλις’, lines 9–10: ‘δεδοχθαι Ἀλλαριωτῶν τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῇ πόλει’. ΑΞΟΣ: *IC*, II, no. 17 (201 B.C.) line 1: ‘ἔδοξεν Φαξίων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῇ πόλει’, line 6: ‘καὶ ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ τὰν ἐκκλησίαν’, line 13: ‘δεδοχθαι Φαξίων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῇ πόλει’, line 18: ‘ὁ δῆμος ὁ Φαξίων’. no. 19 (beginning of the 2nd cent. B.C.) line 1: ‘Φαξίων οἱ κόσμοι καὶ ἡ πόλις’. *IG*, IX² 1, no. 178 line 5: ‘τῶν ἐπιστολῶν τὰν παρὰ τῶν κόσμων καὶ τὰς πόλιος τῶν Ὀαξίων. ΑΠΤΕΡΑ: *IC*, II, no. 2 (after 170 B.C.) line 1: ‘Ἀπτεραίων οἱ κόσμοι καὶ ἡ πόλις’, line 25: ‘δεδοχθαι ἀποκρίνασθαι | τῷ δάμῳ τῷ Ἀπτεραίων’. no. 3 (first half of the 2nd cent. B.C.) line 1: ‘ἔδοξε τῷ βωλῷ καὶ τῷ δάμῳ’, line 12: ‘δεδοχθαι τῷ βωλῷ καὶ τῷ δάμῳ’. no. 4 B (2nd cent. B.C.) line 1: ‘ἔδοξε τῷ βωλῷ καὶ | τῷ δάμῳ’. Same beginning: 4 C (2nd cent. B.C.), 5A, 5B, 8C, 9, 10A, 10B, 12B, 12C (1st cent. B.C.). ΑΡΚΑΔΕΣ: *IC*, I, no. 52 (after 170 B.C.) line 1: ‘ἔδοξεν Ἀρκάδων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῇ πόλει’ (the interpretation given by F. Gschnitzer, *WS* 68 (1955) 137, is erroneous), line 6: ‘ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ τὸ κοινόν τῶν Ἀρκάδων’. no. 53 (after 170 B.C.) line 1: ‘ἔδοξεν Ἀρκάδων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῇ πόλει’, line 6: ‘ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ τὸ κοινόν τῶν Ἀρκάδων’, lines 20–21: ‘διότι τὸ κοινόν τῶν Ἀρκάδων... ἀπ’ οὐδὲ[νός] ἀπέστα τῶν συμφερόντων τῷ δάμῳ[τῷ] Τηίων’, line 28: ‘καὶ τὸ κοινόν τῶν Ἀρκάδων’. ΒΙΑΝΝΟΣ: *IC*, I, no. 2 (after 170 B.C.) line 1: ‘ἔδοξεν Βιαννίων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῇ | πόλει’, line 7: ‘οἱ δὲ ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ τὸν κόσμοις καὶ τὰν ἐκκλησίαν’, lines 13–14: ‘διὸ καὶ ἔδοξεν τοῖς κόσμοις | καὶ τῇ πόλει τῶν Βιαννίων’. ΓΟΡΤΥΣ: *IC*, IV, no. 162 (no date) line 1: ‘τάδ’ ἔφαδε τῷ [πόλι]. no. 165 (3rd cent. B.C.) lines 3–4: ‘τάδ’ ἔαδε ταῖς πόλιθι ἀνφοτέρας’. no. 168 (218 B.C.) line 1: ‘Γορτυνίων οἱ κόσμοι καὶ ἡ πόλις’. no. 231 (3rd cent. B.C.) line 1: ‘ἔδοξε τῇ πόλι’. no. 233 (3rd cent. B.C.) lines 1–2: ‘ἀπελάγασαν ἡ πόλις | οἱ Γορτυνιοί’. no. 236 (3rd cent. B.C.) lines 5–6: ‘ἀπέλασαν... ἡ πόλις | [οἱ Γορτυνιοί]’. *IMM*, no. 65 a (mid-2nd cent. B.C.) lines 16–17: ‘ἀποκρίνασθαι αὐτοῖς δεῖ Γορτυνίων οἱ κόσμοι καὶ ἡ πόλις’,

Note 2 to page 200 (continued).

lines 32–33: 'ἔδοξεν [Γορτυνίων τοῖς κόρ]μοις καὶ τῆ [πό]λει'. no. 65 (2nd cent. B.C.)
 line 25: 'ἔδοξεν Γορτυνίων τοῖς κόρμοις καὶ τῆ πόλει'. no. 105 (139 B.C.) lines
 97–98: 'Ἱεραπυτνίων οἱ [κόρμοι κ]αὶ ἡ πόλις Ἱταν[ίων τοῖς κόρ]μοις καὶ τῆ πόλει
 χαίρειν'. ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΝΑ: IC, II, no. 20 (c. 227–224 B.C.) line 7: 'ὅταν δὲ ψηφίσηται
 ἡ πόλις', lines 8–9: 'ἀποστελλέτωσαν οἱ κόσμοι'. no. 21 (201 B.C.) line 5: 'ἐπελ-
 θόντες ἐπὶ τὰν ἐκκλησίαν', lines 19–20: 'δεδοχθαι τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῆ πόλει τῶν
 Ἑλεϋθερναίων'. ΕΛΥΡΟΣ: IC, II, no. 1 (first half of the 2nd cent. B.C.) line 1:
 "Ἐδοξε τῆ πόλει τῶν Ἑλυρίων'. no. 1 B line 1: "Ἐδοξε [ε] Ἑλ]υρίων τῆ πόλει'.
 ΙΕΡΑΠΥΤΝΑ: IC, III, no. 3C (beginning of the 2nd cent. B.C.) line 1: "Ἐδοξε
 Ἱραπυτνίων τοῖς κόσμοις... καὶ τῆ πόλι'. no. 4 (beginning of the 2nd cent. B.C.) line
 35: 'καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίαι καθήσθω'. ΙΣΤΡΟΝ: IC, I, no. 1 (201 B.C.) line 1: "Ἐδοξεν
 Ἱστρωνίων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῆ πόλει', lines 5–6: 'οἱ ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τὸ
 Ἱστρωνίων'. ΙΤΑΝΟΣ: see above ΓΟΡΤΥΣ no. 105 line 116. ΚΝΩΣΟΣ: IC, I, no. 6
 (mid-3rd cent. B.C.) line 2: "Ἐδοξε Κνωσίων τῆ κόσμοι καὶ τῆ πόλει', line 31:
 'κόσμον καὶ βουλάν'. no. 7 (between 221 and 219) line 1: 'Κνωσίων οἱ κόσμοι καὶ ἡ
 πόλις'. no. 10 (late 3rd cent. B.C.) lines 10–11: 'ἔδοξεν Κνωσι[ων] [τ]οῖς κόσ[μοις] καὶ
 | τῆ πόλι'. no. 11 (after 170) line 1: "Ἐδοξε Κνωσίων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῆ πόλει'. no.
 12 (end of 2nd cent. B.C.) line 1: "Ἐδοξεν Κνωσίων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῆ πόλι', line 9:
 'καὶ ἐπελθὼν ἐπὶ τε τὸς κόσμος | καὶ τὰν ἐκκλησίαν', line 17: 'καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν
 πολιτῶν καὶ ἀκούσαντες', line 20: 'καὶ ἡ πόλις τῶν Κνωσίων', line 27: 'δεδοχθαι τῆ
 πόλει'. no. 14 (2nd cent. B.C.) lines 3–5: 'ἔδοξε Κνω[σίων] | τοῖς κόσμοις κ[αὶ] τῆ
 πό]λει'. *Inscriptions de Délos* (1937) no. 1512 (after 166) line 1: "Ἐδοξεν Κνωσίων
 τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῆ πόλι', line 9: 'ἐπελθὼν ἐπὶ τε τὸς κόσμος | καὶ τὰν ἐκκλησίαν',
 line 17: 'ἔφ' ὧν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν ἀκούσαντες', line 27: 'δεδοχθαι τῆ πόλι
 ἐπαινεσαι'. ΚΥΔΩΝΙΑ: IC, II, no. 2 (201 B.C.) line 1: 'Κυδωνιατῶν ἡ πόλις καὶ οἱ
 ἄρχοντες', line 6: 'οἱ καὶ ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ τὰν ἐκκλησίαν'. ΛΑΠΠΑ: IC, II, no. 3 (201
 B.C.) line 1: "Ἐδοξε Λαππαίων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῆ πόλει', line 4: 'ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ
 τὴν ἐκκλησίαν'. no. 4 (no date) line 1–2: "Ἐδοξε Λαπ[π]αίων | τῆ πόλει'. no. 5A (no
 date) line 1: "Ἐδοξε Λαππα[ίων] τῆ πόλει]. no. 5B, line 1: "Ἐ]δοξε Λαππαίων τῆ
 πό]λει]. no. 6A (2nd half of the 3rd cent. B.C.) line 1: "Ἐδοξε Λαππα[ίων] τῆ πόλει'.
 no. 6B line 1: "Ἐδοξε Λαππαίων τῆ πό]λει'. no. 7A (mid-3rd cent. B.C.) line 1:
 "Ἐδοξε Λαππαίων τῆ πό]λει'. no. 7B line 1: "Ἐδοξε Λαππαίων τῆ πόλει'. no. 7 C
 line 1: "Ἐδοξε Λαππαίων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῆ πόλει'. no. 8 (first half of the 2nd cent.
 B.C.) line 1: "Ἐ[δ]οξε Λαππαίων τῆ | πόλει'. ΛΑΤΩ: IC, I, no. 2 (201 B.C.) line 1:
 "Ἐδοξε Λατῶν τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῆ πόλει', lines 5–6: 'οἱ δὲ ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ τὸ
 κοινὸν τὸ Λατῶν'. no. 15 (uncertain date) line 1: "Ἐδοξεν Λατῶν τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ
 τῆ πόλει', lines 5–6: 'οἱ δὲ ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ τὸ | κοινὸν τὸ Λατῶν'. ΛΥΤΤΟΣ: IC, I, no.
 8 (249 B.C.) lines 4–5: 'δεδοχθαι Λυττίων τοῖς κόσμοις [καὶ | τῆ] πόλει'. ΜΑΛΛΑ:
 IC, I, no. 2 (after 170 B.C.) line 1: "Ἐδοξε (Μ)αλλαίων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῆ πόλει',
 line 5: 'οἱ καὶ ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ τὰν ἐκκλησίαν'. no. 3A a (uncertain date) line 4: 'ἔδοξε
 τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῆ πόλι', line 5: 'ἐπειδὴ τὰς γενομένας περιστάσιος τε τὰν πόλιν
 καὶ τὸ[ν] ἄ[λλο]ν δᾶμον'. ΟΛΟΥΣ: IC, I, no. 4 (mid-3rd cent. B.C.) lines 21–22:
 "Ἐδοξε Ὀλοοντίων τῆ πόλει', line 35: 'ἔδοξε τοῖς πολιταῖς', line 47: 'ἔδοξε |
 Ὀλοντίων τῆ πόλει', line 58: 'ἔδοξε Ὀλοντίους'. no. 4 B (3rd cent. B.C.) lines 2–5:

We may thus attribute the meaning of ‘the assembly’ to the term *πόλις* even in some instances where these guarantees are absent.¹ It is important to note that the term *πόλις* also took on the meaning of the assembly of the *koinon* or of the *ethnos* of the Cretans.²

Examples comparable to those from Crete, containing similar formulae, are to be found amongst the decrees of various *poleis* in Thessaly (Alus, Gonnus, Larisa, Chyretiai) also from the Hellenistic period. The formulae are: ‘ἔδοξεν τῇ πόλει’, ‘δεδοχθαι τῇ πόλει’, ‘ἔδοξε τῇ πόλει ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ’ (where ἐκκλησία means ‘meeting’), ‘ῥαφιξαμένως τὰς πόλιος’, ‘ἅ πόλις καὶ ἅ βουλά’, ‘τοῖς ταγοῖς καὶ τῇ πόλει χαίρειν’, ‘ποτ τὸς ταγὸς καὶ τὰν πόλιν χαίρειν’.³ In a decree

Note 2 to page 200 (continued).

‘ἔδοξε Ὀλουντίων | τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ | τῇ πόλει’, lines 20–22, 37–39: same formulation. ΠΟΛΥΡΡΗΝΙΑ: IC, II, no. 1 (end of the 3rd cent. B.C.) lines 2–3: ‘Π[ολυ]ρρηνίων τοῖς κόσμοις κ[α]ὶ τῇ πόλει’. no. 3 (201 B.C.) line 2: ‘Πολυρρηνίων οἱ κόσμοι καὶ ἅ πόλις’, line 8: ‘δεδοχθαι Πολυρρηνίων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῇ πόλει’. ΠΡΑΙΣΟΣ: IC, III, no. 7 (early 3rd cent. B.C.) line 2: ‘Ἐδοξε τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τῇ πόλι τῇ Πραισίων’. no. 9 (mid-3rd cent. B.C.) lines 2–4: ‘Ἐδοξεν Πραισίων τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ τῷ κοινῷ, ἐκκλησίας κυρίας γεν[ο]μένης’. ΠΡΙΑΝΣΟΣ: IC, I, no. 1 (after 170 B.C.) line 2: ‘Ἐδοξε Πριανσίων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῇ πόλει’. ΡΑΥΚΟΣ: IC, I, no. 1 (201 B.C.) line 2: ‘Ἐδοξε Ῥαυκίων τοῖς κόσμοις καὶ τῇ πόλει’. ΣΥΒΡΙΤΑ: IC, II, no. 1 (201 B.C.) line 2: ‘Συβριτίων ἅ πόλις καὶ οἱ κόσμοι’.

¹ e.g. ΑΠΟΛΛΩΝΙΑ IC, I, no. 1 (201 B.C.) line 3: ‘ὑπὸ τὰς πόλιος τῶ[ς] Ἀπολλωνιατῶν’.

² IC, I no. 12, lines 1, 20, 23.

³ ΑΛΟΣ: IG, IX 2, no. 2 (184/3 B.C.) lines 2–3: ‘ἅ πόλις ἅ Ἀλέω[ν] | [καὶ ἅ] βουλά’. ΓΟΝΝΟΙ: no. 20 (after 200 B.C.) lines 3–4: ‘δε]δόχθαι τῆ[ι πόλει τῆι Γοννέ]ων’. no. 39 (first half of the 2nd cent. B.C.) line 1–2: ‘δεδοχθαι τῇ πόλει τῇ Γοννέων’. no. 40 (between 180 and 160 B.C.) lines 8–9: ‘ἔδοξεν τῆι | [πόλει τῆι Γοννέ]ων’. no. 41 (171–169 B.C.) line 9: ‘ἔδοξε τῆι πό[λ]ει τῆι Γοννέων’, lines 17–18: ‘δε]δόχθαι τῇ πόλει τῇ Γοννέ<ε>ων’. no. 42 (between 196 and 146 B.C.) lines 17–18: ‘ἔδοξε τῇ πόλει ἐν ἐκκλη[σ]ίᾳ ἐννόμῳ’. no. 48 (between 160 and 140 B.C.) lines 11–12: ‘ἔδοξε τῇ πόλει τῇ | [Γοννέων]’. no. 49 (between 160 and 140 B.C.) line 1: ‘Ἐδοξε τῇ πόλει’. no. 50 (between 160 and 140 B.C.) lines 8–9: ‘ἔδοξε | τῇ πόλει τῆι | Γοννέων’. no. 70 (first half of the 2nd cent. B.C.) line 2: ‘ἔδοξε | τῆι Γοννέων πόλει’. no. 76 (first half of the 2nd cent. B.C.) lines 9–10: ‘ἔδοξεν τῇ | πόλει τῇ Γοννέων’. no. 80 (first half of the 2nd cent. B.C.) lines 11–12: ‘δε]δόχθαι τῇ πό[λ]ει τῆι Γοννέων’. no. 86 (mid-2nd cent. B.C.) lines 6–7: ‘ἔδοξε | τῇ πόλει τῇ Γοννέων’. no. 90 (between 160 and 140 B.C.) lines 22–23: ‘δε]δόχθαι τῇ πόλει τῇ Γοννέων’. no. 91 (mid-2nd cent. B.C.) lines 26–27: ‘δε]δόχθαι τῇ πόλει τῇ Γοννέων’. no. 107 (2nd cent. B.C.) lines 5–6: ‘ἔδοξε τῇ πόλει

emanating from a non-Thessalian *polis* and addressed to the people of Larisa, the *tagoi* and the *demoi* are named as the addressees in the place of the πόλις (the assembly of the *demoi*).¹

We have further Hellenistic examples of this use of the term πόλις from Lamia,² Stratos,³ Patrae,⁴ Epidaurus,⁵ Sparta.⁶

This usage continued during the Roman period. It is found from *poleis* of the Argolis,⁷ Laconia,⁸ Doris,⁹ Hypata,¹⁰ and a *polis* in central Macedonia.¹¹

[τῆ Γοννέων]. no. 109 (end of the 3rd cent. B.C.) line 1: “Ἔδοξε τῆ πόλει τῆ Γοννέων”. no. 110 (end of the 3rd cent. B.C.) lines 1–3: ‘ἔδοξε | τῆ πόλει τῆ Γοννέ[ων]’. no. 111 (206–203 B.C.) lines 3–4: ‘ἔδοξεν τῆ πόλει τῆ Γοννέων’. There is one known instance of formula associating the πόλις with the *tagoi* of Gonnoi. It is not reliable, however, for it does not emanate from this polis, but from another: no. 98 (end of the 3rd cent. B.C.) line 9: ‘Γοννέων τοῖς ταγοῖς καὶ τῆ πόλει | χαίρειν’. ΛΑΡΙΣΑ: IG, IX 2, no. 517 (end of the 3rd cent. B.C.) lines 2-4: ‘Φίλιπποι τοῖ βασιλεῖος ἐπιστολὰν ἀ[π]υστέλλαντος πὸτ τὸς ταγὸς καὶ τὰν πόλιν τὰν ὑπογεγραμμένων Βασιλεὺς Φίλιππος Λαρισαίων τοῖς ταγοῖς καὶ τῆ πόλει χαίρειν’, line 9: ‘ψαφιζαμένας τὰς πόλιος’, line 11: ‘πὸτ τὸς ταγὸς καὶ τὰν πόλιν’, line 26: ‘Βασιλεὺς Φίλιππος Λαρισαίων τοῖς ταγοῖς καὶ τῆ πόλει χαίρειν’. ΧΥΡΕΤΙΑΙ: IG, IX 2, no. 338 (196 B.C.) line 2: ‘τοῖς ταγοῖς καὶ τῆ πόλει χαίρειν’. The text, however, was not promulgated in Chyretiae but was addressed to it; the same occurs with a document found at Gonnoi, mentioned above.

¹ See below, n 8.

² IG, IX 2, no. 61 lines 2–3: ‘ἀ πόλ[ις τῶν] | Λαμιέων καὶ ἀ βουλά’. no. 62 (218/7 B.C.) lines 1–2: ‘ἔδοξε [τῆ πόλει] | τῶν Λαμιέων’. no. 63 (3rd/2nd cent. B.C.) line 1: ‘ἔδοξε τῆ πόλει’.

³ IG, IX 1² II, no. 391 (3rd cent. B.C.) line 1: ‘ἔδοξε τῆ πόλει τῶν Στρατιῶν’.

⁴ SIG, no. 684, line 4: ‘τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ συνέδροις καὶ τῆ πόλει’.

⁵ IG, IV 1² (1229) no. 60 (191 B.C.) line 6: ‘ἔδοξε τῆ πόλει τῶν Ἐπιδαυρίων’.

⁶ IG, IX 2, no. 518 line 1: ‘[Λα]κεδαιμονίων ἔφο[ρ]οι κ[αὶ] ἀ πόλις | [Λα]ρι[σσα]ίων τοῖς ταγοῖς [καὶ] τῆ δ[άμ]ωι χαίρειν’.

⁷ IG, IV 1², no. 122 line 77: ‘ἔδοξε τῆ πόλι’ (= Ἀλικῶν). no. 678 (1st cent. B.C.) lines 8–10: ‘ψηφισαμένης τῆς πόλεως’.

⁸ IG, V 1, no. 1145 (Gythium, c. 70 B.C.) line 13–14: ‘τὰν μεγίσταν καταλογὰν | [ποιησάμε]νος τῶν τε ἀρχόντων καὶ τὰς πόλεος ἀμῶν’. no. 1524 (Gythium) line 1: ‘Γυθ]εατῶν ἔφοροι καὶ ἀ πόλις’. SIG, no. 770 A (31–29 B.C.) lines 1–2: ‘[Λα]κεδαιμονίων ἔφοροι καὶ ἀ πόλις Δελφῶν τοῖς ἄρχουσι | καὶ τῆ πόλει χαίρειν’. no. 1331 (Cardamyle) line 3: ‘ἔδοξε τῆ δῆμῳ καὶ τῆ πόλει καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις’.

⁹ SIG, no. 770 B (31–29 B.C.) lines 3–4: ‘Δ[ελφῶν] τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ τῆ πόλει χαίρειν’.

¹⁰ IG, IX, no. 45 lines 7–8: ‘ψηφισαμένης | τῆς πόλεως’.

¹¹ SEG, XII no. 349: ‘Αὐτοκράτορα Καίσαρα | Τραϊανὸν Ἀδριανὸν | Σεβαστὸν καὶ

6. ΠΟΛΙΣ: POLITICAL RIGHTS

The use of *πόλις* to mean ‘political rights’ grew out of the use of *πόλις* to mean ‘state’. Evidence for it is to be found in passages of Plato, Demosthenes, Aristotle and Philochorus.¹

Nevertheless, the phrase *στερεῖσθαι τῆς πόλεως* (to be deprived of the *polis*) does not automatically mean to be deprived of political rights. The technical term for this was *ἀτιμία*. More particularly, when the phrase *στερεῖσθαι τῆς πόλεως* is used of people who were exiled or who imposed exile on themselves,² it is to be understood as meaning the forfeiture of the ability to exercise these rights or, more generally, the deprivation of a fatherland both in physical and in political terms.

7. ΠΟΛΙΣ: PUBLIC LIFE

Another by-product of the use of *πόλις* to mean ‘state’ was its use in the sense of ‘public life’ which is found in a passage of the *Constitution of Athens*,³ and in a fragment of Nicolaus Damascenus referring to the Celts.⁴

Σαβείναν | Σεβαστήν Βραγυλίων | ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ | πολιτεία’ (F. Papazoglou *REG* 72 (1959) 100ff, in interpreting *πόλις* as an ‘agglomération’, failed to note that it occurs together with *βουλή*).

¹ Plato, *Epist.* VII 333 B: ‘Ἐπειδὴ δ’ οὖν ἠλευθέρωσέ τε καὶ ἀπέδωκεν αὐτοῖς δις τὴν πόλιν’; Demosthenes, *Meid.* 106: ‘νῦν δὲ τούτοις οἷς ἐποίηι καὶ διεπράττει’ ἐκεῖνά τε καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, τὴν πόλιν, τὸ γένος, τὴν ἐπιτιμίαν, τὰς ἐλπίδας’; Aristotle, *Pol.* 1280 a 26–27: ‘εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτημάτων χάριν ἐκοινωνήσαν καὶ συνῆλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι τῆς πόλεως ὅσον περ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως’; Philochorus 328 *FGrH* 160 = Didymus, *Schol. in Demosth.* IX 57: ‘τότε δὲ ἐκπολιορκήσαντες αὐτὸν Ἀθηναῖοι τῷ δῆ[μῳ] τὴν πόλιν ἀπέδωκαν’.

² Antiphon II (B), 9: ‘τοῦ δὲ σώματος καὶ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἀπεστερούμην’, V 13: ‘εἰ μὴδὲν διέφερε στέρεσθαι τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως’; Isocrates, *De bigis* 50: ‘τότε μὲν μεθ’ ἡμῶν, νῦν δ’ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν τῆς πόλεως στερήσομαι’.

³ Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 26, 1: ‘Κίμωνα τὸν Μιλτιάδου νεώτερον ὄντα καὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ὄψῃ προσελθόντα’.

⁴ Nicolaus Damascenus 90 *FGrH* 103 e = Stobaeus, *Flor.* IV 2: ‘Κελτοὶ σιδηροφοροῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν πάντα πράττουσι’.

8. ΠΟΛΙΣ: THE TERRITORY OF A STATE

Equally, the meaning 'territory of a state' sprang directly from the use of πόλις to mean 'state'.

Passages in Homer describe 'the polis of Eurypylus', 'the polis of Thoas' which are not settlements but the islands Cos and Lemnos respectively.¹ The meaning of these phrases is 'the state or territory' of Eurypylus or of Thoas.² This meaning of the term πόλις presupposes the meaning 'territory of a polis'; this in turn presupposes the meaning 'state' which, we have seen, attaches to the term πόλις in other Homeric passages.³

In a passage of Hesiod we read that the 'entire polis of the Myrmidons' reverberated to the shouts of Heracles and Cycnus as did Iolcus, Arne, Helice and Antheia.⁴ Here also the term πόλις without doubt signifies a place and not just a community of men; moreover, this place is not a town but a territory since it (a) is qualified by πᾶσα and (b) appears to embrace settlements as part of itself.

Pindar, following the Homeric examples, wrote πόλις Αἴαντος of Salamis.⁵ Similarly Aeschylus meant island states when he wrote the seventy-seventh line of the *Eumenides*.⁶ The term πόλις was used of the territory of the Pisaeans by Stesichorus,⁷ and of Euboea by Euripides.⁸

A fragment of Aristotle's *Thessalian Constitution* tells us that Aleuas, tagos and legislator of the Thessalians in the sixth century B.C., divided the πόλις into lots.⁹ Because it is clear that the object which was divided up into lots will not have been a polis but Thessaly and because, in addition, it has been believed that the term πόλις could not

¹ *Iliad* II 677: 'Κῶν Εὐρυπύλοιο πόλιν', XIV 230: 'Ἀῆμον... πόλιν θείοιο Θόαντος'.

² v. i., pp. 359–360.

³ v. s., pp. 159–160.

⁴ Hesiod, *Scut.* 380–382: 'Πᾶσα δὲ Μυρμιδόνων τε πόλις κλειτή τ' Ἴαωλκός | ἼΑρνη τ' ἦδ' Ἑλική | Ἀνθεία τε ποιήεσσα | μεγάλη ἴαχον'.

⁵ Pindar, *I. V* (IV), 48: 'πόλις Αἴαντος'.

⁶ Aeschylus, *Eum.* 77: 'ὕπερ τε πόντον καὶ περιρρύτας πόλεις'.

⁷ Strabo VIII 356: 'Στησίχορον δὲ καλεῖν πόλιν τὴν χώραν Πίσαν καλουμένην'.

⁸ Euripides, *Ion* 294: '<Εἰβοί > Ἀθηῶν' ἔστι τις γείτων πόλις'; fr. 658 TGF = Strabo VIII 356: 'οἱ γὴν ἔχουσι Εἰβοῖδα πρόσχωρον πόλιν'.

⁹ Aristotle fr. 498 Rose = *Schol. (Vat.) Eur. Rhesus* 307: 'διελὼν δὲ τὴν πόλιν Ἀλεῦας ἔταξε κατὰ τὸν κλῆρον παρέχειν...'

have the meaning of a country, various emendations have been put forward: τὰς πόλεις,¹ τὴν πολιτείαν,² τὴν πολι<τικὴν> (γῆν).³ The two first emendations do not correspond to the meaning of the passage which requires a word signifying 'territory'. The third satisfies this requirement but is not necessary. This was proved by one of the scholars who supported this emendation when he pointed out that the word πόλις did, in some ancient passages, mean 'the territory'.⁴ However, more careful study of the texts we cited above shows that the word πόλις there has a more specialized meaning: 'the territory of a particular state'. This then is the meaning of the word πόλις in this excerpt of Aristotle.⁵ It should be noted that the word πόλις also means Thessaly in Polyaeus.⁶

The word has the same meaning beyond any doubt in a passage of Plato which concerns the search for a suitable site for a military camp.⁷ It occurs again in passages about exile or return from exile.⁸

9. ΠΟΛΙΣ: A COUNTRY IN GENERAL

The term πόλις evolved beyond the meaning of 'territory' and acquired the wider meaning of 'a country in general'. Euripides used it of the

¹ Rose, ad loc.

² E.Schwartz, cited by H. T. Wade-Gery.

³ E.Meyer, *Theopompus Hellenika* (1909) 222 n 1; H.T.Wade-Gery, *JHS* 44 (1924) 58 n 16; U.Kahrstedt, *NGWG* (1924) 130 n 1; M.Sordi, *La lega tessala fino ad Alessandro* (1958) 319 n 4.

⁴ Wade-Gery, op. cit. (referred to *Schol. Pind. Pyth.*, IV 346, *Lysias* VI 6, Aristotle, *Pol.* III 3, Hesychius, s.v. πόλις, and Stesichorus, loc. cit.)

⁵ J.A.O.Larsen, *Greek Federal States* (1968) 17 rejected the corrections we referred to earlier and gives the *polis* the meaning of 'state'. It is, however, clear that it was not the state which was divided by lot but the land belonging to the state.

⁶ Polyaeus VIII 44: 'ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὴν πόλιν Θεσσαλίαν προσηγόρευσαν'.

⁷ Plato, *Resp.* 415 D: 'ἐλθόντες δὲ θεάσασθαι τῆς πόλεως ὅπου κάλλιστον στρατοπεδεύσασθαι'.

⁸ Plato, *Gorgias* 457 B and 460 A: 'ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων', 460 A: 'ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως'; Philochorus 328 *FGrH* 30 = *Lex. Cantabr.*, 354, 1 N, Claudius Casilo (Miller, *Mélanges* 398), *Lex. Demosth.*, *Aristocr.* 27: 'τοῦτον ἔδει...μεταστῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἔτη δέκα (ὑστερον δὲ ἐγένοντο πέντε), καρπούμενον τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐντὸς Γεραιστοῦ τοῦ Εὐβοίας ἀκρωτηρίου'; Maiandrios 491 *FGrH* 1 = *IvP*, 37 (38) line 110 :

Peloponnese, Aristophanes of Sicily, and Pollux tells us that this use of the word was customary in poetic language.¹ Prose writers did not lag behind. Lysias described Sicily, Italy, the Peloponnese, Thessaly, the Hellespont, Ionia and Cyprus as *πόλεις*; Plato used the word *πόλις* of Sicily; a scholiast of Pindar of Thessaly. The lexicographer Hesychius has an entry *πόλιν* which he explains as ‘χώραν’.² This usage was not confined to literature but is also found in a decree which was recorded by Craterus, in which Egypt and Libya are described as *πόλεις*.³

10. ΠΟΛΙΣ: A SOCIAL CLASS

The ancient *πόλεις* were more or less frequently at war. This picture inspired Plato to transfer the term *πόλις* from the states to social classes which, within the state made up groups at least as hostile to each other as were the *πόλεις*.⁴ Aristotle followed the example of

‘κατελθεῖν εἰς τὰμ πόλιν, ἐκπολιορκηθέντος τοῦ τυράννου τοῦ ἐν ταῖ [πόλει]; Plutarch, *Them.* 23, 1: ‘ἐκπεσόντος δὲ τῆς πόλεως αὐτοῦ’.

¹ Euripides 730 *TGF*² = Pollux VIII 27: ‘τοῖς γὰρ ποιηταῖς καὶ τὰς χώρας λέγουσι πόλεις οὐ προσεκτέον ὡς Εὐριπίδης ἐν Τημενίδαις : ἅπασα Πελοπόννησος εὐτυχεῖ πόλις’; Aristophanes, *Pax* 250–251: ‘Ἰὼ Σικελία, καὶ σὺ δ’ ὡς ἀπόλλυσαι. | ΤΡ. Οἶα πόλις τάλαινα διακνασθήσεται’.

² Lysias VI 6: ‘Ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ διώχληκε πόλεις πολλὰς ἐν τῇ ἀποδημίᾳ, Σικελίαν, Ἰταλίαν, Πελοπόννησον, Θετταλίαν, Ἑλλήσποντον, Ἰωνίαν, Κύπρον’; Plato, *Epist.* VII 334 C: ‘μὴ δουλοῦσθαι Σικελίαν... μηδὲ ἄλλην πόλιν’; *Schol. Pind. Pyth.* IV 246: ‘πεποίηκε δι’ αὐτῶν (= τῶν Τεμπῶν) ἐπιτρέχειν τὸν ποταμόν, πρότερον διὰ μέσης τῆς πόλεως ρέοντα καὶ πολλὰ τῶν χωρίων διαφθείροντα’; Hesychius, ‘πόλιν τὴν χώραν’.

³ Craterus 342 *FGrH* 18 = *Schol. T II.*, XIV 230: ‘Αἴγυπτον καὶ Λιβύην τῶ πόλεε’.

⁴ Plato, *Resp.* 422 E – 423 A: ‘ἐκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πάμπολλαι, ἀλλ’ οὐ πόλις, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων. δύο μὲν κἂν ὄτιοῦν ἢ, πολεμία ἀλλήλαιν, ἢ μὲν πενήτων, ἢ δὲ πλουσίων· τούτων δ’ ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ πάνυ πολλαί, αἷς ἐὰν μὲν ὡς μιᾷ προσφέρῃ, παντός ἂν ἁμάρτοις, ἐὰν δὲ ὡς πολλαῖς, διδοῦς τὰ τῶν ἐτέρων τοῖς ἑτέροις χρήματα τε καὶ δυνάμεις ἢ καὶ αὐτούς, ξυμμάχοις μὲν αἰεὶ πολλοῖς χρήσει, πολεμίοις δ’ ὀλίγοις’, 462 A-B: ‘Ἐχομεν οὖν τι μείζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν αὐτὴν διασπᾷ καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντι μᾶς’, 551 D: ‘Ἐν μὲν δὴ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον ὀλιγαρχία ἂν ἔχοι ἁμάρτημα. Φαίνεται. Τί δέ; τόδε ἄρα τι τούτου ἔλαττον; τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ μὴ μίαν, ἀλλὰ δύο ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν, τὴν μὲν πενήτων, τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκοῦντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἰεὶ ἐπιβουλευόντας ἀλλήλοισ’.

Plato.¹ It should be noted that the term *ἔθνος* had a parallel development of meaning.

11. ΠΟΛΙΣ: THE LEGAL EMBODIMENT OF PUBLIC LAW AS DISTINCT FROM THE PHYSICAL INDIVIDUALS, THE CITIZENS

We come now to the last meaning which the term *πόλις* acquired later than all the others and indeed after the demotion of the sovereign Greek *poleis* to the level of municipalities subordinate to the Roman Empire. Official documents from Gythium and Messene drawn up in the first century B.C. provide us with examples of the distinction of the *polis* from its citizens.² The object denoted here by the term *πόλις* is no longer identified with the citizens as in earlier times,³ but is thought of as a legal personage separated from them. This semantic development may have taken place under the influence of the Roman conception of 'state'.

A SYNOPSIS OF THE CONCLUSIONS

1. The original meaning of the term *πόλις*, 'citadel, stronghold' produced the second: 'settlement below a citadel'.⁴ The extension of the meaning of the term *πόλις* from 'citadel' to 'settlement below a citadel' took place while settlements so called differed from villages only in that they were protected by a citadel.⁵ The earliest evidence for the meaning 'a state with its centre in a settlement below a citadel' is exemplified in

¹Aristotle, *Pol.* 1264 a 25–29: 'ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πόλει δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ὑπεναντίας ἀλλήλαις. Ποιεῖ γὰρ (= Socrates) τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἷον φρουρούς, τοὺς δὲ γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας. Ἐγκλήματα δὲ καὶ δίκαι καὶ ὄσα ἄλλα ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν φησὶ κακὰ πάνθ' ὑπάρξει καὶ τούτοις', 1316 b 6–7: 'ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικὴν, πλουσιῶν καὶ πενήτων'.

² *IG*, V 1, no. 1144 line 17: 'τάν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς πολίτας'. no. 1146 line 24: 'τᾶς πρὸς τάν π[ό]λιν καὶ τοὺς πολίτας εὐνοίας'. no. 1432 line 23: 'τάν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς κατοικοῦντας αὐτάν'.

³ v. s., p. 191ff.

⁴ v. s., pp. 156ff.

⁵ v. s., p. 157.

the *Odyssey*,¹ which probably took shape in the second part of the eighth century. This shift of meaning, however, presumably occurred in Attica as early as the second half of the eleventh century and the first half of the tenth, when a state of Mycenaean type was replaced by states of a new type, identified by its reference to a polis-settlement.² The evidence which shows the *polis* to be compatible with every form of government, including monarchy, is much more abundant and older than that which expresses the idea that *polis* and tyranny are mutually exclusive. The evidence for the first viewpoint starts with the *Odyssey*,³ that for the second only in the fourth century B.C.⁴ It is thus clear that the concept of the *polis* was formulated without the intervention of constitutional criteria and that it continued to encompass monarchic systems of government, without any apparent clash, right into the Classical period. The exclusion of tyranny from the idea of the *polis* came about only slowly and is charted in only a very few sources.

2. The use of the term *πόλις* to denote a type of state led to a derivative use of the same term meaning 'the territory of a state'; this appears as early as the *Iliad*.⁵

3. From the use of the term *πόλις* to denote a settlement below a stronghold evolved its use to denote the inhabitants of such a settlement. The oldest occurrence is in the *Iliad*.⁶ A parallel association of ideas caused the term *πόλις* to acquire the meaning of 'the human base of a polis-state', 'a community related to a polis-state'. This meaning, too, is first attested in Homeric passages.⁷

4. A further step led to the restriction of the meaning of *polis* from 'community' to 'citizens'.⁸

¹ v. s., pp. 159–160.

² v. i., pp. 325–329, 411ff, 455–456. One would presume as well that in regions where communities of invaders or refugees or colonists founded polis-settlements as early as the eleventh and the tenth centuries, but where the circumstances demanding the formation of a state arose only later, the term *πόλις* was used meanwhile for denoting these new pre-statal communities which differed from the old ones, the village-communities and the ethnos-communities or tribes.

³ v. s., pp. 175ff, 181–183.

⁴ v. s., pp. 184–185.

⁵ v. s., pp. 205–206.

⁶ v. s., pp. 185–186.

⁷ v. s., pp. 186ff.

⁸ v. s., pp. 191ff.

5. From this derived the sense of 'the assembly' which was very widespread and of long duration.¹

6. Other uses stemmed from the use of *πόλις* to mean 'citizens': 'political rights' and 'public life' from the fourth century B.C.²

7. In the fifth century the term *πόλις* began to be used where the term *ἔθνος* should really have been employed.³

8. The preceding shift which abolished the bounds between the concepts of polis-state and ethnos-state led inevitably to the elevation of the term *πόλις* from the level of a type of state to the level of the genus 'state'. This elevation appears in the course of the fourth century B.C.⁴

9. Earlier, from the fifth century, there is evidence for the promotion of the term from the level of 'the territory of a state of the *polis* type' to the level of 'territory in general'.⁵

The changes in meaning which occurred are shown in tabular form.

The history of the meanings of the term *polis* may be summed up in two phases. The first phase ranges from the initial meaning of the term, 'naturally strong site, citadel' to the meaning 'kind of state'. The semantic changes thereafter occurred within the conceptual field of 'state and politics'. Behind each shift of meaning lies the perception by the Greeks of some semantic relationship between two notions. Thus, the citadel specified in their mind a category of settlements; then this category of settlements specified a category of societies, initially stateless and eventually statal; from the same category of settlements the use of the term *polis* was extended to its settlers, while from the category of society it came to describe its members and from the category of state it passed to its citizens and its territory; from the citizens it expanded to the popular assembly where citizens met, to the political rights which were enjoyed by the citizens, and to the public life which was conducted by the citizens; the extension of the term *polis* to

¹ v. s., pp. 197–203.

² v. s., p. 204.


³ v. s., pp. 172–175.

⁴ v. s., p. 185.

⁵ v. s., pp. 206–207.

encompass *ethne* and *koina* was the result of the observation by the Greeks that *poleis*, *ethne* and *koina* had in common the features of the state. All these shifts of meaning in the field of 'state and politics' are intelligible by us because the Greeks perceived the *polis* in the terms by which we understand the state.

THE MEANINGS OF 'POLIS'



Chapter Three

EXCURSUS ON THE ANCIENT DEFINITIONS OF THE *POLIS*

In the preceding excursus we listed the meanings expressed by the term *πόλις* in various passages written by ancient authors. These meanings were inferred from their context. None of these passages gave us a single definition or description of the term *πόλις*.

However, the *polis* was dealt with by many ancient authors. Amongst numerous passages of ancient literature are to be found ideas on the origins of the *polis*, on its usefulness and convenience, on its structure, on the productive and social forces that functioned within it, on its government, and also critical evaluations of existing *poleis* and blueprints for ideal ones. But it is only in Aristotle's *Politics* that we possess a systematic study – ontological, phenomenological and axiological – of the historical *polis* as well as the author's conception of the ideal one. The most interesting passages from the point of view of our present enquiry are: (a) a number of attempts by Aristotle to define the *polis* and also some approaches by the same to its character through discussions of the parts of the *polis* (*koinonai* of inferior rank, citizens, professional groups or social classes), of the relations between *polis* and constitution, and of the creation of the *polis*; (b) some versions of Stoic definitions of the *polis* which came down to us through later authors.

In this chapter, therefore, we shall devote ourselves mainly to an exposition and critique of the suggestions made by Aristotle on the meaning and content of the polis-state; and at the end of it we shall append the Stoic definitions and also those ideas that foreshadow the corresponding ideas in Aristotle.

I. THE CONCEPT OF *POLIS* IN ARISTOTLE

The *Politics* has not reached us in a properly finished shape. Various anomalies in its construction, together with other indications, have cast doubts on the order of the books (=chapters) in the manuscript tradition. Most scholars agree that the seventh and eighth books should be the fourth and fifth, displacing the fourth, fifth and sixth books so that they become respectively the sixth, seventh and eighth (I, II, III, VII, VIII, IV, V, VI). Some scholars go even further, placing the sixth before the fifth (I, II, III, VII, VIII, IV, VI, V). The traditional order of the books is sometimes attributed to Aristotle and sometimes to those who published his works.

On the basis of these observations, theories have been formulated concerning the genesis of the *Politics*. Thus it has been maintained that the seventh and eighth books, in which the ideal *polis* is discussed, are older than the fourth, fifth and sixth books, whose subject is actual constitutions because Aristotle first followed the example of Plato's *Republic* and then turned to the study of the constitutions of actual *poleis* which presupposes the existence of books IV–VI. It has also been suggested that book I was the last to be written in order to serve as the introduction to the entire work. According to an extreme theory, the *Politics* were made up of five separate essays: (1) on the household (I); (2) on the ideal republic (II); (3) on the *polis*, the citizens, and the classification of states (III); (4) on defective forms of government (IV, V, VI); (5) on the perfect *polis* (VII–VIII).

In addition to the work's problematic genesis, there are also a number of obscurities and incomplete formulations as well as inconsistencies which sometimes verge on the contradictory.

These observations give rise to the suspicion that Aristotle did not check through the text before it was published and that he perhaps left the *Politics* in the form it had had as lectures to his students.

The questions of the order of the books in the *Politics*, of the genesis of the work and of the participation (or not) of Aristotle in its publication are not of immediate relevance to our problem, which is the concept of *polis* (and, attendant upon it, of the citizen and the constitution) according to Aristotle. It is, however, useful for the reader to know that (a) the order of the passages we shall examine in particular books does not correspond to a development of ideas within

a work prepared for publication by its author; (b) obscurities and other incomplete, inconsequential and contradictory thoughts are not found only in the passages under examination but also in other parts of the *Politics*.

A. DEFINITIONS OF THE *ΠΟΛΙΣ*

Aristotle defined the concept of the *polis* in many passages of the *Politics* and in twenty ways. At first sight, these definitions could be divided into two groups, depending on whether the *polis* is defined as *κοινωνία*¹ or as *πλήθος*². In reality there are more groups because the terms *κοινωνία* and *πλήθος* are employed with more than one meaning and in some definitions appear together.

The meanings of 'κοινωνία'

In the passages of the *Politics* in which the *polis* is defined as a *κοινωνία* the latter term is sometimes accompanied by an objective genitive (*κοινωνία πολιτείας*, *κοινωνία τοῦ εὖ ζῆν*, *κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους*)³ and sometimes stands alone.⁴ In the first case the term *κοινωνία* quite clearly means participation (in the *πολιτεία*, in the *εὖ ζῆν*, in the perfect and self-sufficient life). In the second case the term *κοινωνία* describes some association of men.

The Romans translated the word *κοινωνία* by *societas*, a term corresponding to *ἑταιρεία* (*ἑταῖρος=socius*) and which, like *κοινωνία*, meant 'an association of persons aiming at the same goal'. The English render it with the words *community*, *partnership*, *fellowship*, *union*; the French make use of the words *association*, *société*, *collectivité*, *communauté*; the Germans employ the words *Gemeinschaft* and *Verein*. It should also be said that the same translator or commentator may often use more than one of these renderings.

Aristotle himself did not define the content of this term in any of the passages in which he used it. Since, however, it is not possible to

¹ v. i., pp. 220–229, 232–233.

² v. i., pp. 229–233.

³ v. i., pp. 227–229.

⁴ v. i., pp. 220–226.

understand Aristotle's definitions of the *polis* as *κοινωνία* without knowing the content of the latter term, we shall attempt to define it by reference to the context.¹ This will permit an understanding of the extent of that concept together with some of its sub-divisions and specific elements.

1. *The extent of the concept of the word 'κοινωνία'; types of κοινωνία.*

Aristotle classified under the concept *κοινωνία* the concepts *συμμαχία*² (alliance), *πόλις*³ (that kind of *κοινωνία* which he also often calls *πολιτική κοινωνία*⁴), *κώμη*⁵ (village), *γένος*⁶ (clan), *οικία*⁷ (household), *φυλέται*⁸ (members of a *phyle*, tribe), *φράτερες*⁹ (members of a phratry), *δημόται*¹⁰ (those who are enrolled in a *δήμος*, community), *θιασῶται*¹¹ (members of a group who render worship to a god), *ὄργεῶνες*¹² (members of a religious group), *ἐρανισταί*¹³ (members of an association called *ἔρανος*), *συστρατιῶται*¹⁴ (comrades in arms associating for victory and for the profits of warfare), *σύμπλοι*¹⁵ or *πλωτῆρες*¹⁶ (fellow-sailors associating for the profit of seafaring for the sake of trade), *συναπόδημοι*¹⁷ (fellow-travellers). Aristotle also used the

¹ Similar work was done by W.L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle I* (1887) 41-43. cf. the differences and similarities with the remarks which follow.

² *Pol.* 1280 b 9.

³ v. i., pp. 220ff.

⁴ *Eth. Nic.* 1129 b 19, 1160 a 9, 21, 23, 28. *Pol.* 1152 a 7, 1253 a 38, 1260 b 27, 1261 a 38, 1266 b 15, 1272 b 14, 1278 b 25, 1279 b 17, 1281 a 3 and 5, 1295 b 23 and 35, 1299 a 16, 1324 a 16, 1326 b 9, 1332 b 11.

⁵ v. i., pp. 221-222, 243, 245.

⁶ v. i., p. 227. cf. Steph. Byz., s. v. *πάτρα*.

⁷ v. i., p. 216.

⁸ *Eth. Nic.* 1160 a 19. cf. Steph. Byz., s. v. *φυλή*.

⁹ *Eth. Nic.* 1160 a 19.

¹⁰ *Eth. Eud.* 1241 b 26.

¹¹ *Eth. Nic.* 1160 a 20. The relative passage appears to be an interpolation; it is nevertheless accepted as a rendering of Aristotelian thought.

¹² *Eth. Eud.* 1241 b 26.

¹³ This term appears in the interpolation noted above.

¹⁴ *Eth. Nic.* 1159 b 28, 1160 a 17.

¹⁵ *Eth. Nic.* 1159 b 28, 1161 b 14.

¹⁶ *Eth. Nic.* 1160 a 15.

¹⁷ *Pol.* 1263 a 17.

term *κοινωνία* of groups which he did not specify.¹ Smaller *κοινωνία* were made up of two partners: husband and wife before they had any children, a physician and a farmer,² seller and buyer, two sailors and so on. Physician and farmer, seller and buyer constituted associations described by Aristotle as *κοινωνία ἀλλακτικαί*³ (for interchange of services). Under the label of *κοινωνία χρηματιστικά*⁴ (profit-making associations) are to be understood those consisting of fellow-soldiers, fellow-sailors, merchants, etc.

2. Characteristics common to all 'κοινωνία'.

In every *κοινωνία* we meet *δίκαιον* (right) and *φιλία*⁵ (friendship, solidarity), common end or interest.⁶ Their members are described by Aristotle as *κοινωνοί, κοινωνοῦντες*,⁷ that is participants.

3. The common characteristics of the 'polis' and the household.

Only Man of all the animals has the perception of good and evil, or right and wrong. Man's ability to appreciate this moral difference is a factor in the formation of *κοινωνία* and *πόλεις*.⁸

4. Differences between *κοινωνία*.

(a) The *polis* or the *πολιτική κοινωνία* embraces all the other *κοινωνία*: the villages,⁹ the clans,¹⁰ the *συστρατιῶται*, the *φυλῆται*, the *δημόται*,¹¹ and the others.¹² The clans include families.¹³ (b) The *polis*

¹ *Eth. Nic.* 1132 b 32, 1133 a 17 ff.

² *Eth. Eud.* 1241 b 27.

³ *Eth. Nic.* 1159 b 29; *Pol.* 1276 b 7, 1325 a 9, 1328 a 25.

⁴ *Eth. Nic.* 1133a 17.

⁵ *Eth. Nic.* 1159 b 26ff, 1161 a 26ff and 32ff, 1161 b 5ff; *Eth. Eud.* 1234 b.23, 1241 b.11ff, 1242 a 1, 6ff, 22, 26, 27; *Pol.* 1280 b 35-40, 1295 b 22-25.

⁶ v. i., p. 220.

⁷ *Pol.* 1260 b 42, 1264 a 12, 1276 b 21, 1328 a 26.

⁸ *Pol.* 1253 a 16-18.

⁹ v. s., p. 216.

¹⁰ v. s., p. 216.

¹¹ *Eth. Nic.* 1160 a 19.

¹² *Eth. Nic.* 1160 a 8-9, 21, 28-29.

¹³ v. i., pp. 227ff, 244ff, 278ff.

or the *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία* aspires to general and higher aims: self-sufficiency, the εὐ ζῆν.¹ The aims of the *κοινωνία* which are part of the *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία* are restricted and localized; the *πλωτῆρες* seek gain; the *συστρατιῶται* aim for victory or loot; the *δημόται* and the *φυλέται* offer sacrifices to the gods in common and organize festivals.² (c) Families result from the union of a man and a woman, of a master and a slave.³ The villages and the clans are each made up of families; the *poleis* embrace the villages, while at the same time they unite men of different social standing as well as rulers and ruled.⁴ Unlike the family, the villages, the clans and the *poleis*, all of which are made up of unequal and dissimilar people, the *συναπόδημοι* and the partners in *κοινωνία ἀλλακτικαί* or *χρηματιστικαί* are equals. Nevertheless, the latter have different, complementary needs. (d) The families, the clans, the villages and the *poleis* come into being naturally – from the tendency of the dissimilar to unite.⁵ Because they are born naturally, these *κοινωνία* are not fortuitous.⁶ By contrast the *κοινωνία* formed for the sake of profit or for exchange are accidental. (e) In the *Politics* Aristotle was concerned at length with the administration of the *polis*. Furthermore, he noticed that the family had at its head the husband-father, whom he compared to a king.⁷ He also taught that royal authority sprang from the authority of the head of the family,⁸ through the headship of the village or the clan which were formed by the development of families and in their turn formed the *poleis*.⁹ From other sources we learn that the *φυλή*, the *δήμος*, the *θίασος* and the *ἔρανος* also had some administrative organization. This element is missing from other *κοινωνία*, for example those of the *συναπόδημοι* and those formed for the profit or the exchange of services. (f) Let us add, because Aristotle himself does not say it, that the *poleis*, the villages, the clans, the families, the tribes, the phratries and the demes

¹ v. i., p. 220

² *Eth. Nic.* 1160 a 21.

³ v. i., pp. 220–221, 244ff, 278ff.

⁴ v. i., pp. 247–260.

⁵ v. i., pp. 220–221, 244ff, 278ff.

⁶ Aristotle clearly says of the *polis*: ‘πλήθος οὐ τυχόν’. v. i., pp. 231–232.

⁷ *Pol.* 1252 b 20.

⁸ *Pol.* 1252 b 17–23.

⁹ v. i., p. 220ff.

all appear as stable unions and with life-long partners, whereas the *θίασοι* and the *ἔρανοι* were less stable groups, and the partners of businesses and the *συναπόδημοι* came together as circumstances dictated and for short periods of time. (g) It is also worth noting that Aristotle tacitly excluded partners of businesses and *συναπόδημοι* from *κοινωνίαι* when expressed the idea that all *κοινωνίαι* had in common *δίκαιον* and *φιλία*.

It thus seems clear that Aristotle wavered between two concepts of *κοινωνία*, a broader and a narrower. The broader embraced combinations of people in any kind of inter-relationship, not excluding temporary and non-structured ones.¹ The narrower concept was limited to associations of partners who were tied by friendship (solidarity), had some common interests, pursued some common end, and obeyed common rules. The latter concept even covers associations of *θιασῶται*, *ὄργεῶνες*, *ἔρανισταί*. It is obvious that the term 'society' is quite inadequate to render either the broader or the narrower concept expressed by *κοινωνία*; 'union', 'association' and 'community' are suitable to the narrower, but misleading for the broader. In order to preserve the double connotation of *κοινωνία*, is preferable to leave it untranslated. So far as the adjective *πολιτική* in the phrase *πολιτική κοινωνία* is concerned, it is usually translated by *political*. This translation, too, is misleading because political suggests modern ideas very remote from the original; *πολιτική κοινωνία* is indeed the kind of *κοινωνία* which the *polis* is. So it is preferable to use the Greek words.

The meanings of 'πλήθος'

The term *πλήθος* appears as the *genus proximum* of the concept *polis* in five definitions offered by Aristotle. In another definition *πλήθος* is described as a condition for the existence of the *πολιτική κοινωνία* or *πόλις*; lastly there is a definition in which the *genus proximum* of the *polis* is referred to as *κοινωνία πλήθους*.²

The term *πλήθος* does not carry the same meaning in each of these

¹ cf. J. Tricot, *Aristote, La Politique*, I (1962) 211 n 1.

² v. i., pp. 229–233.

concepts; it has three: (1) 'multiplicity',¹ (2) 'totality or composite whole of citizens',² (3) 'a sufficient number of citizens'.³

It should be noted that Aristotle also used the term *πλήθος* to denote the citizens in a *πολιτεία*, that is, in a moderate democracy. This is in fact the meaning of the term *πλήθος* in a passage of the *Politics* in which the *πολιτεία* is defined as the kind of constitution in which 'the *plethos* governs the state with a view to the common advantage' (1279 a 37). Cf. the interpretation given by Hesychius in his gloss 'στρατός: αὶ τάξεις τοῦ πλήθους', that is, the battle formations into which the citizens under arms were divided.

THE *POLIS* DEFINED AS A *KOINΩNIA*

1 'Every polis is a *κοινωνία* of some kind and every *κοινωνία* is established with a view to some good; for mankind always acts in order to obtain that which it thinks good. So, if all *κοινωνίαι* aim at some good, the polis or *πολιτική κοινωνία*, which is the highest of all, and includes all the others, aims at the highest good and to a greater degree than any other.' (1252 a 1ff).

In addition to the *genus proximum*, *κοινωνία*, this definition of the *polis* contains three elements of the *differentia specifica*; a *κοινωνία* which (a) is supreme or of greater authority than the others, (b) contains all the others, (c) aims at the highest good. This kind of *κοινωνία* is not only called a *πόλις* but also a *πολιτική κοινωνία*. This last term, which is also found in other passages of Aristotle,⁴ summarizes the preceding definition since this too has the concept *κοινωνία* as the *genus proximum* and the adjective *πολιτική* functions as the *differentia specifica*, limiting the extent of *κοινωνία* to *πόλις* alone.

2 A little later the *polis* is analysed into its constituent parts. The simplest are the families; between the families and the *poleis* come the

¹ v. i., pp. 229–230.

² v. i., pp. 230–231.

³ v. i., p. 231.

⁴ v. s., p. 216.

villages.¹ At this point the second definition of the *polis* is stated (1252 b 15ff), the general lines of which might be freely rendered: the *πόλις* is a *κοινωνία* made up of villages; it is a final and/or fully-constituted *κοινωνία* which achieves the maximum of self-sufficiency; it is formed to ensure the life (τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν) of its members, but it also brings about their happiness (οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν). Every *polis* is natural (φύσει ἐστίν) like the *κοινωνίαι* which preceded it (αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι), that is the families and the villages. Indeed, the *polis* is the ultimate goal (τέλος) of these *κοινωνίαι*. The nature (of every organism) goes along with its destiny. Thus the nature, for example of a man, of a horse or of a family is the state of the organism after the completion of its formation (τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης). The ultimate reason for, and at the same time the ultimate destiny of, any one thing is the ultimate good to which it aspires (ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον). This is also self-sufficiency. It thus appears that the *polis* is natural and that man is, of his nature, a political animal.² The man outside a *polis* – for reasons which are natural, not fortuitous – is a being either lower than, or higher than man.

Compared with the preceding definition of the *polis* the second has a *differentia specifica* with more elements. Some of them are developments of the three elements of the *differentia specifica* of the first definition: (1) The declaration that the *polis* embraces all the other *κοινωνίαι* becomes clearer with the mention of the villages as component parts of the *polis*, and of the families as component parts of the village. Nevertheless, as we saw, it is stated in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that the *polis* embraces other *κοινωνίαι*, expressly named.³ (2) The opinion that the *polis* is the highest form of *κοινωνία* was developed with the declaration that the *polis* is a final and/or perfected *κοινωνία*, and also with the explanation that this property of the *polis* is connected with the achievement of the highest possible degree of self-sufficiency. (3) The supreme good, stated to be the aim of the *polis* in the first definition, is defined in the second as happiness (the εὖ ζῆν).

¹ On the elements which constitute a polis, v.i., pp. 244–268.

² W.Kullmann, *Gymnasium* 90 (1983) 459–465, maintained that ‘ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον’ means ‘man is by nature a social animal’.

³ v. s., pp. 217–219.

The three elements of the first definition are developed in the first sentences of the second. Thereafter a new element is introduced: the *polis* exists 'φύσει'. According to the context, the nature of every organism is its destiny or, otherwise expressed, its completion.¹ But the destiny of an organism, or its ultimate purpose, or the reason for its existence, is also its supreme good; this is its self-sufficiency. Thus we are offered the equation self-sufficiency = εὖ ζῆν by means of the identification of both with the supreme good. The same concept of the nature of an organism is to be understood in the famous Aristotelian sentence in the *Physics*: 'τὸ τῆ γενέσει ὕστερον τῆ φύσει πρότερον' (what comes later in its own genesis precedes in the order of nature).² The term φύσει in the phrases ἄρχον καὶ ἀρχόμενον φύσει, ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπότην φύσει, φύσει δοῦλον, φύσει διώριστα τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον, τὸ φύσει ἄρχον, κατὰ φύσιν ἔοικεν ἢ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι (which Aristotle uses in expanding his theory that the *polis* was made up of villages and the villages of families), must be similarly interpreted 'according to their natural predestination'. The only possible exception is the phrase φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι (1252 a 29) meaning 'to desire is a natural instinct'.

The idea that man is φύσει a political animal goes beyond the limits of our subject. But in another passage of the *Politics*, it is followed by a brief exposition of the theory of the birth of human *κοινωνία* right up to the *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία* under the influence of common needs and of the shared impetus towards the ζῆν καλῶς which is the ultimate goal (τέλος) of every *κοινωνία* (1278 b 19ff).

3 Following the declaration that right constitutions are those which aim at the common advantage while all those that serve the interests of the rulers (one or more) are deviant (1279 a 17ff) comes the comment 'because they are despotic while the *polis* is the *κοινωνία* of free men'. (1279 a 22).

Here too the *polis* is subordinated to the genus *κοινωνία*. The 'free

¹ The opinion of some (e.g. W.D.Ross, *Aristotle* 5th edn (1949) 239, J.Tricot, op. cit. 24) that Aristotle balanced the idea that the *polis* was created naturally with the idea of the sophists that it was created artificially is contrary to the context.

² *Phys.* 261 a 14. v. i., pp. 278–280.

men' constitute the *differentia specifica*. This definition of the *polis* is narrower than the two preceding definitions, where there is no limitation on its extent. Equally, it is contrary to Aristotle's idea that slaves form part of the nub of the *polis* (the family)¹ just as it also contradicts his statement that the *polis* is made up of masters and slaves (1295 b 19).²

4 In drawing the distinction between the parts (μέρια) of the *polis* and the elements which are essential for its existence, Aristotle repeats in passing that the *polis* was subordinate to the genus *κοινωνία* (οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιάς), without adding any specification (1328 a 22–25). This statement is an incomplete definition of the *polis* as a *κοινωνία*.

5 The partners (κοινωνοί) in any kind of *κοινωνία*, Aristotle goes on, must have something in common, irrespective of whether they shared in it equally or not; for example, land, food and other similar things. When one of the two inter-connected things is the means and the other the end, however, neither obeys the above rule. For example the builder and the house he builds have nothing in common; quite simply the builder's craft exists for the sake of the building. Hence the *poleis* have need of ownership, but ownership is no part of the *polis*. Aristotle then states that living beings can be owned (he means slaves). Immediately afterwards he stresses that 'the *polis* is a kind of *κοινωνία* of ὅμοιοι whose aim is the better life'. He then identifies the best possible life with happiness and observes that some men share in this completely, others to a lesser extent while some never share in it at all. Thus different social classes are created and this leads to the shaping of different kinds of constitutions (1328 a 25–b 1).

The definition of the *polis* in this passage as a *κοινωνία τῶν ὁμοίων* is usually cited and interpreted out of context; but this is not without

¹ v. i., pp. 270ff.

² On the contrary, Aristotle did not accept the existence of *poleis* made up entirely of slaves. This view is justified by a passage expressing the contention that the slaves do not share in happiness and do not live as they wish (1280 a 32) and again in another passage by the contention that the *polis* is self-sufficient while the slave is not (1291 a 9). Aristotle is correct in his standpoint, but infelicitous in his arguments; a *polis* of slaves cannot exist because there is no slave without a master.

relevance to the proper understanding of the definition. The term *ἄλλοιοι* may at first sight be interpreted in its political sense. It is known that at Sparta this term denoted the citizens who enjoyed full rights as opposed to those described as *ὑπομείονες*;¹ Aristotle also testifies to this (1306 b 30). But this interpretation of the term *ἄλλοιοι* conflicts with the context in which it is set, which suggests a different sense. The following facts should be noted: (a) before defining the *polis* as *κοινωνία τῶν ἄλλοιων* Aristotle observes that the *κοινωνοί* of every *κοινωνία* must have something in common even if it is not shared equally; (b) after the phrase *κοινωνία τῶν ἄλλοιων* and still within the definition he adds the statement that this *κοινωνία* has as its aim the most perfect life possible which is explained later as happiness; (c) he goes on to say that it is possible for some men to participate completely in this happiness, while others participate to a lesser extent or not at all. It seems therefore that the idea which Aristotle is expressing is that just as in every *κοινωνία* the *κοινωνοί* share something in common, even if they share it unequally, so in the particular *κοινωνία* which is the *polis* there are *κοινωνοί* who share unequally in something that is common to all of them, happiness. Thus the similarity between the *ἄλλοιοι* is not equality, but participation in the enjoyment of happiness. Who then are the people who in the type of *κοινωνία* which is the *polis* share not equally but unequally in happiness? It would seem that they are not the full citizens because it must be understood that they share fully in happiness, but all the citizens including those who are not full ones, who would have a smaller share in happiness.

Aristotle refers also to people who do not share at all in this happiness which the *polis* ensures. From the meaning of the context we might conclude that this does not apply to the *ἄλλοιοι* or *κοινωνοί* of the *polis*.

It should be noted that elsewhere Aristotle uses the term *ἄλλοιοι* in a wider sense than that with which we are dealing: 'if the entire number of citizens were thirteen hundred, and a thousand of these were rich and they did not allow the three hundred poor a share in the government (*ἀρχή*), although they were free and *ἄλλοιοι* in other respects' (1290 a 34ff).

¹ Herodotus VII 234; Thucydides IV 40; Xenophon, *Lac. Pol.* X 7, XIII 7, *Anab.* VI 14.

In other passages, Aristotle uses the terms *ἴμοιοι* and *ἀνόμοιοι* in a political sense, leaving it to be inferred that only some *poleis* had citizens described as *ἴμοιοι* (1287 a 11ff), or even elevating the inequality of the citizens into a general rule. In one of these passages he states that no *polis* can be made up only of *ἴμοιοι* (1261 a 23); in the other says that the citizens are *ἀνόμοιοι* and it is not possible for them all to be *ἴμοιοι* (1276 b 41, 1277 a 6). This position of Aristotle (which should be compared with his criticism of Plato for the enactment of common ownership and the equalization of the citizens in the ideal Republic¹) does not contradict the idea he expresses in the definition we are discussing here. Indeed, as we have seen, in the last passages the terms *ἴμοιοι* and *ἀνόμοιοι* have a political meaning, while the term *ἴμοιοι* has no such nuance in the definition. Moreover, as we have also seen, in the context of the definition the term *ἴμοιοι* does not cover those who do not share in that happiness.

6, 7 In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle taught that virtue is a middle course. This criterion, he goes on to say in the *Politics*, applies also when one has to decide whether a *polis* or a constitution is good or bad. In the *poleis* there exist *εὖποροι σφόδρα* and *ἄποροι σφόδρα* and *μέσοι*. Since it is admitted that what is moderate and in the middle is best, it is manifest that the middle amount of goods which chance offers is the best amount to possess. Wealth and poverty give birth to moral corruption and inspire behaviour which runs contrary to the interest of the *polis*. Those who excel in strength, wealth, friends and in other goods are not willing to be governed, but know how to govern in a despotic manner; while the poor are too humble and do not know how to govern, but only how to be governed in servitude (1295 a 36–b 21). At this point Aristotle comments that it is possible for a *polis* to exist which comprises both masters and slaves, but not a *polis* made up entirely of free men who are divided into two classes, the lower of which envies the upper, which in turn despises its inferiors. This state of affairs, he says, is the opposite of *φιλία* (friendship with a connotation of solidarity) and of the *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία* because the *κοινωνία* is subordinate to *φιλία* and men are not willing to be partners

¹ v. i., pp. 226, 229, 230, 281.

(κοινωνεῖν) with their enemies, even on a journey; the polis has thus a tendency (βούλεται) to be composed as far as possible of equal and similar properties which are to be found in the middle classes (1295 b 2–1296 a 21).

This comment by Aristotle contains two definitions of the *polis*, one at the beginning and one at the end. The first has as a predicate the nouns *δοῦλοι* and *δεσπότες*, the second the adjectives *ἴσοι* and *ὄμοιοι*. Neither has the genus *κοινωνία*. This, however, is to be understood from the context. Between the two definitions, the term *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία* (which is identical with the *polis*¹) is used as the predicate of this judgement; a community of free men divided into two hostile classes is not a *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία* (= *polis*). The first definition extends the term *polis* to slaves, giving it the widest possible extent. This then is compatible with the inclusion of slaves in the family, a constituent *κοινωνία* of the *polis*.² The second definition only apparently limits the *polis* to *ἴσοι* and *ὄμοιοι*. In fact it identifies the *ἴσοι* and the *ὄμοιοι* with the citizens of middle rank; moreover it does not refer to a situation, but to a tendency.³

8 The definition of a *polis* as a *κοινωνία* is to be inferred, from a passage of the *Politics* which might be translated thus: ‘But, even supposing that it were best for the *κοινωνία* to be as united as possible, this fact does not seem to be proved by applying the formula “if all men say ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ at the same instant”, which Socrates thinks to be a sign of the polis being completely united.’ (1261 b 16ff).

The lack of a direct description of the *polis* as a kind of *κοινωνία* is made good by the fact that Aristotle while speaking of *κοινωνία* is led to mention a formula which Plato put into the mouth of Socrates with regard to the *polis*.⁴ Moreover this passage continues the discussion of the self-sufficiency of a *polis*.

¹ v. s., p. 220.

² v. i., p. 270ff.

³ E. Lévy, *Ktema* 5 (1980) 246.

⁴ Plato, *Resp.* V 462 c.

THE *POLIS* DEFINED AS THE PARTICIPATION
OF THE CITIZENS IN SOMETHING

9 In dealing with the problem of whether or not the *polis* continues to exist under tyranny or oligarchy, Aristotle comments: 'For inasmuch as a polis is a kind of *κοινωνία*, and is in fact a *κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας*.' (1276 b 1).

In the second clause the term *κοινωνία* is accompanied by a subjective genitive *πολιτῶν*, and an objective genitive *πολιτείας*. So we translate: 'the polis is in fact the participation of citizens in a government'.¹ It would seem that the meaning of the term *κοινωνία* in the second clause is projected on to the *κοινωνία* in the first clause which, were it alone, would give us one further definition of the *polis* as a *κοινωνία* and not as the participation of the citizens in something.

THE *POLIS* DEFINED AS A *KOINΩNIA*
AND AS PARTICIPATION IN SOMETHING

10, 11, 12 Amongst other remarks during his examination of the pre-conditions necessary for the existence of a *polis* Aristotle says that 'the polis is not simply the sharing (*κοινωνία*) in a common place with the aim of preventing wrong and the management of trade. These are necessary for its existence, but are not sufficient because the polis is the participation (*κοινωνία*) of individuals and of clans in the good life (*εὖ ζῆν*) with the aim of perfection and of self-sufficiency'. A little later he says: 'the end (or object) of the polis is the good life (*εὖ ζῆν*) and these are the means to that end. And the polis is the participation of clans and villages in a perfect and self-sufficient life (*ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους*), which, in our opinion, is a happy and good (virtuous, noble) life. The *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία* must then be deemed to exist for the sake of good (virtuous, noble) actions, not merely for living in common. Hence they who contribute most to such a *κοινωνία* have a larger share in the polis than those who are their equals or superiors in freedom and birth but inferiors in political

¹ cf. W.L.Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle* III (1902) 152; B.Jowett, *Aristotle's Politics* (1908) 105; H.Rackham, *Aristotle, Politics* (The Loeb Classical Library) (1923) 185. Most, however, interpret '*κοινωνία*' in this passage: 'communauté', 'community'.

virtue, and than those who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue' (1280 b 30–1281 a 8).

We have encountered the term *κοινωνία* five times. The first time it is the predicate, negative, of the term *πόλις* and is accompanied by an objective genitive *τοῦ ἐν ζῆν*. Here, therefore, *κοινωνία* means 'participation'. This meaning requires a subjective genitive, which is missing but obvious: of men. In this phrase Aristotle tells us that the *polis* is not the participation of some men in the habitation of a place. This then is not a real definition of the *polis*, because a true definition is expressed positively. Moreover, Aristotle does not fail to stress that community of place is not a component of the *polis*, but a pre-requisite.

On the second occasion the term *κοινωνία* is the predicate, this time positive, of the (omitted) term *πόλις* and is accompanied by the objective genitive *τοῦ ἐν ζῆν*, itself followed by two datives *καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι*, which function as the subjects of *κοινωνία*. Thus here too the term *κοινωνία* means 'participation'. The entire phrase says that the *polis* is the participation of households and clans in the *ἐν ζῆν*, that is, it expresses one definition of the *polis*, the tenth in our series.

The next time in the same passage the term *κοινωνία* is again the predicate of the term *πόλις*. It is accompanied by the subjective genitives *γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν* and the objective genitives *ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους*. Functionally, these correspond to the datives of the preceding phrase. There is also a correspondence of meaning although we have here *γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν*, while above we met with *οἰκίαις καὶ γένεσι*. At this point too, then, Aristotle describes the *polis* as the participation of groups of men in a good, which is here said to be the perfect and self-sufficient life. This definition may be reckoned to be the eleventh in our series.

When we meet the term *κοινωνία* in this passage for the fourth time it is accompanied by the adjective *πολιτική* in the familiar association which briefly expresses the definition of the *polis* as a *κοινωνία*.¹

Immediately thereafter the term *κοινωνία* is accompanied by the pronoun *τοιαύτη*. So once again the term refers to the *πολιτική κοινωνία*, as it is commonly accepted. But this prevents us from applying the meaning of 'state' to the term *polis* (in the genitive

¹ v. s., p. 220.

singular), which follows. If we give it this meaning, we will translate: 'those who contribute more to the πολιτική κοινωνία share more deeply in the *polis* (=the πολιτική κοινωνία)'. The tautology 'πολιτική κοινωνία (= πολιτική κοινωνία)' is removed if we interpret the term πόλις here as 'political life or public life' according to the meaning which it bears in a passage of Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution*.¹ It is therefore not another definition of the *polis* as participation.

So in the course of discussing the pre-conditions necessary for the existence of the *polis* Aristotle used the term κοινωνία in two different senses; the first, second and third with the meaning of 'participation', the fourth and fifth in conjunction with πολιτική κοινωνία, τιαύτη (=πολιτική) κοινωνία. Wherever the subjects of the participation are indicated, they are the families and the clans or the clans and the villages; wherever the objects of the participation are noted, they are the εὖ ζῆν, the perfect and self-sufficient life. The definition *polis* = 'participation' is encountered twice (nos. 10 and 11); the definition πόλις = κοινωνία which is understood in the formula πολιτική κοινωνία is encountered once (no. 12).

THE *POLIS* DEFINED AS A ΠΛΗΘΟΣ
(=MULTIPLICITY) OF CITIZENS

13 At the beginning of his criticism of the Platonic view that the ideal *polis* should acquire homogeneity through common property and more generally through the equalization of the citizens,² Aristotle comments that if homogeneity progresses beyond a certain point there will no longer be a *polis* because 'by its nature the *polis* is a πλήθος' (1261 a 18). With its continuous unification, he goes on, the *polis* will become a family and a family, if this too consolidates excessively, will become one man. He concludes with a statement we have examined earlier: the *polis* needs not only many (men) but many of unequal status.³

It is clear from the context that the term πλήθος here expresses a

¹ v. s., p. 204.

² v. s., pp. 225, 226, cf. i., pp. 230, 281.

³ v. s., p. 225.

concept opposite to that of the *μία πόλις* (a united, homogeneous *polis*) of Plato – so it has the meaning of ‘multiplicity’.

14 On the same question, Aristotle stresses that Socrates (the character of Plato’s *Republic*) was misled because he started from a mistaken presupposition. Certainly, the polis and the family must share a uniformity, but not a complete uniformity. The excessive unification of a polis will detract from its character as a polis; an intermediary stage will keep that character, but the polis will be a bad polis (1263 b 30ff). It is desirable for a polis, while being a *πλήθος* of citizens, to be made a common good for the citizens and a unity by means of education (1263 b 36ff).

Here too, as in the preceding definition of the *polis* as a *πλήθος*, the latter term derives meaning from the context; since it is placed in contrast to uniformity it must express multiplicity.

THE *POLIS* DEFINED AS A ΠΛΗΘΟΣ (TOTALITY, COMPOSITE WHOLE) OF CITIZENS

15 In a passage in which the constitution is defined as an organization ‘τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων’¹ and it is said that the polis is composite ‘ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων’ the question of what is a citizen is posed, since the polis is ‘πλήθος πολιτῶν’ (1274 b 41).

The context suggests that the *μόρια* who make up the *polis* are its citizens. So the *polis* is a composite of citizens.² This idea is in harmony with Aristotle’s view, in the context of his two preceding definitions, of the *polis* as a *πλήθος* ‘multiplicity’, a view according to which a *polis* which made excessive progress towards the unification of its citizens would cease to be a *polis*. Indeed, in this case the independent existence of the *μόρια* (citizens) would be annulled and the *polis*, from a composite whole, would become ‘one’, according to the Platonic expression, i.e. unitary, indivisible.³

¹ v. i., p. 273.

² B.Jowett, ad loc., ‘a state is composite’; H.Rackham, ad loc. ‘a collection of citizens’; J.Aubonnet (*CUF*), ad loc. ‘collectivité de citoyens’; P.Roussel, *Tribu et Cité* (1976) 40: ‘ensemble de citoyens’.

³ v. same page and supra 225, 226, 229.

The phrase *πολιτικὸν πλῆθος* which we find in two passages of the *Politics* (1288 a 13, 1327 b 18) refers to the citizens, but it does not constitute a definition of the *polis*.

THE *POLIS* DEFINED AS A ΠΛΗΘΟΣ
(=SUFFICIENT NUMBER) OF CITIZENS

16 The debate about the question of what is a citizen (the context of the preceding definition) is continued. The citizen is eventually defined as one who shares in the bodies of the *polis* deliberating about public matters and adjudicating.¹ There then follows this definition of the *polis*: ‘a πλῆθος τῶν τοιούτων sufficiently numerous to secure self-sufficiency’ (1275 b 20–21). In this context ‘a πλῆθος τῶν τοιούτων’ evidently means ‘a quantity of such persons’.

The correspondence between the preceding definition (πλήθος πολιτῶν) and this one (πλήθος τῶν τοιούτων) is illusory. The meaning of the term *πλῆθος* in this last definition is different: it is determined by the need for it to be so large that it ensures the self-sufficiency of the *polis*. The *polis* is then defined as an organism which must have a large enough number of citizens to be self-sufficient.

The quantity of citizens suitable for the ideal *polis* occupies Aristotle’s attention for the entire fourth chapter of the seventh book of the *Politics* (1325 b 41, 1326 a 6–7, 10, 12, 22, 27, 36; 1326 b 2, 7) and in a passage in the third book (1284 a 3–8); cf. a brief hint in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1170 b 29).

The term *πλῆθος* also means ‘a sufficient number’ in a passage of the *Politics* which refers not to the citizens but to the farmers (1328 b 20).

THE *POLIS* DEFINED IN SUCCESSIVE DEFINITIONS
AS A ΠΛΗΘΟΣ (=A COMPOSITE WHOLE) AND AS A ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ

17, 18 The production of food, handicrafts, and arms, the supply of money, the worship of gods and justice are the occupations (ἔργα) needed by every *polis* because it is a πλῆθος; not a fortuitous πλῆθος, but one characterized by self-sufficiency, which guarantees its

¹ v. i., p. 247.

preservation. When one of these occupations is absent, the *κοινωνία* is no longer self-sufficient (1328 b 5ff).

Here we have two successive definitions of the *polis*, the first as a *πλήθος* and the second as a *κοινωνία*. In both, self-sufficiency is noted as the *differentia specifica*.

The concept of the *πλήθος* extends beyond the notion of ‘citizens’, for the *πλήθος* would not be self-sufficient if it did not include non-citizens. The same is to be considered true of the *polis*, even before it is described as a *πλήθος*. Indeed some of the *ἔργα* needed by every *polis*, namely the production of food, crafts, worship of gods, occupied not only citizens, but also their women and children, and even the metics (in oligarchies also the persons who were recognized as citizens only in democracies).

DEFINITIONS OF THE *POLIS* IN WHICH *KOINΩNIA* AND *ΠΛΗΘΟΣ* COEXIST

19 Amongst the arguments which have been formulated against the Platonic teaching that the citizens must become similar to the point where they become as one person is this: the individual has less self-sufficiency than the family, the family less than the *polis*; but the *polis* exists when the *κοινωνία* τοῦ πλήθους is self-sufficient (1261 b 7ff).

Here the *πλήθος* would appear to mean ‘totality of the citizens’, or more simply the ‘citizens’; thus the *κοινωνία* πλήθους is equated with the *κοινωνία* πολιτῶν.¹ Essentially, then, this is a definition of the *polis* as a *κοινωνία*.

20 In the lengthy discussion of the number of citizens in the ideal *polis* Aristotle says ‘a *polis*, then, only begins to exist when it has attained a *πλήθος* sufficient for a good life (εὖ ζῆν) after the manner of the πολιτικὴ *κοινωνία*’ (1326 b 8–9).

In this passage the word *πλήθος* quite clearly means ‘amount of citizens’. Self-sufficiency as a property of the πολιτικὴ *κοινωνία* once more functions as the *differentia specifica* by means of which we may descend from the genus *κοινωνία* to the species *polis*; however, it also

¹ v. s., p. 227.

acts as a factor specifying the content of the non-political concept of *πλήθος*.

ISOLATED ELEMENTS OF THE *DIFFERENTIA SPECIFICA*
OF THE PRECEDING DEFINITIONS

Some of the elements of the *differentia specifica* of the definitions of *polis* as a *κοινωνία* or as a *πλήθος* appear without a definition (the essential element of which is the declaration of the *genus proximum*). Thus:

21 In a passage of the *Politics* it is to be inferred that the aim of the polis is the εὖ ζῆν, happiness (1280 a 31–34).

22, 23 In two other passages of the *Politics* it is clearly stated that the polis is self-sufficient (1291 a 10, 1326 b 4, cf. b 8).

Some passages of the *Politics*, while not giving any definition of the *polis*, cite essential elements for its existence. By their nature, they belong to the predicate of this concept. They are: (1) the existence of common public authorities (1280 a 40–b 1, 1321 b 6); (2) the shared striving for the achievement of virtue (1280 b 5–9). The public authorities are indeed congenial with a state, like the *polis*. As to the second element, we may recall that in other passages of the *Politics* the realization of virtue (or happiness, or εὖ ζῆν, or supreme good) is characteristic of the πολιτικὴ κοινωνία.

Aristotle excluded some human relationships from being a *polis* because the preceding elements were absent. Such relationships include: confederations and alliances (1280 a 34, 40 b 25, 31), pacts of non-aggression (1280 a 31), inter-marriages (1280 b 16, 36), commercial exchanges and economic relationships (1280 a 35ff, b 17ff, 30), and the hypothetical building of a defence wall round two poleis (1280 b 14).

*Comparisons between and further Comments on the Definitions
of the Polis by Aristotle*

To assist comparison, we now set out the definitions of the *polis* (A) as a *κοινωνία*, (B) as the participation of certain people in something, (C) as multiplicity, (D) as a composite whole of citizens, (E) as a sufficient number of citizens.

(A) The *polis* is described as a *κοινωνία*, expressly or by intimations, in twelve definitions: **1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 18, 19, 20.**

Definition **1**: The *polis* is a *κοινωνία* which (a) is supreme over the others, (b) embraces all the others, (c) aims at the highest good.

Definition **2**: The *polis* is a *κοινωνία* made up from villages; it is final and/or fully constituted, achieving the highest degree of self-sufficiency; it accomplishes the happiness (εὖ ζῆν) of its members.

Definition **3**: The *polis* is a *κοινωνία* of free people.

Definition **4**: The *polis* is a *κοινωνία*.

Definition **5**: The *polis* is a *κοινωνία* of *ἴμοιοι* (= sharers in happiness = citizens) and aims at the good life.

Definition **6**: The *polis* [is a *κοινωνία* which] embraces both masters and slaves.

Definition **7**: The *polis* [is a *κοινωνία* which] aims to be made up as far as possible of equals and *ἴμοιοι* (=middle-class people).

Definition **8**: The *polis* [is a *κοινωνία*].

Definition **12**: [The *polis* is a] *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία* for the sake of noble actions.

Definition **18**: The *polis* is a *κοινωνία*, self-sufficient.

Definition **19**: The *polis* is a *κοινωνία τοῦ πλήθους*, self-sufficient.

Definition **20**: The *polis* is a *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία*, self-sufficient.

(B) The *polis* is defined as participation (*κοινωνία*) of certain people in something in three definitions: **9, 10, 11.**

Definition **9**: The *polis* is the participation of citizens in government.

Definition **10**: The *polis* is the participation of households and clans in the εὖ ζῆν.

Definition **11**: The *polis* is the participation of clans and villages in the perfect and self-sufficient life.

(C) The *polis* is defined as multiplicity or non-homogeneity (*πληθὸς*) in two definitions: **13, 14.**

Definition **13**: The *polis* is by nature multiple.

Definition **14**: The *polis* is multiple.

(D) The *polis* is defined as a composite whole (*πληθὸς*) in two definitions: **15, 17.**

Definition **15**: The *polis* is the composite whole of the citizens.

Definition **17**: The *polis* is a self-sufficient composite whole [of the active population].

(E) The *polis* is defined as a sufficient number [of citizens] (*πληθος*) in one definition: **16**.

Definition **16**: The *polis* is a number [of citizens] sufficient to guarantee self-sufficiency.

Let us now proceed to comparisons relating to the logical structure of these definitions:

The terms *κοινωνία* (a group of men), *κοινωνία* (the participation of certain people in something), *πληθος* (multiplicity), *πληθος* (composite whole), *πληθος* (a sufficient number of people) function as the *genus proximum*.

In the case of the *differentia specifica* we observe that:

(1) Most definitions have a *differentia specifica*; five do not: **4, 8, 18** (with *κοινωνία* as the *genus proximum*), **13** and **14** (with multiplicity as the *genus proximum*).

(2) There are various elements of the *differentia specifica*: ontological, axiological, deontological, teleological.

(a) Ontological elements

1. Specifying *κοινωνία*: a *κοινωνία* which embraces all the others (**1**); a *κοινωνία* which is made up of villages (**2**); a *κοινωνία* of masters and slaves (**6**); a *κοινωνία* of free people (**3**); a *κοινωνία* of citizens (**12, 19, 20**); a *κοινωνία* of *ἄμοιοι* (**5**). The first two make the *polis* a sum of inferior *κοινωνίαι*, sometimes named (**2**), sometimes not (**1**). The other make the *polis* a sum of men. They differ, however, as to the extent of the human group which constitutes the *polis*: masters and slaves or free people or citizens or *ἄμοιοι*. The description of the *polis* as a *κοινωνία* of free men is due to a spontaneous association of ideas; *ἄμοιοι* does not mean the full or active citizens as opposed to those who had restricted rights, but those who shared to a greater or lesser degree, in the better life. Aristotle's indecisiveness in defining the extent and the character of those who shared in the *κοινωνία* which was the *polis* is highly significant.

2. Specifying the concept of people participating in something: the citizens (**9**); the households and the clans (**10**) the clans and the villages (**11**). Here too Aristotle wavers between individuals (the citizens) and groups of people (households, clans, villages).

3. Specifying the concept of the composite whole: the citizens (**15**) or the active population (**17**).

(b) Axiological or deontological elements

1. Specifying the *κοινωνία*: a *κοινωνία* supreme over the others (**1**); final and/or fully-constituted (**2**); in the upper rank of sufficiency (**2**), in which the εὖ ζῆν is realized (**2**).

2. Specifying the concept of participation: participation in the εὖ ζῆν (**10**), in the perfect, and self-sufficient life (**11**).

3. Specifying the concept of sufficient number: the realization of self-sufficiency (**16**).

4. Specifying the concept of the composite whole of citizens: the realization of self-sufficiency (**17**).

Without any genus: self-sufficiency (**22, 23**).

(c) Teleological elements

Specifying the *κοινωνία*: the supreme good (**1**); the life (**2**); the good life, the happiness of its members (**5**); noble actions (**12**); the multiplication of equal and similar citizens (**7**).

Without any genus: the aim of the εὖ ζῆν or happiness (**21**).

Formal logic disapproves of the use of axiological, deontological or teleological elements in the establishment of definitions. In fact they have no universal validity. So elements of these categories used by Aristotle in many of his definitions of the *polis* do not really belong to the concept of the *polis*. They nevertheless express his idea of the *polis*.

Of all the definitions of the *polis* as a *κοινωνία* which occur in the *Politics* only the first two are systematic and complete. The second is somewhat more detailed. All the others are casual and brief. Their casual character is responsible for their brevity as also for the differences between them.

The definitions, other than the first two, of the *polis* as *κοινωνία* can be placed in three groups (I, II, III); some of these (I) do not contain any *differentia specifica* (**4, 8**); others (II) contain one of the *differentiae specificae* of the first two definitions: self-sufficiency (**18, 19, 20**); pursuit of the supreme good, which is happiness (**5**); others (III) contain *differentiae specificae* which are not in the first two definitions (**3, 6, 7, 12**). The first two definitions are found in the first book of the *Politics*. The other definitions which agree with these as to the *differentia specifica* are encountered in books II (**8, 19**), III (**3, 12**), IV (**6, 7**), VII (**4, 5, 18, 20**). If the first book was composed before the others, then the definitions of group I (**4, 8**) and II (**5, 18, 19, 20**) are

chance summaries of the first two, and the definitions of group III (3, 6, 7, 12) have the originality of additional specifications. If, on the other hand, the first book was the last to be written,¹ the first two definitions were formulated later than the others; and among them those of groups I and II are simply forerunners of the first two definitions while those of group III reflect the fluctuations in Aristotelian thought before it settled.

The definitions of *polis* as the participation of certain people in something (9, 10, 11) are found in book III; as the multiplicity (non-homogeneity) of citizens (13, 14) in book II; as a composite whole of citizens (15, 17) in books III and VII; as a sufficient number of citizens (16) in book III. If the first book was composed before the others then Aristotle will not have been faithful enough to his first definition of the *polis* as a *κοινωνία*.² If the reverse is the case then these other definitions express attempts by Aristotle to identify the *polis* before he had made clear that the *genus proximum* of the concept must be rendered by the term *κοινωνία* and in no other way.

It is worth examining if, and to what extent, there are logical relations in the definitions of the *polis* by Aristotle (A) between the different concepts of the *genus proximum* and (B) between the different concepts of the *differentia specifica*.

(A) Let us recall that the concepts functioning as *genus proximum* are (1) *κοινωνία* = 'an association'; (2) *κοινωνία* = 'the participation of certain people in something'; (3) *πληθος* = 'multiplicity'; (4) *πληθος* = 'a composite whole'; (5) *πληθος* = 'a sufficient number'.

The two first concepts are expressed by Aristotle by means of the same term: *κοινωνία*, whose original meaning is 'participation', the meaning 'association' coming later. Despite the use of the same term to express them, the two concepts are different: an association unites a number of people; 'participation' expresses a relation between a participant and the object of his participation. The three concepts expressed by the term *πληθος*, 'multiplicity', 'composite whole' and 'sufficient number' are all easily discernible; they have clear limits.

One of the fundamental rules of definition requires that the concept to be defined falls within the scope of the concept serving as the *genus*

¹ v. s., p. 214.

² v. s., p. 220.

proximum. The definition of *polis* as a kind of *κοινωνία* conforms with this rule, and, with a certain flexibility, so does its definition as a composite whole, concepts which in this case might be considered to be equivalent to *κοινωνία*. The concepts of ‘participation’, of ‘multiplicity’, of ‘a sufficient number of citizens’ do not contain the concept of *polis* and thus are not properly its *genus proximum*. They simply refer to certain constituents of the *polis*: the participation of groups of persons in the εὖ ζῆν or in government; the non-homogeneity or multiplicity of the citizens; the adequacy of their number to achieve what is considered to be the essential aim of the *polis*. They are not mutually exclusive but complementary. More precisely still, they are preconditions for the creation and the preservation of the *polis*, a fact which is clearly implied by the context of some of the relevant definitions (9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, cf. 14). We may say that the definition of the *polis* as the ‘participation of some people in something’, as ‘non-homogeneity between citizens’, as ‘a sufficient number of citizens’ belong to definitions of the type which are called descriptive. Such descriptions are not recommended; yet they may be of some use. In our case, at least they do not contradict, but complement the definition of *polis* as a *κοινωνία*.

Some other relations between the various concepts functioning as the *genus proximum* should not be ignored. The term *κοινωνία*, in addition to the meanings of ‘group, community of men’, also retains the original meaning of ‘participation’ which is clearly expressed in the definitions 9, 10 and 11. Furthermore, the definition which describes the *polis* as a *κοινωνία ὁμοίων* is found in contexts which suggest that the ὅμοιοι share not only in the *polis* but also in happiness. This fact brings this definition close to those which say that the *polis* is the participation of certain people in something other than the *polis*: in government (9), in the εὖ ζῆν (10), in the perfect and self-sufficient life (11).

The concept of *κοινωνία* can also coexist alongside the concepts of ‘non-homogeneity or multiplicity’, ‘composite whole’, ‘a sufficient number’. Indeed these concepts can also act as complements of the concept *κοινωνία*, limiting its extent so that it coincides with the extent of the concept *polis*. Thus the *polis* is implicitly described as a *κοινωνία* ‘without homogeneity’, ‘composite’, ‘with a sufficient number of citizens’. That is to say the concepts of the *genus proximum* in the

definitions of the *polis* as 'multiplicity', or 'composite whole' or 'sufficient number' may also serve as elements of the *differentia specifica* of the concept *κοινωνία*.

(B) In connection with the formal elements of the *differentia specifica* we may note the following:

(1) The definitions of the *polis* with the concept *κοινωνία* functioning as *genus proximum* may be divided with reference to the *differentia specifica* into three categories. To the first belong those definitions where the genus *κοινωνία* is specified by means of its division into *κοινωνίαι* of inferior rank. The second category embraces definitions in which the genus *κοινωνία* is specified as a sum of individuals. The definitions of the third category do not extend to the composition of the *κοινωνία*.

(a) Two definitions (1, 2) belong to the first category. The first says that the *polis* is a *κοινωνία* which embraces all the others, is in fact the only sovereign *κοινωνία* and aims at the highest good. The second definition indicates the villages as those *κοινωνίαι* of which the *πολιτική κοινωνία* is composed, and continues: this *κοινωνία* is τέλειος, that is, it is final and/or fully-constituted, it achieves the highest degree of self-sufficiency and realizes the εὖ ζῆν of its members. There are some correspondences between these two definitions: (i) The first attributes to the *πολιτική κοινωνία* all the inferior *κοινωνίαι* without naming them. The second, filling this lacuna, describes them as the villages. (ii) Sovereignty in the first definition becomes self-sufficiency in the second. (iii) The highest good of the first definition corresponds to the εὖ ζῆν of the second. The second definition, however, has an element which is missing from the first: it attributes to the *πολιτική κοινωνία* the qualification τέλειος which expresses, as we have seen, two ideas: definiteness and perfection. But this new element is simply a consequence of two former characteristics of the *πολιτική κοινωνία*; its sovereignty or self-sufficiency and the achievement within it of the εὖ ζῆν or supreme good.

(b) There are five definitions which divide the *κοινωνία* which is the *polis* not into inferior *κοινωνίαι* but into persons. One (6) presents the *πολιτική κοινωνία* made up of despots and slaves. Another (3) removes slaves from this and limits it to free men (but this is due to a spontaneous association of ideas). A third (5) says that the *polis* is a *κοινωνία τῶν ὁμοίων* and it appears that ὅμοιοι are those which a few

lines above had been described as *κοινωνοὶ εὐδαιμονίας*, and must be taken to be the citizens. A fourth (7) lets the *polis* be a *κοινωνία* which has the tendency to be made up as far as possible of equal and similar people meaning the middle-class citizens. The fifth (12) does not define the species of persons implied.

(c) There are five definitions which do not divide the *κοινωνία* which is the *polis* into inferior *κοινωνίαι* or into persons. Three of these (18, 19, 20) state that the *polis* is a self-sufficient *κοινωνία*; the other two (4, 8) state only that the *polis* is a *κοινωνία*.

(2) The definitions of *polis* where the role of *genus proximum* is played by the concept of 'participation' divide into two categories. Two speak of the participation of groups; the third has individuals as those who participate. We find then here again, then, the same fluctuation as in the definitions of the *polis* as a kind of *κοινωνία*.

(a) According to the first definition of the first category (10) the *polis* is the participation of households and clans in happiness with the aim of perfection and self-sufficiency; according to the second (11) the *polis* is the participation of clans and villages in the perfect and self-sufficient life. The reference to households and clans in the first definition corresponds to the view which Aristotle formulated at the beginning of the *Politics*, according to which the *polis* was made up of villages which had already been constituted from families. The mention of clans and villages in the second definition corresponds to another view of Aristotle according to which each village had been settled by a clan which included related families. The two views are compatible. The axiological and teleological elements of the two definitions are identical.

(b) The unique definition of the constituent parts as individuals describes them as citizens (9). This definition also differs from the two preceding ones as to the object of participation which in this case is government: *polis* is the participation of citizens in government.

(3) Both definitions of the *polis* as a multiplicity or homogeneity leave it to be inferred that this property is to be attributed to the citizens (13, 14).

(4) One of the two definitions of *polis* as a composite whole mentions the citizens as its constituent elements (15); the other does not note its components and appears to mean the active population more generally (17).

(5) Finally the only definition of *polis* as a sufficient number is completed as: [number] of citizens [sufficient] to ensure their own happiness (16).

It is also worth noting the various combinations of elements of the *differentia specifica* and the *genus proximum*.

Two elements of the *differentia specifica* are linked with two *genera proxima*. (a) The division of the *πολιτική κοινωνία* into inferior *κοινωνία*i and specifically into villages (1, 2) corresponds to the ‘participation’ of households and villages (10) or of clans and villages (11). (b) The concept of ‘happiness’ appears in the *differentia specifica* of definitions of the *polis* as a *κοινωνία* (1, 2, 5) and as ‘participation’ (10).

Three different *genera proxima* appear together with the *polis* in a sense wider than that of the citizen body. These are: (a) the *κοινωνία* (1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 20); (b) the ‘participation’ (10, 11); the ‘composite whole’ (17).

Four different *genera proxima* are accompanied by two elements of the *differentia specifica*: (a) citizens are referred to together with the concepts of ‘participation’ (9), or ‘multiplicity’ (13, 14) or ‘composite whole’ (15, 17), or ‘sufficient number’ (16). (b) Self-sufficiency accompanies, the concepts ‘κοινωνία’ (1, 2, 19, 20), ‘participation’ (11), ‘composite whole’ (17), ‘sufficient number’ (16).

One further observation is worth making: the axiological, deontological and teleological elements are constant; in contrast the ontological elements vary. The former are formulated by means of terms which correspond to two concepts: ‘good’ and ‘self-sufficiency’. The good is termed *κυριώτατον ἀγαθόν* (1), or *εὖ ζῆν* (2, 10, 20, 21) or *εὐδαιμονία* (2), or *εὖ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς* (11), or *καλαὶ πράξεις* (12), or *ζωὴ ἀρίστη* (5), or *ζωὴ τελεία* (10, 11). Self-sufficiency is expressed by the word *αὐτάρκεια* (2, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23). The ontological elements of the *differentia specifica* fluctuate on two levels: (a) The *polis* is analysed sometimes into groups (1, 2, 10, 11) and sometimes into individuals (3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16); (b) In the second case, the *polis* includes even slaves (1), while on another occasion it covers the ‘free men’ (3), though more frequently it is limited to the citizens (5, 7, 9, 13, 15, 16); on one occasion, the members of the *polis* remain undefined (12). Aristotle’s fluidity insofar as the ontological elements of the *differentia specifica* are concerned is thus

much greater, and more significant than that demonstrated in his formulations of the *genus proximum*.

Aristotle's hesitations and retractions with regard to the *genus proximum* and the ontological elements of the *differentia specifica* of the concept expressed by the term *polis* are of course due to the fact that he did not revise the text of the *Politics*. For us, however, it is of greater value to have more than one definition of the *polis* since we are thus shown various moments and aspects of Aristotle's thinking on the matter. In this respect these definitions are mutually complementary and of equal value. On the other hand, however, one cannot overlook several gradations of importance. (a) The first two definitions (**1, 2**) are superior to the rest because they are more mature, fuller and the only ones which are not occasional. (b) The genus *κοινωνία* (=a human group) is expressed or intimated on twelve occasions (**1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 18, 19, 20**), while the genus which comes next, from the point of view of frequency, *κοινωνία* (=participation), appears three times (**9, 10, 11**), followed by *πλῆθος* (=composite whole) on two occasions (**15, 17**); *πλῆθος* (=multiplicity) and *πλῆθος* (=sufficient number of citizens) appear only once (**13, 16**). In addition to this significant frequency, *κοινωνία* (=a human group) plays the role of genus in the two major definitions of the *polis*. It is thus clear that Aristotle conceived the *polis* first and foremost as a kind of *κοινωνία* (=an association). (c) The first two definitions also contain the most valid elements of the *differentia specifica* of the *polis*. According to these, the *polis* is a *κοινωνία* made up of villages or clans, kinds of *κοινωνία* less complete than the *polis*, and it also embraces other kinds of *κοινωνία* even less complete and inferior; the superiority of the *polis* in relation to the villages or the clans rests upon three facts: it is supreme (sovereign), reaches the highest degree of self-sufficiency and achieves the highest good, the εὖ ζῆν. The analysis of the *polis* into persons instead of villages or clans and the hesitations between categories of persons (free and slave, free only, citizens) are found in occasional definitions.

B. THE PARTS OF THE POLIS

In various passages of the *Politics*, Aristotle mentions as parts (μέρη or μόρια) of the *polis* either (1) the *κοινωνίαι* of which it was composed or

(2) its citizens, or (3) the professional groups and social classes, or (4) its various functions.¹

This fourfold division of the *polis* does not testify to hesitation on the part of Aristotle as to its composition.² It is rather an analysis of the *polis* from four different points of view: the *polis* (1) was created from the unification of villages or clans,³ (2) consisted of citizens and (3) was divided into social classes; the functions (4) were parts not exactly of the *polis* but of public life.

Because the *polis* is analysed from different viewpoints into (1) *κοινωνίαι* of inferior rank, (2) citizens and (3) social groups, and, furthermore, because the first two analyses were produced by the same method,⁴ all the analyses have the same weight. The modern idea that the analysis of the *polis* into citizens is more important than that into inferior *κοινωνίαι* is based on the following arguments: (a) Aristotle subdivided the *polis* sometimes into families and sometimes into villages under which he placed the families; (b) if the *polis* was only a union of families it would also have embraced all those who, according to Aristotle, were members of the family, that is women, children and slaves.⁵ But the first argument does not even contrast the division of the *polis* into inferior *κοινωνίαι* with its composition from citizens; it relates only the hesitation shown by Aristotle in his analysis of the *polis* into inferior *κοινωνίαι*.⁶ Regarding the second argument it is to be noted that, in analysing the *polis* into individuals, Aristotle describes them sometimes as its citizens,⁷ sometimes as the free population,⁸ and sometimes he includes even the slaves in it.⁹

¹ Aristotle, *Politics* 1328 a 22ff, refuses to accept as parts of a *polis* those elements which are essential to its existence.

² On the contrary, P.Lévêque, *PM* fasc. 14 (Jan.-March 1981) 5, expressed the view that Aristotle, seeing the *polis* as a community of citizens and as a community of families and villages, came up against a very serious difficulty.

³ Without doubt Aristotle did not mean a union of villages as a settlement of polis type, but as a state of polis type. This is clearly shown by the fact that the *polis* which was made up of villages (1252 b 28) had been defined from the start as a πολιτικὴ κοινωνία (1251 a 7). On this term see above, pp. 214, 215–216, 218.

⁴ v. i., pp. 244–268.

⁵ E.Lévy, op. cit. 277.

⁶ v. i., pp. 244–246.

⁷ v. i., p. 269.

⁸ v. i., pp. 270–271, cf. 247, 260.

⁹ v. i., p. 270, cf. 247, 260.

1. PARTS OF THE *POLIS*: THE *KOINΩNIAI* OF INFERIOR RANK

A systematic analysis of the *polis* into its component *κοινωνία* is found between the first and second definition of the *polis* as a *κοινωνία* and in close relationship with them. The first definition presupposes this analysis since it states that the *polis* subsumes the other *κοινωνία*.¹ In the second it is clearly stated that the *polis* is a τέλειος (final and/or fully constituted) *κοινωνία* which is made up of villages; it is also stated that the *polis* is the goal of each *κοινωνία* of which it is composed.²

Aristotle distinguished these *κοινωνία* by analysing the *polis* into its component parts according to his usual method, as he himself states. This consists of (a) the analysis of each composite whole down to its uncompounded elements (1252 a 18) and (b) the study of things in the process of development from the beginning (1252 a 24–25). Aristotle used the same method in examining property and the art of getting wealth (*Pol.* 1256 a 1ff), in discussing the nature of the citizen (*Pol.* 1274 b 39ff), and in studying happiness (*Eth. Nic.* 1095 a 3ff).

The simplest *κοινωνία* is formed by the union of individuals; a male and a female, a master and a slave.³ It is necessity that gives rise to such unions; they are prescribed by the nature of people who are unable to exist without one another. The male and the female come together for procreation; their decision is not deliberate but born of instinct, as happens also with the other animals and with plants. He who by nature is a master because he can, thanks to his intellectual faculties, foresee things and he who by nature is a slave because his bodily strength enables him to carry out orders unite each other, in order to survive; master and slave thus have a common interest (1252 a 26–34).⁴ The union of male and female forms the family; the completed family

¹ v. s., p. 220.

² v. s., pp. 220–222.

³ It is to be understood that we are talking of the simplest *κοινωνία* which are part of the *polis*; as we have seen (pp. 216–217) there are other *κοινωνία* (of two persons) which have no bearing on the *polis*.

⁴ However in *Eth. Eud.* 1241b 17ff, Aristotle argues that there cannot be a *κοινωνία* between a master and a slave, because, as in the relationship between the craftsman and his tool, the master and the slave are not two, the latter being a part of the former.

requires slaves; this *κοινωνία* comes into being to face daily needs (1252 b 9–14, cf. 1253 b 4–7). From the point of view of self-sufficiency it is superior to the individual, but inferior to the *polis* (1261 b 12).

The next *κοινωνία* is the village,¹ which is made up of a number of families. Indeed, it appears that it resulted naturally from a founding family and that its members are inter-related. It is the first *κοινωνία* to have aims beyond the everyday (1252 b 14–19).

The *κοινωνία* which is made up of a number of villages is the *polis*; it is complete and self-sufficient, the goal of every preceding *κοινωνία*.²

In another passage of the *Politics*, Aristotle substitutes the clans for the villages (1280 b 33–34). This is not an essential contradiction since, as we noted above, Aristotle saw the village as the sum total of inter-related families. Elsewhere the *polis* is described as a *κοινωνία* of clans and villages (1281 a 1); this perhaps takes into account the knowledge which corrects the previous view – that certain clans did not correspond to villages and certain villages did not correspond to clans.³

There are rather more passages in the *Politics* in which the *polis* is linked directly with the families without the intervention of villages or clans. There is no reason to suppose that Aristotle is formulating a different view: taking careful note of the context, we may observe that this is not the case, but that we are dealing with particular circumstances which made the philosopher either link the *polis* directly with the family or, for the sake of brevity, pass over the intermediate *κοινωνία* (1253 a 18–19, b 2, 1260 b 14, 1261 b 11, 1263 b 31, 1289 b 29).

The tribes, demes and phratries are named as other parts of the *polis*, but are noted occasionally as electoral bodies without relation to the families or clans (1300 a 25, cf. 1280 b 37).

In the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle refers to the phratries, the religious associations and the commercial associations as parts not of the *polis* but of *κοινωνία* of the *polis* (1241 b 25). The meaning of this statement is not clear.

The *polis* is not simply the sum total of villages or clans, just as the village or the clan is not simply the sum total of families. This is because every *κοινωνία* of higher rank carries out a task or

¹ To be understood in the hierarchy of *κοινωνία* which are parts of the *polis*.

² v. s., pp. 220–222.

³ v. s., p. 218.

accomplishes an aim which an inferior *κοινωνία* cannot fulfil. In particular the *polis* is superior to the *κοινωνία* embraced by it in self-sufficiency (1252 b 29, 1253 a 1, 1261 b 12–13, 1275 b 20, 1280 b 33–34, 1281 a 1, 1291 a 9, 1326 b 2, 7, 1328 b 15–19),¹ in achieving happiness (1252 b 30, 1278 b 22–30, 1280 a 31–33, b 33–34, 39ff, 1281 a 4, 1328 a 36–37, 1332 a 4–8), and in performing good (1252 a 1ff).

The pursuit of self-sufficiency (including security) passes through the entire hierarchy from individuals to the *polis* and is the force which creates families, villages or clans, and *poleis*. Each higher stage is found in the extension of that immediately below it.²

2. PARTS OF THE *POLIS*: THE CITIZENS

Aristotle regarded the citizens as parts of the *polis*, alongside the villages and the clans (and their sub-divisions, the families).

In this case also he applied the method of dividing the compounds into indivisible *μέρη*: thus he found that the citizens of a *polis* are *μέρη* of that *polis* because the *polis* is a composite whole (*πλήθος*) of citizens (1274 b 39ff).

This idea is also expressed in two passages of the seventh book, where the discussion is about the ideal *polis*. In the first passage, those who form the component parts of the *polis* (1326 a 17–21) are distinguished from the slaves, metics and foreigners; the contrast shows that the former are the citizens. In the second passage, it is said that none of the citizens belongs to himself but that all belong to the *polis* because each is a part (*μέριον*) of the *polis* (1327 a 26–28). The same idea is to be understood from the definitions of the *polis* as a *πλήθος* (composite whole or sufficient number) of citizens.³

A passage of the third book of the *Politics* expresses the opinion that those citizens who are greatly distinguished in outstanding virtue and political ability should not be counted as a part of the *polis* (1284 a 3–8). In reality Aristotle means to convey the idea that these citizens should not stay within the confines of the *polis*; on the one hand equality does them an injustice, on the other the *polis* is threatened by

¹ Self-sufficiency is described in *the Eth. Nic.* 1097 b 7ff, 1134 a 25 f, 1177 a 27f.

² v. i., pp. 278–280.

³ v. s., pp. 230–231.

them; it was for this reason that many democratic *poleis* established ostracism.

The statement that the citizens are parts of the *polis* resulted, by applying the analytical method, from the statement that the *polis* is the sum of its citizens. Elsewhere, however, Aristotle attributed a greater extent to the *polis*, enclosing within it all free men¹ and expressly including slaves (in one definition, in the passage in which the slaves are ranked within the family, the fundamental *κοινωνία* of the *polis*).²

Aristotle defines the citizens both positively and negatively; positively in definitions, negatively in references to various categories of non-citizens which had also helped him to form the concept of the citizen. The picture is completed by Aristotle's observations on the composition of the citizen body under various forms of government.

Below we shall examine in succession first the definitions of the citizen, then the contrasts of the citizen with categories of non-citizens and finally the correlation between the citizen body and the government.

(a) DEFINITIONS OF THE CITIZEN

Aristotle defines the citizen on eight occasions in the *Politics*, all in the third book.

I The first is at the beginning of the third book and is directly connected with the analysis of the *polis* into the individuals of which it is composed, the citizens, and with the explanation – referred to amongst the definitions of the *polis* – ‘because the *polis* is a *πλῆθος* (composite whole) of citizens’. The problem immediately arises: what is a citizen? The answer starts in the negative, by referring to various categories of persons who are not citizens (1275 a 2ff), and continues positively with a passage which we quote in the original because its interpretation will only become clear after lengthy discussion: ‘Πολίτης δ’ ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς. Τῶν δ’ ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι διηρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, ὥστ’ ἐνίας μὲν ὅλως δις τὸν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τινων ὀρισμένων χρόνων· ὁ δ’ ἀόριστος, οἷον ὁ δικαστὴς καὶ ἐκκλησιαστής. Τάχα

¹ v. s., p. 243, i. pp. 260ff.

² v. s., p. 243, i. pp. 260ff.

μὲν οὖν ἂν φαίη τις οὐδ' ἄρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς τοιοῦτους, οὐδὲ μετέχειν διὰ ταῦτ' ἀρχῆς· καίτοι γελοῖον τοὺς κυριωτάτους ἀποστερεῖν ἀρχῆς. Ἄλλὰ διαφερέτω μηδέν· περὶ ὀνόματος γὰρ ὁ λόγος· ἀνόνημον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ, τί δεῖ ταῦτ' ἄμφω καλεῖν. Ἔστω δὴ διορισμοῦ χάριν ἀόριστος ἀρχή. Τίθεμεν δὴ πολίτας τοὺς οὕτω μετέχοντας. Ὁ μὲν οὖν μάλιστ' ἂν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς λεγομένους πολίτας σχεδὸν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν.' (1275 a 22–34).

The term *ἀρχή* is used here with two meanings: 'authority, power'; 'office, magistracy'. The first meaning clearly appears in the phrases 'μετέχειν ἀρχῆς' (twice) and 'ἀποστερεῖν ἀρχῆς'. The second is equally well recognizable in 'ἀρχῶν' (the plural denotes offices, not the abstract authority) and in 'ἀόριστος ἀρχή' (which is a label for two magistracies taken together). Consequently, the sense of the passage we have quoted may be rendered with some freedom as follows: 'Some offices are limited in point of time, so that they cannot be held at all for more than a single term or can only be held after certain fixed intervals. Other officials are without limit of tenure, for example the judges in popular courts and the members of the assembly. It may possibly be contended that such persons are not officials at all and so do not hold authority (or power) by virtue of their functions as popular judges and members of the assembly. Yet it would be ridiculous to deny the quality of holders of authority (or power) to those who actually hold it in the highest degree. But there is no need to continue the contention, as the whole argument is the question of a single word. In fact we have no word to denote what is common to both a judge and a member of the assembly or to describe the one and the other. Let us, then, for the sake of distinction, call these two functions alike office without limitation of time. Accordingly we lay it down that those are citizens who share in such an office. This is generally speaking the definition of the citizen which will most satisfactorily fit with all to whom this term is applied.'

In this passage there are two formulations of a definition of the citizen, one at the beginning and the other at the end, separated by comments which throw light on the first and open the way for the second. The first says that the citizen is he who participates actively in κρίσεως and ἀρχῆς.¹ The commentary is based on the contention that

¹ Most recognize *μετέχειν* as having the meaning of actual participation. Some (e.g. O. Gigon, *Aristoteles, Politik und Staat der Athener* (1955) ad loc., E. Lévy, op. cit. 236,

the members of the popular assembly and the heliasts are life-magistrates and thus share in ἀρχή, that is in authority, power. The second formulation of the definition corresponds to the sense of the commentary: those who share in authority in this way, that is the members of the popular assembly and the heliasts, are citizens. The first formulation differentiates between two spheres of participation of citizens, κρίσεως and ἀρχῆς. The commentary and the second formulation recognize only the exercise of ἀρχή (=authority divided between various ἀρχαί =offices) by ἀρχαί (=authorities, officials, magistrates). Thus the term κρίσις which appears only in the first statement remains in suspense.

The view that the term κρίσις denotes the act of the judge while the term ἀρχή means administrative competence has prevailed.¹ Nevertheless, earlier scholars rightly discerned that the term κρίσις did not specifically refer to the exercise of justice.² Indeed, many facts militate in favour of this view: (a) In the commentaries which follow the first formulation of the definition both the judge and the member of the assembly belong to the genus ἄρχων (official, magistrate) and to the category of those who hold ἀρχή (authority, power). If therefore the

J.Bordes, *Ktēma* 5 (1980) 429 believe that this verb here and elsewhere has the meaning of conditional participation while actual participation is expressed by the word κοινωνεῖν. There are two difficulties in this view: (a) as we shall see (p. 252) the first definition of the citizen applies to citizens of democratic πόλεις who share actively and for life in 'office' in the way in which Aristotle notes; (b) in the second definition, which applies to all regimes, and thus also to oligarchies, where the citizen was defined as empowered to share in deliberative or judicial authority, Aristotle expresses his meaning here by the phrase 'ᾧ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν' (see below, p. 254) which shows that *koinonein* on its own does not denote the possibility of participation. These two observations lead to two conclusions; (1) they do not justify a semantic difference between μετέχειν and κοινωνεῖν; (2) the relationship of the first two definitions imposes the interpretation of μετέχειν in the way that we have suggested.

¹ W.L.Newman, op. cit. III (1902) 136 (see, however, the following note also); B.Jowett, op. cit., ad loc.; E.Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (1946) ad loc.; H.Rackham, op. cit., ad loc.; K.Kahlenberg, *Zur Interpretation von Buch III der Politik* (1934) 9 (in P. Steinmetz, op. cit. 106); O.Gigon, op. cit., ad loc.; J.Tricot, op. cit. 167; Cl.Mossé, *Eirene* 6 (1967) 17; J.Aubonnet, op. cit., ad loc.; E.Lévy, op. cit. 236; J.Bordes, op. cit. 429.

² F.G.Schömann, *Griechische Alterthümer* 3rd edn I (1871) 108 n 4. cf. W.L.Newman, op. cit. I (1887) 230 n 1; J.Aubonnet, op. cit. II 1 (1971) 212 n 4.

term *κρίσις* referred specially to judicial functions, participation in this would quite simply have been a part of participation in *ἀρχή*, in authority in general. The mention of *κρίσις* would logically have been superfluous. Should it be supposed that Aristotle mentioned judicial function in particular only to stress its importance? One would have expected him to stress either the *βουλευόμενον* or the *βουλευτικόν* which in other passages of the *Politics* he describes as the *κύριον τῆς πολιτείας* (1299 a 2–3, 1316 b 31). (b) In a passage of the *Politics* one and the same political body is described as that which deliberates (*βουλευόμενον*) for (public) interests and decides (*κρίνον*) on the right (1329 a 2–4). (c) In other passages of the *Politics* the terms *κρίσις*, *κρίνειν*, *κριταί*, all have a significance which is clearly political and not judicial. There are four such passages. The first concerns the apella of Sparta: ‘and whatever the kings and the elders introduce in the assembly, they do not merely let the people listen to their views, but the assembly has the final decision (*ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσί*) and anybody who wishes may speak against the proposals, a right that does not exist in other constitutions’ (1273 a 11–12).¹ The second refers in general to the *βουλευόμενον* (the popular assembly or to other bodies which take counsel and make decisions: *σύγκλητοι*, *βουλαί*, *ἀρχεῖα*) of any *polis* whatever: ‘The deliberative element (*τὸ βουλευόμενον*) has authority (*κύριον ἐστί*) in matters of war and peace, the dissolution of alliances, legislation, sentences of death and exile, confiscation and audits of magistrates. All decisions (*κρίσεις*) concerning the above matters must be assigned either to all citizens or to some of them (for instance to a particular magistracy or to several), or some of them to all, and others of them only to some’ (1298 a 4–9).² In the third passage the offices are described thus: ‘The title of magistracy, to put it simply, is chiefly to be applied to all of those offices to which have been assigned the duties of deliberating (*βουλεύσασθαι*) about certain matters and of deciding (*κρίναι*) and commanding.’ (1299 a 25–26).³ In the fourth passage the word *κριταί* obviously does not denote the judges but a social class, the

¹ This passage has already been used by Schömann. Furthermore *κρίνειν* has been interpreted as deciding and not as ‘δικάζειν’ by Newman, Rackham, Aubonnet.

² Rackham and Aubonnet have also interpreted *κρίσεις* here as ‘decisions’.

³ *βουλεύσασθαι* and *κρίναι* have been rendered respectively by ‘deliberating’ and ‘deciding’ by Barker, Gigon, Tricot and Aubonnet. cf. 1326 b 24 ‘ἀρχοντος δ’ ἐπίταξις

ruling one, since on the one hand they, the κριταί, are distinguished from other classes, the farmers, the artisans, the soldiers, the wealthy, the priests, and on the other hand their declared mission is to decide for the ἀναγκαῖα and συμφέροντα and not for the dispensation of justice (1328 b 20–23); cf. another passage of the *Politics* in which κρίνειν certainly refers to judges but also has the specialized meaning of decision as distinct from the process of trial (τὸ δικάζειν) and from the deliberation (τὸ βουλευέσθαι) which precedes the pronouncement of the verdict (1286 a 24ff). All the passages we have mentioned before, of all three groups (a, b, c), suggest that the μετέχειν κρίσεως in the earlier formulation of the definition of the citizen refers to the participation of the citizens in every kind of body which deliberates and decides, not just to the popular courts but to the popular assembly as well. Yet this idea was also expressed by means of the μετέχειν ἀρχῆς, since it is later explained that both the judges and the members of the assembly are ἀρχαί and a little further down it is stated that both were subject to the genus ἀόριστος ἀρχή. Thus either the phrase μετέχειν κρίσεως is superfluous or its meaning, as well as that of μετέχειν ἀρχῆς, must be reconsidered so that both these concepts may be accommodated. In the first case the presence of μετέχειν κρίσεως in the earlier formulation of the definition of the citizen may be attributed to the carelessness of Aristotle himself in the spoken development of his thought, or to a misunderstanding of one of his students who wrote it down, or to some later user of the text. The logical co-existence of the notions μετέχειν κρίσεως and μετέχειν ἀρχῆς is possible if either had a narrower extent than that which they have been given. Specifically, μετέχειν κρίσεως could mean participation in the popular assembly and in the popular courts and μετέχειν ἀρχῆς could refer to every other area of ἀρχή (authority) and not to ἀρχή (authority) in general. This should be compared with Aristotle's division of constitutions into three parts (μόρια): τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς and τὸ δικάζον (1297 b 41–1298 a 3). Ἀρχή in the first formulation of the first definition would be equated not with every kind of ἀρχή, but only with περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς in the passage which we have

καὶ κρίσις ἔργον' which may express the same idea (κρίσις would cover βουλευέσθαι and κρίναι in 1299 a 25–26) but not necessarily (if κρίσις includes the judicial responsibilities of the archon).

just mentioned, while the βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν κοινῶν and the δικάζον of the same passage together would cover the κρίσις of the definition. If we accept that μετέχειν κρίσεως and μετέχειν ἀρχῆς are complementary in meaning, we should render the first formulation of Aristotle's definition of the citizen thus: 'There is no better description of the citizen than that he takes part in the bodies which make decisions and in other offices.' In consequence the μετέχειν ἀρχῆς of the second formulation is a contraction of the μετέχειν κρίσεως and the μετέχειν ἀρχῆς of the first.

We shall not proceed at this point to examine the content of this definition of the citizen given by Aristotle; this cannot be done until we consider the second definition.

2 Continuing Aristotle observes that the preceding definition is appropriate for the citizens of *poleis* with democratic constitutions; under other forms of government it might perhaps apply, but then again it might not (1275 b 5ff). Next he compares characteristic gradations of citizens in non-democratic *poleis*. Some *poleis* have no popular assembly and in its place there functions some kind of convention with a small number of members (σύγκλητος). Trials are not conducted by the plenum of a body of magistrates but are assigned to sections; for example, in Lacedaemon suits for breach of contract are not tried by the ephors all together, but each ephor undertakes one case of this kind; the elders try murder cases [in the same way] and some other magistracies are competent for other suits. In contrast, in Carthage certain magistracies judge all judicial affairs.

At this point a correction to the first definition is announced (1275 b 13), and there follows a statement which generalizes the preceding observations on oligarchic constitutions. "Ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἄρχων ἐκκλησιαστής ἐστὶ καὶ δικαστής, ἀλλ' ὁ κατ' ἀρχὴν ὀρισμένος· τούτων γὰρ ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τισὶν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ δικάζειν ἢ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν' (1275 b 14ff). Translations of the first clause concur roughly with this rendering: 'Under other constitutions the member of the assembly (ἐκκλησιαστής) and the judge (δικαστής) are not magistrates without limitation, but officials who are appointed by the nature of their office'. This rendering overturns the syntactical construction of the original since it takes as subjects the predicates ἐκκλησιαστής and δικαστής

and as predicates the subjects *ὁ ἀόριστος ἄρχων* and the *ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὀρισμένος*. Let us try to translate this clause without disturbing its syntax: 'Under other constitutions it is not the holder of office without limitation who is a member of the assembly or a judge but he who is appointed by the office which he exercises.' It is clear that in this version it is understood that in non-democratic constitutions (1) there were ἀόριστοι ἄρχοντες and (2) members of the assembly and judges were not these magistrates, but some other officials. But this is absurd, since, in his commentary on the first definition, Aristotle describes as holders of office without limitation precisely the members of the popular assembly and the popular judges; holders of office without limitation other than the members of the popular assembly and the popular judges would be a *contradictio in adjecto*. So the syntax of the passage is without doubt the direct opposite of that which its meaning imposes, and the reciprocal transposition of the subjects and predicates is justified. Nevertheless, this transposition is not enough; greater freedom in translation is required. We would put forward the following rendering: 'In other constitutions there is no holder of office without limitation (=member of the assembly and judge); but the functions of the member of the assembly and of judge belong to one who by his office is entitled to sit in the assembly and to judge.' This translation both agrees with the examples Aristotle himself noted earlier (conventions of small numbers in the place of assemblies, members of which were, presumably, *ex officio* magistrates, and administration of justice by magistrates with judicial powers instead of popular judges), and with the continuation of the discussion: 'τούτων γὰρ ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τισὶν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ δικάζειν περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν'. This may be analyzed in the following way: (1) 'πᾶσιν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ δικάζειν περὶ πάντων'; (2) 'πᾶσιν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ δικάζειν περὶ τινῶν'; (3) 'τισὶν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ δικάζειν περὶ πάντων'; (4) 'τισὶν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ δικάζειν περὶ τινῶν'. Actually, Aristotle was not thinking of offices, but of functions: βουλευέσθαι and δικάζειν. The copulative conjunction καὶ emphasizes the fact that both political and judicial functions were united in the same offices.

Immediately after the introductory statement we have quoted and discussed from the point of view of its meaning there follows this definition of the citizen: 'Τίς μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων

φανερὸν ὃ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς πολίτην ἥδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης τῆς πόλεως' (1275 b 17ff). Translators and commentators disagree as to the meaning of the term ἀρχή. Some render it with words meaning 'rule, sway, power', or 'function, service' or 'administration',¹ while others consider it to correspond to ἀρχή 'magistracy', 'office'.² Some interpret ἀρχή which is defined by the adjective βουλευτική as βουλή 'council' and the ἀρχή which is defined by the adjective κριτική as 'judicial function'.³ As we saw, there is no such problem in the first definition.⁴ The sense of the adjectives βουλευτική and κριτική cannot be doubted; the first refers to deliberations on political matters, the second to the administration of justice. The same conclusion is also to be drawn from the juxtaposition of the two adjectives and from the fact that both qualify the noun ἀρχή. Things are different in comparison with the first formulation of the first definition where the noun ἀρχή has no qualification and is contrasted with the noun κρίσις, with the consequences we have already seen.⁵

The interpretation of the two adjectives βουλευτική and κριτική is by no means sufficient to supply an answer to the question of whether the noun ἀρχή here means 'office, magistracy' or 'power, function'. The facts require more thorough examination. The adjectives are associated disjunctively in the manuscript tradition: βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς. But as far as we know, in those ancient oligarchic constitutions taken into consideration by the definition of the citizen we are discussing there were no offices which were purely political or purely judicial. So the interpretation of ἀρχῆς as one particular office does not correspond to the reality with which Aristotle was familiar. Thus we must follow the thought of replacing ἢ with καί, put forward by Aretinus and accepted

¹ cf. P.Vinogradoff, *Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence* (1922) 103: 'deliberative or judicial administration'; J.Aubonnet, ad loc.: 'pouvoir délibératif et judiciaire'.

² cf. W.L.Newman, op. cit. I (1887) 229–230: 'to share in office, deliberative or judicial', III (1902) 140: 'participation in either deliberative or judicial office'; H. Rackham, op. cit., ad loc.: 'to participate in deliberative or judicial office'; E. Barker, op. cit., ad loc.: 'sharing in deliberative or judicial office'; O.Gigon, op. cit. 389: 'an den betrachtenden oder richtenden Behörde teilzunehmen'.

³ cf. J.Tricot, op. cit., ad loc.: 'au conseil et aux fonctions judiciaires'. Immediately afterwards in the commentary he says, in summary, 'aux fonctions publiques'.

⁴ v. s., pp. 247ff.

⁵ v. s., pp. 248ff.

by several editors and commentators, so that we arrive at *βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς* to correspond with the formulation *βουλευέσθαι καὶ δικάζειν* which precedes it. But even this correction does not remove the difficulty we have noted: since offices in oligarchic constitutions were political and judicial alike, it is redundant to describe them in this way. Let us therefore examine whether it is possible that the term *ἀρχή* can be interpreted as ‘power, authority’. The concept of power includes the activities which are denoted by the adjectives *βουλευτικῆς* and *κριτικῆς*. However, do we not still find ourselves faced with a pleonasm? The answer is no. The adjectives *βουλευτική* and *κριτική* do not exhaust the whole extent of the concept ‘power, authority’, according to Aristotle’s thought, expressed in the first definition of the citizen. There, as we have seen, the concept ‘power, authority’, was divided into ‘power *κρίσεως*’ (deliberation and decision) and ‘power *ἀρχῶν*’ which was exercised by elected magistrates for a limited period of time. The word *κρίσεως* in the first definition (where it covers both deliberation and decision) corresponds to *ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς* in the second (and not only to *κριτικῆς*) while the power of the *ἀρχῶν* (offices) in the first definition has no corresponding word in the second. In other words, the adjectives *βουλευτική* and *κριτική* were added to limit the extent of the notion expressed by the term *ἀρχή* (power). So the second definition regards as citizens those who participated in the assembly, even if they were excluded from elective office which had not only political and judicial responsibilities higher than those of the assembly, but also executive ones and shared in the government of the state.

At what points then does the second definition of the citizen differ from the first so as to cover citizens of both democratic and oligarchic regimes? (1) The second definition confines the rights of the citizen to the limited responsibilities, political and judicial, which the assembly had in oligarchies. The citizen of the second definition is not the highest, lifelong magistrate like the members of the assembly and of the popular courts in a democracy, because in an oligarchy there were no popular courts and the assembly was not the highest magistracy. (2) The same definition replaces actual participation in power¹ with the right of participation (*ἔξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς*). We may note that

¹ v. s., p. 252.

ἐξουσία (ἔστι) is equivalent to ἐξεσσι.¹ People who do not actively share in power, because they have no qualifications, nonetheless enter into the concept of citizen.

3 Continuing, Aristotle notes that some people define the citizen by a practical criterion: by birth of parents who were citizens, or, more narrowly, by descent from generations of citizens. Next he records an objection which had been formulated against this definition of citizen: how could it be established whether or not his ancestors were citizens? Aristotle's answer is that one could simply use the same criterion for them too, with the exception of the original colonizers or founders of a *polis* (1275 b 22–23).

He then refers to another question – whether the naturalization of citizens after a change of constitution is legal or illegal. He replies: illegality is not identical with non-reality; so someone who was illegally naturalized can be a citizen just as the illegalities perpetrated by a magistrate do not alter the fact that he is really a magistrate (1275 b 34–1276 a 3). At this point he recalls that the citizen had been defined earlier by the criterion of participation in some kind of office: ‘ὁ δὲ πολίτης ἀρχῆ τινι διωρισμένος ἐστίν (ὁ γὰρ κοινωνῶν τῆς τοιάσδε ἀρχῆς πολίτης ἐστίν, ὡς ἔφαμεν)’. (1276 a 4–5). As happens also in the second definition, ἀρχή is interpreted by some as ‘function’² and by others as ‘office, magistracy’.³ The indefinite pronoun τινί which qualifies the noun ἀρχῆ justifies the second interpretation. This fact disproves the idea that ἀρχῆ τινι is an abbreviation of ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ (rather: καὶ) κριτικῆς of the second definition and is therefore referring to it.⁴

4 At the beginning of the second chapter of the third book Aristotle poses the question whether the virtue of the good man (ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ)

¹ cf. O.Gigon, op. cit. 392; E.Braun, *SBOeAW*, Phil.–Hist.Kl., 247: 4 (1965) 22; O.Lendle, *Die Einleitung des dritten Buches der aristotelischen Politik*, in P. Steinmetz (ed), op. cit. (1973) 229.

² cf. O.Gigon, ad loc., J. Tricot, ad loc.

³ H.Rackham, ad loc., has ‘functions’ for ‘ἀρχῆ τινί’, ‘office’ for ‘ἀρχῆς’. J. Aubonnet, ad loc., in both cases uses ‘pouvoir’ a word with two meanings ‘power’ and ‘office’. E. Barker, ad loc., also used in both instances ‘office’.

⁴ W.L.Newman, op. cit. II (1887) 147; J. Tricot, op. cit. II 1 (1962) 56 n 2, refers to both first and second definition because he believed that κρισεως denoted judicial function.

is the same as the virtue of the good citizen (πολίτου σπουδαίου). He then inquires what the virtue of the good citizen is. He immediately likens the citizen to the member of a ship's crew: 'the citizen is one sort of partner as is the sailor' (1276 b 21). Here one can perceive a definition of the citizen as a partner (κοινωνός) of the *polis*. In other passages of the *Politics*, Aristotle assumes non-citizens to be part of the *polis*.¹

5 Aristotle goes on from this point to say that although sailors differ from each other in function all have the common virtue of bringing about navigational safety. In the same way the citizens, despite inequalities, have a shared merit in everything which contributes to the salvation of the *κοινωνία* (=polis); however, because the *κοινωνία* (=polis) is the *πολιτεία* (=constitution), the kind of political merit is determined by the *πολιτεία* (=constitution); by contrast, the virtue of the good man is only one (1276 b 22–34). After a chain of reasoning (1276 b 34–1277 a 21) which we shall omit, Aristotle says: 'If then the virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a good man, and if furthermore a person ruled is also a citizen as is the ruler, the virtue of a citizen in general will not be the same as that of a man, although that of a particular citizen will.' (1277 a 21–23).

While the first three definitions describe the citizen from the point of view of his sharing in authority, this one refers to the citizen as governed. The quality of governed citizen is not permanent. The citizen rules and is ruled. This appears from the continuation of the discussion where, amongst other things, we read: 'Furthermore men are praised for being able to rule and to be ruled, and it is generally held that the virtue of a citizen consists in the ability to do both well.' (1277 a 25–29). 'The ruler and the ruled do not have to learn the same arts but the citizen must know both and share in them both.' (1277a 30–32). 'It has been well said that he who has never been ruled cannot rule well. The virtue of a ruler is not the same as that of a person who is ruled, hence the good citizen ought to know and to be capable of both, and the virtue of the good citizen consists in having a knowledge of the government of free men on both sides.' (1277 b 12–16). This should be compared with a passage in the first book: 'but in most cases of

¹ v. i., pp. 260ff.

republican government the citizens rule and are ruled in turn' (1259 b 5–6), cf. also the eighth definition.

6 Aristotle addressed himself to the definition of a citizen after a discussion of the constitution during which he also treated of questions relative to citizens. 'Is a citizen truly a person who has the right to share in authority or to be elected to an office (*κοινωνεῖν ἔξεστιν ἀρχῆς*) or are we to count as citizens also the craftsmen? If those who have no share in offices (*οἷς μὴ μέτεστιν ἀρχῶν*) are also to be considered as citizens, then it is not possible for every citizen to possess the virtue we defined earlier (the ability to command and to obey), for the citizen is a man capable of governing. If on the other hand no craftsman is a citizen, in which class are each of them to be ranked? For they are neither resident aliens nor foreigners.' (1277 b 33–39).

I have translated *ἀρχῶν* by 'offices' as is usually done because in the plural the term *ἀρχαί* always means the particular magistracies. On the contrary, *ἀρχή*, in the singular, as in the preceding definitions, can mean either an 'office, magistracy'¹ or 'authority, power', in general.² I have thus translated it with its two variations: 'to share in authority' or 'to be elected to an office'.

The phrase *ὃ κοινωνεῖν ἔξεστιν ἀρχῆς* of this definition corresponds to *ὃ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν* of the second.³ In contrast, the problem which Aristotle poses here has not been faced in any of the preceding definitions. The way in which he formulates the problem makes it difficult to understand: 'should craftsmen be regarded as citizens in those *poleis* where they do not share in authority (or do not become officials)?' Such a problem indeed does not arise so far as the democratic *πόλεις* are concerned either objectively (craftsmen there were citizens) or according to the Aristotelian criterion for the citizen in democratic *poleis* (craftsmen there were 'lifelong officials' as members of the assembly and of the popular courts and furthermore they could

¹ W.L.Newman, op. cit. I (1887) 241; H.Rackham, ad loc.; J.Aubonnet, ad loc.; E.Barker, op. cit. 107; E.Lévy, op. cit. 239.

² V.Ehrenberg, *Der griechische und der hellenistische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* III 3 (1932) 18 = *Der Staat der Griechen* (1957) 31 = *The Greek State* (1960) 42 = *L'état grec* (1976) 82; G.Tricot, op. cit. I (1962) 188.

³ E.Braun, op. cit. 24.

assume any office, either elective or drawn by lot). Aristotle's answer to this problem is cautious because, on the one hand, to recognize the craftsmen as citizens in *poleis* in which they had no access to authority conflicts with Aristotle's principle that the good citizen must be able to rule and be ruled.¹ On the other hand, not to recognize the craftsmen as citizens raises the problem of how they should be described, since they are then neither citizens, nor metics nor foreigners. The first difficulty is not a real one; if craftsmen are not citizens, then the rule which Aristotle alludes to does not apply to them, since they do not govern but are only governed. Aristotle solves the second difficulty in this way: not all who are necessary for the existence of the city are citizens; even the children of citizens are not citizens, but future citizens; in some earlier communities all the craftsmen were slaves or foreigners; even today this occurs on a great scale; the extension of the property of citizen to craftsmen and to hired labourers is a question of the constitution; in an oligarchic constitution hired labourers do not become citizens though if they become rich; the craftsmen may become citizens – albeit with limitations on the attainment of office; finally, the offspring of parents one of whom is not a citizen are treated differently; generally there are gradations of citizens (εἶδη πλείω πολίτου) (1277 b 33 – 1278 a 35, cf. 1277 b 2).

The sixth definition of the citizen thus repeats the second; the comments which accompany it develop it further, throwing light on the citizen from the point of view of the non-citizens.

7 That there are gradations of citizens, continues Aristotle, is clear also from the fact that the full-citizen is the 'μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν', while the metic, according to the Homeric phrase 'ὡσεὶ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην', is 'ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων' (1278 a 35–38).

Μετέχειν τιμῶν is equivalent to the *μετέχειν ἢ κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῶν* of other definitions.²

8 At the end of the seventh chapter of the third book Aristotle encounters the following problem, which had been posed by others: should the legislator who wishes to draw up the most just laws look

¹ v. s., pp. 257–258.

² v. s., pp. 247ff, 252ff, 258ff.

after the interests of the best or of the greatest number of citizens? Just, observes Aristotle, must be considered to be that which has as its aim the interest of the polis as a whole and of all the citizens as individuals. He continues: 'and a citizen is in general one who shares in governing and being governed (ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι); he differs under different forms of government, but in relation to the best one he is a man who is able and willing to be governed and to govern with a view to the life in accordance with virtue' (1283 b 42–1284 a 3). In this passage the citizen is then described as he is in the fifth definition. The same idea is repeated in the seventh book although it does not receive the form of a definition (1332 b 11). On the other hand the nominal infinitive ἄρχειν in the definition we are discussing corresponds to the noun ἀρχή in the three first definitions and in the sixth. The fact that the citizens differ according to the regime was also noted before the first definition (1275 a 3), between the first and the second (1275 b 4–7) and between the sixth and the seventh (1278 a 17).

(b) THE NON-CITIZENS

We have seen how in the course of discussing his first and seventh definitions of the citizen Aristotle noted several categories of non-citizen which he used to illustrate the concept of the citizen. Non-citizens are also mentioned in other passages of the *Politics*. Here we shall arrange Aristotle's views on non-citizens by category in order to obtain a complete picture.

1. In describing in various places facts that he regarded as non-essential qualities of the citizens, Aristotle at the same time noted that they could be possessed by non-citizens as well. One did not become a citizen in virtue of the place one lived: metics and slaves lived alongside citizens but were not themselves citizens (1275 a 6–8). Nor was everybody who participated in a common system of justice a citizen, since the same right was given to non-citizens by virtue of commercial treaties (1275 a 8–11). The fact that non-citizens were indispensable to the life of the polis did not confer citizenship either (1278 a 3). It is implied that this was the case with the metics, foreigners, slaves and freedmen, mentioned earlier in the same passage. All these classes were strangers to the citizen body. In another passage of the *Politics* Aristotle states: 'it is manifest that property must belong to them (i.e.

the citizens), inasmuch as it is necessary for the tillers of the soil to be either slaves of barbarians' (1329 a 25). This is not a question of the restriction of the citizenship to those who owned land, but of the exclusion of slaves and barbarians from political rights.

2. Aristotle also mentions categories of citizens who in some constitutions did not have full rights while in others they did; thetes, craftsmen (1277 b 34ff, 1278 a 8–26, cf. 1328 b 34ff, 1329 a 19ff). One might also compare the descriptions *ἀρχόμενοι πολῖται* (1277 a 21–23, 1278 a 16) or simply *ἀρχόμενοι*, as distinct from full citizens (1277 a 32); the category of citizens who only have the right to vote but not to be elected (1300 a 15ff); finally other categories of people who might or might not be citizens, not according to the form of government but in virtue of a legal decision: those whose mother or father is not a citizen, bastards (1278 a 27–35). The non-citizens of these categories are defined as those deprived of the right of *βουλευεσθαι* and *κρίνειν* (1281 b 30ff). The non-citizen is then presented as the exact negative of the citizen according to the second definition, where he is described as one who possesses this right (*κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς*).¹ Minors, men deprived of civil rights, thetes, craftsmen, and those only one of whose parents was a citizen were potential citizens; minors would automatically become citizens once they reached the age of majority; for bastards and for those only one of whose parents was a citizen a special law was sufficient; in contrast, the extension of political rights to social classes or to professional categories was associated with constitutional reforms.

3. Connected to the citizen body, though they were not citizens, were women, young people, old people, all those who had lost political rights (*ἄτιμοι*) and political fugitives (1260 b 15–20, 1275 a 14–21, 1278 a 4–6). However, while all the definitions of the citizen given by Aristotle accord this quality only to men, there are two passages in the *Politics* which confer this description on women. 'Some in practice define the citizen as he who was born of two parents both citizens (*ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν*) and not only of one, whether father or mother.' Further down he says: 'It is not possible to apply the presupposition of parentage from a citizen, male or female, to the first settlers or the original founders of a polis' (1275 b 22–33). Women are called citizens

¹ v. s., pp. 220ff.

also in another passage with the same content (1278 a 28). It is clear that in these passages the term 'citizen' is employed in a wider sense than it usually has in the *Politics* and in other of Aristotle's works.

The citizen body is narrower than the *polis*. This is the reason why Aristotle might sometimes think of some categories of people as members of the *polis*, while elsewhere he distinguished them from the citizens: women (1269 b 15–22), craftsmen,¹ slaves.²

(c) THE ROLE OF ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΙ (CONSTITUTIONS, FORMS OF GOVERNMENT) IN DETERMINING THE CITIZENS AND NON-CITIZENS³

We saw above how on several occasions Aristotle took into account differences between forms of government in order to define the citizen. It is now necessary to examine the relevant passages in greater detail. (1) At the beginning of the third book, following the question of who is a citizen and preceding the formulation of the first definition,⁴ we read: 'There is often discussion as to this question: people do not all agree that the same person is a citizen; he who is a citizen in a democracy may often not be one in an oligarchy.' (1275 a 2–4). (2) Immediately after the first definition Aristotle stresses that there are different forms of government; of necessity therefore the citizens are accordingly different; thus a man who is a citizen in a democracy is likely to be, or not be, a citizen under other forms of government (1275 a 39–b 1). This reflection leads him to formulate the second definition of the citizen which would be valid for all constitutions.⁵ (3) In the remarks supporting the fourth definition⁶, he observes that the virtue of the citizen differs from one form of government to another. (4) In the introductory remarks to the sixth definition⁷ we meet this thought: 'since there are many forms of government, there are also many kinds

¹ v. s., p. 261.

² v. s., pp. 243, 247, 260ff.

³ Greek *πολιτεία* is usually translated 'constitution' or 'government' or 'form of government'. On the *πολιτεία* in Aristotle see the most recent remarks of E.Lévy, op. cit. 241ff, J.Bordes, op. cit. 249ff. For the *politeuma* see E.Lévy, op. cit. 239.

⁴ v. s., pp. 247ff.

⁵ v. s., pp. 252ff.

⁶ v. s., pp. 257ff.

⁷ v. s., pp. 258ff.

of citizen, and especially of citizen who is governed' (1278 a 15ff). 'Citizen who is governed' probably means a citizen who never becomes a magistrate.¹ (5) Within the last definition of the citizen² we read: the citizen is different from one form of government to another (1284 a 1). In all these passages it is understood that every form of government has different criteria for admission to the body of active citizens (those who might become magistrates). Aristotle elsewhere noted the existence of different criteria within the same form of government.³

The citizen is decisively associated with the type of government in other passages, too. (1) At the beginning of the second book we read: 'Of necessity, either all the citizens may participate in everything; or they may own nothing in common; or some things may be common property and others not. To have nothing in common is obviously impossible, since the *πολιτεία* (=form of government) is a kind of *κοινωνία* (=participation); everyone must first of all participate in a place; a single polis occupies a single place, and its citizens participate in the single polis' (1260 b 37–42). (2) Aristotle criticizing Hippodamus' constitution noted: 'The artisans, the farmers and the warriors all participate in the constitution. But the farmers have no arms and the artisans neither arms nor land, so that they become almost slaves of those who possess arms. To share in all the offices is impossible for them (for it is inevitable that generals and civic guards and the principal magistrates must be taken from the class of those who carry arms). Yet, if the artisans and the farmers have no share in the constitution, how can they be friendly towards it? But it may be said that those who possess arms must necessarily be stronger than both the other classes, which is not easily accomplished unless they are numerous; and if this be the case, why should the other classes share in the constitution and have power to appoint magistrates?' (1268 a 16–26). (3) In a passage in the fourth book, those who are not eligible for office, though they may be able to vote, are also regarded as citizens (1300 a 15ff). (4) In another passage, in the fifth book, Aristotle records the case of a citizen who formed a party of people 'ἐκτὸς τῆς πολιτείας' (1304 a 15–16). These people would not have been slaves nor even metics; a citizen

¹ v. s., pp. 260ff.

² v. s., p. 260.

³ v. s., p. 261.

could associate himself only with members of the social classes related to the citizens. (5) At one point in the seventh book, Aristotle stresses that in democratic constitutions everyone participates in every office, while in oligarchic regimes the opposite is true (1328 b 30). (6) At another point of the same book, he expresses the opinion that the virtue of a *polis* depends on that of the citizens who share in the constitution. He adds that under his own system all citizens would participate in it (1332 a 33–35). In both phrases which we set alongside each other the enlargement of the concept of ‘citizen’ to embrace those outside the constitution is implied; it thus includes those who have no access to power – a criterion, according to Aristotle, of the true citizen.¹

According to this criterion there should be no citizens in kingdoms, much less in absolute states. However, we read in two passages of the *Politics* that king’s armies are made up of citizens while those of tyrants are mercenaries (1285 a 26, 1316 a 7) and in another that an absolute monarch is the lord of citizens (1287 a 9ff). But in these three passages, as also in that immediately preceding, Aristotle uses the term *πολίτης* with a meaning wider than that which he himself defined in successive definitions. He did the same with his use of the term for women.²

Comparisons between and Recapitulation of the Definitions of the Citizen by Aristotle

The citizen is defined positively by Aristotle in several successive definitions as he who:

- 1 shares in power (*ἀρχῆς* or *κρίσεως* καὶ *ἀρχῆς*, in which *κρίσις* means the deliberative authority of the assembly and of the popular courts and *ἀρχή* the authority of elected officials);³
- 2 has the possibility of participating in political and judicial authority (*ὃ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς*);⁴

¹ v. s., pp. 252–256.

² v. s., pp. 261–262.

³ v. s., pp. 247–252.

⁴ v. s., pp. 252–256.

3 is defined by the fact that he is permitted to assume some kind of office (ἀρχῆν τινὶ διωρισμένος ἐστί);¹

4 is a partner (κοινωνός) of the *polis*;²

5 governs and is governed (καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν);³

6 has the right to participate in power or may be elected to an office (κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς, μέτεστιν ἀρχῶν);⁴

7 may be elected to an office (ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν);⁵

8 governs and is governed (ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι).⁶

The first definition applies to citizens of democratic constitutions; the second was formulated to suit those of oligarchic regimes; the fourth identifies the citizen body with the *polis*; the sixth is a paraphrase of the second; the fifth and eighth complement the definition with the self-evident fact that citizens who accept office do not keep it but return to the ranks of those who are governed; the third and the seventh require eligibility to office.

The non-citizen is defined by Aristotle, conversely to the citizen, as he who does not have the right to deliberate and to judge. The non-citizens are divided into potential citizens and metics or foreigners. Potential citizens are minors and all who will acquire political rights through a change of constitution or by law. The description of the citizen is exceptionally attributed to women and to subjects of monarchical states.⁷

The type of constitution is the decisive factor in the composition of the body of active citizens; however, certain people may be excluded by law from this body (persons deprived of their rights, bastards, offspring of a marriage between citizen and non-citizen).⁸

¹ v. s., p. 256.

² v. s., pp. 256–257.

³ v. s., pp. 257–258.

⁴ v. s., pp. 258–259.

⁵ v. s., p. 259.

⁶ v. s., pp. 259–260.

⁷ v. s., pp. 260–262.

⁸ v. s., pp. 262–264.

3. PARTS OF THE *POLIS*: PROFESSIONAL GROUPS, SOCIAL CLASSES, STATE ORGANS

The professional groups and social classes were also described by Aristotle as *μέρη* or *μόρια* of the *polis*. This division of the *polis* was not based on an analysis of the whole, as it was with its division into inferior *κοινωνία*¹ and into citizens.²

In his utopian republic Hippodamus distinguished three classes, craftsmen, landowners and warriors. Aristotle described these groups as *μέρη* of the *polis* and of the *demos* and then as *μόρια* of the *polis* (1257 b 30–33).

In the fourth book of the *Politics*, discussing actual constitutions, Aristotle picks out the wealthy, the poor and those between the two, as fundamental *μέρη* of the *polis*, the former being heavy-armed, the poor without armour; one portion of the common people is agricultural, another is engaged in trade and another is mechanic. He goes on to use repeatedly the terms *μέρη* and *μόρια*, without mention of particular groups. He finally lists as the *μέρη* of the *polis* the farmers, the mechanical class (τὸ βάναισον), the commercial class, the labourers (τὸ θητικόν), and the military class (1290 b 30–1291 a 7).

Later Aristotle mentions the professional classes regarded as indispensable by Plato. He adds to those of Plato the judges, the βουλευόμενον, the wealthy who contribute from their fortunes, and those who serve in the magistracies. All these categories, both Plato's and his own, Aristotle described as *μόρια* of the *polis*. He then observes that in many instances it is possible for the same citizens to be both soldiers (or βουλευόμενοι, magistrates or judges) and farmers (or members of other classes), while it does not happen that the same citizens are both rich and poor. Thus, he concludes, the essential *μέρη* of the *polis* would seem to be the rich and the poor; he adds that of all the *μόρια* of the *polis* these are the *μέρη* opposed to each other (1291 a 12–b 14). As we can see, throughout this extract the terms *μόρια* and *μέρη* of the *polis* were used of professional classes or categories on whom fell state duties (the warriors, βουλευόμενοι, magistrates, judges) and finally of the rich and the poor.

¹ v. s., pp. 244ff.

² v. s., pp. 246ff.

The distinction of the citizens into *μέρη* on the basis of property recurs in two other passages of the fourth book and in two of the fifth: 'in every polis there are three parts of the polis, the very rich, the very poor, and those between the two' (1295 b 2–3). 'It is necessary [for the preservation of the constitution] that the part of the polis that wishes the constitution to remain should be stronger than the part that does not want it. Every polis consists of quality as well as of quantity. By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth; by quantity, numerical superiority. Yet it is possible that the quality belongs to one part of the polis and the quantity to another; for instance that the low-born may be more numerous than those of noble birth, or the poor than the rich.' (1296 b 15–24). 'So also a polis is composed of parts, one of which often grows without its being noticed; as for instance the number of the poor under democracy and moderate constitutions.' (1303 a 1–2). 'Constitutions are also overthrown when the parts of the polis which are considered to be opposed to each other –the rich and the poor –become equal and a middle class scarcely exists, or is very small. This happens because if either of the two parts becomes much the superior, the other part is not willing to risk an encounter with a manifestly stronger opponent' (1304 a 38–b 8).

Professional groups or social classes are also described in other passages of the *Politics* as *μέρη* or *μόρια* of the polis but without being named. The same groups are also called *γένη* (1291 a 7, 1329 b 1) and it seems that they are alluded to as *ἀνόμοια εἶδη* which make up the polis in a passage in the third book (1277 a 6–10).

Aristotle maintains that a polis could not exist without *μέρη* (=social classes) (1261 a 23–24, 1264 a 25, 1277 a 6–10, 1289 a 14–19, 1328 b 2) and he saw that they had a role in the genesis of the various constitutions (1289 b 27ff, 1290 a 12ff, b 21–25, 1291 b 14, 1296 b 25–40, 1328 b 2), as well as in their preservation or reversal.

Although the passages of the *Politics* cited so far give expression to the idea that all social classes form parts (*μέρη* or *μόρια*) of the *polis*, a single passage of the same work states that craftsmen, and any other class that does not create virtue 'do not share in the polis' (1329 a 20). It is possible, however, that in this passage the term *πόλις* does not mean 'polis-state', but has another meaning: 'political rights'.¹ If this is

¹ v. s., p. 204.

the case we have here the idea that craftsmen and any other class that does not produce virtue do not share in political rights.

4. PARTS OF THE *POLIS*: STATE FUNCTIONS

We noted passages of the *Politics* in which the terms *μόρια* and *μέρη* indiscriminately describe the producing classes, socio-economic groups and state organs, such as the βουλευόμενον, the judges and the warriors.¹

In the seventh book the term *μέρη* is applied to the warriors, to those who deliberate about matters of policy and to those who judge law-suits (1329 a 3–5); the context shows that Aristotle here was not only referring to state functions but was aware of this fact. Indeed, he goes on to ask whether these *μέρη* could be assigned separately to different citizens or jointly to the same ones; and in the course of his answer he notes that each of these *ἔργα* (functions) demands a different kind of ability (1329 a 5–34). Both the question and the change of the description from *μέρη* to *ἔργα* clearly show that he did not mean social classes, but functions.

C. *POLIS* AND *POLITEIA* (CONSTITUTION, FORM OF GOVERNMENT)²

In many passages of the *Politics*, the concept of the ‘polis’ and the concept of the ‘politeia’ (constitution, form of government) come into contact and, as a result, are reciprocally defined. According to the context, the *politeia* is sometimes the same as the *polis*, sometimes it covers only part of the *polis*, and sometimes it intersects the *polis* in other ways.

Other passages connect the *polis* not with the constitution in general but with a particular constitution or constitutions.

¹ v. s., pp. 266ff.

² For the term *πολιτεία* cf. J.Bordes, *Politeia dans la pensée grecque jusqu’ à Aristote* (1982); Ph.Gauthier, *REG* 97 (1984) 523–530.

1. THE RELATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF *POLIS* AND *POLITEIA*(a) *POLIS* AND *POLITEIA* HAVE THE SAME CONTENT

The definition of the *polis* as the participation of the citizens in the *politeia*¹ combines the three concepts: that of the *polis* as the subject, those of the other two in the predicate. The latter presupposes another definition: citizens are those who participate in the *politeia*. On the other hand, Aristotle's analysis of the *polis* into 'parts = citizens' is equivalent to the definition of the *polis* as the totality of the citizens which was sometimes stated in connection with the same analysis.² We therefore arrive at two equations: (a) '*polis* = the totality of the citizens'; (b) 'citizens = those who share in the *politeia*'. Thanks to the term common to both equations, 'citizens', the two other terms, *polis* and *politeia*, coincide: the content of the *polis* is the same as that of the *politeia*.

A similar logical process and a similar result appear in a passage of the seventh book where it is said that a *polis* is virtuous when the citizens who participate in the *politeia* are virtuous and, in addition, that in the ideal constitution imagined by Aristotle all the citizens will participate in the *politeia* (1332 a 34–35). Here we have the equations: (a) 'virtuous *polis* = virtuous citizens'; (b) 'the citizens participate in the *politeia*'. As in the preceding case, the common term, 'citizens', equates *polis* and *politeia*.

In the second book, the *politeia* is defined as *κοινωνία τις*; it is later said that the object of *κοινωνία*, 'participation', is a place, the place τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως, and that the citizens are *κοινωνοὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως* (1260 b 40–42, cf. *Nic. Ethics* 1241 b 14).³ From this association it may be inferred that the citizens share also in the *politeia*, an idea which is expressed in the two passages to which we have just referred. The identification of the *politeia* with the *polis* occurs here through the intermediate equations: (a) 'πολιτεία = κοινωνία τις'; (b) 'κοινωνία τις = μία πόλις'; (c) 'πολιταί = κοινωνοὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως'.

Politeia is also defined as a *koinonia* in the third book (1276 b 30),

¹ v. s., pp. 227–229.

² v. s., pp. 246ff.

³ The term *κοινωνία*, predicate of *πολιτεία*, in the passage of the *Politics*, probably means 'participation'. It has been understood in this way by W.L.Newman, op. cit. II

where the idea that the aim of the citizens is the preservation of the *koinonia* (= of the *polis*, not of participation) is formulated.¹ Here we have three terms, *koinonia*, *politeia*, *citizens*, which are interconnected as follows: (a) '*politeia* = *koinonia (polis)*'; (b) 'the citizens are found within the *koinonia (polis)*'. It is not certain here whether the citizens are identified with the *koinonia (polis)* or are part of it, and thus whether the content of *polis* coincides or not with that of *politeia*.

(b) THE *POLIS* IS BROADER THAN THE *POLITEIA*

The coincidence of the contents of *polis* and *politeia* (constitution, government) in the preceding passages derives from the double equation: '*polis* = citizens; citizens = constitution'. In other passages, however, the *polis* is depicted as going beyond the citizens. The same passages do not repeat the equation 'citizens = constitution' but this is understood: only the citizens are found within the constitution, non-citizens are outside it. Thus these passages display the following logical scheme: the *polis* embraces non-citizens; [only citizens were embraced by the constitution]. The content of the constitution is, then, a part of the content of the *polis*. This occurs chiefly in the passages in which women, slaves, and categories of people excluded from the constitution in certain regimes, for instance craftsmen, are regarded as members of the *polis*. Similarly, the definition of the *polis* as a *koinonia* of freemen extends the *polis*, but not the constitution, to metics, and even to members of the families of citizens and metics.²

The idea that the *polis* is wider than the constitution is also to be understood from Aristotle's view according to which the *polis* is made up of families whose members include men, women, children and slaves,³ and also from the definition of the *polis* as a *koinonia* of masters and slaves.⁴ The description of women as citizens in three

(1887) 228, and J. Tricot, op. cit. I (1962) 84. E. Barker, op. cit., ad loc., translated *κοινωνία* as 'some sort of association'. O. Gigon, op. cit., rendered it as 'Gemeinschaft', and *πολιτεία* as 'Staat' – that is, as though Aristotle had *πόλις* in the place of *πολιτεία*.

¹ W.L. Newman, op. cit. III (1902) 156, regarded *πολιτεία* as identical with *πολιτική* *κοινωνία*, citing the passages 1260 b 27 and 1295 b 35.

² v. s., pp. 222–223.

³ v. s., pp. 244ff.

⁴ v. s., pp. 225–226.

passages of the *Politics* does not have any bearing on the question we are discussing; it merely enlarges, improperly, the extent of the concept 'citizen'.¹

In a passage of the third book of the *Politics*, *πολιτεία* (constitution) is identified with *πολίτευμα*, itself defined as τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων (supreme power in the *poleis*) which is made up in some *poleis* of a few and in other *poleis* of many. Constitutions are next divided into the right and the divergent; the former are those in which either one, or a few or the many govern for the sake of the common interest; the latter those where the one, or the few or the many govern according to their own interest (1279 a 26–31). It thus seems that *πολίτευμα* or κύριον τῶν πόλεων are the holders of power. And it is further implied that when power belongs to one person, that person is either a king or a tyrant; when it is assumed by few or by many, these persons are citizens defined in the same text as partners [in government] in harmony with the various definitions of the citizen given by Aristotle himself.² The content of *politeia* and the content of *polis* are correlated in this text by means of the following equations: (a) 'πολιτεία (constitution) = *πολίτευμα*'; (b) '*πολίτευμα* = τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων'; (c) 'κύριον τῶν πόλεων = all those who participate in government, be they a monarch or few or many citizens'. Since the *πολιτεία* (= *πολίτευμα*) is identified with the ruler or the citizens of a *polis* and simultaneously is its dominant element, it does not have the same content but corresponds to part of it. In addition, the contrast between a king or tyrant and the citizens implies the idea that the monarchs were not considered the equivalent of the citizenry under republican regimes. In other passages, however, Aristotle ascertains differences between royalty and tyranny, suggests some relation between the former and aristocracy, and admits that kings ruled over citizens. Kings govern according to law and over willing subjects, whereas tyrants rule despotically, over unwilling subjects, and do not render accounts (1285 a 4, 17–19, 25–29, b 4–5, 1295 a 15–17, 20–24, cf. 1312 b 24ff). Royalty comes near to aristocracy, while tyranny consists of extreme oligarchy

¹ v. s., pp. 261–262.

² v. s., pp. 247ff, 252ff, 256, 258ff, 259, 260.

and democracy (1310 b 3–4). Kings take their guards from among the citizens (1285 a 25–29). These three ideas accord with each other.

In assessing Hippodamus' plan for a constitution, Aristotle observed: 'if the cultivators of the common land are to be distinct both from those who cultivate their own farms and from the warriors, they will be a fourth part (=class) of the polis, holding no share in it but estranged from the politeia' (=constitution, government) (1268 a 38–40). Here, without doubt, we have the formula: (a) 'the polis will embrace landless farmers', (b) 'the politeia will not embrace landless farmers'. Hence we have also the idea that the polis is broader than the politeia. This idea, however, is not intended by Aristotle to reflect a true situation; it is put forward in a critique of a suggested constitution and formulated in the apodosis of a conditional sentence.

(c) OTHER ASSOCIATIONS OF *POLIS* AND *POLITEIA*

Some definitions of the politeia include the concept of polis in their predicate.

One of these describes the politeia as the way of life in the polis (1295 b 1).

Another, which has two variations, defines the politeia as the τάξις (ordering, organization, regulation) of the polis in respect of the magistracies and especially the magistracy that is supreme over all matters (κυρία πάντων). The first variation adds that the πολιτεύμα is everywhere supreme over the polis (κύριον τῆς πόλεως) and the πολιτεύμα is the πολιτεία; thus in democracies the people holds power, in oligarchies the few (1278 b 9–14). The second variation makes clear that 'τάξις of the polis' means 'how the competences between magistracies are distributed and what is the supreme power in the constitution (τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας)' and distinguishes the politeia (constitution) from the laws which have only a limited aim (1289 a 15–19). In this definition therefore the politeia is doubly defined; both as the 'ordering of the polis' and as politeuma.

The description ἡ τάξις τῶν ἀρχῶν is a shorter variation of the same definition given to politeia (1290 a 8). The polis is not mentioned but is implied, not only because it appears in the more detailed variations of the definition of politeia, but also because the polis is necessarily the area in which the politeia or the arrangement of magistracies functions.

Politeia is defined again as 'ordering' in another passage of the *Politics*; this time however, as the 'ordering' not of magistracies but of the inhabitants of the *polis* (τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων) (1274 b 39). The difference from the preceding definition does not mean an extension of the concept of *politeia*; the element which is given greater breadth now is the concept of 'regulation' which no longer concerns the *politeuma*, i.e. the holders of power, but all the inhabitants of a *polis*. This extension is reasonable, because the *politeia* regulates not only the power within the *polis*, but also the political and social position of those who do not participate in it but live on the territory of the *polis*.

A statement in the seventh book is different: 'since our present object is to discern the best constitution, and this is, namely, the one under which a *polis* will be best governed ...' (1332 a 4-8). Nevertheless, we again meet the concepts of constitution (*politeia*) and *polis* related to each other by means of the way in which the *polis* is governed.

2. ASSOCIATIONS OF THE *POLIS* WITH VARIOUS CONSTITUTIONS

(a) POSITIVE ASSOCIATIONS

We saw above that Aristotle first formulated a definition of the citizen in a democratic *polis* which he immediately modified in order to apply it to the citizens of oligarchic regimes as well.¹ Equally, the definitions of *polis* as a kind of *κοινωνία*, as a *κοινωνία* of citizens, as participation of the citizens in the *politeia*, as a composite whole of citizens, as a number of citizens,² and also the analysis of the *polis* into *μόρια*-citizens³ referred to both democratic and oligarchic *poleis*. In addition, other passages have been noted above in which the *polis* is associated with both these regimes.⁴ This also occurs in many other passages of the *Politics* which need not be cited.

Aristotle also linked the *polis* with monarchy — whether kingship or tyranny. From a more general viewpoint we must note that the *Politics*, the handbook dealing with the *polis*, does not consider only

¹ v. s., pp. 247ff, 252ff.

² v. s., pp. 220ff, 223ff, 227, 230, 231.

³ v. s., pp. 246ff.

⁴ v. s., pp. 268ff, cf. i. pp. 275ff.

democracies or oligarchies but also kingship (1284 b 35–1288 a 32, 1289 a 26ff, 1310 a 39–b 41) and tyranny (1285 a 18ff, 1289 a 26ff, 1293 b 22ff, 1295 a 1–23, 1310 a 39–1315 b 41) with abundant examples from *poleis* (and fewer from *ethne*). Moreover, there are many passages that refer directly to a *polis* governed by ‘one man’ or a ‘monarch’ (1284 b 13–15), more specifically a king (1252 b 19, 1284 b 37–40, 1285 a 2ff, b 14–19, 30–38, 1286 b 6–7, 22, 1288 a 30–31, 40, 1310 b 38–40),¹ even an absolute one (παμβασιλεία) (1286 b 34, 1287 a 9–12) or a tyrant (1281 a 11–14, 1284 a 26ff, 1286 b 38, 1310 b 17–18).² Furthermore, let us recall passages we have quoted above which mention ‘citizens’ under kings or tyrants. Although the term ‘citizen’ may have been used improperly in these passages,³ there is no reason for similar caution in the case of passages in which the term *πόλις* does not square with the citizens (the coincidence of the *polis* and of the citizen body holds good only in oligarchies and democracies), but probably means a type of state.

(b) NEGATIVE ASSOCIATIONS

In distinguishing constitutions into *ὀρθαί* and *ἡμαρτημένοι* or *παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν*, Aristotle stated that the *polis* does not belong with the latter because these are despotic whereas the *polis* is a *κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων* (1279 a 17–22). In the same discussion Aristotle cites as *ὀρθαί πολιτεῖαι* the kingship, the aristocracy and the polity (moderate democracy), as *ἡμαρτημένοι* the tyranny, the oligarchy (government of the few for the sake of their own interest) and the democracy (extreme democracy) (1279 a 34–b 10). In the first book of the *Politics*, Aristotle draws a sharp distinction between *βασιλικός* and *πολιτικός* describing the former as the one who governs as sole ruler and the latter as the one who takes turns to govern and be governed (1252 a 12–17). It is obvious that this distinction reflects the idea of incompatibility between *polis* (whence *πολιτικός*) and monarchy. In the *Oeconomicus*, Aristotle distinguishes four types of administration: those of a king, of a satrap (governor under a king), of a *polis* and of a private man (1345 b 14).

The view implied by all these passages manifestly contradicts that

¹ See also 1265 b 35ff, where Aristotle refers to views of other people.

² cf. Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* XVI 2.

³ v. s., pp. 264, 271–272.

mentioned earlier, according to which the *polis* may coexist with democracy (defined by the participation of many in power, thus covering both the polity and the democracy of the first passage quoted here), with oligarchy (defined by the participation of the few in power and thus covering both the aristocracy and the oligarchy of the same passage), and with the power of 'the one', whether king or tyrant: Furthermore, the dissociation of the *polis* from oligarchy and democracy clashes with the definitions of the *polis* as a *κοινωνία* of citizens which again are determined by their participation in the government of the *polis*.

That the *polis* cannot coexist with tyranny or with oligarchy or democracy does not appear in other passages of the *Politics* as Aristotle's own view. The separation of the *polis* from the oligarchy or from the tyrant, found in two places in the third book, is part of an opinion expressed by others (1274 b 35ff, 1276 a 7–9). Aristotle adopts the opposite view.¹

(c) THE *POLIS* CHANGES WITH EVERY CHANGE OF CONSTITUTION

The third book of the *Politics* opens with the problem of the nature of the *polis*. That this question should be posed is justified by the fact that there is no agreement as to whether the public actions of a tyrant or an oligarchic government should be regarded as the actions of the *polis* (1274 b 34–36). Aristotle does not immediately take sides on this question but, having momentarily defined the *politeia* as the *τάξις* (ordering, organization, regulation) of the inhabitants in the *polis* (1274 b 39),² he asks what is the citizen and proceeds to formulate the first two definitions.³ He next notes a practical definition of the citizen,⁴ states his own position on whether or not Cleisthenes rightly gave political rights to non-Athenians and embarks on the third definition of the citizen.⁵ Only then (1276 a 8ff) does he return to the problem of whether the actions of a tyrant or an oligarchic government are or are not those of the *polis*. He now formulates it in this way: some people

¹ cf. s., p. 185.

² v. s., p. 272.

³ v. s., pp. 247ff, 252ff.

⁴ v. s., p. 256.

⁵ v. s., p. 256.

ask, when does the polis act and when does a political action not emanate from it? What happens, for example, when the government has been altered from oligarchy or tyranny to democracy? He goes on: some people deny that the polis is bound to discharge public debts on the ground that the loan was borrowed by the tyrant and not by the polis; in general they regard as invalid for a democracy political actions or regimes which rest upon force and do not serve the common welfare. From there Aristotle is led to the problem of when a *polis* is the same and when it is different (1276 a 18). To answer this question, he examines and rejects various criteria; he finally introduces this one: the polis is a kind of participation and in particular it is the participation of the citizens in the politeia (1276 b 1ff). Hence he concludes that the polis changes every time that there is a change in the politeia: the continuity of the polis depends on the continuity of the politeia, not on its name, which may not change, even if the inhabitants happen to change. As to whether or not a polis is bound to respect engagements assumed by an earlier politeia, this is another problem (1276 b 2–15).

The view that the *polis* which became a democracy is not the same as the *polis* which previously had a different kind of regime, tyranny or oligarchy, is consistent with two of Aristotle's other ideas: that the *polis* is made up of its citizens (expressed in some definitions of the *polis* as well as in its analysis into parts-citizens); and secondly that the citizens of a *polis* are different from politeia to politeia. When the κύριον τῆς πόλεως is identifiable with one person, king or tyrant, the king or tyrant is the only citizen. Every change of politeia calls for a change in the composition of the citizen body which is the *polis*. The *polis* changes ontologically, while remaining unchanged historically.

A Synthesis of the Aristotelian Associations of 'Polis' with 'Constitution' and with Particular Constitutions

The concept of the *polis* according to Aristotle is, then, made clearer by means of correlations with the concept of πολιτεία (constitution, government) or with particular types of πολιτεῖαι.

Two different views on the extent of the two concepts have been noticed: (1) that the *polis* coincides with the politeia;¹ (2) that the

¹ v. s., pp. 269–270.

concept of the *politeia* covers only a part of that of the *polis*.¹ Each results from a different syllogism:

- (1) a. The *polis* is identified with its citizens;
 b. the citizens participate in the *politeia*.
-
- Polis* and *politeia* coincide; both are the citizens.
- (2) a. The *polis* includes non-citizens;
 b. only citizens participate in the *politeia*.
-
- The *politeia* covers part of the *polis*.

When Aristotle says that *politeuma* or the κύριον τῆς πόλεως may be one person, king or tyrant,² he is essentially thinking of the *polis* limited to a single ruler; which implies a third syllogism:

- (3) a. The *polis* is identified with its single ruler;
 b. only this single ruler participates in the *politeia*.
-
- Polis* and *politeia* have the same extent:
 the single ruler.

This syllogism is different from the first as to the extent of the *polis* and the *politeia*: it limits it to one person. Essentially, however, the first and the third syllogisms are identical. So they could be unified into one:

- (1+3)
- a. The *polis* is identified either with the citizens
 or with a single ruler;
 b. The *politeia* consists either of the citizens
 or of the single ruler.
-
- Polis* and *politeia* have the same extent:
 either the citizens or the single ruler.

Aristotle would thus appear to adopt two positions on the compatibility of the *polis* with different *politeiai*: on the one hand, he

¹ v. s., pp. 270–272.

² v. s., p. 271.

stresses that the *polis* can coexist with all kinds of *politeiai*;¹ on the other hand, he declares that there is no *polis* where there is a divergent *politeia*.² The first view runs right through the *Politics*; the second occurs only once. The idea that the *polis* cannot continue when the regime changes implies that those which have a tyrannical regime, i.e. a divergent *politeia*, are also *poleis*. So it is opposed to the second view and is consistent with the first.

D. THE *ΠΟΛΙΣ* IN RELATION TO THE OTHER *ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΙ*

The concept of the *polis* is finally defined by means of its relations with the *koinoníai* of which it is made up, and with the *ethnos*.

1. THE *POLIS*: *ΓΕΝΕΣΕΙ ΥΣΤΕΡΟΝ, ΦΥΣΕΙ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ*

We saw earlier that, according to Aristotle, the *polis* genetically follows the *koinoníai* which it contains, namely the villages or the clans, which in turn follow their own constituent parts, likewise *koinoníai*, the families. We also saw what the moving force for development was, again according to Aristotle. The families were formed of individuals, because people could not survive living on their own, nor could they achieve their natural destinies. Men and women come together by instinct to bring forth children. The natural masters and the natural slaves associate to carry out works indispensable for the survival of both, since the former are in a position to foresee and make plans but lack sufficient bodily strength to execute them, while the latter are capable of executing orders but not of directing an operation. Springing from one founding family, clans or villages retain their coherence in order to satisfy needs beyond the rudimentary daily requirements satisfied by the family. But even such *koinoníai* are not self-sufficient; in order to realize the highest degree of self-sufficiency, happiness, it is necessary for villages or clans to unite into broader and more composite *koinoníai*, with a greater number of people, the *poleis*.³

¹ v. s., pp. 273–274.

² v. s., p. 274.

³ v. s., pp. 220ff.

The progression from family to *polis* is necessary and unavoidable.

Granted that the aims of individuals, of families and of clans are achieved to the highest degree in the *polis* and through the *polis*, this does not produce a *koinonia* more composite and higher ranking than the *polis*. The *polis* is not part of a wider or higher whole. Aristotle did not ignore the *koina*, which were confederacies of *poleis*, since he himself described the 'constitutions' of many *κοινά*. From this fact it would appear that he regarded the *koina* as similar to the *poleis*; he did not see them as *koinoniai* ranking higher than *poleis*. Likewise Aristotle thought that the *ethnos* did not succeed the *polis* nor did it embrace it; he saw it as a *koinonia* parallel to the *polis*.¹

That the *polis* was not surpassed by any other *koinonia* does not mean that its existence was not threatened. The *polis* is a composite whole of dissimilars: of unlike persons (man and woman, master and slave), and also of different professional and social classes (1261 a 17–b 20). It could therefore cease to exist if the homogeneity of the citizens which Plato regarded as desirable were to occur. If the differences were absent, the *polis* would become like a family and eventually like a man.

The natural order of the *koinoniai* which we have mentioned above is the opposite of the genetic one: the *polis* is prior in nature to the clans or the villages, and these to the households, because naturally the whole precedes its parts. Aristotle adduces two proofs for this view. The first is an analogy: when a body is destroyed, the foot or the hand no longer exists. The second refers specifically and directly to the *polis* and to its parts: the simplest elements of the *polis*, the individuals, cannot live outside it; whoever cannot enter into partnership or has no needs because he is self-sufficient, does not become part of a *polis* but lives alone like a god or a wild beast (1253 a 19–29). The reversal of the natural order from the genetic is formulated epigrammatically in the *Physics*: τὸ τῆ γενέσει ὕστερον τῆ φύσει πρότερον (1261 a 214). To put the *polis* before the other *koinoniai* means that the *polis* existed as the natural destination of man even before it had been constituted. Concentrating successively into families and clans or villages, man first satisfied his elementary and daily needs, then something more than these, while also having others which could only be satisfied within the

¹ v. i., pp. 280ff.

polis.¹ Aristotle does not contradict himself when he places the *polis* sometimes at the end and sometimes at the beginning; he simply changes his angle of vision. Moreover, as the facts stand, one could say that in Aristotle's mind the *natural* order 'polis → clan or village → family → individual' is the very power which creates the *genetic* one 'individual → family → clan or village → polis'.

2. *POLIS* AND *ETHNOS*

Unfortunately, Aristotle did not give us even the most elementary definition of *ethnos*. He merely, on occasion, associates the *ethnos* with the *polis* as well as with the family.

In some passages of the *Politics* and other works of Aristotle, the terms *πόλις* and *ἔθνος* are employed in a way which implies that the *poleis* and the *ethne* were comparable entities (1295 a 33ff, 1310 b 55ff; *Nic. Ethics* 1094 b; *Rhetoric* 1386 b 9ff). This impression is confirmed by other passages which, taking the matter a step further, note either similarities or differences between *poleis* and *ethne*.

(1) A positive comparison between *polis* and *ethnos* appears in a passage of the third book of the *Politics* where it is said 'a fifth kind of kingship is that in which a single ruler is sovereign over all matters in the way in which every *ethnos* and every *polis* is sovereign over its public affairs' (1285 b 30–31). It follows that the *ethne* are equally sovereign with the *poleis*. The idea that there was some affinity between the *ethnos* and the *polis* is implicit in all the passages in which Aristotle, while dealing with the *polis*, cites evidence referring not only to *poleis* but also to *ethne*. It should be noted, moreover, that one passage of the *Politics* implies that the *ethne* had the same origins as the *poleis*. This is the passage in which Aristotle states his view that the kingship in both *poleis* and in *ethne* was a continuation of the monarchical authority enjoyed by the *paterfamilias* within the family (1252 b 19–20).

(2) The differences between the *polis* and the *ethnos* noted by Aristotle are quantitative, qualitative and historical.²

¹ v. s., p. 221.

² cf. R. Weil, *Aristote et l'histoire* (1960) 376ff; A.I. Dovatur, *Politika i politii Aristotelije* (1965) 7ff; W. Siegfried in *Schriften zu den Politika des Aristoteles*, P. Steinmetz (ed),

(a) The quantitative differences relate to the size of the settlement and of its population. Babylon, we read, resembles an ethnos more closely than a polis, since part of its population did not know of its fall until three days after the event (1276 a 28–30). In another passage it is said that a polis with a large population is like an ethnos (1326 b 4ff).

(b) The most characteristic qualitative difference between a polis and an ethnos resides in the fact that a polis is formed from villages that are politically unified, whereas an ethnos is still a simple aggregation of villages. Another qualitative difference is stated in the second passage referred to above relating to the size of the population. A polis consisting of too many people can certainly be self-sufficient but it will have the disadvantage of an ethnos in matters of administration: no general will be able to command its excessively large army, nor any herald be heard, unless he have the voice of the mythical Stentor (1326 b 4ff). A third qualitative difference is that the polis is composed of unlike men; a quantity of persons all alike does not make a polis. The parts of a whole must be of different kinds; accordingly, a polis surpasses in this respect even an ethnos of which the population is not scattered among villages but forms a unitary state like the Arcadians. The poleis are preserved by the exchange of services of equal value between its members, as already stated in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This principle also holds good between free and equal citizens because they cannot both rule and be ruled simultaneously (1261 a 23–34). In this passage Aristotle maintains, as he does elsewhere, that a polis cannot stand without economic and social classes, having previously criticized the Platonic view of the full equality of citizens in an ideal polis.¹ It is on the basis of this criterion, that the polis is compared by Aristotle to an ethnos no longer broken up into village communities, but united.² Thus Aristotle appears to believe that even a politically unified ethnos has not developed economic and social inequalities within itself.

(c) Aristotle also took into account the stage of historical

(1973) 244ff; R.Müller, in H.Kreissig, F. Kühnert (eds), *Antike Abhängigkeitsformen in den griechischen Gebieten ohne Polis-Struktur, Actes du colloque sur l'esclavage (1981)*, (= *Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur der Antike* 25) (1985) 49–55.

¹ v. s., pp. 225, 226, 229, 230.

² cf. W. Dittenberger, *GGA* (1874) 1376, W.L.Newman, *op. cit.* II (1887) 231.

development of the *ethnos* in comparison with that of the *polis*. From the constitutional point of view, he noted that the *ethne* were still ruled by kings, as the *poleis* had been earlier (1252 b 19ff). He made a similar observation with regard to economic development: the *ethne* are unaware of trade, but still exchange commodities for commodities (1257 a 23ff).

It is worth adding here Aristotle's uncertainty as to whether the Carthaginians constituted a *polis* or an *ethnos*.¹ When he is talking about institutions, he calls Carthage a *polis* (1273 b 12, 1293 b 15, 1307 a 5, 1316 a 34, 1320 b 4). In the only passage in which he includes Carthage amongst the *ethne*, he is dealing with customs (1324 b 13).

3. THE *POLIS* OUTSIDE THE GREEK WORLD

Aristotle cites many political institutions and situations in Carthage, and also amongst the Italians, the Tyrrhenians, the Celts, the Iberians, the Thracians, the Scythians and other peoples of the Pontus, the Persians, the Indians, the Egyptians, the Libyans and the Ethiopians (1262 a 20, 1272 b 24, 1275 b 11, 1280 a 36, 1290 b 5, 1293 b 15, 1310 b 38, 1311 b 38–1312 a 18, 1316 b 5, 1320 b 4, 1324 b 12, 1329 b 2–35, 1332 b 24, 1336 a 18, 1338 b 23, 1339 a 35), but uses the term *πόλις* only of Carthage. It seems therefore that, although he did not restrict the *polis* to the Greek world, outside it only Carthage was in harmony with his idea of the *polis*.

II. THE *POLIS* ACCORDING TO PROTAGORAS, PLATO AND THE STOICS

Not a single definition of the *polis* can be found in the surviving Greek literature earlier than Aristotle. There are only a few ideas held by Protagoras and Plato that give some indication of the picture each of them had of the *polis*.

¹ W. Siegfried, *Zur Staatslehre des Aristoteles* (1942) 3 = in P. Steinmetz (ed), op. cit. 44.

PROTAGORAS

The view held by Protagoras is recounted by Plato in the dialogue named after him. This is basically a theory concerning the creation of the *polis*, but within this framework we are given an opinion as to the condition *sine qua non* for the existence of a *polis* and also an assessment of this condition. It is possible to distinguish three phases of human history in Protagoras' statement: that prior to the foundation of polis-settlements, that between this event and the formation of polis-states, and the phase through which mankind has been passing ever since. During the first phase, men became aware of the existence of gods and began to worship them, acquired the ability to speak and constructed words, built houses, and learned to wear clothes and nourish themselves from the produce of the land. Their dwellings were scattered, however, and they were therefore unable to resist the attacks of wild beasts, not yet knowing the art of war, which is part of politics. In order to protect themselves against the wild animals they came together in groups and built cities. They then experienced another evil, however: they harmed each other, because they had not yet learned the art of politics; they therefore returned to their earlier way of life, with all its consequences. To save them from destruction, Zeus ordered Hermes to bring mutual respect and justice to men, so as to achieve order in the cities and cohesion between men through friendship. Zeus also instructed Hermes to see to it that all men were accorded mutual respect and justice, because otherwise there could be no polis; to secure this end, he was ordered to establish a law according to which anyone who was unable to conduct himself towards his fellow citizens with respect, and in accordance with justice, was to be condemned to death. This is the reason, continues Protagoras, why the Athenians listen to the opinion of every citizen on questions connected with political virtue. And later he states explicitly that political virtue includes justice and soundness of mind, a concept that seems to take the place of mutual respect (*Protagoras* 322 A–323 B). In this passage we may note ideas that can be found fully worked out in Aristotle. (1) The *polis* is formed as a result of necessity. (2) For there to be a *polis* it is not enough for men to dwell together. (3) A *polis* comes into being when there is political virtue. (4) The term *φιλία* is also used. Certain differences may be noted, however, the most important being: (1)

Whereas Protagoras attributed the creation of the *polis* to men's need to protect themselves from the wild beasts when they dwelt in scattered residences, and from the harm they caused each other when they dwelt together, Aristotle introduced the lack of self-sufficiency as the motive for the foundation of *poleis*.¹ (2) Whereas Protagoras saw in the *polis* an organization of individuals, Aristotle saw in it a process that began with the foundation of the family and progressed via the *genos* or the village to terminate in the *polis*.² Amongst these similarities and differences we may note a number of other relationships between the two: (1) Protagoras spoke of *κοινωνία* (participation), albeit on a different level from that on which it was placed by Aristotle; according to Protagoras, for there to be a *polis* everyone had to participate in political virtue, to which mutual respect and justice are contributing factors; according to Aristotle, the *κοινωνία* (participation) had as its object the 'good life' or 'perfect and self-sufficient life'.³ (2) Protagoras saw the *polis* as an organized community, even though he did not define it explicitly by means of an appropriate categorical term (like Aristotle's *κοινωνία*).

PLATO

Plato's ideas on the *polis* were set out in the *Republic* and the *Laws*. In both these works Plato, like Protagoras, set forth his views on the creation of the *polis*, and included amongst them his views on its essence. These views, however, already foreshadow those of Aristotle. In the *Republic* the long history of the creation of the *polis* begins with an express statement of the idea that the initial impetus was supplied by the fact that each human being on his own is not self-sufficient, but has many needs, and also of the idea that this state of affairs is the sole human motive in forming *poleis*. Here there is complete agreement between Aristotle and Plato. Plato goes on to expound the view that the satisfaction of men's needs, both original and acquired, involved a steadily increasing division of labour, beginning with the most

¹ v. s., pp. 220ff, 278ff.

² v. s., pp. 220ff, 278ff.

³ v. s., pp. 220ff, 225ff.

elementary specialities, progressing to those needed to secure a pleasant way of life, and ending with those that are an essential part of the true *polis*, which presupposes the existence of justice, security and competent administration; to this end there is a need for specialized soldiers and administrators (*Republic*, 369 A ff). During this account, Plato interprets the term *πόλις* once as *ξυνοικία* and the second time as *κοινωνία*. *Ξυνοικία* is used as a synonym for *οἰκησις* (369 C). *Κοινωνία* clearly has the meaning of association (371 B), as in Aristotle. Another Aristotelian idea, that a *polis* is composed not of equals, but of men between whom there were differences, is foreshadowed at another point of Plato's account (370 A–B). On the other hand, Plato differs from Aristotle and comes closer to Protagoras in deriving the *polis* directly from individuals, without the intervention of the family and the *genos* or village. Plato changed his mind on this point in the *Laws*, where he places settlements of autonomous clans (*gene*) and associations of clans in tribes between the droves and the *polis* (680 E–681 E).

THE STOICS

Today then, the Aristotelian definitions of the *polis* and the citizens are the earliest of their kind, though this does not imply that there were not earlier definitions which are now lost. After Aristotle, all we have are a few indirect reflections of definitions of the *polis* formulated by the Stoics. They may be divided into two groups, on the basis of the ideas expressed in them, though the two have certain points of contact.

1 According to Stobaeus, Cleanthes asked whether a *polis* is not a structure in which to dwell (*οἰκητήριον κατασκευάσμα*) of an urban character (*ἀστεῖον*), where justice is to be administered (*ἔστι δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν*). And he replied positively, on the grounds that a *polis* is, firstly a dwelling place (*οἰκητήριον*), secondly a system of humans (*σύστημα ἀνθρώπων*), and thirdly a reference of the settlement to its inhabitants (*κατὰ τὰ συναμότερα διὰ <τὴν εἰς> τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας ἀναφοράν*) (*SVF* 328). The same author elsewhere quotes only the question asked by Cleanthes (*SVF* 587), whereas Eusebius and Dio Chrysostomus have transmitted to us some versions of the reply.

Eusebius recorded two meanings of the polis: 'habitation', 'settlement' (οἰκητήριον) and 'system of the inhabitants including the citizens' (τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐνοικούντων σὺν τοῖς πολίταις σύστημα) (SVF 528). Obviously, the second point of this formulation is a contraction of the second and the third point of the first formulation by Stobaeus; at the same time, however, it stresses that a part of the inhabitants consists of citizens. Dio Chrysostomus limited the description of the *polis* by the Stoics to one point: 'an organization of humans' (SVF 1130).

2 Clemens has attributed to the Stoics the following definition: 'the polis is an important thing, and the demos an urban system and a multitude of humans (πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων) ruled by law' (SVF 327). Compared with the first definition in Stobaeus, this one, in addition to being even more succinctly formulated, exhibits some confusion; but on the other hand it provides a new element. Confusion is to be noted in the following points: (1) it is not the *polis*, but the *demos* which is described; (2) the description of the *demos* contains features attributed to the *polis* in the first description in Stobaeus, though differently combined: 'urban system' instead of 'urban settlement'; 'multitude of humans' instead of 'system of humans'. The view that the *polis* is an important thing, however, occurs in the first formulation by Stobaeus. The new element provided by the formulation by Clemens consists of the phrase 'ruled by law'. Although it corresponds to the 'administration of justice' in Stobaeus, it goes beyond it. Last but not least, we quote a description of the *polis* by Dio Chrysostomus 'a multitude of humans (πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων) dwelling together and ruled by law' (SVF 329). Two out of the three points of this definition, 'multitude of humans' and 'ruled by law', are shared by the definition in Clemens; the remaining point, 'dwelling together', corresponds to 'settlement' and to 'inhabitants' in Stobaeus and Eusebius. In the Stoic definition, then, the term πλῆθος appears to be more general and rather vaguer than in Aristotle, where it occurs with three different meanings, as we have seen: 'multiplicity or dissimilarity of citizens', 'the entire body or the composition of the citizens', and 'a sufficient number of citizens'.¹

Despite the differences exhibited by the Stoic definitions of the first

¹ v. s., pp. 229ff.

and the second group, there are two threads which unite them. The first thread leads from the perception of the *polis* as a 'system of humans' or a 'system of inhabitants including the citizens' to its description as a 'multitude of humans ruled by law'. In fact, a system of humans needs to be ruled by law and law guarantees the maintaining of such a system. The second thread leads from the association of the humans with a settlement to their living together.

The Stoic extension of the *polis* beyond the citizens is not alien to Aristotle's thought, which, as we have seen, sometimes includes in the *polis* categories such as the wives and children of the citizens, and even metics and slaves.¹ The undoubtedly new features, in comparison with the definitions of Aristotle, are community of place, and subjection to a common system of justice. Community of place is not anti-Aristotelian, however. Aristotle did not reject this feature; he merely stated that it was not a sufficient condition for the existence of a *polis*; the Stoic definition, too, is not content with community of place, but postulates unity of law. Unity of law, however, does not entail legal equality, but merely implies that common laws were in force within the borders of the *polis*, which in turn presupposes that they stemmed from a single source.

A SYNOPSIS OF THE CONCLUSIONS

As we said at the beginning, the *Politics* of Aristotle is an ontological, phenomenological and axiological study of the *polis*, both historical and ideal. During our review of the passages from Aristotle, we concentrated on the features relating to the historical *polis*. We encountered elements that were component features of the ideal *polis* only when these were mentioned in combination with features characteristic of the *polis* in history.

The factual elements in the *Politics* include observations relating to real situations by Aristotle himself or his informants, and also generalizations based on these observations. This material thus consists

¹ v. s., pp. 270ff.

of evidence that may be used by us in accordance with the established principles of criticism.

1. Aristotle referred to things with which he was familiar by means of terms whose meaning can be defined with great clarity: from the context; from comparison of different passages; and from the evidence of other ancient texts. I give here those terms that correspond to modern scientific concepts.

πόλις (= 'state' or 'kind of state')¹.

πόλις (= political rights)².

πόλις (= 'political life', 'public life').³

πολιτεία (= constitution)⁴.

πολίτευμα or *κύριον τῆς πόλεως* or *τῶν πόλεων* or *τῆς πολιτείας*
(= dominant element in the *polis*).⁵

ἀρχή (= 'authority', 'sovereignty');⁶ *ἄρχειν*, *ἄρχεσθαι*;⁷ *ἄρχων*, *ἀρχόμενος*.⁸

ἀρχή (= 'office', 'magistracy', 'position').⁹

ἄρχων,¹⁰ (= magistrate), *δικαστής*,¹¹ *ἡλιαστής*,¹² *ἐκκλησιαστής*,¹³

¹ v. i., pp. 289–290.

² v. s., pp. 202, 265.

³ v. s., p. 204.

⁴ v. s., pp. 233, 257, 262ff, 268–278.

⁵ v. s., pp. 250, 271. See also 1289 b 22: 'εἰ γὰρ εἶεν οἱ πλείους ὄντες εὐποροὶ κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν ἡ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος', 1281 a 12–14: "Ἐχει δ' ἀπορίαν τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. Ἡ γὰρ τοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους, ἢ τοὺς ἐπεικεῖς, ἢ τὸν βέλτιστον ἕνα πάντων, ἢ τύραννον'.

⁶ v. s., pp. 224, 247–251, 254, 255, 258, 264.

⁷ v. s., pp. 260, 265.

⁸ v. s., pp. 222, 261.

⁹ v. s., p. 248, 249, 251, 255, 256, 258, 260, 265.

¹⁰ v. s., pp. 248, 249, 252, 253.

¹¹ v. s., pp. 247, 248.

¹² v. s., p. 252.

¹³ v. s., pp. 247, 248, 252.

βουλευτικόν οἱ βουλευόμενον;¹ δικάζον;² βουλευέσθαι,³ δικάζειν.⁴
 πολίτης,⁵ ἄτιμος,⁶ μέτοικος.⁷
 ἐλεύθερος,⁸ δοῦλος,⁹ δεσπότης.¹⁰
 θῆτες, βάνουσοι.¹¹
 εὐποροὶ σφόδρα, ἄποροὶ σφόδρα, μέσοι.¹²

2. That the concept of *πόλις* in the *Politics* is identical with the concept of state, or is a sub-category of it, is clear from the following associations:

(a) The *πόλις* is defined as the most sovereign association;¹³ sovereignty is one of the basic features characteristic of the state.

(b) The *πόλις* has *πολίται*;¹⁴ the *πολίτης* is defined as one who takes part in the functioning of the *polis* either as ruler or as ruled;¹⁵ the Aristotelian *πολίτης* is therefore the same as the modern 'citizen', who exists and functions only within a state.

(c) The *πόλις* is governed in conformity with a system that is called *πολιτεία*; the Aristotelian context, and all other ancient passages reveal that the term *πολιτεία* means 'constitution'.¹⁶ The constitution falls entirely within the scope of the concept 'state'. It is worth noting,

¹ v. s., pp. 250, 251, 254, 255, 264, 266, 268.

² v. s., p. 251.

³ v. s., pp. 251, 252, 253, 261.

⁴ v. s., pp. 251, 252, 253.

⁵ v. s., pp. 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234, 235, 236, 237, 244–276.

⁶ v. s., p. 261.

⁷ v. s., p. 260.

⁸ v. s., p. 222.

⁹ v. s., pp. 228, 260ff.

¹⁰ v. s., p. 226.

¹¹ v. s., pp. 258, 266.

¹² v. s., pp. 266ff.

¹³ v. s., p. 220.

¹⁴ v. s., pp. 246ff.

¹⁵ v. s., p. 246ff.

¹⁶ v. s., pp. 233, 257, 262ff, 268–278.

moreover, that the *polis* is consistent with every kind of constitution.¹ The specific characteristic of the *polis* with reference to the general concept 'state', cannot, therefore, be defined in terms either of a preference for or an aversion to any particular constitution. The kind of constitution is the factor that determines the breadth of the citizen body.²

(d) The *πόλις* is governed by authorities (*ἀρχαί*), both collective and individual: popular assembly, council, courts and magistrates.³ These authorities exercise their 'authority' (*ἀρχή*)⁴ in three spheres: deliberative, judicial and executive;⁵ at any particular time, those ruling are distinguished from those ruled.⁶

(e) The *πόλις* is an independent economic area; only in this way can it aspire to become self-sufficient.⁷

(f) Within the *polis* there is division of labour (farmers, craftsmen), and social stratification at two levels: into free and slaves⁸ and, at the level of the free, into wealthy, poor and middle classes.⁹

(g) The terms *πολίτευμα, κύριον τῆς πόλεως, κύριον τῶν πόλεων, κύριον τῆς πολιτείας*¹⁰ denote that element which is politically predominant in the *polis*, depending on the constitution in force.

So far as the Stoic definitions of the *polis* are concerned, they coincide in both their ideas and formulations with modern definitions of the state, which place emphasis on the existence of a society organized under a common authority and on territoriality.¹¹

¹ v. s., pp. 273ff.

² v. s., pp. 246ff.

³ v. s., pp. 247ff.

⁴ v. s., pp. 248ff.

⁵ v. s., pp. 247–260.

⁶ v. s., pp. 257–258, 260.

⁷ v. s., pp. 221–222, 231–233.

⁸ v. s., pp. 222, 228, 260ff.

⁹ v. s., pp. 266ff.

¹⁰ v. s., pp. 271–273.

¹¹ v. s., pp. 68–69.

PART TWO

**WHENCE, WHEN AND HOW
DID POLIS-STATES RISE?**

Chapter One

THE ORIGINS OF THE POLIS-STATE

THE DEBATE

The scholars who have dealt with the question of the origin of the polis-state have followed one of two possible lines of thought: (I) the polis-state was the natural result of historical developments; (II) the polis-state was the product of political will – that is, it was formed deliberately and in accord with a plan.

I. THE POLIS-STATES DEVELOPED NATURALLY FROM EARLIER FORMS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

There are eleven different variations of this position.

1. EVERY POLIS-STATE ORIGINATED IN THE UNIFICATION OF VILLAGES OR GENE

This is the earliest view of all, having been advanced by Plato and Aristotle.¹ In modern times it has been supported by W.W.Fowler (1893), G.Glotz (1926, 1928), R.Cohen (1948), N.G.L.Hammond (1967), A.R.Burn (1968) and G. Huxley (1978, 1979).² Fowler and Burn both added that the villages that united to form polis-states had previously broken away from an *ethnos*, a feature which brings them closer to another view (the eighth in this series). Supporting arguments were put forward by Fowler, Burn and Huxley. The first maintained that the autonomous communities that still existed in the nineteenth century in India, Russia and Slovenia were a form of political organization older than the

¹ v. s., pp. 218ff, 276ff, 283.

² W.W.Fowler, *The City-State of the Greeks and the Romans* (1893) 23–52; G.Glotz, *Histoire grecque I* (1926, 1948) 125; idem, *La Cité grecque* (1928, 1953) 14; R.Cohen, *La Grèce et l'hellénisation du monde antique* (1948) 46; A.R.Burn, *The Lyric Age of Greece* (1968) 26; N.G.L.Hammond, *Epirus* (1967) 32; G.L.Huxley, in *Στήλη, τόμος εις μνήμην Ν.Κοντολέοντος* (1978) 258ff; idem, *On Aristoteles and Greek Society* (1979) 18–19.

state. These communities had the following distinctive features in common: firstly, the families that lived in them were related by blood; moreover, the village took the name of the ancestral family; secondly, the heads of the families formed a council that administered the community; thirdly, the land belonged indivisibly to all the families; fourthly, the community had a common cult. The same type of pre-state organization is seen by Fowler (1) in the autonomous villages referred to in the ancient Greek tradition as the earliest political organizations and as constituent elements of certain cities (those that resulted from a synoecism); (2) in the autonomous villages that survived into the historical period in some parts of Greece; and (3) in the villages and *gene* that made up the population of many ancient Greek polis-states. Burn and Huxley added a number of examples of the formation of ancient Greek states of this type, commenting that it was these examples, or others similar to them, that Aristotle had in mind.

2. EVERY POLIS-STATE ORIGINATED IN A STATE OF CLANS

A.Heuss traced (1946=1969) the origin of the polis-state, described by him as a 'state of citizens' (*Bürgerstaat*), to a 'state of clans' (*Geschlechterstaat*), and this to an undefined 'political order' (*politische Ordnung*) founded by a 'defensive association of kinsmen' (*genossenschaftliche Wehrverband*) after it had settled.¹

3. EVERY POLIS-STATE ORIGINATED IN A UNIFICATION OF PRINCIPALITIES

F.Kolb presumed (1984) that the *Polis* emerged out of united principalities which had been ruled either by kings or by aristocrats.²

4. EVERY POLIS-STATE ORIGINATED IN A VILLAGE COMMUNITY

Marx expressed the view that the polis-state or 'community of citizens-landowners' evolved from a pre-statal village community. This view has been followed by Marxists and by many non-Marxists. J.Hasebroek criticized it as merely a construction.³

¹ A.Heuss, *AuA* 2 (1946) 39ff = F.Gschnitzer (ed), *Zur griechischen Staatskunde* (1969) 58ff.

² F.Kolb, *Die Stadt im Altertum* (1984) 62.

³ J.Hasebroek, *Griechische Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (1931) 99-100.

5. THE POLIS-STATES ORIGINATED IN THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE MYCENAEAN DEMES, OR LATER DEME CONFEDERACIES

This phenomenon has been noted by many. It was developed into a theory of the origins of the polis-state, however, by G.Pugliese Carratelli, G.Maddoli and C.G.Thomas. The former (1961) put forward the following hypothesis: the migrations at the end of the Mycenaean period resulted in the dissolution of the Mycenaean states, but not of their lower echelons, which consisted of semi-autonomous demes governed by a *basileus* and a council of elders. The demes (δᾶμοι), freed from the suzerainty of the Mycenaean *anax*, became autonomous political societies, both in the regions where the invaders gained the ascendancy, and in the areas untouched by them. Thus, one of the former, Elis, was organized into demes, each of which was governed by a collective body, whose members bore the title βασιλεῖς; and an Archaic inscription from the Cretan polis-state Dreros refers to a body whose members were called δάμοι and were clearly analogous with the δαμιουργοί of other cities. In Attica, which was not entered by the invaders, the Mycenaean demes united, after a period of independence, to form the polis-state of the Athenians, involving, in some cases, intermediate unions of a few villages or cities.¹ Maddoli writes that the terms ἀναξ, βασιλεύς, γερουσία and δᾶμος, and also the institutions to which they referred, continued from the Mycenaean period into the historic period without a break and with no essential change; the fact that these terms and institutions were also known amongst the Dorians is to be explained by the hypothesis that they too had them as early as the prehistoric period. The first historical polis-states replaced earlier demes, inheriting their administrative machinery, i.e. the king and the council of elders; other early demes were united in confederacies, many of which are attested, and these were later transformed into polis-states. Maddoli analyses the Mycenaean institutions at great length and stresses the connection between these and the institutions reflected in the Homeric poems and appearing in the historical sources.² According to C.G.Thomas (1981), 'it is possible that the roots of the city-state, or some of them at least, extend back into the B.A. If this is the case, the Greek polis may be a distant relative of the ancient Near-Eastern city-state'. However, she points out the differences between the polis and the Mycenaean state and stresses that the polis was rather a continuation of the Mycenaean damos.³

¹ G.Pugliese Carratelli, *ANL Quad.* 54 (1961) 182–188.

² G.Maddoli, *SMEA* 12 (1970) 57.

³ C.S.G.Thomas, in R.Griffith and C.S.G.Thomas (eds), *The City-state in Five Cultures* (1981) 32ff.

6. THE POLIS-STATES ORIGINATED IN THE UNIFICATION OF TRIBES

This view was propounded by Fustel de Coulanges (1864). It is a modification of the view of Plato and Aristotle referred to above, which is tacitly based on the circumstance that the Attic *gene* were divisions of phratries, the phratries of tribes, and that the tribes were the basic division of the Athenian people.¹ A.Momigliano saw traces of tribes older than the polis-states and independent of them in the Dymanes in Locris and the Dorian tribes that dwelt apart in Rhodes and Crete (1961).² D.Roussel attacked this view (1976), using the following arguments: (a) the *ethne* had no tribes, phratries or *gene* (as noted by M.Weber, and A. Heuss); (b) Greek tradition ascribed the founding of the tribes to lawgivers, who worked within the framework of polis-states; (c) the view that the *gene*, phratries and tribes of the Greeks were connected with formations that are found in some of the societies studied by anthropologists is unfounded; (d) a long period of time separated the tribes of the Ionian and Dorian polis-states from the tribal societies.³

K.J.Neumann, K.J. Beloch and G.De Sanctis do not belong here, since their view is that the tribes formed ethnos-states, from which the polis-states sprang.⁴

7. THE POLIS-STATES WERE THE RESULT OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF *ETHNE*

In contrast to Aristotle, M.Defourny asserted (1932) that families, *gene* and villages never existed outside the framework of broader societies, but were created within the *ethne*, which were transformed into polis-states after certain economic and social developments had taken place: the division of labour between specialized producers and the formation of a central authority. The fact that some polis-states were formed by the unification of villages is advanced as a supporting argument.⁵

8. THE POLIS-STATES DERIVED FROM PARTS OF *ETHNE* THAT BROKE UP

K.J.Neumann (1906), U.von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1910=1923), K.J.Be-

¹ Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité antique* (1864) book III chap. 4.

² A.Momigliano, *ANL Quad.* 54 (1962) 190 = *Terzo contributo alla storia degli studi classici* II (1966) 726.

³ D.Roussel, *Tribu et cité* (1976) 5-6, 180.

⁴ K.J.Neumann, *HZ* 96 (1906) 1-80; K.J.Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* I 1, 2nd edn (1913) 95ff; G. de Sanctis, *Ἀρχαία* (1912) 54.

⁵ M.Defourny, *Aristote, Etude sur la Politique* (1932) 438ff, 450ff.

loch (1912), G.De Sanctis (1912), B.Keil (1912), J.Kaerst (1901=1916=1927), E.Barker (1918), V.Ehrenberg (1929, 1957=1960=1976, 1983), F.Taeger (1939=1958), G.Gianelli (1948=1951=1954=1961=1967=1983), F.Walbank (1950), J.A.O.Larsen (1950), H.Bengtson (1950=1960=1960=1969=1977), M.Sordi (1952), F.Gschnitzer (1955, 1971), Ch.G.Starr (1961), M.Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet (1972=1977), and the present writer (1971=1971) have all put forward the view that the polis-states were founded by fragments of *ethne* in one way or another. The supporting arguments fall into two categories. On the one hand, it has been argued that the polis-state preserved a number of structures and institutions of the *ethnos* (argument a); more specifically, it has been stressed that the polis-states assigned important functions to the *gene*, the phratries and the tribes; all of these are to be found in the *ethnos*, and their nature resembles that of the *ethnos* and differs from that of the polis-state, which is based on local ties (argument b); it has also been emphasized that the polis-states inherited from the *ethne* the combination of three constitutional bodies, king, council and popular assembly (argument c). On the other hand, importance has been attached to the survival into the historical period of *ethne* in the more conservative parts of Greece (argument d) and to the attested fact that some polis-states arose within *ethne* (argument e).¹

Of the scholars mentioned above, V.Ehrenberg explicitly distinguished between the ethnos-state and the *ethnos* in the sense of a 'tribe, tribal community', and regarded the latter as the common ancestor of the ethnos-state and the polis-state.² He noted, moreover, that 'occasionally, neighbouring

¹ U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen*, in P.Hinneberg (ed), *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, II 4,1 (1910) 41–44 = 2nd edn (1923) (non vidi) (argument b); B. Keil, *Griechische Staatsaltertümer*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden, op. cit. III 3 2nd edn (1912) 306 (argument b); J. Kaerst, *Geschichte des Hellenismus I* (1901) = 3rd edn (1927) 2 with note 1 (argument a); E.Barker, *Greek Political Theory* (1918, 1970) 29–32; V.Ehrenberg, *Gnomon* 5 (1929) 7 (argument b); idem, *Der Staat der Griechen I* (1957) 18 = *The Greek State* (1960) 24 = *L'état grec* (1976) 54 (argument d); F.Taeger, *Das Altertum I* (1939) 145–150 = 6th edn (1958) 145–150 (arguments b, c, e); W.F.Walbank, *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques* (1950) I, 267; J.A.O.Larsen, *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques* (1950) I, 392–393 (argument d); H.Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte* (1950) 56–57 = 5th edn (1977) 58–59; M.Sordi, *Acme* 6 (1953) 432 (arguments a, c); F.Gschnitzer, *WS* 68 (1955) 123, 138ff; idem, *Chiron* 1 (1971) 1; Ch.G.Starr, *The Origins of Greek Civilization* (1961) 324, 336, 338, 342; G.Giannelli, *Trattato di storia greca*, 5th edn (1967) 99; M.Austin, P.Vidal-Naquet, *Economies et sociétés en Grèce antique* (1972) 93= *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece* (1977) 79. A.M.Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece* (1980) 27ff, indirectly accepts this view, whereas on p. 25ff explicitly states the opposite.

² V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1957) 18 = (1960) 24 = (1976) 53–54.

settlements united to form a joint village community . . . which in "citadels of refuge" might possess common places of safety in times of war'.¹ He thus came close to the view of Fowler and Burn, that the polis-state originated in the unification of villages that had previously broken away from an *ethnos*.²

D.Roussel (1976), G.K.Vlachos (1974=1981), and M.I.Finley (1985), totally oppose the idea that the creation of the polis-state was in any way connected with the *ethnos*.³

9. THE POLIS-STATES RESULTED FROM THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MYCENAEAN STATES

We saw above that G.Pugliese Carratelli and G. Maddoli considered the polis-state to have derived from *damoi* (village communities) or the Mycenaean states.⁴ And we shall see below that V.Ehrenberg regarded the Homeric societies as the immediate precursors of the polis-states, and the Mycenaean kingdoms as the ancestors of the Homeric societies.⁵ There is also a view, however, that links the Mycenaean state directly with the polis-state. This was propounded by C.S.G.Thomas (1977), based on the following line of argument: the polis-states contained organs of government that were survivals from the Mycenaean states; the Mycenaean term *damos*, Att. *demos*, continued to be used to mean village, and also popular assembly; the double kingship at Sparta may possibly have sprung from the Mycenaean pair *anax* and *lawagetas*; the Mycenaean title *basileus*, which designated a junior official, came to mean the supreme magistrate in post-Mycenaean states; another Mycenaean title, *telestas*, occurs in Elis in the historical period as the title of a magistrate, and in Cameirus as a personal name; these survivals of Mycenaean elements in Dorian regions are to be explained in terms of Chadwick's thesis that the Dorians were part of the population of the Mycenaean states.⁶ A similar position is adopted by G.K.Vlachos, who believes that the polis-state was founded 'in the radically changing area of the old Achaean principalities'.⁷

¹ V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1957) 18 = (1960) 25 = (1976) 55, and already in *Der Griechische und der hellenistische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* III 3 (1932) 10.

² v. s., pp. 293ff.

³ D.Roussel, op. cit. 3ff; G.C.Vlachos, *Les sociétés politiques homériques* (1974) 289 = *Πολιτικές κοινωνίες στον Όμηρο* (1981) 286; M.I.Finley, in *XVIth ICHS, Reports, I* (1985) 257-258 = *Ancient History* (1985) 90-93.

⁴ v. s., p. 295.

⁵ v. i., p. 299.

⁶ C.S.G. Thomas, *Minos* n.s. 16 (1977) 208-217.

⁷ G.C.Vlachos, loc. cit.

10. THE POLIS-STATES RESULTED FROM THE TRANSFORMATION OF HOMERIC STATES

This view was formulated by V.Ehrenberg (1921), along with the idea that the Homeric type of state sprang from the Mycenaean. As proof, he pointed to the continuity of two state bodies, the king and the council of elders.¹ P. Lévêque (1981) also believes that the polis-state was created directly out of the Homeric state.² Ch.G.Starr conjectured (1961) that the immediate precursor of the polis-state was some kind of small kingdom that grew out of the Homeric state.³

11. THE POLIS-STATES WERE SOMETIMES THE RESULT OF THE UNIFICATION OF VILLAGES AND SOMETIMES FOUNDED DIRECTLY

E.Meyer (1893), G.Busolt (1920), H.Bengtson (1950=1960=1960=1969=1977) and N.G.L.Hammond (1959=1967) attributed the creation of the polis-states to two causes: in mainland Greece they derived from confederacies of villages, detached from their own *ethne*; overseas, states that coincided with a settlement might possibly be founded directly. The former phenomenon is attested; the latter may be conjectured.⁴

II. THE POLIS-STATE WAS THE PRODUCT OF POLITICAL WILL AND UNRELATED TO ALL EARLIER TYPES OF SOCIETY

This thesis was formulated long ago by M.Weber (1922, 1924), and more recently by D.Roussel (1976). The arguments of the former consist of the observation that the division of the citizens into tribes is attested only in polis-states, never in *ethne*, and of the judgement that this division seems artificial and rationalistic. However, the great German sociologist, taking into account the fact that even the Cleisthenic tribes, which were the work of a known

¹ V.Ehrenberg, *Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechenland* (1921) 126ff. cf. also the definition of *polis* in the same work (above p. 31).

² P.Lévêque, *PM*, no. 14, January-March (1981) 6; idem, *La Pensée*, no. 217/218 (1981) 24.

³ Ch.G.Starr, *Historia* 10 (1961) 131.

⁴ E.Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, II (1893) 330f = 2nd, 3rd, 4th edn III (1937) 301f; G.Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde* I (1920) 154; H.Bengtson, op. cit. (1950) 72 = 5th edn (1977) 80; N.G.L.Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* (1959) 98-99 = 2nd edn (1967) 98-99.

lawgiver, were formed not on a local basis, as one would have expected, but as though they were kinship groups, felt obliged to acknowledge that Cleisthenes might have acted this way under the weight of tradition; he stressed immediately, however, that this does not mean that the Greek polis-state evolved from a tribal society, but that Greek thought was not yet rationalistic enough.¹ The arguments used by Roussel revolve around the following axes: the Greek polis-state was an aggregate not of groups but of individuals; those groups that were called *gene*, phratries and tribes had no past; the Greek *gene* did not resemble the groups that have been studied by social anthropology, but were groups of related families; the phratries were no older than the Homeric poems; tribes are found only amongst the Ionians and the Dorians, and there is nothing to show that they were older than the dissolution of the Ionian and Dorian *ethne*; furthermore, the phratries and the tribes appear to be artificial, and the latter spread from city to city like a fashion.²

Comments

1. The problem of the origins of the polis-state has been generally approached in an abstract way. Only D.Roussel has taken individual polis-states into account.

2. The two general trends, one seeing the polis-state as deriving from one or another earlier type of social group, and the other considering it to be the product of political will, denying any link with the past, are diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive.

3. Those hypotheses that have in common the fact that they refer the origins of the polis-states to an earlier type of political society are, for the most part, also presented in a mutually exclusive way. There are few exceptions: Ehrenberg (8 and 10), Starr (8 and 10), Bengtson (8 and 11).

4. The existence of a large number of rival theories is an indication of the inadequacy of the proof adduced to support each one of them and to refute all the others. This inadequacy is due to the lack of any extensive research into the issue, and to errors of methodology.

5. Errors of this kind abound in the work of D.Roussel. I here note

¹ M.Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (1922) 220ff; idem, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1924) 96.

² D.Roussel, *op. cit.* 5ff, 42 and alibi.

only those which are involved in his main line of approach and therefore undermine his main conclusions. (i) He concerned himself with the problem of whether the polis-state originated in the tribal society or not, instead of considering the wider problem of the origins of the polis-state without any preconceived limitation.¹ He thus excluded *a priori* other possible origins and left them uninvestigated. (ii) He did not adopt a firm position on the concepts 'tribal society' and 'ethnos': in some places he disapproves of the rendering of the term ἔθνος by the expression 'tribal society',² or defines it as a 'non-centralized political society',³ while in others he describes it as a kind of organization without a state machine and contrasts it with the 'political society', adding that the lack of a state machine is a characteristic feature of 'tribal societies', thereby identifying 'ethnos' and 'tribal society'.⁴ (iii) In his attempt to demonstrate that the phratries and the tribes were not inherited by the polis-states but were created within them, he made defective use of the evidence and drew erroneous conclusions.⁵

¹ D.Roussel, *op. cit.* passim, esp. 30, 93, 102, 129, 130, 140, 157, 162, 169, 198, 213, 237, 258, 259.

² D.Roussel, *op. cit.* 3.

³ D.Roussel, *op. cit.* 132.

⁴ D.Roussel, *op. cit.* 4.

⁵ The above, and other, methodological weaknesses in Roussel's book are noted in an essay on which I am working, *Phratries and Tribes in Greek Polis-States* (forthcoming).

A NEW INVESTIGATION

In order to deal with the problem of the origins of the polis-state, we must firstly bear in mind its definition and secondly examine all the known cases of the creation of a state of this type.

As far as the former condition is concerned, the reader is reminded that: (1) the *polis* was a kind of state related to a community, which had either founded the state in question, or had been formed by it; (2) in either event, this community was defined, both objectively and subjectively, with reference to a polis-settlement; (3) this was a settlement that was characterized by the fact that it was situated beneath a stronghold.

As for the second condition, I shall now present the results of an investigation covering all the polis-states whose origins are known or can be conjectured. Polis-states that were colonies of other polis-states are naturally not taken into consideration. The results of this research show that the polis-state had a variety of origins.

A. POLIS-STATE FOUNDED
BY AN INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY

1. POLIS-STATE FROM A UNITARY COMMUNITY

Many polis-states were founded by migrants of various kinds: invaders, refugees and colonists. The groups of invaders came from the Greek *ethne* that moved from their homelands to other areas between 1125 and 950 B.C. The refugees were displaced by these invaders, or by conquerors at a later date. The colonists set forth from a permanently established community (in this respect they resembled the refugees and differed from the invaders) without any external pressure (in this respect they resembled the invaders and differed from the refugees).

The *ethne* from which the groups of refugees came had no state organization. They did, however, have some form of pre-statal structure. This conclusion is suggested for the Dorian groups by the following observations: (a) Despite the fragmentary nature of the

available evidence, many of the Dorian polis-states exhibit, sometimes in a complete, unaltered form, sometimes not, a division of the citizens into groups with two common features: three tribes are involved; these always have the same names: Hylleis, Dymanes, Pamphyloi.¹ (b) All the royal families in the Dorian polis-states mentioned in the sources derive their descent from Heracles. It appears, therefore, that before they broke away from the *ethnos*, all the Dorian groups were organized in conformity with a common pattern, the features of which were that it included members of all three Dorian tribes and was ruled by a Heracleid. The same picture is true of the conditions under which were formed the groups of refugees that set forth from Attica: (a) The division attested for Attica and some of the Ionic polis-states is four-fold, and the four tribes everywhere have the same names: Aigicoreis, Argadeis, Geleontes and Hopletes.² (b) According to the local traditions, several Ionic polis-states traced their foundation to groups that were formed in Attica and placed under the leadership of men referred to by name.³

The groups of refugees, by contrast, moved in an unorganized fashion and had no leaders. This information is also derived from some of the traditions of the Ionic polis-states.⁴

The groups of invaders, and some of the groups of refugees and colonists (those that came from *ethne* at a pre-political stage), had no experience of a state. The remaining groups of refugees and colonists had experience of a state, but not of a polis-state. Decisive events intervened between the state with which they were familiar and the polis-state that they founded, more so in the case of the groups of refugees than in the case of the groups of colonists. Firstly, wherever there was an invasion, the local landowners lost their economic base. Secondly, the dangers and the struggles attendant upon the migration brought the members of the community closer together. Thirdly, the territory conquered overseas was distributed to all the men. The colonists, who set out under settled conditions, retained their social distinctions, but the economic ones were abolished. The landowners ceased to own property the moment they embarked on the ships, if not

¹ *ibidem*.

² *ibidem*.

³ M.B.Sakellariou, *La migration grecque en Ionie* (1958) *passim*.

⁴ M.B.Sakellariou, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

even earlier, at the point they decided or were obliged to become members of the migrant group.¹ When the group settled in its new home, plots of land were also given to those that had been landless in the motherland. As a result, those groups of refugees or colonists that came from societies with class distinctions, which had some experience of a state, were converted into classless communities without a state mechanism, becoming in this respect more like the groups of invaders or of refugees and colonists that came from pre-political societies.

Whatever their origin, and whatever the conditions under which they migrated, the new communities were autonomous and independent from the outset, but they did not acquire a state mechanism until they were faced with conditions that made this necessary. A pre-political community was capable of distributing land, slaves and booty, and of organizing settlement, the exploitation of the natural resources and defence. A state mechanism, and the ideology attendant upon it, evolved in any given society only when class differences came into existence.²

The states created by these communities were of a new type; they also differed from the pre-political *ethne*. It was therefore necessary for them to be distinguished by a new appellative. The one that came to be used was the appellative *πόλις* describing a kind of settlement, since this seemed to be the feature characteristic of the new type of state.

Just as the type of state was known by an appellative that indicated a type of settlement, so, probably at an earlier date, each community took the name of the inhabitants of the settlement: Corinthians, Argives, Milesians, Ephesians. The ethnic names, Dorians, Ionians etc., continued to be used by the peoples in question to indicate their remote origins and the broader group to which they belonged, their awareness of this deriving not only from the traditions, but also from survivals of cults, customs and structures and above all, of dialect.

A group of Dorians settled at Corinth; its leader founded a dynasty that survived until it was overthrown by Cypselus.³ Archaeological

¹ cf. the well-known decree of the Theraeans arranging the expedition of colons to Cyrene (*SGHI* I (1969) 5, lines 24–51).

² v. s., pp. 68–69 and i., pp. 345–346, 394–419, 436–470.

³ Pausanias II 4, 3–4.

evidence indicates that Corinth was occupied by Dorians within the Submycenaean period (1125-1050 B.C.), and that the other settlements in the historic Corinthia are later.¹ Corinth, was a polis-settlement from the beginning, since it was protected by Acrocorinth.² The Corinthians later spread to other settlements that were founded by them; they also incorporated a small community of Lapiths who, after helping the Dorians to capture Corinth, were settled at Petra.³ These Lapiths were a fragment of a pre-Dorian *ethnos*. All the settlements in Corinthia, apart from the polis Corinth, were villages of the polis-state of the Corinthians. The dating and the circumstances of its foundation are dealt with in the two following chapters.

Argos, Mycenae, Tiryns and Nauplia, all polis-settlements according to the ancient definition, were also seized by the Dorians by the end of the Late Mycenaean period.⁴ The communities settled at each of these places founded states.⁵

Four settlements in the Argolis emerged in the historic period with a population of Dryopes: Hermione,⁶ Eion,⁷ Asine,⁸ and Dryope.⁹ Only the occupation of Asine by them is dated: it is assigned by archaeological evidence to the Submycenaean period.¹⁰ The Dryopes had lived at an earlier date in central Greece.¹¹ Two of these settlements, Asine and Hermione, became the seats of polis-states.¹²

¹ R.Hope Simpson, O.T.P.K.Dickinson, *A Gazetteer of Aegean Civilisation in the Bronze Age I* (1979) 61ff.

² v. i., p. 398.

³ Herodotus V 92b.

⁴ R.Hope Simpson, O.T.P.K.Dickinson, *op. cit.* 28, 41, 43, 48.

⁵ v. i., pp. 436-444.

⁶ Herodotus VIII 73; Diodorus IV 37, 2. cf. Nicolaus Damascenus 90 *FGrH* 30 = *Exc. de Ins.* 9, 5 (with my comments in *Peuples préhelléniques d'origine indo-européenne* (1977) 274).

⁷ Diodorus IV 37, 2; Strabo VIII 6, 13.

⁸ Herodotus, *loc. cit.*; Aristotle, fr. 441 Rose = Strabo, *loc. cit.*; Diodorus, *loc. cit.*; Strabo, *loc. cit.*; Pausanias IV 34, 9-11; *Etym. Magn.* s.v. Ἀσινεῖς. cf. Nicolaus Damascenus, *loc. cit.* (and comments referred to above n 6).

⁹ Herodorus 31 *FGrH* 36 = Stephanus Byz., s.v. Δρυόπη.

¹⁰ R.Hope Simpson, O.T.P.K. Dickinson, *op. cit.* 49; Κ.Θ.Συριόπουλος, *Εἰσαγωγή εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἐλληνικὴν ἱστορίαν I* (1983) 144.

¹¹ Aristotle, *loc. cit.*; Diodorus, *loc. cit.*; Strabo, *loc. cit.*; Pausanias, *loc. cit.*; *Etym. Magn.* *loc. cit.*

¹² M.B.Sakellariou, *Peuples préhelléniques d'origine indo-européenne* (1977) 275-276.

We learn from Strabo and Pseudo-Scymnus, who used Ephorus as their source, that Sicyon was colonized by Dorians led by Phalces.¹ Pausanias recorded two other details: Phalces was a son of Temenus, leader of the Dorians who conquered Argos, and Sicyonia was part of the kingdom of Argos.² The additional information given by Pausanias is refuted by archaeological evidence, which suggests different conclusions as to the date at which Sicyon was colonized by the Dorians, and also as to the manner in which they were organized before the founding of the polis-settlement of Sicyon and the polis-state of the Sicyonians. Indeed, the polis-settlement of Sicyon is attested archaeologically from the Archaic period, and other settlements in Sicyonia date from the Geometric period.³ To the extent that we may rely on this data, we may conjecture that: the Dorians who invaded Sicyonia did not build any settlements before the Geometric period; until then they will have been organized in pastoral groups that sheltered together with their flocks in temporary quarters; the founding of settlements during the Geometric period marks the transition of a large part of this population from a pastoral to an agricultural economy. For the organization of the Dorians of Sicyonia in the period between the founding of the villages and the founding of the polis-settlement of Sicyon, we may choose between two models: either the villages corresponded with independent communities throughout this entire period or, sooner or later, these communities formed a confederacy of villages. The latter hypothesis seems the more probable, since the foundation of the polis-settlement of Sicyon can only have been the work of social forces that resided in all the villages of Sicyonia. The circumstances in which this step was taken will be dealt with below.⁴

Outside Sicyonia, the Argives laid claim, as part of the heritage of Temenus, to Epidauria, Troezenia, the Hermionis and Asine. The evidence for this is derived from Ephorus, Nicolaus of Damascus and

¹ Ephorus 70 *FGrH* 18 b, c = Strabo VIII 8, 5, Pseudo-Scymnus 527.

² Pausanias II 6, 7–II 7, 1. He also refers to Phalces as the son of Temenus in II 36, 3 and II 36, 5.

³ R. Hope Simpson, O.T.P.K. Dickinson, *op. cit.* 68–70.

⁴ *v. i.*, pp. 403, 447–449.

Pausanias.¹ We know from archaeological evidence, however, that the Hermionis and Asine were not conquered so early by the Dorians of Argos, but remained in the hands of the Dryopes until the end of the eighth century.² By contrast, there is no doubt that Epidauria and Troezenia became Dorian at an early date. Moreover, the two cities in these areas, Epidaurus and Troezen, show signs of continuous inhabitation from the Geometric period.³ Epidauria and Troezenia certainly became Dorian earlier than this. It is unlikely, however, that they were colonized by the Argives, either then or earlier, given the fact that the claim of the Argives to Asine and Hermione, and also to Sicyon is unfounded. Generally speaking, the claims connected with the heritage of Temenus are an invention of the Argives.⁴

Aegina is said to be a colony of Epidaurus.⁵ But the settlement of Dorian Aegina begins at the end of the Protogeometric period,⁶ which means it is earlier than Epidaurus. It follows that if the tradition preserved a genuine memory of the colonizing of Aegina from Epidauria, this will have taken place at a time when the Dorian population of Epidauria had not yet founded the polis-settlement of Epidaurus.

Tradition has it that Phlius was colonized by Argives and Sicyonians.⁷ The reference to the Argives appears to reflect the invention by them of the history according to which certain areas of the Peloponnese fell within the heritage of Temenus. By contrast, reference to the Sicyonians may come from an authentic Phliasian tradition. The chronological relationship between Phlius and Sicyon, however, is the

¹ Ephorus 70 *FGrH* 18 b, c=Strabo VIII 8, 5; Pseudo-Scymnus 531-532 (Epidauria); Nicolaus Damascenus 90 *FGrH* 30 = *Exc. de Ins.*, 9, 5 (Troezenia, Hermionis, Asinaea); Pausanias II 26, 1-2, II 28, 3-7, II 29, 5 (Epidauria), II 30, 10 (Troezenia), II 34, 5 (Hermionis).

² Pausanias II 36, 4-5, III 7, 4; cf. s., p. 305.

³ Ν.Φαράκλας, *Ἐπιδαυρία* (*Ancient Greek Cities*, ed. by Athens Center of Ekistics, no. 12) (1972) fig. 13 b; idem, *Τροιζηνία, Καλαύρεια, Μέθαινα* (same series, no. 10) (1972) fig. 14 b; R.Hope Simpson, O.T.P.K.Dickinson, op. cit. 52, 54.

⁴ On the 'heritage of Temenus' and Argos in the Dark Ages cf. Th.Kelly, *A History of Argos to 500 B.C.* (1976) 38ff.

⁵ Pausanias II 29, 5.

⁶ R.Hope Simpson, O.T.P.K.Dickinson, op. cit. 59; Κ.Θ.Συριόπουλος, op. cit. 207.

⁷ Pausanias II 13, 1.

same as that between Aegina and Epidaurus, with which we have just dealt: Phlius goes back to the Protogeometric period,¹ while Sicyon, as already noted, was built in the Archaic period.² The problem is solved if we make the same conjecture as in the case of Epidaurus and Aegina: Phliasia will have been colonized from Sicyonia at a time when the latter had not yet founded Sicyon and established a polis-state.

There is much convincing evidence to suggest that the Spartan state was formed gradually.³ (a) The Agiad kings were buried at Pitane⁴ and the Eurypontids at another village, possibly Limnae.⁵ It has been properly concluded from this that the Dorians who occupied the region formed two kingdoms: one at Pitane, ruled by the Agiads, and the other at Limnae, under the Eurypontids.⁶ (b) The double kingship at Sparta is satisfactorily explained by the hypothesis that two kingdoms were united to form one.⁷ (c) Pausanias refers to warfare between the villages of Sparta, with the inhabitants of Cynosoura and of Limnae aligned against the inhabitants of Mesoa and Pitane.⁸ It has been suggested that each pair of villages mentioned formed a state.⁹ This is probable, but not certain: Pausanias' statement rather seems to imply that these pairs of villages may have been alliances.¹⁰ (d) Pausanias also mentions a campaign by the Spartans against Κυνουρία, when their rulers were Echestratus, son of Agis, and Prytanis, son of Eurypon.¹¹ This is impossible, however, for two reasons: (i) The Spartans did not yet have a joint border with Cynuria; in fact they had not conquered Aegyitis to

¹ R.Hope Simpson, O.T.P.K.Dickinson, op. cit. 68.

² v. s., p. 306.

³ What follows is a resume of material set out in my article 'Contribution à l'histoire archaïque de Sparte et d'Argos', which appeared in the review *Ἀρχαιολογία* 2 (1981) 83ff.

⁴ Pausanias III 14, 2.

⁵ Pausanias III 12, 8.

⁶ G.L.Huxley, *Early Sparta* (1960) 16–17; A.Toynbee, *Some Problems of Greek History* (1969) 171; P.A.Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia, A Regional History 1300–362 B.C.* (1979) 106.

⁷ G.L.Huxley, op. cit. 17; W.G.Forrest, *A History of Sparta 950–192 B.C.* (1968) 28; A.Toynbee, loc. cit.; P.A.Cartledge, loc. cit.

⁸ Pausanias III 16, 10. cf. G.L.Huxley, loc. cit.; W.G.Forrest, loc. cit.

⁹ A.Toynbee, op. cit. 172.

¹⁰ Article referred to above (n 3), 85ff.

¹¹ Pausanias III 2, 2.

the north, Amyclae and Pharis to the south, or Geronthrae to the east. The conquest of Aegyptis is attributed to the kings Archelaus and Charilaus or Charillus,¹ of whom the former was assigned to the fourth generation after Echestratus,² while the latter was thought to be the grandson or great grandson of Prytanis.³ The conquest of Amyclae, Pharis and Geronthrae are dated to the following generation.⁴ (ii) Before these conquests not only did Sparta not have a common border with Cynuria, but it did not have an army large enough to wage war against the Cynurians and the intervening communities. It appears, therefore, that the Κυνουρεῖς of Pausanias were in fact the inhabitants of Cynosoura, one of the villages of historical Sparta.

The political fusion of Pitane and Limnae into a single state will have taken place while Agis was ruler of the former and Eurypon of the latter. This hypothesis is suggested by the fact that the two royal houses took the names Ἀγιάδαι and Εὐρυπωντίδαι, though both were Heracleids. The distinction of the Heracleids into Agiads and Eurypontids will necessarily have taken place as soon as two families bearing the same name, Heracleids, were found within the same community. Their fathers ruled before Agis and Eurypon, according to the sources. If we take this statement literally, the unification of the two kingdoms will have been accomplished in the second generation after the conquest. It is possible, however, that the Spartan tradition has meanwhile forgotten some of the predecessors of these two kings. Since Pausanias states that it was the Lacedaemonians, and not the Limnatae or the Pitanatae, that waged war on the Κυνουρεῖς, it is a reasonable hypothesis that this war took place after the unification of the Limnatae and the Pitanatae. The annexation of Mesoa cannot be dated.

The original villages had very small territories, in which there was no place for perioeci and helots. These classes were formed as a result of the conquests carried by the unified Sparta.⁵ The villages never united to form a single settlement. Sparta was nonetheless thought of as a *polis*. This is perhaps to be explained by the fact that the villages were

¹ Pausanias III 2, 5.

² Herodotus VII 204; Pausanias III 2, 3-5.

³ Herodotus VIII 131 (great grandson); Pausanias III 2-3 (grandson).

⁴ Pausanias III 2, 6.

⁵ v. i., pp. 400-402.

under the protection of a common 'citadel'. As a result the state focussed on Sparta was considered a polis-state.

The polis-states of Styra and Carystus on Euboea had a population of Dryopes¹ who had settled in those areas before the end of the Mycenaean period.²

The pre-Dorian population of the Greek mainland, who migrated under the pressure of the invaders and of the conditions they created even in areas that were not directly affected by them, turned to the Cyclades, other Aegean islands, the western coast of Asia Minor, Crete and Cyprus.

The majority of the Cyclades were settled by groups of Ionians, with the exception of Melos, Thera and Anaphe, which became Dorian. Certain traces of occupation can be detected on Naxos from the Late Mycenaean period, on Andros, Delos and Donoussa from the Protogeometric period, and on Tenos, Paros and Siphnos from the Geometric period.³ These groups formed independent pre-political polis communities that founded states at a later date.

The ancient testimonia on the Greek colonization of Ionia fall into two groups: some speak of a single migration from a single area; others refer to a variety of origins and migrations not only within the broader context of the colonization as a whole, but within the narrower perspective of the different *poleis*; they all agree, however, that each *polis* was founded separately. I have discussed elsewhere the reasons why the information in the former group is unreliable; I also cited independent evidence that partly confirms and partly supplements the testimonia in the latter group, as well as evidence implying that the different *poleis* were not all founded at the same time.⁴ Some scholars believe that the Ionic polis-states detached themselves from an earlier Ionic confederacy that will have been founded immediately after the Greeks settled on Ionic territory. Their arguments are as follows: (a)

¹ Herodotus VIII 46; Thucydides VII 57, 4; Pseudo-Scymnus 577; Diodorus IV 37, 2. M.B.Sakellariou, *Peuples préhelléniques d'origine indo-européenne* (1977) 273.

² op. cit. 266–271, 273, 274–276.

³ R.Hope Simpson, O.T.P.K.Dickinson, op. cit. 304–346; K.Θ.Συριόπουλος, op. cit. 77–83, 162–184, 269–299.

⁴ M.B.Sakellariou, *La migration grecque en Ionie* (1958) 21–358.

the ancient testimonia suggesting a single colonization movement are genuine, and are confirmed by the fact that the lands of the Greek colonies in Ionia were adjoining, and also by the references in the Hittite texts to a strong Achaean kingdom in Asia Minor; (b) the title of 'basileus of the Ionians' in Roman times must have survived from a hypothetical stage of Ionic political unity earlier than the period when the Ionic *poleis* were completely independent, and earlier than the religious league, the Panionion; (c) the widespread occurrence of the festival of the *apatouria*, and of the four tribes, the Aigicoreis, the Argadeis, the Geleontes and the Hopletes, suggests that all the Ionians of the East were once subject to a single political authority; (d) there were a number of traditions suggesting that the kings of Ephesus (1) waged war on the Samians because the latter cooperated with the Carians against the other Ionians, (2) assisted Priene in a war against the native population, (3) detached Larisa ad Hermum from the Maeonians.¹ These arguments are not conclusive, however. The first is inconsistent.² The widespread occurrence of the *apatouria* and the four tribes amongst the Ionians is better explained by the hypothesis that these institutions go back to the original Ionic *ethnos*, in mainland Greece; furthermore, the *apatouria* was not celebrated at Ephesus,³ which is supposed to have been the headquarters of the federation. In connection with the fourth argument, it may be observed that none of the traditions involved demonstrates that the king of Ephesus had a prominent position amongst the kings of the Ionic polis-states. The second argument, the existence of a 'basileus of the Ionians' in the Roman period, would carry weight, if we did not possess ancient traditions and other evidence according to which the Ionic cities were founded separately and by independent communities. Under these conditions, it is legitimate to suppose that the Ionic polis-states founded a confederacy after a period of independence, and that this confederacy degenerated into the amphictyony known to us, when the

¹ A.Momigliano, *Atti del IIIo Congresso Nazionale di Studi Romani I* (1934) 429–443 = *Quinto Contributo alla Storia degli Studi Classici e del mondo antico I* (1975) 205–10 (arguments a and b); C.Roebuck, *CIPh* 50 (1955) 34, 36 (arguments a, b, c, d); F. Cassola, *La Ionia nel mondo miceneo* (1957) 350–51; F.Gschnitzer, *Chiron* 1 (1971) 1.

² M.B.Sakellariou, *op. cit.* 21–37.

³ Herodotus I 147.

Ionic *poleis* regained their complete sovereignty at the dawn of the Archaic period.¹

The ancient testimonia relating to the Greek colonization in Aeolic territories are similar to those relating to the Greek colonization in Ionic territories. The prevailing picture given by the traditions is of a single colonizing enterprise, but at the same time the memory is preserved of a variety of different origins, some of which are mentioned by name. Even if we did not have the example of the corresponding stories concerning the colonization in Ionia, the invention of a single unifying version would still seem more likely than a number of stories referring to different homelands. It is therefore probable that each group of new-comers established itself in a single polis-settlement and formed a pre-statal polis community which eventually founded a polis-state.

A group of Magnetes founded a polis-settlement in Crete called Magnesia. Their descendants moved on to the east of the Ionian colonies, near the river Maeander, where they founded a new Magnesia and later a polis-state.² Other migrants from Magnesia built Magnesia ad Sipylum, and later founded the associated state. These states were known not by an ethnic based on the name of the settlements, but by the primary ethnic name of the founders: *Magnetes*.

Refugees from Laconia and Arcadia also crossed to Crete. According to the tradition, the polis-settlement of Gortyn was built by people from Amyclae and Tegea.³ Archaeological investigation reveals that this event may have taken place during the Late Minoan period.⁴ Other Arcadians, in this case of unspecified origin, built a polis-settlement that retained the name of the founders: *Arcades*. This settlement can be traced in the archaeological record from the Protogeometric period.⁵

The Dorian polis-states of Crete were thought to be colonies of the

¹ P.Carlier, *La royauté en Grèce avant Alexandre* (1948) 454.

² *IMM* nos. 17 and 20; Conon 26 *FGrH* 1, xxix; Parthenius 5; *Anthologia Palatina* VII 304; Pliny, *N.H.* V 114; *IG* II², 1091, *Schol. Apoll. Rhod.* I, 584. cf. Strabo XIV 1, 11 and 40, Athenaeus IV 74, p. 173 e-f. M.B.Sakellariou, op. cit. 106–110.

³ Conon 26 *FGrH* 36; Pausanias VIII 53, 4.

⁴ K.Θ.Συριόπουλος, op. cit. 155, 217, 352.

⁵ K.Θ.Συριόπουλος, op. cit. 214, 348.

Argives and the Lacedaemonians.¹ But the archaeological evidence assembled so far demonstrates that the colonization of Crete by Dorians began in the Submycenaean period – that is, at the same time as the Dorian penetration of the Peloponnese. Cnossos, Karfi, Kavousi and Phaestus were certainly settled at this date. They were followed in the Protogeometric period by Kalo Khorio, Anavlokhos and Kato Symi, in the Geometric period by Khania, Gournes, Spiliaridia, Patela, Khalavara, Kavousi (after an interruption in occupation during the Protogeometric period), Klisidi, Vrokastro and Trypiti, and at a later date by other sites.² These settlements, and all the others built at this early date, were the homes of independent pre-statal polis communities for a long period of time.

The polis-settlement founded by a group of Magnetes in Crete³ was abandoned before it became the seat of a polis-state.

Argos is also said to have been the mother city of the Doric polis-states of the Dodecanese and Cnidus.⁴ Even if this reflects the reality, however, the Dorian migration to the Dodecanese would have taken place before the foundation of the Argive state. In fact, the three polis-settlements on Rhodes – Ialysus, Cameirus and Lindus – as well as Cos, Calymna and Casos, were all colonized during the Protogeometric period, and more precisely, after 950 B.C.⁵ It follows that the polis-states associated with them were not colonies of another polis-state, but primary states created by communities that had not yet acquired political experience.

Halicarnassus, another Doric polis-state in the SE Aegean was said to be a colony of the Troezenians.⁶ But there are traces of post-Mycenaean occupation at Halicarnassus from as early as the Submycenaean period⁷ – that is, earlier than the archaeologically attested

¹ Diodorus V 80, 3; Strabo X 4, 8 and 18.

² Κ.Θ.Συριόπουλος, *op. cit.* 150–156, 211–221, 286–294.

³ *v. i.*, p. 314.

⁴ Strabo XIV 2, 6 (Rhodes, Cos, Halicarnassus, Cnidus); Diodorus V 53, 4 (Carpathos).

⁵ R.Hope Simpson, O.T.P.K.Dickinson, *op. cit.* 349–366; Κ.Θ.Συριόπουλος, *op. cit.* 150, 210–211, 284–285. The absolute date is that of A.Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece* (1970) 127, *cf.* 75.

⁶ Pausanias II 32, 6.

⁷ Κ.Θ.Συριόπουλος, *op. cit.* 149, 210, 283.

beginning of Troezen in Geometric times.¹ Halicarnassus was therefore colonized by a pre-statal community that at a later, undetermined date, founded the polis-state of the Halicarnassians.

The Arcadians and the Magnetes who founded colonies at this time were only a small part of the respective *ethne*. And they do not appear to have joined with any other ethnic groups in their colonial settlements. By contrast, the polis-states of Ionia and Aeolis did not have a homogeneous population of Ionians or Aeolians. Groups of Aeolians, Achaeans, Arcadians, Azanes, Abantes, Molossi, Athamanes and Dryopes all settled in Ionia,² and there were groups of Achaeans and Arcadians in Aeolis. Moreover, the Ionians themselves were not a homogeneous group, since they came from different areas: Attica, Aegialean Achaea and the NE Peloponnese.³ The Achaean migrants set out from the Argolis, Laconia, and Messenia. The Molossian and the Athamanian colonists detached themselves from the main mass of their *ethnos*, which dwelt in the Pindus range, passed through Boeotia and crossed to Ionia in boats that set off from the shores of Attica.⁴

The Dorians, the Magnetes, the Athamanes and the Molossi belonged to *ethne* that were migrating at this period. The Abantes, the Arcadians and the Azanes came from settled *ethne*; their migration to Asia Minor was provoked by the circumstances that arose in Greece at this time, but we do not know if they were refugees rather than colonists. In contrast, the Achaeans and the Aeolians, who dwelt in areas that were conquered by invaders – Dorians, Boeotians and Thessalians – were clearly refugees. The same was true of those groups of Ionians that set forth from Aegialea and the NW Peloponnese, but not of those that came from Attica. This region was not conquered by invaders, and the traditions of some of the Ionic *poleis* retained the memory that they were founded by organized groups. These traditions are confirmed by a number of other pieces of evidence.⁵ The Ionians who set forth from Attica were therefore colonists.

¹ R.Hope Simpson, O.T.P.K. Dickinson, op. cit. 54.

² M.B.Sakellariou, op. cit. 247–302. For my more recent views on the Dryopes: *Peuples préhelléniques d'origine indo-européenne* (1977) 235, 278.

³ M.B.Sakellariou, *La migration grecque en Ionie* (1958) passim.

⁴ M.B.Sakellariou, op. cit. 58–62, 177–179, 206–207.

⁵ v. i., pp. 412–413, 461–462.

Other primary polis-states were founded by colonists in Sicily and Magna Graecia in the eighth and the seventh centuries. These colonists came from the Megaris, Achaëa, and West Locris.

As we shall see, the polis-state of the Megarians was formed sometime between 670 and 650 B.C.,¹ and succeeded a confederacy of μέρη.² It follows that the Megarian colonies founded before 670 were undoubtedly primary polis-states, while there are diminishing chances of this being the case for those founded between 670 and 650. Of all Megarian colonies, Hyblaea Megara is the only certain primary polis-state and two others, Chalcedon and Selymbria, the only probable ones.³

The founding of all the Achaean colonies in Magna Graecia is also earlier than the emergence of polis-states in Achaëa. The colonies in question, Sybaris, Croton, Metapontium and Caulonia, were founded between 720 and 650 B.C., while the Achaean polis-states and their confederacy are dated to the beginning of the fourth century B.C.⁴ Certainly, according to Strabo and Pausanias, the Achaeans who succeeded the Ionians in Achaëa in the Peloponnese founded πόλεις from the beginning.⁵ But shortly afterwards the former informs us that Achaëa was originally divided into twelve μερίδες (parts), each of which contained several demes.⁶ Moreover, Herodotus furnishes evidence that in his time Achaëa was divided politically into twelve μέρη (parts).⁷ It is thus clear that in the first passage of Strabo and in that of Pausanias, the term πόλεις is used improperly.

Unfortunately, there is no evidence to indicate whether these colonies were sent out by the *ethnos* of the Achaeans or by one of the confederacies of demes into which it was divided;⁸ we are in any event also unaware of the date at which these confederacies were formed.

Similarly, the polis-state of Epizephyrian Locri (673 B.C.) is earlier than the formation of polis-states in West Locris. The fact that the

¹ v. i., p. 406.

² v. i., pp. 320–321.

³ v. i., p. 404.

⁴ v. i., pp. 404, 414–415.

⁵ Strabo VIII 7, 4; Pausanias VII 1, 4.

⁶ Strabo VIII 7,5.

⁷ Herodotus I 145.

⁸ v. i., p. 329.

colonists adopted the name of the *ethnos* (Lokroi) indicates that it was the work of the whole *ethnos* and not of some of its parts.

2. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF DEMES

Aristotle, following the example of Plato, derived all the *poleis* from unions of villages;¹ to 'live in villages' (κατὰ κώμας οἰκεῖν) was thought by the ancients to be a characteristic of the *ethnos*.²

The attested examples of this process reveal to us polis-states that derived from existing συστήματα of δήμοι. The most comprehensive statement that we have on this comes from Strabo, who used Apollodorus as his source. He makes two observations: (1) Homer mentions very few *poleis* in the Peloponnese, but alludes rather to regions, each of which had 'συστήματα δήμων'; (2) the later *poleis* resulted from the unification of these demes.³ Strabo does not make clear whether the demes that constituted each *polis* coincided with the demes of a single 'system', nor whether all the 'systems' evolved into *poleis*. This uncertainty is resolved indirectly by the examples following this passage: *poleis* were indeed formed from all the demes of some 'systems', and some 'systems' evolved into *poleis*. The term σύστημα occurs in other passages of Strabo, with the difference that it is there followed by the genitive κωμών. This difference is not a substantial one, since the terms δήμος and κώμη are sometimes synonymous. In the second of the two passages, the author tells us that in his day all the Carians used to gather at the shrine of Zeus Chrysaoreus to offer sacrifices and confer about matters of common interest; the 'system' that organized these meetings was called the σύστημα Χρυσαιορέων, and consisted of villages; 'systems' that had a greater number of villages, like the Κεραμιᾶται, had a greater number of votes; the Στρατονικεῖς took part in the 'system', despite the fact that they were not Carians, because they had villages in the 'system' of the Χρυσαιορεῖς.⁴ We see that the term σύστημα is here used of a kind of

¹ v. s., pp. 220ff, 278ff, 285.

² Thucydides III 94, 4, cf. 15, 1, where the word 'πόλειςιν' means 'states' in general.

³ Strabo VIII 3, 2.

⁴ Strabo XIV 2, 25.

amphictyony, the members of which were not *poleis*, as in the case of the majority of Greek amphictyonies, nor *ethne* as in the Pylaeon-Delphic amphictyony, but villages, or even groups of villages. Stratonicea was a Greek *polis*, but was part of the 'system of the Χρυσαιορείς', because its territory had villages that belonged to it. The term *σύστημα* occurs in an inscription from the first century B.C. with precisely the meaning of amphictyony, more specifically the Pylaeon-Delphic one.¹ The same word is used by Polybius as a synonym for the term *κοινόν* (confederacy) in two passages, one referring to the Achaean Confederacy,² the other to the Chalcidic Confederacy.³ We learn from some of the inscriptions that will be examined below that 'deme systems' entered into international agreements and took decisions on internal matters, just like the confederacies of *poleis*. It follows that the terms *σύστημα δήμων* and *σύστημα κομῶν* meant not only 'amphictyony of demes' but also 'confederacy of demes'. This is the sense of the expression *σύστημα δήμων* in the passage of Strabo referring to the origins of some of the polis-states in the Peloponnese.

Strabo attests to the following examples of 'deme systems' being converted into polis-states: Mantinea was formed from five demes, Tegea from nine, Heraea also from nine, Aegium from seven or eight, Patrae from seven, Dyme from eight, and Elis from an undefined number. In the same passage we read that the synoecism of Mantinea had been instigated by the Argives, and that of Heraea on the orders of Cleombrotus or Cleonymus.⁴ To these examples for which there is evidence, we may add one that is hypothetical: that of Sicyonia, from which the polis-state of the Sicyonians emerged.⁵

The synoecism of Mantinea from villages is confirmed by Diodorus and, indirectly, from authors referring to the dissolving of Mantinea into villages by the Spartans in 385 B.C.⁶ The synoecism occurred either

¹ SIG, no. 761 A = *Fouilles de Delphes* III 1 (1929) 480, lines 15–16.

² Polybius II 41, 15.

³ Polybius IX 28, 2.

⁴ Strabo VIII 3, 2.

⁵ v.i., pp. 449–451.

⁶ Xenophon, *Hell.* V 2, 7; Ephorus 70 FGtH 79 = Harpocration, s.v. Μαντινέων διοικισμός; Diodorus XV 5, 12. cf. Isocrates, *On the Peace* 100, Polybius IV 27, 6, Pausanias VIII 5, 9.

in the sixth century or in the decade 460–450 B.C.¹ As to Strabo's statement about Tegea, it is confirmed and supplemented by Pausanias, who furnishes the names of the nine villages that made up the new *polis*. He does not mention the name of Tegea and represents Aleos, the eponymous hero of Alea, as the founder of the *polis*.² As far as the synoecism of Elis is concerned, Strabo states in an earlier passage that this city was founded after the Persian Wars.³ The exact date of this event, the year 471 B.C., is known from Diodorus. The same author described the earlier settlements as *πόλεις* instead of *δήμοι*,⁴ but a number of Attic demes are called *πόλεις* by Thucydides and Philochorus.⁵ There is evidence in an inscription from Olympia for an alliance concluded between the Eleans and the Heraeans c. 500 B.C., at a date when they were both 'deme systems'. An explicit provision of the treaty prescribes that whoever violates it, whether private individual, or magistrate, or damos, shall pay a fine.⁶ This confirms that the member villages of these two 'systems' were in fact called *δήμοι* (not *πόλεις* as Diodorus claims); at the same time it demonstrates that this 'deme system' had the right to contract interstate agreements that were binding on the member demes. Another decree of the Eleans implies that this 'deme system' could take decisions on internal affairs binding on each of the demes.⁷ It appears, then, that this 'deme system' was a true state.

This conclusion may be extended, however. A decision of the Chaladrians, a deme of the Eleans (first quarter of the fifth century B.C.), concerns the granting of political rights to foreigners.⁸ This indicates that the demes of this 'system' had separate citizen bodies which had certain powers that fell outside the competence of the authorities of the 'system'. It follows that there was a division of sovereign rights between the 'system' and the member demes. That is,

¹ E.Meyer, *KIP* III (1967–1969) 978.

² Pausanias VIII 45, 1.

³ Strabo VIII 3, 2.

⁴ Diodorus XI 54, 1.

⁵ Thucydides II 15, 1–2; Philochorus 328 *FGrH* 94 = Strabo IX 1, 20.

⁶ *SGHI*, no. 17.

⁷ *DGEEP*² no. 409.

⁸ *DGEEP*² no. 415.

this 'deme system' was a federal state, and the demes were federated states.¹ As with the polis-states and ethnos-states, the demes and the 'deme systems' sprang from and were organized around communities; in the case of the demes it was a simple community, while in the case of the 'deme systems' it was composed of a number of simple communities. The citizens of the demes, like the citizens of the polis-states, were members of the corresponding community. They were also by right members of the 'system'.

Yet, despite this example of a confederacy of demes that had the features of a state (the member demes being federated states), we cannot exclude the possibility that some confederacies of demes were not yet states. In this case, the birth of a polis-state would not merely involve change from one kind of state to another, but statehood itself would come into being together with the emergence of the polis-state.

A 'deme system' did not evolve inevitably into a polis-state. We have seen above that the 'deme systems' of Mantinea and of Heraea were compelled to become polis-states by a foreign power; without this they might have remained 'deme systems' for a longer period, or might never have become polis-states, or might have followed some other development.

Indeed, some 'deme systems' in Arcadia dissolved into a number of polis-states equal to that of the demes.² The polis-state of the Megarians derived from the unification of five *mere*, one or two of

¹ Oibotas, son of Oinias, winner in the Olympic Games of 756 B.C., is referred to by Philistus 556 *FGrH* 2 = Stephanus Byzantius, s. v. Δύμη, Pausanias VI 3, 8, VII 17, 6 and 13, S. Julius Africanus (in Eusebius, *Chron.*, arm., in Karst, *Eusebius Werke*, V(1911) 91), Philostratus, *Gymn.* 12 Jüthner 142, as a native of Dyme; an inscription quoted by Pausanias VII 17, 7, says that he was a Παλεύς. Pausanias, commenting on this inscription, expresses the view that Paleia was the former name of Dyme. But it seems that in reality Paleia was a settlement different from Dyme (E. Meyer, *RE* XVIII 3 (1949) 89, followed by L. Moretti, *Olympionikai*, *MAL*, ser. VIII, vol. VIII 2 (1957) 60, R. Koerner, *Klio* 56 (1974) 461, 469–470 and other scholars). If so, it would be reasonable to infer that Paleia had its own 'citizenship' at the time c. 756 B.C., but not to decide as to whether it formed a separate state (thus R. Koerner, loc. cit.) or was a deme-state member of a deme system, according to the model exemplified by the deme of the Chaladrians in respect to the deme system of the Eleans.

² v. i., pp. 321–322.

which were 'deme systems'.¹ The term *μέρη*, which is also used for divisions of the *ethnos* of the Achaeans,² and the term *μερίς* used of the same divisions³ as well as of divisions of the Boeotian Confederacy,⁴ suggest a picture in direct contrast with that indicated by the term *σύστημα δήμων*. *Σύστημα* clearly denotes a *union* of pre-existing independent entities, in this case demes. *Μέρος* and *μερίς* equally clearly denote a *division* of a larger unit. As we may infer from the Achaean evidence, one and the same entity was called a *μέρος*, *μερίς* when seen as a division of a larger entity and a *σύστημα δήμων* when seen as a federation of smaller entities.

3. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF 'PARTS' (*ΜΕΡΗ*)

According to the ancient authorities, Megara was settled by Dorians. On the other hand, the cults of Hera and of Apollo Lykeios at Megara and of Hera at the Heraeum as well as archaeological evidence from the Heraeum indicate that a part of the colonists came from Argos.⁵ The campaign of the Dorians in the Megaris has been dated to between 1000⁶ and 850 B.C.⁷ The latter date seems very low.

Plutarch has preserved the information – which he perhaps derived from Aristotle's *Μεγαρέων Πολιτεία*⁸ – that at one time the Megarians 'used to be settled in village communities, with the citizens divided into five *μέρη*'; and that the inhabitants of these *μέρη* were called Heraeis, P(e)iraeis, Megareis, Kynourieis and Tripodiskioi.⁹ The view that this situation ante-dated the arrival of the Dorians¹⁰ has two difficulties: (a)

¹ See below (same page).

² Herodotus I 145; Strabo VIII 7, 4.

³ Strabo VIII 7, 5.

⁴ *Hellenica Oxyrh.* 66 FGrH XI 3 = POxy. 842.

⁵ U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *SPAW* (1925) 230ff; E. Meyer, *RE* XV 1 (1931) 181; K. Hanell, *Megarische Studien* (1934) 69–73.

⁶ E. Kirsten, in A. Philippson, *Die griechischen Landschaften* I 3 (1952) 971.

⁷ Th. Dunbabin, *JHS* 68 (1948) 65.

⁸ G. L. Huxley, in *Στήλη, τόμος εις μνήμην Ν. Κοντολέοντος* (1978) 263.

⁹ Plutarch, *Qu. Gr.* 17, 295 b.

¹⁰ W. R. Halliday, *On Plutarch's Greek Questions* (1928) 96. cf. also H. Payne, *Perachora* I (1940) 20.

the ethnic *Ἡραεῖς* presupposes the existence of the settlement called *Ἡραῖον*; this was formed around the sanctuary of the same name, which was founded c. 850 B.C.;¹ (b) Peiraeum was settled at the earliest in 700 B.C.² The second date marks the beginning of the period during which the Megaris was divided into villages and *μέρη*.

No attention has been paid to the distinction drawn by Plutarch between *μέρη* and villages. It assumes significance when we take into consideration the fact that the settlements of the Megaris which are dated archaeologically to the Geometric (900–700 B.C.) and Archaic (700–480 B.C.) periods are more numerous than the *μέρη*. Traces of Geometric habitation have been noted at Megara, Nisaea, Cynosoura, Tripodiskos, Pagae, Heraeum and Moulki. Peiraeum and Aigeirus began to be inhabited during the Archaic period.³ We thus have four settlements – Nisaea, Pagae, Moulki and Aigeirus – that are not referred to by Plutarch as *μέρη*, though they will have been amongst the villages of the Megaris, of which the author gives neither the number nor the names. It follows that some of the *μέρη* of the Megaris had more than one village. More specifically, the *μέρος* of Megara will have included the harbour of Nisaea in addition to Megara itself (which was a polis-settlement, since it had an acropolis). The settlements of Pagae and Aigeirus, on the Corinthian gulf, appear to have been the harbours of Tripodiskos.

4. POLIS-STATES FROM THE DEMES OF A CONFEDERACY THAT BROKE UP

Pausanias gives a detailed list of the *poleis* of Arcadia that took part in the synoecism of Megalopolis in 371 B.C. First, he states that the Arcadians chose as founders of the new *polis* four Tegeatae and two each from Mantinea, Cleitor, Maenalus and Parrhasia. He then gives a list of the *poleis* whose inhabitants were moved to Megalopolis: Alea, Pallantium, Eutaea, Soumateium, Asea, Peraetheis, Helisson, Oresthas-

¹ M.B.Sakellariou, in M.B.Sakellariou, N.Faraklas, *Corinthia and Cleonaea*, (=Ancient Greek Cities, Athens Center of Ekistics, 3) (1971) 25, App. II, 5.

² M.B.Σακελλαρίου, in M.B.Σακελλαρίου, Ν.Φαράκλας, *Μεγαρίδες, Αιγίοσθενα, Ἐρένεια* (=Ancient Greek Cities, 14) (1972) 22.

³ M.B.Σακελλαρίου, op. cit. 17–19, 23 and App. II.

sium, Dipaea and Lycaea from the area of Maenalus; Tricoloni, Zoetium, Charisia, Ptoleiderma, Cnausum, and Paroreia from the area of the Eutresians; Aegys, Scirtonium, Malea, Cromi, Blenina and Leuctrum from the area of the Aigytae; Lycosoura, Thocnia, Trapezus, Proseis, Acacesium, Acontium, Macaria and Dasea from the area of the Parrhasians; Gortys, Theisoa by Mount Lycaeam, Lycaea and Aliphera from the area of the Cynourians; Theisoa, Methydrium and Teuthis of the *poleis* that belonged to Orchomenus; and Tripolis, Callia, Dipoenia and Nonacris.¹ It is clear from the context that Pausanias was not giving an exhaustive list of the polis-states and regions of Arcadia in 371 B.C. His list is nonetheless valuable for the information it does provide. Of interest here is the mention of *poleis* divided into groups and the names of these groups: Μαίναλος, Εὐτρήσιοι, Αἰγῦται, Παρράσιοι, Κυνουραῖοι and Ὀρχομενός. The impression is that each of these polis-states had originated from a single deme having previously been a member of a 'system'. This development was different from that by which a 'deme system' was converted into a single polis-state.² Tricoloni, a *polis* of the Eutresians in the text under consideration, appears in another passage of Pausanias as an unassigned *polis*.³

5. POLIS-STATES FROM A POLIS-SETTLEMENT THAT BROKE AWAY FROM AN ETHNOS-STATE

Several cities of the Macedonian state broke away from it and became independent polis-states for a short time.⁴ The cities that remained part of the Macedonian state, and also those that returned to or were incorporated in it, had their own local administration within the framework of the state; this was also true of the cities of the state of the

¹ Pausanias VIII 27, 2ff. In his edition of Pausanias, N. Παπαχατζής, follows the reading Ἴασαία instead of the emendation Ἀσέα and writes Ἀσέα instead of the reading Ἀλέα on the ground that Alea lies far from Megalopolis.

² v. s., pp. 316–319.

³ Pausanias VIII 35, 6.

⁴ Evidence and discussion: U.Kahrstedt, *Hermes* 81 (1953) 85–111; Δ.Κανατσούλης, Ἡ Μακεδονία μέχρι τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ Ἀρχελαίου I (1964) 27–39. For the dates, v. i., p. 408.

Molossi.¹ Some of the Thessalian polis-states also conducted their own foreign policy for short periods of time. The polis-state of Pherae remained independent until Philip II of Macedon imposed his rule in Thessaly.

B. POLIS-STATES FORMED ALONGSIDE A CONFEDERACY

In the previous section (A) of this chapter, we discussed cases involving the formation of a polis-state from one or more independent communities. In this section, we will study the formation of polis-states within an *ethnos* or part of an *ethnos* that had retained its geographical cohesion and political unity. This process occurred alongside the transformation of the *ethnos*-state into a confederacy of polis-states.

Numerous observations in anthropology concur to suggest the following pattern. The permanent settlement of a tribe is accompanied by the creation of self-governing village communities. From this point there are two different routes to the formation of a political society: either each village evolves into a state, or a number of neighbouring villages link their fortunes and create one state. That these processes took place in the ancient Greek *ethne* with which we are concerned here may be conjectured not only from the universality of the evidence, but also from the fact that a significant number of them relate to Indo-European peoples.² At any rate, we see that the Greek village community gave rise to polis-state, while the unification of a number of communities initially resulted in deme confederacies from which, ultimately, one or more polis-states sprang.

¹ Evidence and discussion: U.Kahrstedt, loc. cit.; A.Giovannini, *Untersuchungen über die Natur und die Anfänge der bundesstaatlichen Sympolitie in Griechenland* (1971) 76–80; J.Kalléris, *Les anciens Macédoniens* II (1976) 589–623; N.G.L.Hammond, G.T.Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* II (1979) 647–652; F. Papazoglou, in *Ancient Macedonia III (Third International Symposium 1977)* (1983) 204–208.

² cf. G.Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde* I (1920) 152; V.Ehrenberg, *Der griechische und hellenistische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds), *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* III 3 (1932) 10–11 = *Der Staat der Griechen* (1957) 18–20 = *The Greek State* (1960) 24–27 = *L'état grec* (1976) 53–58; F.Gschnitzer, *WS* 68 (1955) 134ff; A.Giovannini, op. cit. 71–75.

1. FROM VILLAGE TO POLIS-STATE WITHIN A CONFEDERACY

The evolution from village community to polis-state, and the conversion of the ethnos-state into a confederacy of polis-states took place within Greek *ethne* that did not split when migrating.

The Phocian Confederacy included twenty two polis-states¹ within an area of 1,600 square kilometres.² West Locris, with an area of 800–830 square kilometres³ had eleven polis-states.⁴ For each of the polis-states in these two confederacies, that is, there were on average 73 square kilometres. If account is taken of the fact that only a very small part of Phocis and West Locris was suitable for cultivation, the conclusion is inescapable that most, if not all, of these polis-states had only one settlement, their polis. In the light of the model described above,⁵ we must assume that, after they had established themselves, the Phocians and West Locrians formed several communities, each of which lived in settlements that were villages in terms of modern criteria but *poleis* in ancient terms, since they were built below natural strongholds, and that these settlements were quickly fortified and became seats of political authorities. These settlements also acquired the character of cities, in the modern sense, to the extent that they ultimately developed secondary production services and a market.

Other Greek confederacies, and in particular the Boeotian, appear on the historical horizon with polis-states that had no other settlements and polis-states that did have. The former polis-states will have evolved from single autonomous villages. The latter will have been formed with an intermediate phase involving deme confederacies,⁶ or around the strongest community, militarily and economically.

¹ Demosthenes, *De falsa legatione* 123. Pausanias X 3, 1–2 states that Philip destroyed twenty Phocian *poleis* (Lilaea, Hyampolis, Anticyra, Parapotamii, Panopeus, Daulis, Erochus, Charadra, Amphicleia, Neones, Tithronium, Drymaea, Elateia, Trachis, Medeon, Echedameia, Ambrossus, Ledon, Phlygonium and Stiris) and spared one (Abae). He does not mention the *polis* of Delphi.

² K.J.Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* III 1 (1922) 289.

³ K.J.Beloch, loc. cit.

⁴ Thucydides III 101.

⁵ p. 323.

⁶ v. s., pp. 316–319, v. i., pp. 444–454.

Herodotus refers to an Azanian 'from the polis of Paion'.¹ Pausanias mentions an Azanian from 'Pellana'.² These statements do not indicate, however, as has been believed, that Azania dissolved into polis-states,³ but are evidence for the Azanian *ethnos* having a confederacy constituted of polis-states.

The model of direct evolution from an original village community to a polis-state did not occur in Thessaly. In this country, some noble families managed to extend their rule over large territories including several villages; as a result the respective village communities lost their self-determination. Yet some of these villages eventually recovered their liberty and gave birth to polis-states. The whole process has been reconstructed as follows: the villages in which the families of the large landowners established themselves became administrative centres; these villages were equipped with the means of defence; they then developed craft production and commerce thus taking on the character of a city; their residents acquired political autonomy, that is, they formed polis-(and city-) states; some of these states conducted their own independent foreign policy from time to time; finally, the majority of them were reunited with the Thessalian state, which became a confederacy of polis-states.⁴

2. THE CONFEDERACY AND THE POLIS-STATES OF THE IONIANS OF ATTICA, EASTERN BOEOTIA AND CENTRAL EUBOEA⁵

Many modern historians maintain that the polis-state of the Athenians was formed gradually in the ninth and eighth centuries,⁶ or perhaps

¹ Herodotus VI 127.

² Pausanias VI 8, 5.

³ G. Busolt, *op. cit.* 147 n 4.

⁴ *v. i.*, p. 459-460, cf. p. 410.

⁵ cf. M. B. Sakellariou, *REA* 88/89 (1976/7) 11-21.

⁶ G. Gilbert, *JCI Ph.*, Suppl. VII (1873-1875) 211ff; T. Kansel, *De Thesei synoecismo* (1882); U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen* II (1893) 38ff; G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* II (1895) 76ff; K. J. Beloch, *op. cit.* I (1893) 2nd edn (1912) 206ff; G. De Sanctis, 'Αρχαία (1912) 21ff; L. H. Leper, in *Sbornik archeologicesici statej, podnesennij Grafu A. A. Bobriskomu* (1911) 248ff (german summary in the book by S. Solders cited below); M. Cary, *CAH* III (1925) 577-580; G. Busolt, *op. cit.* II (1926) 775; G. Glotz, *Histoire Grecque* I (1926) 389; S. Solders, *Die ausserstädtischen Kulte*

also the seventh.¹ Their arguments are not convincing, however.² On the contrary, a variety of evidence suggests that at the beginning of the first millennium B.C. Attica and parts of eastern Boeotia and Euboea belonged to a single authority.³ (a) The fact that the Athenians successfully repulsed an invasion by an alliance of Dorians from the Peloponnese,⁴ probably in the middle of the tenth century,⁵ shows that they were numerous enough and occupied a fairly large territory.⁶ (b) The members of the Pylaeon-Delphic Amphictyony were twelve *ethne*, including the Ionians.⁷ In historical times, the 'Ionians' who participated in the Amphictyony were the Athenians, the Chalcidians, the Eretrians and other polis-states in Euboea. It seems, then, that the 'Ionians' entered the Amphictyony as an *ethnos* not yet dissolved into polis-states and possessed central authorities which would have taken the decision to become members of the Amphictyony. Each *ethnos*

und die Einigung Attikas (1931) 103–129; J.Hasebroek, *Griechische Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (1931), 141; E.Kornemann, *Staaten, Völker, Männer* (1934) 30–51; H.Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte* (1950) 76 = 5th edn (1977) 84–85; C.Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (1952, 1958) 35–38, 53–54; C.S.G. Thomas, *Early Greek Kingship* (1965) 109.

¹ S.Solders, *op. cit.* 113; M.Cary, *loc. cit.*; H.Bengtson, *loc. cit.*; C.S.G.Thomas, *loc. cit.*; G.Giannelli, *Trattato di storia Greca*, 5th edn (1969) 145.

² J.Sarkady, *ACUSD* 2 (1966) 9ff; M.B.Sakellariou, *op. cit.* 11ff.

³ The arguments that follow are developed at greater length by M.B.Sakellariou, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Hellanicus 4 *FGrH* 125 = *Schol. Plat. Symp.*, 208 D; Lycurgus, *In Leocratem* 84ff; Strabo IX 1, 7; Pausanias I 39, 4–6; Cicero, *Nat. Deor.* III 49, *De fin.* V 62; Velleius Paterculus I 2.

⁵ The campaign of the Dorians of the Peloponnese against the Athenians is connected with the founding of Megara (Pausanias, *loc. cit.*), in which the Argives and the Corinthians took part. The traditions concerning this are confirmed by a number of cults and other features of Megara: U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *SBPAW* (1925) 230ff; E.Meyer, *RE* XV 1 (1931) 181–182; K.Hanell, *Megarische Studien* (1934) 75–91; M.B.Σακελλαρίου in M.B.Σακελλαρίου, Ν.Φαράκλας, *Μεγαρίς, Αιγόσθηνα, Ἐρένεια* (= *Ancient Greek Cities*, 14) (1972) 21. The foundation of Megara has been dated between 1000 (E.Kirsten, in A.Philippson, *Die griechischen Landschaften* I 3 (1952) 871) and 850 (Th.J.Dunbabin, *JHS* 68 (1948) 65). It can in any event not have taken place before the occupation of the Argolis by the Dorians of Argos.

⁶ H.Berve, *Griechische Geschichte* I (1931) 80; J.Sarkady, *op. cit.* 21.

⁷ Theopompus 115 *FGrH* 63 = Harpocration, s.v. Ἀμφικτύονες; Aeschines, *De falsa legatione* 116.

disposed of two votes. One of the 'Ionian' votes went to the Athenians, the other was allotted to one or other of various Euboean polis-states. The situation clearly reflects the superior political weight that had accrued to the Athenians in the historical period, but also reveals that the Euboean polis-states possessed the right to participate in the Amphictyony because they were members of the *ethnos* from the time that it entered this organization. (c) Already in antiquity, the peoples of the Near and Middle East used the ethnic 'Ionians' to refer to the Greeks. The earliest known occurrences of this are in Assyrian texts dating from the end of the eighth century.¹ Ionians and Easterners met at a coastal city in Syria, on the site of the modern Al Mina, and in the surrounding area.² These Ionians came from Euboea. They settled in Al Mina about 800 B.C., or slightly later,³ and carried on trade within the city and its hinterland, part of which belonged to the Assyrians.⁴ It seems, therefore, that the Euboeans, when questioned by the locals about their provenance, declared themselves not as Chalcidians or Eretrians, but as Ionians, i.e. as members of the Ionian *ethnos*. (d) The leaders of the Athenian state prior to the archons who held office for ten years, a practice introduced in the year 752/1 B.C., are described in the sources sometimes as hereditary kings⁵ and sometimes as archons elected for life.⁶ The contradiction becomes more significant when some

¹ H. Bengtson, *Philologus* 92 (1957) 148–155.

² Th. J. Dunbabin, *The Greeks and their Eastern Neighbours* (1957) 30; C. Roebuck, *Ionian Trade and Colonization* (1959) 62.

³ J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas* (1964) 62ff=(1980) 39ff; M. R. Popham, L. H. Sackett, *Excavations at Lefkandi, Euboea (1964–1966)* (1968) 33; J. N. Coldstream, *Geometric Greece* (1977) 93–95, 103, 199–200, 267. It used to be believed that the first Greeks to settle at Al Mina were from the Cyclades, and this gave rise to the hypothesis that it was from them that the peoples of the East knew the name Ionians (T. J. Dunbabin, *op. cit.* 29, C. Roebuck, *loc. cit.*).

⁴ T. J. Dunbabin, *op. cit.* 28; J. N. Coldstream, *op. cit.* 358–359.

⁵ Plato, *Symp.* 208 D; *Marmor Parium* 28, 29, 30, 31; Pausanias I 3, 3; *Schol. Aesch.* I 172; *Souda* and Photius, s.v. *παρ' Ἴππον καὶ κόρην; Λέξεις ρητορικαί*, in Bekker, *An. Gr.* I (1814) 295. cf. A. Ledl, *Studien zur älteren athenischen Verfassungsgeschichte*, 143ff, 218ff, C. Hignett, *op. cit.* 38ff.

⁶ Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* III 1 and 3; Philochorus 328 *FGrH* 211 a = Tatianus, *Ad Gr.* 32 (Eusebius, *Euang. Prop.* I 11, 4, *Chron.*, Abr. 914 = Syncellus, *Chron.* 340, 3 Bonn). Castor 250 *FGrH* 4 = Eusebius, *Chron.*, arm. 85–88 Karst ~ Barbarus, 298, 9 Frisk; Justinus II 7, 1 ~ Velleius Paterculus I 2; Pausanias IV 5, 10; Eusebius, *Can.*, arm. 175,

documents cite as archons individuals who are referred to elsewhere as kings,¹ and even more so when they add that these elected magistrates were descendants of Codrus, king of the Athenians.² The first life archon is sometimes said to have been Medon, son of Codrus,³ and sometimes Acastus, son of Medon.⁴ Many modern scholars, considering it highly unlikely that the Athenian hereditary monarchy was abolished at the end of Mycenaean times, think that it continued long after this date and consequently reject the description of the Athenian rulers before the middle of the eighth century as archons elected for life.⁵ But it is improbable that some Athenian historian chose to describe the descendants of Codrus as life archons rather than hereditary kings, that this description became fashionable, and that Aristotle preferred the more recent and, moreover, erroneous version to the older, genuine one. Consequently we have to consider whether it was possible for an Athenian of that period to be simultaneously a hereditary king and an archon elected for life. We find that this could be the case if the same person was hereditary king of the Athenian polis-state and elected life archon of a broader political entity.⁶

It would seem that the collapse of the Mycenaean state in Attica did not remove the needs that had led to the existence of state. Thus the void resulting from the dissolution of the centralized Mycenaean structures came gradually to be filled by the local communities. The Mycenaean kingdom of Pylos contained a number of communities which enjoyed some rights for settling their affairs; they were called *damoi*. It is not improbable that the Attic *demoi* of historical times had existed since the Mycenaean age. Some of the states of the confederacy

Karst, lat. (Hieronymus) 67 Helm. cf. Heracleides I 3, *FHG* II, 208. cf. also A.Ledl, loc. cit., C.Hignett, loc. cit.

¹ Diognetos: king (*Marmor Parium* 29) or archon (Castor, loc. cit.); Pherecles: king (*Marmor Parium* 30) or archon (Castor, loc. cit.); Aeschylus: king (*Marmor Parium* 31) or archon (Castor, loc. cit.).

² Castor, loc. cit.; Pausanias, loc. cit.; Eusebius, loc. cit.

³ Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* III 3; Castor, loc. cit.; Eusebius, loc. cit.

⁴ Aristotle, loc. cit.

⁵ J.Toepfer, *Hermes* 31 (1896) 110 = *Beiträge zur griechischen Altertumswissenschaft* (1897) 289; G. De Sanctis, op. cit. 79–80; A.Ledl, op. cit. 242; C.Hignett, op. cit. 41–42.

⁶ The term *ἄρχων* is used in Aeschylus, *Persae* 72, of the Great King, and in Sophocles, *Ajax* 668, of the Atreidae. In both cases it refers to super-kings.

were *poleis*. One of them was the polis-state of the Athenians, whose king, as we have conjectured, was also the head of the confederacy. Others were some of the demes of the Classical polis-state of the Athenians, of whom the tradition records that at earlier date they were called *poleis*.¹ Other federated polis-states were located in Euboea, those of the Chalcidians² and of the Eretrians³ amongst them. A confederacy uniting states in Attica and in Euboea would inevitably have also included the territories of Oropus, Tanagra and Aulis.

3. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF DEMES

As we saw, Strabo states that some of the *poleis* of the Peloponnese evolved from 'deme systems' which may be divided into two groups: those that developed outside ethnos-states and those that developed within them. The first group was dealt with above.⁴ We now turn to the latter. The polis-states in question are those of Aegium, Patrae and Dyme, who were members of the Achaean Confederacy. It will be recalled that the 'deme system' of Dyme had eight demes, that of Aegium seven or eight, and that of Patrae seven.⁵ In this passage, Strabo does not mention how the other polis-states of the Achaean Confederacy were formed. Elsewhere, however, he tells us that the Achaeans were originally settled in *μερίδες*, each of which included seven or eight demes, and Herodotus alludes to the division of Achaea into twelve *μέρη*.⁶

¹ *Hymn to Demeter* 96ff, 151, 475; Thucydides II 15, 1–2; Charax 103 *FGrH* 43 = Steph. Byz. s.v. 'Αθήναι; Philochorus 328 *FGrH* 94 = Strabo IX 1, 20; *Marmor Parium* 239 *FGrH* 20; Theophrastus, *Char.* 26.

² Chalcis was certainly a *polis* at the time that it captured Sciathos, Peparethos and Scyros (9th or 8th century) and colonized Pithecusae and Cumae (770–750 B.C.): M.B.Sakellariou in *Gli Eubei in Occidente, Atti del diciottesimo convegno di studi sulla Magna Grecia* (1978) (1979) 15.

³ For Eretria, cf. M.B.Sakellariou, op. cit. 15–16. Lefkandi, which should not be identified with ancient Eretria (M.B.Sakellariou, op.cit. 16) may have been a separate federal state.

⁴ v. s., pp. 316–319.

⁵ v. s., p. 317. R.Koerner, *Klio* 56 (1974) 461, 469–470, refuses to admit that a stage involving a 'deme system' preceded the rise of polis-states in Achaea without really justifying his negative position.

⁶ v. s., p. 320.

According to Plutarch, the only settlements in the region of Tanagra in the heroic age were villages.¹ This will also have been true of other regions of Boeotia in the first centuries of the first millennium B.C., until these deme confederacies were transformed into polis-states.

C. DISSOLUTION OF CONFEDERACIES INTO POLIS-STATES – SECESSION OF POLIS-STATES FROM CONFEDERACIES

1. DISSOLUTION OF CONFEDERACIES INTO POLIS-STATES

Before the middle of the eighth century the Ionian Confederacy of Attica, part of eastern Boeotia and central Euboea² broke up into autonomous states, the number of which is unknown. The political societies of the Athenians, the Chalcidians and the Eretrians were already polis-states. The Eretrians had abandoned the old Eretria and built the new by the beginning of the eighth century.³ The polis-state of the Eretrians also included the region of the Graikoi, in eastern Boeotia. This emerges from two pieces of evidence: (a) the fate of the name *Graikoi* in the West is only explicable in terms of the presence of Graikoi at Cuma in Italy; (b) the lack of reference to their participation in the colonization of that city can only be explained on the assumption that they were included in their capacity as citizens of Eretria.⁴

While the Ionian Confederacy was disintegrating, the Tetrapolis consisting of the later Attic demes Marathon, Oenoe, Probalinthus and Tricory(n) thus will have become independent for a short time. That this part of Attica was once independent may be inferred from its name, which is significant by itself, and also from other evidence: the inhabitants of the Tetrapolis elected a separate archon and separate hieropoioi, were represented in the *theoria* sent by the Athenians to Delphi, had the right to maintain separate relations with the sanctuary

¹ Plutarch, *Qu. Gr.* 37, 299 C.

² v. s., pp. 325–329.

³ For the most recent collection of evidence and discussion, cf. M.B.Sakellariou in *Gli Eubei in Occidente, Atti del diciottesimo convegno di studi sulla Magna Grecia (1978)* (1979) 15–17.

⁴ M.B.Sakellariou, *op. cit.* 26.

at Delphi, and received privileges at the hands of the *polis* of Delphi.¹ The political society formed by the Tetrapolis for a short time may have been a 'system of demes': the second component in the name Tetrapolis does not necessarily mean that it was composed of polis-states, since the demes of Attica are sometimes referred to as *poleis*.²

The polis-states of the Boeotian Confederacy were also independent for brief periods of time, the first from 457 to 447 and the second from 386 to 378.³

The Phocian Confederacy was dissolved in 346 B.C. and re-established a few years later. During the intervening period its polis-states were completely autonomous.

The polis-states of the Achaean Confederacy also became independent at the end of the fourth century.⁴

2. SECESSION OF POLIS-STATES FROM CONFEDERACIES

The Plataeans⁵ and the Hysiaeans⁶ defected from the Boeotian Confederacy in 519 B.C. During the Persian Wars, when the other Boeotians collaborated with the Persians, the Plataeans and the Thespians aligned themselves with the Greeks who were resisting the invaders.⁷ The Orchomenians, who joined the Confederacy during the Persian Wars, seceded from it during the Corinthian War and allied with the Spartans against the rest of the Boeotians.⁸

Of the polis-states in the Achaean Confederacy, only Pellene is recorded as having pursued an independent foreign policy from time to time, or as having seceded entirely.⁹ It had a similar policy during the

¹ A. Boëthius, *Die Pythais* (1918) 36, 43ff, 107; W. Dittenberger, *SIG II* (1917) 11–12.

² v. s., p. 329.

³ v. i., p. 417.

⁴ v. i., pp. 417–418.

⁵ Herodotus VI 108; Thucydides III 55 and 68, 5.

⁶ This hypothesis is that of J.A.O. Larsen, *Greek Federal States* (1968) 29, who based it on the fact that the Asopus river was fixed as the southern boundary of Thebes.

⁷ Herodotus VI 108, 111, 113, VII 132. J.A.O. Larsen, op. cit. 31, held the view that each Boeotian *polis* offered the symbols of submission separately to the Great King.

⁸ Xenophon, *Hell.* III 5, 6, IV 3, 15–18; Plutarch, *Lys.* 20, *Ages.* 18.

⁹ G. Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde II* (1926) 1532 (and n 3), 1534; J.A.O. Larsen, op. cit. 7, 82, 128.

time of the Achaean *ethnos*, waging war alone against neighbouring Sicyon in the seventh and sixth centuries.¹

We saw above that Pausanias mentions the Cleitorians amongst the colonizers of Megalopolis.² Since we know from other sources that the Cleitorians belonged to the confederacy of the Azanes, the mention of them by Pausanias, together with his failure to mention any other Azanes, indicates that they had become an independent polis-state before the foundation of Megalopolis in 371 B.C.

A SYNOPSIS OF THE CONCLUSIONS

All the examples of polis-states examined so far were founded by a community (in practice by the men of a community).

1. Some polis-states were established by completely independent and autonomous communities of various kinds, and under a variety of circumstances:

(a) A group of migrants founded a polis-settlement and formed a community related to this settlement; it later created a polis-state.³

(b) An established *ethnos* or part of an *ethnos* was divided into village communities (*δῆμοι*) that eventually came together in a federation (*σύστημα δήμων*). This federation later founded a polis-state.⁴

(c) An established community was divided up into *μέρη*; the communities related to them united to form a polis-state.⁵

(d) A confederacy of demes broke up, each of the formerly federated communities founding a polis-state.⁶

¹ POxy. 10, 1241 III, 2ff, 11, 1365 = 105 FGtH 2; Aelian, V.H. vi 1.

² v. s., p. 321.

³ v. s., pp. 302ff.

⁴ v. s., pp. 316ff.

⁵ v. s., pp. 320–321.

⁶ v. s., p. 321–322.

(e) The communities of polis-settlements within an *ethnos*-state naturally formed polis-states when they broke away.¹

2. Some polis communities created their own state machinery, while at the same time the pre-statal organs of their own *ethnos* were acquiring statal functions, and the *ethnos* was thus being transformed into a confederacy of polis-states. We have cited examples related not to this stage of the evolution, but to the antecedent stages.²

3. Some polis-states that were members of a confederacy became independent either after the dissolution of the confederacy³ or as a result of secession.⁴

Ultimately, there was an *ethnos* behind every polis community. But in no case did an *ethnos* create a polis-state. Between the one and the other lay some intermediate stages. This, however, did not prevent the polis community from preserving features of the *ethnos*, or each particular polis community from preserving the features of the particular *ethnos* from which it came.⁵

¹ v. s., pp. 322–323.

² v. s., pp. 324ff.

³ v. s., pp. 330–331.

⁴ v. s., pp. 331–332.

⁵ v. s., pp. 301, 303.

Chapter Two

WHEN AND WHERE WERE POLIS-STATES FOUNDED?

THE DEBATE

Scholars have so far dealt with the problem of when and where the polis-state made its appearance, not of when and where particular polis-states were founded. The answers that have been given to the former question will be cited in chronological order of the date proposed for the genesis of the polis-state.

1. THE MYCENAEAN PERIOD

Glötz was of the opinion (1926, 1928) that the earliest polis-states were created as early as the Mycenaean period; they were destroyed when the Mycenaean world collapsed; after the Dark Ages that followed, the process of the creation of polis-states began again. He did not adduce any arguments to support his dating of the first polis-states to the Mycenaean period, but simply stated it while sketching the semantic evolution of the term *πόλις* (acropolis → fortified town → political organization which did not destroy, but incorporated the *gene*, phratries and tribes), and as a corollary of his view that every Achaean ruler established himself in a polis-settlement (with an acropolis and a fortified town).¹ This view was not accepted by other scholars, and in any event was shown to be unfounded by the understanding of the nature of the Mycenaean state gained from the study of a number of documents written in Linear B.²

Despite this, H. van Effenterre has recently (1985) postulated an even earlier, pre-Mycenaean, origin for the polis-state. His extensive arguments may be summarized as follows: (a) 'Greece of the poleis' was presaged during the Mycenaean period by the widespread use of the Greek language, the existence of a large number of small states, and the moderate monarchy; (b) during the Dark Ages can be detected remains of social customs that appear to have been resuscitated after a period of suppression; (c) a network of small communities,

¹ G. Glötz, *Histoire Grecque I* (1926, 1948) 124; idem, *La Cité grecque* (1928, 1953) 12ff.

² cf. A. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece* (1980) 31.

each centred on a site chosen for its defensive potential, appeared in Greece after the arrival of the Greeks, but before the Mycenaean period; (d) Greek religion does not resemble a religion associated with a tribal organization, particularly with respect to the gods who were patrons of cities, already attested in the Mycenaean period; (e) there is nothing inconsistent in the existence of city and *ethnos*: the cities and the *ethne* simply represented different levels of organization.¹

2. AFTER THE COLONIZATION OF ASIA MINOR OR DURING THE GREEK DARK AGES

J.B.Bury (1900=1902) dated the creation of the Greek polis-state to c. 900 B.C.² B.Keil (1912) located the first Greek polis-states in the eastern Aegean, during the period immediately after the Dorian invasion, which resulted in a flight of the population from mainland Greece to the islands and the coast of Asia Minor.³ U.Wilcken agreed as to the area and the period.⁴ N.G.L.Hammond (1959=1967) retained this chronology but extended the area in which the polis-states first appeared to include the regions in the Peloponnese and Crete to which the Dorians spread.⁵ G.Maddoli (1970), who derived the first polis-states from the demes into which the Mycenaean states dissolved, gave precedence to mainland Greece, and raised the date as high as the tenth century B.C.⁶

3. BEFORE 800 B.C.

V.Ehrenberg (1937) gave precedence to Asia Minor without justifying his opinion. He dated the beginnings of the polis-states in mainland Greece about 800 B.C., on the basis of the following arguments: (a) the Greek colonies founded about the middle of the eighth century B.C. were polis-states from the very beginning; their mother cities will therefore have had the same character even earlier. (b) In the *rhētra* of Lycurgus, an ancient document from before the first Messenian war (c. 735 B.C.), Sparta appears as a polis-state. (c) The

¹ H. Van Effenterre, *La Cité grecque* (1985) 64–74, 86, 94ff, 97, 123ff, 146ff, 149ff, 154ff.

² J.B.Bury, *A History of Greece* (1900) 72 = 3rd edn (1953) 56.

³ B.Keil, *Griechische Staatsaltertümer*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* III 3 (1912) 304ff.

⁴ U.Wilcken, *Griechische Geschichte* 5th edn (1943) 56.

⁵ N.G.L.Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* (1959) 97–100 = 2nd edn (1967) 97–100.

⁶ G.Maddoli, *SMEA* 12 (1970) 40.

polis-state seems to be known in the *Odyssey*. (d) About 700 B.C. ideas of the following kind appear in Hesiod: the citizens have obligations to the *polis*; Zeus oversees the proper functioning of justice within the *polis*; the *polis* should be founded on justice. Hesiod lived in a backward *polis* in Boeotia: the creation of polis-states in the more advanced regions of Greece will therefore have taken place much earlier. (e) In the seventh century, things were so advanced that the 'family-Polis' had been replaced by the 'hoplite-Polis'.¹

H.Schaefer (1960) felt that Ehrenberg's dates were 'unexpectedly high', and criticized him for failing to distinguish the 'local pre-conditions for the polis-state from the political phenomenon'.² He did not discuss Ehrenberg's specific arguments, however, which are of a political nature.

In reply (1961), Ehrenberg repeated the first and the third of his arguments; he acknowledged that he had not distinguished clearly enough between the polis-settlement and the polis-state, but countered that it would be difficult to argue that Smyrna was not a state from the time of the foundation of the settlement there.³ Ehrenberg also stated this view in a more concise form (1957, 1960, 1976).⁴

Ehrenberg was supported by H.Bengtson (1950=1960=1960=1969=1977), J.Cook (1961) and D.Kagan (1965), the last named repeating the first of his predecessor's arguments.⁵

J.Gaudemet, Cl.Mossé, G.K.Vlachos, P.Lévêque and C.G.Thomas also sided with Ehrenberg. The first of these thought (1967) that the polis-state was foreshadowed in the Homeric poems and crystallized during the Greek Dark Ages, beginning in Ionia.⁶ At the same time (1967), Cl.Mossé agreed that the polis-state appears already formed in the eighth century B.C. At a later date (1984) she came closer to Gaudemet, seeing the emergence of the polis-state in

¹ V.Ehrenberg, *JHS* 57 (1937) 149–159 = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 83–97, cf. n 10. The first of Ehrenberg's arguments was formulated differently by A.Gwynn, *JHS* 38 (1918) 88: the Greek colonies of the eighth century were founded by states that were passing through a transitional phase from feudalism to oligarchy.

² H.Schaefer, *ZSS Röm. Abt.* 77 (1960) 424 = *Probleme der alten Geschichte* (1963) 386.

³ V.Ehrenberg, *Von den Grundformen griechischer Staatsordnung*, *SBHAW* (1961) Abt. 3, 15 = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 109–110.

⁴ V.Ehrenberg, *Der Staat der Griechen I* (1957) 8 = *The Greek State* (1960) 11 = *L'état grec* (1976) 34.

⁵ H.Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte* (1975) 72 = 5th edn (1977) 80; J.Cook, *CAH* 2nd edn II 38 (1961) 32 = 3rd edn II 2 (1975) 797; D.Kagan, *The Great Dialogue* (1965) 17ff.

⁶ J.Gaudemet, *Institutions politiques de l'antiquité* (1967) 149.

the Homeric poems, and dating its creation to the ninth century.¹ In the meantime (1974=1981), G.Vlachos also saw reflections of the polis-state in Homer.² C.G. Thomas (1981) shares the same idea.³ P.Lévêque dated (1973) the crystallization of the polis-state to the eighth century, and later (1981) dated its creation to the turn of the ninth to the eighth centuries, both in Asia Minor and in southern Greece. This chronology rests on the view that the Homeric poems reflect, not the polis-state itself, but a type from which the polis-state evolved.⁴

The idea that the polis-state was born in Asia Minor was propounded also by G. De Sanctis (1932, 1940) and A. Toynbee (1969), neither of whom assigned a date to the phenomenon.⁵

Opposition to the idea that the first polis-states were created in Asia Minor came from R.M.Cook (1946), S.Mazzarino (1947), G.M.A.Hanfmann (1953), Ch.G.Starr (1962) and G.Pugliese Carratelli (1964).⁶

4. EIGHTH CENTURY B.C. OR THE END OF THE DARK AGES

H.D.F.Kitto (1951) dated the beginnings of the polis-state to the period between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, on the ground that the *Iliad* reflects 'an advanced or degenerated form of tribalism', while the *Odyssey* is aware of the existence of independent cities in Crete.⁷

S.Deger (1970) makes the evolution of the polis-state contemporary with the political rise of the aristocracy, which she dates to the eighth century; at the same time, she asserts that the society of Ithaca described in the *Odyssey* is not contemporary with the poet, but earlier, since it is depicted as capable of functioning without a king or a popular assembly.⁸

¹ Cl. Mossé, *Les institutions politiques grecques à l'époque classique* (Coll. U 2) (1967) 5; eadem, *La Grèce archaïque d'Homère à Eschyle* (1984) 39ff, 62ff, 70ff.

² G.C.Vlachos, *Les sociétés politiques homériques* (1974) 58, 228, 256 = (1981) 44, 147, 271.

³ C.S.G.Thomas, in R.Griffeth and C.S.G.Thomas (eds), *The City-State in Five Cultures* (1981) ix.

⁴ P.Lévêque, *PdP* 28 (1973) 25; idem, *La Pensée* 217/218 fasc. (1981) 24; idem, *PM* fasc. 14 (January-March 1981) 6. On the necessary preconditions for the polis according to this same author, v. i., p. 426.

⁵ G.De Sanctis, *Problemi di storia antica* (1932) 14ff; idem, *Storia dei Greci I* (1940) 176-177; A.Toynbee, *Some Problems of Greek History* (1969) 41-44.

⁶ R.M.Cook, *JHS* 66 (1946) 87-88; S.Mazzarino, *Fra Oriente e Occidente* (1947) 234, 237; G.Hanfmann, *HSCP* 61 (1953) 15-19; Ch.G.Starr, *The Origins of the Greek Civilization* (1962) 335ff; G.Pugliese Carratelli, *ANL Quad.* (1964) 183.

⁷ H.D.F.Kitto, *The Greeks* (1951) 65.

⁸ S.Deger, *Herrschaftsformen bei Homer* (1970) 135, 181, 185.

A. Snodgrass has a different assessment of the Homeric poems as evidence for the dating of the polis-state, though he too puts this in the eighth century (1980, 1986). In his view, the Homeric poems have echoes of 'some form of tribal state' and 'reminiscences of Mycenaean kingdoms'; but the poet was living through the formation of the polis-state, which took place during his own time. Snodgrass also adds that the polis-state came into being in order to worship a local deity; and the earliest local cults are dated to the eighth century B.C. The same scholar cited the following arguments against earlier datings: (a) the Mycenaean state was different from the polis-state; (b) the fact that Smyrna, Iasos in Caria and Zagora on Andros were walled about 850 B.C. and shortly afterwards does not necessarily mark the transformation of these settlements into the centres of polis-states; it could equally be due to considerations of security: fortification and town-planning are not essential preconditions for the creation of states of this type.¹

Mention should be made here of F. de Polignac, who dated the creation of the polis-state to the eighth and seventh centuries (1984), seeing a number of changes in the spheres of religion and the organization of space as the symptoms of or preconditions for it.²

5. BETWEEN 750 AND 650 B.C.

Ch.G. Starr dated the creation of the *polis* to between 750 and 650 B.C. and located the earliest examples in mainland Greece. Originally (1961), he proposed this dating in conjunction with the idea that the polis-state was created at the time of the decline of the kingship and afterwards.³ Later (1962), he expressed his views at greater length. The Homeric poems still have elements foreign to the spirit of the polis-state: the states are ruled by Zeus-born kings, and the institutions are based upon personal allegiance. Even in Hesiod there is no public justice, since it is administered by corrupt kings. Positive signs of the creation of the polis-state and its location in mainland Greece are: (a) the elevation of the hoplites into the main military force; (b) the *rhētra* of Lycurgus and some of the ideas in Hesiod; (c) the fact that the Greek colonies founded from the middle of the eighth century B.C. onwards are polis-states from the very beginning; (d) the fact that southern Greece was culturally more advanced

¹ A. Snodgrass, *op. cit.* 27–32. cf. *idem* in C. Renfrew, J.F. Cherry (eds), *Peer Policy interaction and socio-political change* (1986) 49.

² F. de Polignac, *La naissance de la Cité grecque* (1984) *passim*.

³ Ch.G. Starr, *Historia* 10 (1961) 136–137.

than any other part of the Greek world; (e) the fact that it was in this region that the earliest wars between polis-states were fought.¹

Some of these arguments (c, d) were repeated by C.S.G.Thomas (1965, 1966) who agreed with Starr on the beginnings of the polis-state but disagreed on the date at which it was perfected, which she makes contemporary with Solon,² in agreement with Berve.³

Recently (1986) Ch.G.Starr maintained only two of his earlier arguments (the ones we have noted as c and e). On the other hand he developed some ideas formulated by A.Snodgrass (demographic expansion, appearance of shrines held as centres for civic unity); and he noted the rise of aristocracy, evidenced by the growing wealth of burials.⁴

6. SEVENTH CENTURY B.C.

The creation of the polis-state was dated to the seventh century B.C. by E.Barker (1918), V.Ehrenberg (1921, 1929) and W.K.Lacey (1968). The first of these did not adduce any supporting arguments.⁵ The second proposed this date as a by-product of his theory that the polis-state was the successor to a society dominated by nobles,⁶ which is the society still portrayed in the Homeric poems, while Hesiod was acquainted with the *polis*, a community of free men.⁷ The third of these writers also dated the polis-state with reference to its nature as an independent, autonomous and self-sufficient community.⁸

H.Berve (1931) should perhaps also be included here for his view that the polis-state was brought to completion by the legislation of Solon, which was looked upon by later writers as the standard for the polis-state.⁹

7. SIXTH TO FIFTH CENTURIES B.C.

Later (1936=1966, 1937, 1938), H.Berve brought the dates of the creation and maturity of the polis-state even lower. He was of the opinion that not even

¹ Ch.G.Starr, *The Origins of Greek Civilization* (1962) 324, 335–337.

² C.S.G.Thomas, *Early Greek Kingship* (1965) 16, 24, 151; idem, *PdP* 21 (1966) 8.

³ See below.

⁴ Ch.G.Starr, *Individual and Community, The Rise of the Polis 800–500 B.C.* (1986) 35ff.

⁵ E.Barker, *Greek Political Theory* (1918, 1960, 1970) 31.

⁶ v. s., p. 31.

⁷ V.Ehrenberg, *Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum* (1921) 126–136; idem, *Gnomon* 7 (1929) 5–8.

⁸ W.C.Lacey, *The Family in Classical Greece* (1968) 51.

⁹ H.Berve, *Griechische Geschichte* I (1931) 174, 176.

Miltiades was subject to the spirit of the *polis*, which finally prevailed in the time of Pericles.¹

V.Ehrenberg observed (1937) that Berve was confusing the polis-state with democracy.²

8. NO ABSOLUTE DATE

Many of the suggestions as to when the Greek polis-state emerged contain indirect references to data or texts, which are, however, left undated. Such data are: the rise of the state and urbanization in Greece, certain institutions, and even the history of certain terms. The texts referred to are frequently the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, less frequently the *Works and Days*, and rarely a few other written sources.

Marx and Engels, who related the rise of the *polis* to the rise of the state and the urbanization, declared that the Homeric poems reflect a social organization earlier than the state, the city and the city-state; Engels drew this conclusion from his study of the history of Archaic Athens. The Marxists continue to hold the same views, to investigate the same problems, and to use the same sources, though they have also added some further observations relating both to the breadth and the depth of the question, and have extended their researches into other areas, such as the rise of the Spartan state, the development of slavery, and the process of economic and social differentiation within the community. Runciman based his statements on the Homeric poems, the *Works and Days* and later texts, and also on the semantic evolution of terms such as βασιλεύς, αἰσωνμήτης and δημιουργός. Other scholars concern themselves only with a limited range of problems and sources.³

E.Will mentioned the development of the polis-state amongst other phenomena of the eighth, seventh and sixth centuries B.C., observing that it is impossible to date the definitive formation of the different polis-states. He also wrote that the polis-state came to maturity the moment that relations between the citizens were regulated by written rules.⁴

¹ H.Berve, *Antike* 12 (1936) 1ff = *Gestaltende Kräfte der Antike* (1966) 234ff; idem, *Miltiades* (*Hermes*, Einzelschriften 2) (1937) passim; idem, *NJADB* 1 (1938) 3. Berve contradicted this view when he used the expression 'Polis der adligen Herren' on p. 6 of the last work.

² V.Ehrenberg, *JHS* 57 (1937) 147 n 2, 152–158 = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 82 n 3, 94–96.

³ v. i., pp. 344ff, passim.

⁴ E.Will, in *Deuxième conférence internationale d'histoire économique* (1962) (1965) 41, 59.

9. POSITION RESERVED

Other scholars have reserved their positions. G.Pugliese Carratelli thought it fruitless to seek to establish the time and the place of the creation of the polis-state (1961).¹ M.Austin and P.Vidal-Naquet (1972=1977) observed that the creation of the polis-state is shrouded in obscurity and that it is difficult to date it for a variety of reasons: the polis-state is an abstraction, the content of which depends on the criteria used; the individual polis-states were formed at different times and in different ways; the evidence of the ancient authors is inadequate, and archaeology is of little assistance. After saying all this, however, these two authors acknowledge that a sure indication of the existence of the polis-state is to be seen in the founding of colonies that were polis-states in Sicily and Italy from the middle of the eighth century onwards.²

Comments

1. As with the previous problem, the question of the origins of the polis-state, so the issue of the period and place in which the polis-state was born has been treated in entirely abstract terms. Only a very few scholars have made reference to one or more particular polis-states, and this always within the framework of a general discussion.

2. Three tendencies have been followed: positive, reserved, and wavering. Most scholars fall in the first category. A reserved position has been adopted by only G.Pugliese Carratelli. M.Austin and P.Vidal-Naquet, jointly proclaimed on the one hand that the creation of the polis-state cannot be located within time and space, and on the other admitted that the argument that suggests that the mother cities that sent out the Greek colonies founded in Italy and Sicily in the eighth century were themselves polis-states is valid as evidence.

3. The positive answers suggested to the problem of the time and place of the formation of the polis-state cover a broad spectrum, ranging from the Mycenaean period down to the fifth century B.C. We thus again encounter a situation already observed both in the case of the definition of the *polis* and in the case of its origins.

¹ G.Pugliese Carratelli, *op. cit.* 188.

² M.Austin, P.Vidal-Naquet, *Economies et sociétés en Grèce ancienne* (Coll. U 2) (1972) 63-64 = *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece* (1977) 49-50.

4. Two scholars changed their minds: H.Berve (first view 1931; second 1936, 1937, 1938) and V.Ehrenberg (first view 1921 and 1929; second 1937 onwards).

5. As in the case of the problems considered earlier in this book, the variety and fluidity of the opinions expressed derives from the fact that some of them were formulated without any evidence to support them, and others were based on inadequate arguments.

6. The lack of arguments, or the use of inadequate arguments largely depends on the fact that the approach to the problem is confined to the most general formulation of 'when and where the polis-state was created'. This limitation carries with it a number of disadvantages: (1) it already contains within it the general framework of the answer, which is 'the polis-state was created in a particular region and at a particular period'; (2) it precludes the scholar from widening his research field both in space and in time; (3) it does not lead to the discovery of sound evidence. The content of the problem itself therefore has to be changed.

A NEW INVESTIGATION

The problem of where and when the polis-state was created is subordinate to a wider question: where and when were individual polis-states founded? This has two advantages: (1) It brings us face to face with particular situations, and enables us to adduce concrete evidence; the assembling of a sufficiently large number of particular answers will automatically furnish the answer to the general question where and when was the polis-state created. (2) It leads to make some statements concerning the phases in the creation of the polis-states and the successive stages by which the phenomenon spread.

The criterion by which to establish the beginning of each individual polis-state can only be the coincidence of a community with a polis-settlement and a state.¹ A polis-state exists from the moment that the three are found together.

As we have seen, it was the community (in practice its decision making element) that founded both the polis-settlement and the polis-state. The converse did not occur.² The influence of the polis-state and the polis-settlement on the community operated at a different level: they helped to transform the nature of community that founded the state and the settlement.

If the structures of the founding community were based on kinship (or fictiv kinship), then its settlement in one place converted it into a unitary and local community and in time gave rise to new structures. Moreover, the community was then redefined with reference, not to the *ethnos* from which it originated, but to the settlement founded by it: thus a community of Dorians was transformed into Corinthians and another into Argives; a community composed of Ionians from Attica and migrants of different origins was transformed into Milesians, and another mixed community into Phocaeans. The same phenomenon is to be found, *mutatis mutandis*, in the case of communities that derived from the local fragmentation of an *ethnos*: a community of an Arcadian confederacy of demes, for example, was transformed into Mantineans.

¹ v. s., p. 151.

² v. s., pp. 300ff, *passim*.

The role of the state in the transformation of the community by which it was founded was somewhat different. The community made use of the state machine either to protect its homogeneity or, conversely, to introduce foreign elements into its midst. For either of these to happen, decisions had to be taken by competent state organs.

Given that the community was always antecedent both to the polis-settlement and to the polis-state, it follows that when we do not know the date at which the community was formed, but do know the foundation date of the settlement or of the state associated with it, these dates furnish a *terminus ante quem* for the community.

The foundation date for every polis-settlement is to be derived from archaeological evidence. When a settlement has been adequately investigated, the date of its foundation, or refoundation, may be estimated more or less accurately.

The state, too, leaves its mark on the archaeological evidence, in the form of the ruins of various public buildings. It is also attested in both public and private documents. But there is no sound evidence for the earlier stages of the polis-states. When there is no *prytaneion*, council-chamber, or place in which the assembly was convened, is a defence wall, a temple, or a tomb assumed to be 'royal' sufficient evidence to indicate the existence of a state? And what evidence for the existence or non-existence of a state can be found in very early texts, such as the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey* or the *Works and Days*?

Before we proceed, we must agree on the criteria to be used. In order to secure the greatest possible measure of agreement, we shall select the most exacting criteria. It is thus out of the question to use here criteria inherent in theories which identify as states societies that have attained an elementary organization; or define as the minimal function of the state the maintenance of order and the waging of war; or even stress that a state is born as soon as a society comes to recognize the authority of officials with proven success in securing its welfare.¹ Criteria that meet our present need are to be found in theories for which a state is a stratified society with an organizational hierarchy, making use of coercion. The most demanding amongst these theories is that professed by Marx and Engels and developed by their followers, who view the state as the instrument of a class. Accordingly, they do

¹ Ch.G.Starr, *op. cit.* 42-44.

not make its emergence coincide with the beginning of patriarchal slavery and the rise of aristocratic families. For them, it originates in the formation of a class of landowners strong enough to use coercion in order to derive economic profit from the systematic, thoroughgoing exploitation of the slave population and other elements of society, and in the weakening of the governing organs of the clans, the phratries and the tribes, in favour of governing organs controlled by the ruling class. The Marxist assessment as to the pre-conditions of a state is shared by some non Marxist historians and sociologists. W.G.Runciman also formulated very strict requirements for dating the emergence of the state in the Greek commonwealth. He demanded the presence together of four criteria: 'specialization of governmental roles; centralization of enforceable authority; permanence, or at least more than ephemeral, stability of structure; and emancipation from real or fictive kinship as the basis of relations between the occupants of governmental roles and those whom they govern'.¹ It is reasonable to assume that if we take into account the most exigent criteria for defining the state and describing its rise, our conclusions will meet with the approval of those who formulated them, and a *fortiori* of those whose own criteria are less demanding.

Our investigation will take place at two levels: firstly, at the level of general data; secondly, at the level of data drawn from and referring to individual *poleis*.

I. GENERAL DATA

A. DATING OF THE POLIS-STATE WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONDITIONS OF ITS EMERGENCE

The emergence of the *polis* has been attributed by the founders of Marxism to two interconnected social processes involving class struggle: the expansion and intensification of slave labour, and the demotion of an ever increasing number of members of the original community from the rank of landowners to that of the landless. Slaves were also found

¹ W.G.Runciman, *CSHS* 24 (1982) 351.

in pre-political societies, but relations between slave-owners and slaves at this time were 'patriarchal'. They gave way to the classic relations of slave ownership under new conditions. The old source of slaves, the taking of prisoners of war, was increasingly exploited. Some communities reduced the populations conquered by them to chattel-slavery. Commodity-slavery also made its appearance. Even members of the community itself lost their freedom as a result of debt or for other reasons. Other members of the community did not fall so low; but being deprived of their landed property, they rented their labour to rich landowners and became dependent on them as clients. Three basic classes were thus formed: landowners, landless but free, and slaves; the first was divided into large and small landowners. At the same time, an important change took place in the productive forces: some members of the community concerned themselves solely with agricultural production, while others specialized in handicraft. The former continued to live near their land, while the latter concentrated together in a settlement, which thus became an urban settlement, a *polis*. The large landowners, who did not work the land themselves, but derived their income from the labour of the free landless population and of slaves who lived in the countryside, also made their homes in the same settlement. Thus, the differentiation between city and countryside went hand in hand with the more general social differentiation. The polis-state and the urban settlement evolved together. Engels detected different stages in the formation of the *polis* in the history of Archaic Athens.¹

Marxist historiography has been concerned for the most part to document these positions and discover supporting arguments for them. We will consider here only those ideas of some originality. G.Thomson associated the rise of the *polis* with the growth of commodity products and chattel-slavery.² R.F.Willetts adopted Thomson's first point and proposed as a second the development of private property.³ T.Yuge saw

¹ F.Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884) chapter 4 and 5, with quotations by Marx. Further Marxian quotations in the book by E.Ch.Welskopf, *Die Produktionsverhältnisse im Alten Orient und in der griechischen Antike* (1957) 352-376.

² G.Thomson, *Studies in Ancient Greek Society, II: The First Philosophers* (1955) 14.

³ R.F.Willetts, *Ancient Crete* (1965) 4-5.

the *polis* as the result of trade and money relations.¹ G.A.Koshelenko proposed two different models for the creation of a Greek *polis*, the Athenian and the Spartan (1984). His ideas may be summarized as follows. The formation of the Athenian state took place in two stages. During the first, the original class of the exploited, which consisted of slaves, was increased by the addition to it of Athenian farmers who lost their land and became dependent on the rich: this process reached its peak towards the end of the seventh century, resulting in a crisis that was overcome by the legislation of Solon. The second stage in the formation of the Athenian state now began. Once the process of enslaving Athenians had been arrested, and the Athenian farmers had been emancipated, as a result of the importance acquired by middle level landowners serving as hoplites, the need for slaves was satisfied by increasing the number of enslaved foreigners. The state mechanism was adjusted to meet the new situation. This process was completed by the time of the Persian Wars. The Spartan state was formed in a different context, and in three stages. When the Spartans enslaved the earlier Achaean population, Spartan society took the form of a primitive state. The aristocracy later attempted to bring other members of the community under its control, resulting in a crisis that became acute during the second Messenian war. The third stage began with the creation of a regime in which all the citizens were equal, rallying together and becoming militarized in order to be able to hold down the much more numerous body of the slave population.²

Max Weber and J.Hasebroek also saw the formation of the polis-state and the creation of the polis-settlement as contemporary phenomena, which they attributed to economic causes. In contrast with Marx, Engels and their followers, however, they asserted that the polis-state was not the earliest state formation in the Greek world. According to Hasebroek, who expounded his ideas at length, the polis-state was preceded by a state dominated by an estate of nobles (*Adelsstaat*). The overthrow of this estate and the formation of the polis-state and the polis-settlement were the result of technical and economic progress and

¹ T.Yuge, *Spartacus: Symposium rebus Spartaci gestis dedicatum 2050 A* (1981) 61.

² G.A.Koshelenko, in *Conferenčija pričini privrašenija pervobitnovo obšestra rabovladelčeskoe i feodalnoe (Akademija Nauk CCCP, Otdelenie Istorii)* (1984) 36–41.

the emergence of the hoplites as the predominant force in the army.¹

H.Berve, V.Ehrenberg, S.Deger, A.Snodgrass and Ch.G.Starr have dated the emergence of the *polis* on the grounds of criteria other than class division and the urbanization, but still related to social and economic changes.²

B. DATING OF THE POLIS-STATE WITH REFERENCE TO THE HOMERIC POEMS

The question of the origins of the polis-state, and even more so the question of the time and place of the creation of this type of ancient Greek state, are also illuminated by the Homeric poems. Many of the scholars who have turned their attention to these questions have accordingly expressed their opinions on the nature of the 'Homeric state'; and the study of the 'Homeric state' has frequently led to connections being drawn with the polis-state. The latter is referred to by most of them as 'city-state', 'Stadtstaat', etc., while a good number use the Greek term *polis*.

The scholars who focus their attention on the Homeric poems may be divided into two groups. Some of them are primarily interested in the date of the creation of the polis-state, while others are primarily interested in whether or not the polis-state is reflected in the Homeric poems. It should be noted that for Marx, Engels and many of their followers as well as for other scholars the date of birth of the polis-state is only a side issue to their main interest, the genesis of the state in general.

Until 1877 the prevailing and unchallenged view was that the Homeric poems depicted aristocratic societies organized as monarchic states. This view was attacked by L.H.Morgan, K.Marx and F.Engels, who suggested that the Homeric poems depict peoples, tribes, phratries and *gene* without any class divisions, and therefore without the need for a state organization. The larger groups, peoples, tribes and phratries, were governed democratically: the supreme power resided with the

¹ J.Hasebroek, *Griechische Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (1931) 9ff, 159ff.

² v. s., pp. 336ff, passim.

assembly of the warriors, which met when needed, in order to take decisions; between meetings, the direction of common affairs was the responsibility of a small body composed of the elders of the clans. This view of the kind of society and of its organization reflected in the Homeric poems was formed in accordance with observations made by Morgan in his study of the Iriquois Indians of North America, and was supported by reference to a number of features in the Homeric poems that were thought to correspond to the organization of the Iriquois.¹

Since then the debate continues between scholars defending three main positions: (I) according to the first, the Homeric poems portray more or less the polis-state; (II) according to the second, they reflect states, but no polis-state; (III) according to the third, they clearly depict pre-statal relations.

I

Those who hold that the Homeric poems reveal awareness of the polis-state either (1) confine themselves to that statement or (2) assume that the polis-state coexisted with other forms of state.

(1) The former group includes the views of E.Meyer, G.Busolt, G.Glotz, A.Heuss, H.Strassburger, W.Hoffmann, G.Micknat, J.Gaudemet, Cl.Mossé, G.Maddoli, M.Hammond, G.Vlachos, J.V.Luce. Ed.Meyer claimed that at the time the epic poems were composed the city-state was so predominant in the Greek world of Asia Minor that the poets were unaware of any other state formations and, moreover, depicted non-Greek peoples, such as the Laestrygonians and the Cimmerians as living in city-states.² G.Busolt subsumed the 'Homeric state and kingship' under the 'Polis'.³ Similarly, G.Glotz called the first chapter of his book on the Greek city-state 'La Cité homérique'; he also stated categorically that in the Homeric period, every small region of Greece formed a separate 'Cité'.⁴ H.Strassburger is of the opinion

¹ L.H.Morgan, *Ancient Society* (1877); K.Marx, *Abstract of Morgan's 'Ancient Society'*, in *Marx-Engels Archive IX* (1941) 1-192; F.Engels, *loc. cit.*

² Ed.Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, II (1893) 335 = 2nd, 3rd, 4th edn III (1937) 307.

³ G.Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde I* (1920) 317ff.

⁴ G.Glotz, *La cité grecque* (1928) 39ff.

that in the Homeric poems, the *polis* was the normal type of state.¹ A similar position is adopted by G.Micknat, who wrote that the *Iliad* presents a picture of polis-states with various kinds of relationship to each other.² According to Cl.Mossé, the epic poems show the monarchy developing within the framework of the polis-state which consists of *gene*;³ more particularly 'la cité des Phéaciens et celle d'Ulysse-sont déjà des cités: l'espace civique y est partiellement délimité et la communauté y a une existence réelle, constituant le démos'.⁴ J.V.Luce made the following comments: in his description of the shield of Achilles, the poet shows a matter of homicide being settled by public litigation, which represents a stage intermediate between the blood feud as a purely family matter and the treatment of homicide as a crime punishable by the state. All the scenes of war and peace reflect a type of state that consists of a small community, is ruled by a king, and centres on an urban settlement. In many passages of Homer, the term *πόλις* is used to mean 'state'. Priam, Nestor and Odysseus are kings of polis-states.⁵ W.Hoffmann also took a positive attitude, but with a qualification involving some nuances. He declared that the narrative takes the polis-state for granted throughout, but that the action is remarkably a-political, particularly if viewed from the standpoint of the fifth century. The reason for this, in Hoffmann's estimation, is that the poems are concerned with individuals, with individual deeds and individual motives, and have no political content; in this climate, of course, the polis-state had no place. That the polis-state formed part of the poet's environment is clear from various pieces of evidence: (a) the personal conflict between Menelaus and Paris has been overlaid by a war between the Greeks and the Trojans; (b) from time to time the individuals consider their group; (c) the shield of Achilles has scenes showing the dispensing of justice.⁶ A.Heuss, J.Gaudemet, G.Maddoli,

¹ H.Strassburger, *HZ* 177 (1954) 233 = F.Gschnitzer (ed.), *Zur griechischen Staatskunde*, (1969) 104.

² G.Micknat, *Studien zur Kriegsgefangenschaft und zur Sklaverei, in der griechischen Geschichte* (= Abh. Mainz, XI) (1959) 608.

³ Cl.Mossé, *Histoire des doctrines politiques en Grèce* (= Que sais-je?) (1969) (non vidi).

⁴ Cl.Mossé, *AION (archeol.)* 2 (1980) 7-19.

⁵ J.V.Luce, *PRIA* 78c (1978) 1-15.

⁶ W.Hoffmann, in *Festschrift Bruno Snell* (1956) 153-165.

and M.Hammond expressed themselves more concisely than the previous scholars.¹

(2) The view that in the Homeric poems the polis-state appears alongside other types of states has five formulations.

(a) According to H.Francotte, the polis-state appears only in the more recent parts of the poems.²

(b) V.Ehrenberg, H.D.F.Kitto and C.S.G.Thomas saw matters differently: the polis-state is absent from the *Iliad*, but appears in the *Odyssey*. Ehrenberg wrote: 'the *Iliad* shows no trace of the existence of a Polis, while the *Odyssey* does.'³ Kitto saw in the *Iliad* signs of tribalism.⁴ Thomas commented that, in the *Odyssey*, there are frequent indications of a polis organization and allusions to the spirit of the city-state. Ithaca and the city of the Phaeacians have permanent residences for people of all social and political levels, public meetings to take decisions, established customs and permanent harbours. Features of the polis-state can also be seen in the sphere of religion, the administration of justice, the existence of social classes and public buildings.⁵

(c) The position adopted by S.Deger takes a different form; Troy is represented as an oriental city-state, whereas the community of the Phaeacians reflects the poet's experience of the city-state that was being formed in his time in Ionia. Deger does not accept that Ithaca had the character of a city-state, since the *Odyssey* not only makes no mention of public administration, but also shows the community as functioning even though the king is away and there is no popular assembly.⁶

(d) H.M.Chadwick and F.Gschnitzer distinguished two types of state in the Homeric poems with great clarity and on the basis of sound criteria. The former noted that the majority of the states there are called by the names of peoples, and very few by the names of cities, and concluded that the cities, which are located in the southern parts of

¹ A.Heuss, *AuA* 11 (1946) 40 = F. Gschnitzer (ed.), *Zur griechischen Staatskunde* (1969) 59; J.Gaudemet, *Institutions politiques de l'antiquité* (1967) 149; G.Maddoli, *SMEA* 12 (1970) 12; M.Hammond, *The City in the Ancient World* (1972) 159.

² H.Francotte, *Mélanges de droit public grec* (1910) 48.

³ V.Ehrenberg, *JHS* 57 (1937) 156 = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 93.

⁴ H.D.F.Kitto, *The Greeks* (1951) 65.

⁵ C.S.G.Thomas, *Early Greek Kingship* (1965) 18ff = *PdP* 21 (1966) 8ff.

⁶ S.Deger, *Herrschaftsformen bei Homer* (1970) 125–128, 133–135, 163–164, 184–185.

Greece, had a political or military, rather than a tribal basis.¹ Gschnitzer set out his case at much greater length. He was the first scholar to undertake an extensive investigation into the polis-state (*Stadtstaat*) and the 'stem' or 'tribe' (*Stamm*) in the Homeric poems. From it, he concluded that 'the epic poems know of stem-states (*Stammstaaten*) in the north and the south of the Greek world, but the poets seem to have first-hand experience mainly of the conditions in the early city-states of the Greek east'; that the stem-state plays a greater role than the polis-state; and that the names of the states indicate stem-states, whereas the reality reflected is that of the polis-state. He accounted for these general observations by the hypothesis that the material for the poems consisted of elements dating from a period during which the stem-state was the predominant form, while the poems themselves were composed at a period and in a place where the *polis* was emerging. Gschnitzer's arguments are both positive and negative. The negative arguments may be summarized as follows: (a) there are no indications of the existence of political rights; (b) the city plays an important role in the lives and thoughts of men, but as yet has no political content; (c) a number of passages connect a king with a city, but the cities involved are those which in the past were the seats of a Mycenaean *anax*; (d) in other passages, the cities seem to be political centres, but this does not imply that the states corresponding with them were confined to a single city; (e) the term *πόλις* never means 'state' in the Homeric poems, which use the word *δῆμος* to express this concept. The following are the positive arguments: (a) the language of the poems already includes a number of ethnics that may be derived from the names of cities; two of these, *Pylioi* and *Mykenaioi*, are connected with states of the Mycenaean period; but *Athenaioi* is used of a state that existed in the period at which the poems were composed; (b) the state of the Trojans in the *Iliad* and those of Ithaca and the Phaeacians in the *Odyssey* give the impression of city-states; it appears, therefore, that these states were invented by the poets along the lines of the city-states of their own period.²

(e) According to G.K.Vlachos, the epic poems reveal a Greece that has passed through the tribal stage and is moving towards the polis-

¹ H.M.Chadwick, *The Heroic Age* (1912) 589.

² F.Gschnitzer, *Chiron* 1 (1971) 2-16.

state; more specifically, the Phaeacian state possesses some characteristics of the *polis* at the stage when it was being formed, but also has traces of earlier ideologies and earlier institutional patterns; moreover, the word *πόλις* already has a political meaning.¹

II

Some scholars share in the view that the Homeric world witnessed the state. But they do not recognize it as a polis-state. U.von Willamowitz-Moellendorff and J.A.O.Larsen assigned the Homeric state to the category of 'stem-state'. The former cited as an argument the fact that Homer usually refers to his heroes by ethnic names; the latter simply stated his view.² According to J.Hasebroek, the Homeric state was a 'Stammes-Staat oder Gaufürstentum'.³ V.Ehrenberg drew a distinction between the polis-state, a community of citizens, and the Homeric state, which he described as an 'estate-state' (Ständerstaat).⁴ A.Mele described the Homeric state as a personal state, and saw it as a 'stem' (*ethnos*) in the process of dissolution, citing the following facts as arguments: (a) the 'stem' of the Hellenes was divided into two states, that of Achilles and that of Ajax, son of Oileus; (b) in addition to the Hellenes, the state of Achilles included Myrmidons and Achaeans; (c) two other 'stems', those of the Aenianes and the Perrhaebi, were united under a single king.⁵ P.Lévêque did not describe the Homeric state, but simply claimed that the polis-state derived from it.⁶

III

The view originated by L.H.Morgan and developed by K.Marx and

¹ G.C.Vlachos, *Les sociétés politiques homériques* (1974) 58, 228, 256 = *Πολιτικές κοινωνίες στον Όμηρο* (1981) 44–45, 49–52, 147, 219, 240, 268, 271.

² U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen*, in P. Hinneberg (ed), *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, II 4, 1 (1910) 41–42 = 2nd edn (1923) (non vidi); J.A.O.Larsen, in *IXe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques I* (1950) 393.

³ J.Hasebroek, *Griechische Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (1931) 9.

⁴ V.Ehrenberg, *Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum* (1921) 131–133; idem, *Gnomon* 5 (1929) 5–6.

⁵ A.Mele, in R.Bianchi Bandinelli (ed), *Storia e civiltà dei Greci I* [1978] 35ff.

⁶ P.Lévêque, *PM* fasc. 14 (1981) 6; idem, *La Pensée*, fasc. 217/218 (1981) 24.

F.Engels that the Homeric poems do not portray any kind of state is followed by all Marxists as well as by some non-Marxist scholars. Sometimes it is specifically stated that these poems do not portray the polis-state, in accordance with their view that the polis-state came into being only when the conditions had been created for the formation of state.

We cite here views which belong to the literature concerning the polis-state.

Finley stressed the importance of personal relations in the world of Odysseus. What appears to us to be an alliance of communities was in reality that of individuals linked by ties such as intermarriage and hospitality.¹

Ch.G.Starr commented: 'Homer cannot be said to exhibit the political institutions of the city-state. Assemblies and councils meet, but the position of the Zeus-born kings and the ties of personal loyalty are of a different flavor from that of the later days.'² The same author stressed recently that the Homeric poems reflect an age of chieftains.³

M.Austin and P.Vidal-Naquet refused to recognize the Homeric cities as polis-states, arguing that they were not communities of citizens sovereign both internally and externally.⁴

The problem of whether and to what extent the epic poems depict the type of state that was called πόλις by its creators, requires further discussion, which will involve both an, inevitably extensive, critique of the views propounded so far, and the citing of new evidence.

The point to be established is, of course, whether the Homeric poems do or do not reflect the kind of state for which the ancient Greeks used the term πόλις. The investigation will be all the clearer, however, if the question is divided into two parts: (1) Do the Homeric poems contain reflections of the state in general? (2) What kinds of

¹ M.I.Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (1956) 108–118 = *Le monde d'Ulysse*, 2nd edn (1978) 121–129.

² Ch.G.Starr, *PdP* 12 (1957) 103.

³ Ch.G.Starr, *Individual and Community, The Rise of the Polis 800–500 B.C.* (1986) 14–33.

⁴ M.Austin, P.Vidal-Naquet, *Economies et Sociétés en Grèce ancienne* (1972) 52–53, 73 = *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece* (1977) 40–41.

state are reflected in them? In this way: we first of all avoid confusion between the genus 'state' and the species 'polis-state'; and secondly, if the answer to the first question is positive, we may then investigate the extent to which the *polis* is represented in the poems in comparison with other kinds of state.

1. EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE IN THE HOMERIC POEMS

The structure, institutions and functions of the societies portrayed in the Homeric poems have been the subject of much study. The bibliography includes innumerable titles, and it would be difficult to make a selection of even the more important of them not exceeding three dozens.¹

The present contribution to the question of whether the Homeric poems reflect societies with statal or pre-statal organization has been carried in accordance with the following premises. (1) If clear indications of the existence of the state can be established in the Homeric texts, and there are no counter-indications, we must conclude that the Homeric world had experience of the state. (2) If clear indications of the existence of a pre-statal organization can be established in the Homeric texts, and there is no indication of the state, we must conclude that Homeric society was in a phase earlier than the formation of the state. (3) If clear indications can be established in the Homeric texts both of a pre-state organization and of a state

¹ General treaties on society and state in Homer: A.Fanta, *Der Staat in der Ilias und Odyssee* (1882); G.Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde I* (1920) 317ff; G.Finsler, *Homer I-III*, 3rd edn (1924); G.Calhoun, 'Classes and Masses in Homer', *Cl. Phil.* 29 (1934) 192-208, 301-316; R.Köstler, 'Die homerische Rechts- und Staatsordnung', in *Gesammelte Aufsätze* (1950) 7-25 = E.Beneker (ed), *Zur griechischen Rechtsgeschichte* (= *Wege der Forschungen*, 45) (1968) 172-195; A.B.Feldman, 'Homer and Democracy', *ClJ* 47 (1951/1952) 337ff; M.I.Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (1956); Ch.G.Starr, 'The Decline of the Early Greek Kings', *Historia* 10 (1961) 129ff; P. De Fidio, 'Le categorie sociali e professionali nel mondo omerico', *AISS* 2 (1969/1970) 1-71; G.C.Vlachos, *Les sociétés politiques homériques* (1974) = *Πολιτικές κοινωνίες στὸν Ὀμηρο* (1981); A.Stella, *Tradizione micenea e poesia della Iliade* (1978) 49ff; W.G.Runciman, 'Origins of State: The Case of Archaic Greece', *CSHS* 24 (1982) 351-377. Forms of power, institutions: Moreau, 'Les assemblées publiques d'après l'Iliade et l'Odyssee', *REA* 6 (1893) 204ff; G.Finsler, 'Das homerische Königtum', *NJKADL* 17 (1906) 313ff, 395ff;

organization, we must conclude that the Homeric world already knew the state, but some explanation must also be given of the presence of indications of an earlier organization. One legitimate solution would be to assume that, at the time that these epic poems were composed, state forms coexisted with pre-state structures though in different places. A second legitimate solution would be to suppose that the echoes of pre-statal structures in the Homeric poems are archaisms. These archaisms could be of two kinds: either archaisms within reality, or archaisms within the poetic material and the tradition in general. Indeed, we know, on the one hand, that societies preserve for long periods of time structures, institutions and functions formed under earlier conditions. On the other hand, we are aware that Homer frequently refers to features of material civilization, cultural life, political geography and so on, that no longer survived in his times. (4) Homer's silences, whether on statal or pre-statal conditions and institutions, are by no means conclusive. They should be interpreted as inherent in the nature of the epic, and as a product of specific factors: (a) The Homeric poems are not historical narratives, but poetic compositions. They are directed at the imagination and emotions, and strive to achieve dramatic effect. To this end, some situations are brought to the forefront of the action, but

M.P.Nilsson, 'Das homerische Königtum', *SBPAW* (1927) VII = *Opuscula selecta* II (1952) 371ff; C.W.Westrup, *Le roi de l'Odyssee et le peuple chez Homère* (1929); K.Stegman von Pritzwald, *Zur Geschichte der Herrscherbezeichnung von Homer bis Plato* (1930); V.Bartoletti, 'Il re omerico', *SIFC* 12 (1935) 185ff; idem, 'L'aristocrazia e monarchia nell' Odissea', *SIFC* 13 (1936) 113ff; Sp.Marinatos, 'Διογενεὶς βασιλῆς', *Studies Presented to D.M.Robinson* 1 (1951) 126ff; G.Jachman, 'Das homerische Königtum', *Maia* n.s. 6 (1953) 241ff; K.Marót, 'Basileus', *AAASH* 19 (1962) 175ff; C.G.Thomas, *Early Greek Kingship* (1965); eadem, 'The roots of Homeric Kingship', *Historia* 15 (1966) 387ff; S.Deger, *Herrschaftsformen bei Homer* (1970); R.Descat, 'Idéologie homérique du pouvoir' *REA* 81 (1979) 229ff; Y.V.Andreev, 'Könige und Königsherrschaft in den Epen Homers' *Klio* 61 (1979) 361–384; R.Mondi, 'Σκηπτοῦχοι βασιλεῖς. An Argument for Divine Kingship in Early Greece', *Arethusa* 13 (1980) 203ff; R.B.Siola, 'Su alcuni aspetti della monarchia omerica', *Studi in onore di A.Biscardi* 5 (1984) 457–458; P. Carlier, *La Royauté en Grèce avant Alexandre* (1984) 137–239. Forms of state: W.Hoffmann, 'Die Polis bei Homer', *Festschrift Bruno Snell* (1956) 156ff; C.S.G.Thomas, 'Homer and the Polis', *PdP* 21 (1966) 5ff; F.Gschnitzer, 'Stadt und Stamm bei Homer', *Chiron* 1 (1971) 1ff; G.Mansuelli, 'Alle origini del concetto greco di città: letture omeriche', *Antichità Cretese, Studi in onore di Doro Levi* II (1974) 16ff.

many more are kept in the background. (b) In Sparta, all that we see is the family life of the royal couple, and this only in connection with the hospitality they offer to Telemachus. In Pylos, too, the poet confines himself to the brief visit by Telemachus; the only action of public interest is the offering of a sacrifice. During the course of the rather longer sojourn of Odysseus on the island of the Phaeacians, the king and the elders are concerned to offer hospitality to Odysseus and restore him to his native land; within this context, they offer sacrifices and organize and attend games and dances; we have a few fleeting pieces of information about the kingship and the council of elders, and these either come from the lips of Alcinous or are to be derived from indirect allusions rather than direct description. Troy furnished potentially better ground for the description of the kind of events in which we are interested: it is a society at war, and is observed over a long period of time in the *Iliad*. But the poet confines himself to referring briefly to instances of public meetings. The events in Ithaca also cover a long period; but the plot of the epic requires that Ithaca is without a government. It would in practice have been impossible for even a pre-statal society to function for twenty years without a king, council of elders and assembly. The camp of the Achaeans is not a normal society. The relations between Agamemnon and the other leaders and the meetings of their *agora* may have borne some resemblance to the relationships and events of social life in times of peace, but they do not constitute evidence for it.

The foregoing methodological considerations dictate that we observe with equal attention every piece of positive evidence regardless of whether it points to conditions relating to the polis-state or the state in general, or to pre-statal society. Nevertheless, in the interest of greater clarity we shall also discuss those counter-arguments which have had some impact.

(a) EVIDENCE FOR MONARCHY AS WELL AS FOR LIMITED KINGSHIP

Of the many references in Homer to *ἄνακτες* or *βασιλεῖς*, some demonstrate beyond all doubt that the poet was familiar with the idea of the supreme authority resting with one person. The indications are both (1) conceptual and (2) factual.

(1) The conceptual indications fall into five groups. The first

consists of the expressions ἴφι ἀνάσσειν and μέγα κρατεῖν occurring in characteristic contexts.¹ The verb ἀνάσσειν, like the noun ἄναξ, was inherited from the Mycenaean despotic regimes; ἴφι means 'by force', which indicates that the Mycenaean *anax* had force at his disposal. Moreover, the expression ἴφι ἀνάσσειν is also used of gods,² which gives us a clear idea of the scale of the power recognized in the man who is said ἴφι ἀνάσσειν. The expression μέγα κρατεῖν means 'to be of superior strength, to be stronger than'.

The second group of conceptual indications consists of the formulae ἀνάσσειν Ἰλίου or Ἀργείων, or Καδμείων, βασιλεύσει Ἀχαιῶν etc., Πύλοιο ἄναξ, ἄναξ Λυκίης, βασιλῆα Μυκλήνης, Θεσπρωτῶν βασιλεύς, Σιδονίων βασιλεύς etc.³ These formulae clearly express the idea of the wielding of monarchical power over a town or territory or people.

The third group consists of formulae where the verb ἀνάσσειν governs a dative: Αἰτάλωϊσι, Ἀργείοισι, Κεφαλλήνεσσι, Λελέγεσσι, Μυρμιδόνεσσι, Τρώεσσι, Φαιήκεσσι, τοῖσιν.⁴ Cf. the phrase according to which Zeus θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν ἀνάσσει.⁵ Two other examples of this construction clearly suggest the idea of property: κτήμασιν οἴσιν ἀνάσσει; δώμασι σοῖσι ἀνάσσοις.⁶

The fourth group consists of formulae where the verb ἀνάσσειν governs phrases composed of a preposition, ἐν, μετά, and a dative: ἐν ἀνδράσιν, ἐν Φαίηξιν, μετ' ἀθανάτοισιν, μετ' ἀνθρώποισιν μετὰ τριτάτεσσιν, μετ' Ἀργείοισιν.⁷ These formulae imply not absolute power over a people, but the exercising of the functions of a king within a people.

The fifth group consists of the formulae 'Cos, *polis* of Eurypylus'

¹ *Iliad* VI 478: 'καὶ Ἰλίου ἴφι ἀνάσσειν'; *Odyssey* XI 284: 'ὅς ποτ' ἐν Ὀρχομενῷ Μινυεῖφ ἴφι ἄνασσαν'; *Iliad* I 78-79: 'ὅς μέγα πάντων | Ἀχαιῶν κρατέει', X 33: 'ὅς μέγα πάντων Ἀργείων ἦνασσε', XVI 172: 'αὐτὸς δὲ μέγα κρατέων ἦνασσε'.

² *Iliad* I 38.

³ *Iliad* II 77, IV 18, VI 173, 478, VII 106, 296 = III 107, 180, IX 59, X 33, XI 46, 304; *Odyssey* I 401, IV 618, X 110, XI 276, XIV 316.

⁴ *Iliad* I 180, 231, 281, 288, II 108, 643, IX 73, XIII 218, 452, XIX 104 = 109, 122, 124, XX 181, 307, XXI 86, 188, XXIV 202, 536; *Odyssey* II 234 = V 12, X 110, 491, XIII 452.

⁵ *Iliad* II 669.

⁶ *Odyssey* I 117, 402.

⁷ *Iliad* I 252, IV 61, XIV 94, XXIII 471; *Odyssey* VII 23, 62.

and 'Lemnos, polis of Thoas'¹ and also 'people of Priam'.² Here we have the idea of a monarch being master of a territory or of a people. But the concept of territory is expressed by means of the term πόλις, a fact that implies the existence of states described as poleis.³ From these circumstances we may deduce that Eurypylus and Thoas were conceived of by the poet as the masters of their respective poleis and Priam as the master of the Trojans. But, as we shall see below,⁴ Priam cannot be regarded as an absolute monarch, since he is hedged about by an assembly and a council of elders. The formula 'people of Priam' will therefore have given expression to an idea rather like the one indicated by a formula such as 'the regiment of X' that is 'the regiment commanded by X'. The 'people of Priam' would mean 'the people who had Priam as their king'. As a result, one can legitimately hesitate between the three possibilities: 'polis of Eurypylus', 'polis of Thoas?' 'territory of a polis which has Eurypylus or Thoas as its king?' 'territory of a polis which belongs to Eurypylus or Thoas?'

(2) The factual indications of the power wielded by kings in the Homeric poems illustrate two items: the absolute domination of a ruler over a country and its inhabitants and instances of an allocation of shares of land or booty. The first item is depicted in three passages. Agamemnon is represented as offering to Achilles seven πτολίεθρα (townlets protected by a stronghold) along with their inhabitants; this is done on the fiat of Agamemnon, without consultation of the inhabitants; and he asserts, as if it were perfectly natural, that the latter would honour Achilles with gifts, as a god, and would carry out his orders.⁵ In another passage Menelaus asserts to Telemachus that he will give a πόλις to Odysseus and his people if they will come and dwell in Argos (the Peloponnese) and to this end he will drive out the dwellers of one of the polis-settlements that obey him as their lord.⁶ In this instance, too, the people had no say. It is worth noting that, whereas Menelaus is enabled to dispose of the inhabitants of a settlement

¹ *Iliad* II 677, XIV 230.

² *Iliad* IV 47.

³ v. s., p. 205.

⁴ v. i., pp. 366 ff.

⁵ *Iliad* IX 149–156 = 291–298.

⁶ *Odyssey* IV 171ff.

according to his will, he does not think of Odysseus as of the sole recipient but associates with him his people. We have here, then, reflections of two different relations between a king and a people. The position of Agamemnon or Menelaus *vis-à-vis* the dwellers of the townlets they offer as gifts squares with the idea of absolute rule expressed by the formulae ἴφι ἀνάσσειν, μέγα κρατεῖν. The relationship between Odysseus and his people is evidently that which is described by the formulae meaning 'to exercise the functions of king within a people'. In a third Homeric passage, it is said that Peleus gave to Phoenix, a foreigner (like the would-be recipients in the two other examples), not only wealth, but also much people, the Dolopes, to rule over them.¹

Several other passages depict methods of allocation of land or booty among the members of a community or the participants in a military action. A passage in the *Odyssey* states that as soon as the Phaeacians settled on Scheria, the king built temples for the gods and houses for members of the community, and divided up the land.² This text clearly depicts a state organization in which the distribution of plots of land in the countryside and within the settlement (a custom well known from Archaic and Classical Greek colonies) fell within the competence of the king as did the building of temples. On the other hand, three passages in the *Iliad* represent instances of a champion – Bellerophon, Meleager, Aeneas – receiving a demesne by a people – respectively the Lycians, the Aetolians, the Trojans.³ In the *Iliad*, Nestor relates that after an expedition the king, Neleus, retained for himself a great part of the booty and gave the rest to the people to divide.⁴ In other quarters, Agamemnon receives part of the booty distributed by the Achaeans.⁵ How can these discrepancies be explained? We have to take account of the circumstances involved in each of these practices. The first practice follows the founding of a colony under conditions implying the existence of a statal organization, headed by a king. Otherwise, the

¹ *Iliad* IX 482–484.

² *Odyssey* VI 9–10: 'καὶ ἐδείματο οἴκους / καὶ νηοῦς ἐποίησε θεῶν, καὶ ἐδάσσατ' ἀρούρας'.

³ *Iliad* VI 194, IX 575–580, XX 184.

⁴ *Iliad* XI 703–705.

⁵ *Iliad* I 122–129, 368–369.

distribution of plots and the building of temples would be decided and supervised by the people itself. The second practice implies an organization in which the right of allotting a demesne to a champion lies with an assembly. The third practice is attested after a victorious expedition. In this case, the king has the privilege of selecting from the booty before it is distributed. This privilege testifies to the superiority of the king *vis-à-vis* the warriors. The fact that the king does not interfere with the division of the booty among them can be explained by his desire to leave them the responsibility for an act that, if executed by the king, could expose him to criticism. The fourth practice is that of an expeditionary army composed of many allies. The 'Achaean' do not correspond to an assembly of a pre-statal community. This term is unlikely even to mean that the division of the booty was discussed by the soldiers and decided by democratic means. It is reasonable to suppose that this matter was dealt with according to the rules of the *agora* depicted in many passages of the *Iliad*, that is at the level of the chiefs and other well-born men. The commander-in-chief will not have had the privilege of first choice, like the king of his community. The reasons are obvious. The commander-in-chief of an army of allies was superior only in military matters. In all other affairs he enjoyed no special status.

The indications listed and discussed above clearly show that the Homeric representation of 'king' is not consistent. It reflects two kinds of kingship: a despotic kingship, to which refer (a) the expressions *ἰφι ἀνάσσειν*, *μέγα κρατεῖν*, and *ἀνάσσειν* or *βασιλεύειν* with a noun (denoting a town or people) in the genitive or dative, and (b) the donations of land and people made by a king to a foreigner to 'rule over'; and a restricted kingship, to which refer the expressions meaning 'to rule within a people' and the relation between Odysseus and his people. The formulae of the fourth and the fifth groups above as well as the right of the king to distribute land or to select from the booty may refer equally to an absolute monarch or to a king with limited power. The case of a community offering a demesne to a champion points either to a pre-statal society or to a statal organization in which public land was disposed of by an aristocratic assembly. However, the instance in which Agamemnon is represented as receiving his share of booty from the Achaeans is irrelevant.

One may ask whether it was possible for one person to be, at one and the same time, king of a community to which he himself belonged, and which he ruled in collaboration with a council of elders and an assembly, and master of a different population, which was foreign to his community. Such a situation seems impossible: the king of a community would not have been able to take personal possession of a people subjugated by his community. It seems, therefore, that we are dealing with two different situations. The reflects of absolute monarchy may well go back to the Mycenaean era, whereas those of restricted kingship seem to portray situations familiar to Homer.

Most of the evidence we have referred to and discussed was never taken into account by those who dispute the very existence of a king in times of peace. On the other hand, the arguments advanced in support of the opposite view make use of evidence that is either erroneous or consists of survivals from periods earlier than the Homeric one.¹ In order to remove all doubt, however, we shall review the arguments formulated by Marx and Engels, and their followers, and also those recently propounded by W.G.Runciman.

The Marxist position lies on six arguments. All are inconclusive: (a) In the second book of the *Iliad*, Odysseus, while addressing a group of non-nobles, is made to say that a multitude of lords is not a good thing, and that everyone should obey a single leader – the man who has received the sceptre from Zeus. These verses were adduced by Homeric scholars in the middle of the nineteenth century as proof that Agamemnon was a kind of super-king. Marx countered this by pointing out that all that Odysseus was doing was demanding obedience to the supreme commander of an army. Later scholars have added other arguments in support of this view.² The view may, in fact, be accepted. But this does not upset the conclusion we have formulated above, which is based on other passages. (b) Marxists consider that some passages in Homer state that booty was distributed not by the kings, but by the Achaeans³ – that is, by the people. This argument has been

¹ v. s., pp. 356ff.

² K.Marx, quoted by F.Engels, *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats* (1884) ch. IV; F.Engels, *ibidem*.

³ K.Marx, *loc. cit.*

found above to be unwarranted.¹ (c) Homer's use of epithets that attribute a divine origin to individual leaders, Marxists maintain, does not prove that these men were politically predominant. In the *Odyssey*, the swineherd Eumaeus is called 'divine' (*δῖος*), and heralds and rhapsodes are described as 'holy' (*ἱεροί*). At this period, then, these epithets were also used of non-nobles, and must have referred to the sacred origins of the lineage.² But: Eumaeus is presented by Homer as the son of a king,³ and heralds and rhapsodes were thought of as sacred for special reasons: the rhapsodes because they were inspired by a divine power, and the heralds because they were under the protection of the gods. (d) None of the Homeric kings promulgates laws, exacts taxes, has a state treasury or state property, or has an army at his disposal.⁴ All these are *argumenta ex silentio*.⁵ (e) It is impossible to draw the borders between the 'kingdoms' of Agamemnon, Diomedes and Menelaus. This might be due to the fact that they were not rulers of territorial states, but representatives of *gene* or phratries, which looked upon land as a common good.⁶ This argument is invalid for the following reasons: (1) The Homeric poems are aware of an advanced stage of private landed property at the level of the household; and there is no reference to any example of primitive communism at the level of the *genos* or the phratry or the community. (2) If, despite this, we accept the existence of primitive communism at the level of the *genos* or phratry, or the community, would this not have involved fixed borders? (3) The people of Menelaus did not have common borders with the people of Agamemnon, nor with the people of Diomedes, because the Arcadians dwelt between the first and the other two. (4) There are certainly difficulties in drawing the borders between the lands in which Agamemnon and Diomedes ruled, as there are in other areas, notably Thessaly. This is due, however, to the conflicting information available to the poet, who derived some of it from the Mycenaean tradition and some of it from later sources. (f) That the 'kings' and the

¹ v. s., pp. 360ff.

² K.Marx, loc. cit.; A.B.Feldman, *CIJ* 47 (1951/1952) 337ff, 339.

³ *Iliad* XV 403ff.

⁴ A.B.Feldman, op. cit. 338.

⁵ v. s., pp. 356-358.

⁶ A.B.Feldman, op. cit. 340.

'princes' were not accorded any special respect by those who did not hold these titles is clear from the fact that Dolon interrupts Hector.¹ But this is an incorrect inference from the passage in question. In it, Hector assembles the warriors of Troy and asks for a volunteer from amongst them to go and spy on the Greek camp; silence follows, until Dolon speaks and declares that he will undertake the mission.²

W.G.Runciman disputed the existence of a real kingship in the Homeric poems, on five grounds. These too are ill-founded. (a) The Homeric 'kings' did not command a real army, and were dependent on the support of their friends and followers. When Telemachus had to assemble a ship's crew, he did it with help of some of his friends, the alternative being to use his slaves.³ Telemachus' case is not appropriate, however: he was not a king, and was not even *de facto* master of the situation. And how many historical kings did not rely on the support of friends and subjects to impose their authority? All the other elements in this argument rely on Homeric silences. (b) A palace like that of Alcinous does not imply that its occupant was a monarch.⁴ This verdict is a matter of personal opinion. (c) The 'gift-devouring kings' of Hesiod are not rulers, but merely nobles.⁵ This judgement is correct, but it does not follow that the term *βασιλεύς* and the term *ἄναξ* do not denote true kings in many other passages of Homer. (d) The term *βασιλεύς* continues for some time to refer to individuals who were not true kings. In an inscription from Chios, dated to the beginning of the sixth century, one of the magistrates is called *βασιλεύς* and another *δήμαρχος*. When Pheidon became the true ruler of Argos, he ceased to be a king and became a tyrant. The founder of Cyrene is called *βασιλεύς* and also *ἀρχηγέτης* or *ἡγεμών*. It was only later, in Macedonia for example, that a *βασιλεύς* was a true king.⁶ But: the inscription from Chios reflects a situation in which the title of *βασιλεύς* had been devalued and applied to an elected magistrate, because the kingship had been replaced by an elected magistracy; the ancient

¹ A.B.Feldman, *op. cit.* 340.

² *Iliad* X 299f.

³ W.G.Runciman, *CSHS* 24 (1982) 354.

⁴ W.G.Runciman, *op. cit.* 358.

⁵ W.G.Runciman, *loc. cit.*

⁶ W.G.Runciman, *loc. cit.*

evidence relating to Pheidon means that he had exceeded the powers of a traditional king and assumed those of a tyrant; the founder of Cyrene is referred to as *βασιλεύς* because he in fact became king after the foundation of the colony. (e) The *αἰσυμνήτης* is defined by Aristotle as an elected dictator; at Miletus, Megara, Teos and Chios, certain annual magistrates were called *αἰσυμνήται*. In Homer, by contrast, an *αἰσυμνήτης* is merely the judge at the games.¹ The evolution of the meaning of the term *αἰσυμνήτης* does not demonstrate that Homeric society was of pre-statal character. The explanation for it is of a different order: when some states acquired elected magistrates, they gave them the title *αἰσυμνήτης*, which was already in use to indicate an elected official.

(b) EVIDENCE FOR A COUNCIL OF THE ELDERS

A council of elders is attested in the Homeric poems at Troy and on the island of the Phaeacians. It is only from passages relating to these two cases that authentic evidence can be derived.²

Twelve magistrates take part in the council of the Phaeacians.³ They are called *ἄρχοι*,⁴ *βασιλεῖς*,⁵ *βουλευφόροι*,⁶ *ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες*.⁷ That they are nobles is clear from the epithet *διοτρεφεῖς*⁸ (Zeus-reared) used to describe them, and also from the title *βασιλεύς* which has the meaning 'noble' in other passages of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and also in Hesiod and a number of other Archaic texts. The terms *ἄρχοι*,

¹ W.G.Runciman, op. cit. 356–357.

² Many scholars have cited for this purpose certain passages in the *Iliad* in which the leaders of the Greek contingents discuss with Agamemnon or address assemblies of the Greek army. These scenes undoubtedly have some similarity with meetings of councils, or with popular assemblies, but there are also differences. The similarities add nothing to our knowledge, while the differences are due to the fact that the scenes in the *Iliad* are set in a military camp and not in a community.

³ *Odyssey* VIII 390.

⁴ *Odyssey* VIII 391.

⁵ *Odyssey* VI 54, VII 49, VIII 41, 390.

⁶ *Odyssey* XVI 12.

⁷ *Odyssey* VII 98, 136, 186, VIII 11, 26, 97, 387, 536, XIII 186, 210.

⁸ *Odyssey* VII 39.

ἡγήτορες ἢ δὲ μέδοντες connote their position as elders. The term βουλευφόροι refers to their function of deliberating and decision making. They are appointed by the people.¹ In some passages they seem to have the same rank as the king. (a) The poet represents Alcinoos as saying to Odysseus ‘δῶδεκα γὰρ κατὰ δῆμον ἀριπρεπέες βασιλῆες / ἀρχοὶ κραινοῦσι, τρισκαιδέκατος δ’ ἐγὼ αὐτός’.² According to the generally accepted view, these verses reveal that the king was *primus inter pares*. (b) The elders hold a sceptre³ like the kings in other passages of Homer. (c) In one passage, the king summons the elders⁴ in another, the elders summon the king.⁵ (d) The king and the elders take joint decisions.⁶ In other passages there is some indication that the king was superior to the elders: (1) the activity of the elders is denoted by the verb κραινεῖν⁷, not by ἀνάσσειν or κρατεῖν, which indicate the possession of power and are used of the kings.⁸ (2) It is Alcinoos alone who announces to the assembly of the Phaeacians the decision taken by himself and the elders.⁹ On another occasion, the poet makes Alcinoos tell Odysseus that he is going to decide when to send him home.¹⁰ The council of the Phaeacians resembles the *gerousia* of the Spartans¹¹ in the following points: the kings of Sparta were members of the *gerousia*, and the Spartan elders were elected by the people. It is, of course, highly unlikely that the poet based his description of the Phaeacian elders on the model of the Spartan *gerousia*. But it is equally improbable that this was the product of his imagination.

The members of the corresponding body at Troy¹² are called

¹ *Odyssey* VII 150. cf. S. Deger, op. cit. 165.

² *Odyssey* VIII 390–391.

³ *Odyssey* VIII 41 and 47.

⁴ *Odyssey* VIII 40–41.

⁵ *Odyssey* VII 54–55.

⁶ *Odyssey* VII 186ff, 226, XIII 13ff.

⁷ *Odyssey* VIII 390. cf. S. Deger, op. cit. 175.

⁸ v. s., p. 359.

⁹ *Odyssey* VIII 26ff.

¹⁰ *Odyssey* VII 317.

¹¹ cf. S. Deger, op. cit. 165.

¹² S. Deger, op. cit. 124ff.

γέροντες,¹ δημογέροντες² and ἡγήτορες ἠδὲ μέδοντες.³ It was a requirement for eligibility for the office that they should have passed the age for military service.⁴ Their opinion carries great weight, even in matters involving military action, to the degree that it limits the initiative of Hector, who is depicted as protesting strongly against one of their instructions, and flouting it.⁵ In other passages of Homer, the elders are seen distributing booty or sitting in judgement.⁶ The arguments (a) that the elders do not take any part in the war, and (b) that they are not called *διογενεῖς*, *διοτρεφεῖς* or *βασιλεῖς*, like the Phaeacian elders and Penelope's suitors, have been advanced in support of the hypothesis that they were not nobles, but rich merchants, and consequently that the poet conceived of Troy as a state ruled by a plutocracy; and since there was no regime of this nature in Greece at the date of composition of the Homeric poems, it has also been assumed that the poet was familiar with it outside Greece, in the East.⁷ The first argument is without foundation, however: as we have noted, the poet makes it clear that the reason the elders did not serve in the army was their age; it follows that they had served when they were young men. So, too, at Sparta: men were eligible for the *gerousia* only after they had ceased to have military obligations. The second argument is based on the silence of Homer, which may be merely coincidental.

The view that Homeric society was still passing through the stage of archaic democracy that preceded the formation of the state attributes to the council of elders greater importance than it had in practice, and makes use of inappropriate arguments. (a) It is claimed that this body was the only permanent authority and had the last word on matters of importance. These judgements are not based on passages from Homer; moreover they contradict those passages that throw genuine light on the roles of the king and the council. Instead, a passage of Aeschylus is

¹ *Iliad* II 53.

² *Iliad* III 149.

³ *Iliad* XIV 144.

⁴ *Iliad* III 150: 'γήραι δὴ πολέμοιο πεπαυμένοι'.

⁵ *Iliad* XV 718–725.

⁶ *Iliad* XI 687–688, XVIII 503–508.

⁷ S.Deger, loc. cit. (cf. eadem, *WYAW* 5 (1979) 26–27).

cited.¹ (b) It is also claimed that the Homeric council of elders acts without the need for a royal command or the expression of a royal opinion.² Three passages from the *Iliad* are cited in support of this. One of them (XXII 119–120) explicitly refutes the assertion it is supposed to support, since king Priam says that he himself will ask the council of elders to take the oath. The other two (XI 687–688, XVIII 503–508) do indeed show the council acting alone, but in matters of minor importance, such as the distribution of booty and the judging of a civil case. Our picture of the council of elders should be based on *all* the passages relating to it, which were cited and discussed above.

(c) EVIDENCE FOR AN ASSEMBLY

The Homeric poems contain descriptions of assemblies at Troy, Ithaca and Scheria, and there is also reference to an assembly on the island of Syrie.³

Eumaeus tells Odysseus how he was abducted by pirates when he was a child, while his father, the king of Syrie, was away from the palace to attend the assembly.⁴

Ithaca is represented as surviving without an assembly for twenty years. But, as was said above, no community would be able to survive for so long without a king, without a council and without an assembly: the situation in Ithaca is in conformity with legendary and poetic requirements. Besides, it has been stressed that the description of the assembly meeting called by Telemachus contains some echo of its legitimacy, of its relations with the king, and of rules governing its functioning.⁵

The poet describes two assembly meetings in Troy. Both were convened in front of the palace. At the first, the only speaker is the goddess Iris, who is conveying a message from Zeus. The meeting is dissolved by Hector, clearly in his capacity as leader of the Trojan

¹ F.Engels, loc. cit.

² A.B.Feldman, op.cit. 341.

³ Many scholars also take into account the meetings of the Achaean army described in the *Iliad*. These may be used only as supporting evidence, however, and with great care.

⁴ *Odyssey* XV 446.

⁵ G.C.Vlachos, op. cit. 194ff = 114ff; R.Descat, *REA* 81 (1979) 236.

army, hurrying off with his men to battle because the divine message revealed that the Greeks were preparing to attack.¹ At the second meeting there was a discussion of the Greek demand that Helen be returned by the Trojans to the Achaeans. Antenor advocates acceptance of the Greek demand, while Paris proposes that it be rejected, though he offers to return the items that he has taken from the palace of Menelaus, and to pay compensation for Helen. Finally, the king suggests that Paris' proposals be conveyed to the Greeks. The meeting adopts this proposal.²

The Phaeacians assemble after a summons by the king to hear the decision taken by him and the council of elders to restore Odysseus to his country.³ As we saw above, the Phaeacian assembly had the right to elect the members of the council of elders.⁴ The people also elected the judges at the games.⁵

In general, the assembly seems to have played a role that was formal rather than substantial, as it was under pre-statal conditions. Just how removed was the assembly of the Homeric poems from the tribal assembly, is clear from the fact that it met not by *gene* or *phratries*, but as individuals.

The views that the assembly indeed had sovereign rights, and that it had a tribal organization are either unsupported, or rely on erroneous arguments. (a) In support of the assertion that the assembly took authoritative and final decisions, it has been observed that there is no indication in the epic poems of the people being coerced by another authority to take decisions against its will.⁶ However, there is no case of the assembly refusing to accept the proposals put before it by the king and the elders. (b) It has been claimed that the declaration of war fell within the competence of the assembly of the *gene*, and that this had the final word. This position is based on a passage in Homer in which Tydeus and Polynices seek the assistance of the Mycenaean: the latter were ready to give it, but were restrained from doing so by warning

¹ *Iliad* II 786–810.

² *Iliad* VII 345–379.

³ *Odyssey* VIII 7ff.

⁴ See p. 367.

⁵ *Odyssey* VIII 259.

⁶ F.Engels, loc. cit.

signs from Zeus.¹ But: firstly, this passage² does not state that the Mycenaean assembly had assembled together by *gene*; secondly, in conformity with what we know from other passages of Homer, used above, the Mycenaean assembly will have been summoned in order to give its approval to a proposal from the king and the elders. (c) It has also been claimed that a certain messenger addresses not 'king' Priam, or 'prince' Hector, but the Trojan assembly.³ The messenger in question, however, is not a human, but Iris, sent by Zeus.⁴ This episode cannot be regarded as typical, or as based on reality.

(d) DISCUSSION OF FURTHER NEGATIVE ARGUMENTS

The view that Homer and Hesiod were unaware of any form of organization worthy of being considered a state has been supported by other arguments, which are worth discussing here.

(a) W.G.Runciman stated: 'There are three and only three forms of power, and therefore varieties of sanction, on which the roles constitutive of statehood can be based. These correspond to the familiar distinction between the economic, the social (in the sense of social status) and the political. That is to say, the powers of any and all rulers derive from some combination of (1) possession of or control over the sources and distribution of wealth and therewith the ability to offer or withhold the means of subsistence, (2) attribution by subjects and/or fellow citizens of superior honour or prestige, whether deriving from sacred or secular personal or institutional charisma, and therewith the ability to attract and retain a following, and (3) command of technical and organizational means of physical coercion and therewith the ability to impose obedience by force. . . . But legitimacy is no less important than money and soldiers to the ability of a protostate to achieve the permanence which makes a state. The deliberate quest for supernatural or dynastic prestige by those who have taken or come to economic and political power can be documented across an enormous range of places and times. Although not all incumbents of monarchical

¹ A.B.Feldman, op. cit. 339.

² *Iliad* IV 376ff.

³ A.B.Feldman, op. cit. 341.

⁴ *Iliad* II 786.

roles claim divine descent (as the Spartan kings did and Herodotus appears to accept at face value), a claim to more than ordinary descent is common place. . . Penelope's suitors in an Ithaca already at the semistate stage had the means to murder Telemachus and Laertes and then fight it out for the kingship among themselves, yet they not only refrain from doing so but sought and acknowledged the legitimacy which would accrue to the successful aspirant to the hand of Odysseus' widow. . . But respect accorded to good birth – the *agathon genos* of Odyssey XXI 335 or *agathon haima* of IV 611 – is sufficiently well attested both in Homer and elsewhere.¹ This statement suffers from two fundamental weaknesses: in its theoretical formulation, it restricts the scope of the subject; and in its practical application, it makes use of *argumenta ex silentio*. The subject is placed on a narrower basis by being limited to the situation in which sovereignty and the ability to impose sanctions belong to a monarch. But, as emerged from the discussion above, Homeric societies, with a few exceptions, were not governed by monarchs since there were councils of elders and assemblies functioning alongside them. The following questions must therefore be asked: did the governing organs of Homeric societies control the sources of wealth and their distribution? Were they invested with legitimacy and authority? Did they possess the technical and organizational means of physical coercion? The evidence at our disposal pertaining to the first question falls into two groups: one group assigns to the 'people' the right to allocate land, while, in the other group, a king is represented distributing agricultural land and building temples or as absolute master of towns with their population. It is clear that the Homeric poems have incorporated experiences of a pre-statal social organization as well as of a regime in which the authority of the king had been strengthened.² There is much more evidence relating to legitimacy and authority than that cited by Runciman in the passage under discussion. The Homeric kings were generally regarded as the offsprings of gods, the favourites of gods, and the possessors of *charisma* and another superhuman power – *hieron menos* (divine strength). Under normal circumstances, kingship was hereditary. This is implied by numerous instances of royal genealogies mentioned in the

¹ W.G.Runciman, op. cit. 361–362.

² v. s., pp. 358ff.

Homeric poems and, *a fortiori*, by Hector's expectation expressed as a prayer to the gods, that his son would one day rule over Troy.¹ Murdering a king is considered impiety. Elective kingship, such as *Heerkönigtum*, is unknown. Neither the ideas connected with *charisma* and *hieron menos*, nor the hereditary nature of the kingship, are new features: they go back to the pre-political priest-kings. Nevertheless, they continued to constitute elements of the authority and legitimacy of the kingship even in historical times. The council of elders also possessed legitimacy and authority: this emerges clearly from what was said above about the councils of the Trojans and the Phaeacians. There remains the question whether the king, the council of elders, and the assembly commanded the means of physical coercion. The scene in which Odysseus strikes some soldiers with his sceptre in order to restrain them² is the only one of relevance to this question. The fact that Homer is otherwise silent on the question should not be used as evidence, however.³

(b) Runciman also invoked the fact that neither Homer nor Hesiod are familiar with taxation or compulsory military service.⁴ Here, too, we are dealing with omissions, which may be due to the lack of appropriate occasions on which to mention these subjects.

(c) Runciman stressed furthermore that Homer is unaware of 'any legal system, any rules for the settlements of feuds, any cases of laying capital charges before the assembly, any administration of law';⁵ and that even in Hesiod, justice 'is still purely customary: there is no code or constitution to which Hesiod appeals in his denunciation of the judgements of the unjust basileis, but only the hope that supernatural misfortune may befall them'.⁶ Once again Runciman is exploiting silences in Homer that are perfectly natural. As for the references in Hesiod, it may be noted that: (1) it is going too far to suggest as a date for the creation of the state the substitution for customary justice of enacted law; (2) the invocation of divine retribution against people who

¹ *Iliad* VI 478. cf. P.Carlier, *La Royauté en Grèce avant Alexandre* (1984) 187ff.

² *Iliad* II 198–199.

³ v. s., pp. 356–358.

⁴ W.G.Runciman, op. cit. 359, 365.

⁵ W.G.Runciman, op. cit. 355.

⁶ W.G.Runciman, op. cit. 365.

have committed injustice is also found in societies that have an organized state and possess a developed legal machine.

(d) M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet emphasized that the Homeric poems are unaware of the citizen and his rights and duties.¹ The citizen, and his rights and duties, however, are characteristic features not of the state in general, but of certain types of state.

(e) EVIDENCE FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RELATIONS
IMPLYING THE EXISTENCE OF A STATE

We continue our investigation with the question whether there are any reflections in the Homeric poems of economic and social relations that would make the existence of the state necessary, in accordance with the criteria agreed above.²

The Homeric world is familiar not only with personal property, but with inequalities in wealth. The epic vocabulary has a number of characteristic epithets: *πολύκληρος* (owner of many plots),³ *πολυπάμων* (exceeding wealthy),⁴ *πολυλήιος* (rich in seeds),⁵ *πολύμηλος*,⁶ *πολύρρην*,⁷ *πολυβούτης* (rich in flocks, sheep, oxen);⁸ and their counterparts: *ἄκληρος* (he who has no plot),⁹ *θῆτες* (landless workers),¹⁰ *θητεύειν* (to work for food, shelter and clothing).¹¹

Homeric societies consist of two circles. To the inner circle belong the members of a community,¹² while the outer circle includes all other groups.

The community is no longer unified, but is divided into three strata:

¹ M. Austin, P. Vidal-Naquet, *Economies et sociétés en Grèce ancienne* (1982) 52–54= *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece* (1977) 40–44.

² v. s., pp. 345ff.

³ *Odyssey* XIV 211.

⁴ *Iliad* IV 433.

⁵ *Iliad* V 613.

⁶ *Iliad* II 605, 705, XIV 490.

⁷ *Iliad* II 106, IX 154, 296; *Odyssey* XI 257.

⁸ *Iliad* IX 154, 296.

⁹ *Odyssey* XI 490.

¹⁰ *Odyssey* IV 644.

¹¹ *Iliad* XXI 444; *Odyssey* XVIII 357.

¹² v. s., pp. 369–371.

nobles, intermediate and lowest classes, which are denoted by the terms *ἔξοχοι*, *μεσήεντες* and *χειριότεροι*, respectively.¹ The *ἔξοχος* is contrasted with the *δήμου ἄνδρα*,² a phrase that obviously denotes both the middle and the lowest strata. It follows that there was a greater distance between the nobles and the middle stratum, than between the middle and the lowest. The lowest stratum included the thetes. Reference is made to another group of wage-earners: the *ἔριθοι* who were paid a daily wage;³ these were probably small farmers who supplemented their incomes by hiring out their labour.

Outside the community were to be found both free men and slaves. The free men were those who had left their own community either because they had lost their property, or because they had committed murder and were in danger from the victim's relatives. They were called *μετανάσται* and had no rights.⁴ They too no doubt worked as thetes. Slavery in the Homeric poems is regarded by Marxists in general as 'archaic' or 'patriarchal'. However, the hypothesis has recently been propounded by a Marxist historian that the Homeric world had advanced beyond this stage.⁵ Supporting evidence is sought in certain passages in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* which possibly imply a slave regime harder than the patriarchal. One of these passages stresses that the man who lost his freedom lost half his worth at the same time;⁶ another states that the slave is compelled to work by external pressure which he is unable to resist.⁷ The same idea is expressed in the epithet *ἀναγκαῖοι*, which is attached to the substantive *δμῶες* (those who have been defeated and reduced to slavery).⁸ Under these conditions, it is only natural that slaves left without a master do not carry out their

¹ *Iliad* XII 269–270.

² *Iliad* II 188–189.

³ *Iliad* XVIII 550, 560.

⁴ *Iliad* IX 640, XVI 59.

⁵ G. Audring, in *Antike Abhängigkeitsformen in den griechischen Gebieten ohne Polisstruktur. Actes du Colloque sur l'esclavage, Iéna 1981 (= Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur der Antike 25 (1985) 15–16).*

⁶ *Odyssey* XVII 322–323.

⁷ *Iliad* VI 458.

⁸ *Odyssey* XXIV 210.

assigned work.¹ The *λαοὶ ἀγροῖῶται*² have been regarded as slaves used as shepherds.³ This interpretation is by no means certain, however.

Was the world reflected in the Homeric poems familiar with whole populations like the 'helots' subjected to a community? The hypothesis that the *λαοὶ ἀγροῖῶται* belonged to this social category⁴ is nothing more than one possibility, like the one referred to above, and also a third, according to which they will have been free peasants.⁵ However, the view that the world of Homer was not aware of serfdom or mass slavery, as it is called by the Marxists, is itself unsound. It has been supported by the misinterpretation of a passage in the *Iliad* which says that Bellerophon received a *temenos* from the Lycians. 'This land he was expected to work himself, with the help of his family and slaves. There was no serfdom.'⁶ The passage in question however, says none of this. Homer's failure to mention serfs is less likely to reflect the real situation than to be due to the plot of the poems. In Homer's time there were already helots and other serfs in mainland Greece and Crete; and it is highly unlikely that the Greek communities that had settled in the eastern Aegean had not themselves reduced local populations to serfdom. The poet had no cause to mention populations of this type because they lived in the countryside, while the heroes of his poems moved in military encampments, on the seas, and in palaces.

Homeric society had a pronounced class character, the predominant class being the aristocracy. The nobles imposed their authority through their wealth, their power, and their ideology, and possessed certain privileges. The nobles were the champions of the community. Battles took the form of single combats between the nobles on either side. The non-nobles were inferior to them in physical strength, armour and skill. Despite their great numbers, therefore, they played merely a supporting

¹ *Odyssey* XVII 320–321.

² *Iliad* XI 676.

³ Richter, *Landwirtschaft*, 6, cited by G.Audring, loc. cit.

⁴ R.Descat, *REA* 81 (1979) 233; J.Harmatta, in E.Ch.Welskopf (ed), *Soziale Typenbegriffe im alten Griechenland und ihr Fortleben in den Sprachen der Welt* III (1981) 157f; G.Audring, op. cit. 15–16.

⁵ W.L.Westermann, *RE Suppl.* VI (1935) 896; idem, *The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity* (1955) 6.

⁶ A.B.Feldman, op. cit. 338.

role. The predominance of the nobles as warriors was due to many factors. They were free of the need to earn their livelihood and received special training, continually practicing and consolidating their martial spirit. They also enjoyed a better diet, containing an abundance of proteins. The non-nobles enjoyed none of these advantages. Besides, the Homeric poems reflect the life and the ideology of the nobles. The plots of the epics unfold at the level of kings and nobles. The people are portrayed in a shadowy manner, on the periphery or in the background of the pictures drawn by the poet. The kings appear not only as leading actors, but also as motivating forces. Above all Agamemnon: he, and no one else, has been promised by Zeus that he will take Troy.¹

Nobles alone had the right to take part in the games.² Odysseus behaves differently towards the nobles and the non-nobles: he addresses the former with tact and accords them respect, while he strikes the latter with his sceptre, calls them unwarlike and weak, and calls on them to be obedient.³ Thersites, who was himself a noble,⁴ but who abuses the kings, is described by the poet as ugly, intemperate, unpleasant and stupid.⁵ The nobles describe themselves as *ἄριστοι, ἔξοχοι*, whereas they refer to the thetes by the deprecatory term *χειριότεροι*.⁶ The nobles even hold the merchants in contempt: when Odysseus refuses to take part in the games organized by the Phaeacians in his honour, Euryalus, one of the sons of Alcinous, taunts that he does not resemble a man skilled in contests but a merchant faring to and fro with his ship and mindful only of his merchandise and the profits of his greed.⁷ This attitude is typically aristocratic, and survived in the aristocracies of the Archaic and Classical times. It stands in contrast, of course, to the positive attitude adopted by Homer when he describes the Phaeacians as a nation of sailors and merchants.⁸ To

¹ *Iliad* II 111–115, 284ff = IX 18ff, II 284–288, 371–373, 412ff.

² *Odyssey* VII 107ff.

³ *Iliad* II 188–206.

⁴ In *Iliad* II 246, Thersites is described as 'λιγύς ἀγορητής'. He is then conceived as someone who not only had the right to speak in the assemblies, but also as one who spoke very well.

⁵ *Iliad* II 212–218, 246ff, 265ff.

⁶ v. s., p. 375.

⁷ *Odyssey* VIII 159–164.

⁸ *Odyssey* VI 36–37, 270ff, VII 35ff.

overcome this difficulty, it is necessary to assume that the poet was consciously projecting onto the society of the Phaeacians a type of society that did not exist in the Greek world, but which was known to him from elsewhere, perhaps from Phoenicia.

The economic and social relationships reflected in the Homeric poems were thus precisely the ones that are regarded as a necessary precondition for the formation of a state, according to the most exacting theory of the state, that of Marx. Furthermore, our statements contain elements which accord with the four structural and functional criteria posited by W.G.Runciman as minimal requirements for the recognition of a society as a state. (1) The demand that there should be specialization of government is satisfied by the distinct but mutually complementary powers of the three organs: king, council and assembly.¹ (2) The demand that there should be a central authority with the power of coercion is satisfied, at least in its first part. The king rules 'with power'.² There is no evidence for the exercise of coercion by the king; but Homer's silences do not constitute evidence.³ And in this instance, the lack of the means of coercion would be inconsistent with the 'power' of royal authority, which is explicitly attested, as we have seen. (3) There is no doubt about the permanence of the structures. (4) Finally, the fact that the assembly consisted of individuals, who were not acting within the framework of the *genos* or *phratry*,⁴ demonstrates that the relations between ruler and ruled were not determined by ties of kinship.

2. TYPES OF STATE IN THE HOMERIC POEMS

After the work of F.Gschnitzer,⁵ we are now obliged to abandon once and for all the concept of the 'Homeric state'; we must speak in terms of types of Homeric state, and be prepared to admit the existence of types other than the stem-state and the polis-state, if the evidence so dictates. In this way, we will be able to proceed to some assessment of

¹ v. s., pp. 358–371.

² v. s., p. 358.

³ v. s., p. 356–358.

⁴ v. s., pp. 369–371.

⁵ v. s., p. 353.

the position occupied by the polis-state in the world of Homer, a world that was a blend of features from the period of the composition of the poems and of earlier periods.

Data bearing on the question may be found in the list of the military forces of the Greeks and their enemies in book II of the *Iliad*, and in various passages scattered throughout the two poems. In book II, each military contingent corresponds with a state. This state coincides sometimes with a people, sometimes with a sub-division of a people, sometimes with a 'stem' or 'ethnos', sometimes with two or three 'stems', sometimes with communities defined in a variety of ways, and sometimes with communities that are not named. Data of this kind furnish direct evidence on the types of Homeric states, in accordance with the criteria for distinguishing between states set out in the first part of this work.¹ On the other hand, the military contingents sometimes have a single leader, and sometimes two or more. It might be supposed that the mention of two or more leaders implies a federation. But some of the leaders are not historical personages: Agamemnon, Menelaus, Achilles, Ajax, Odysseus and Hector are former gods,² and other figures are poetic creations (most of the leaders of the allies of the Trojans have Greek names). And even those that were historical persons will not have had exactly the same character as the one they are given in the poems. Finally, the homeland of each military contingent is indicated by reference sometimes to a single settlement, sometimes to more than one, and sometimes to none at all. All this may partly reflect reality and partly be due to ignorance. Even in the former case, however, the citing of only one settlement does not necessarily imply that the corresponding state was a polis-state. Similarly, the lack of any reference of this kind does not necessarily mean that the people lived in villages. This may be confidently asserted only in the case of the Magnetes, who are located further north than the territory they occupied in the historical period, and therefore at a time when they were on the way to this territory and were still a migrating

¹ See especially pp. 78ff, *passim*.

² M.B.Sakellariou, *La migration grecque en Ionie* (1958) 58ff (Ajax), 116-123 (Agamemnon), 192-196 (Hector), 265-266 (Achilles); *idem*, *Peuples préhelléniques d'origine indo-européenne* (1977) 237 (Achilles).

stem.¹ Other passages in the two poems may be used to supplement or to correct the picture formed from book II of the *Iliad*. In particular, they make it possible to identify the communities that are not named, and acquaint us with the use of the term *πόλις* in the senses of 'state', and 'state territory'.

Let us see which Homeric states belong to which categories.

(1) States that coincide with a people are those of the Thracians (*Il.* II 844–845), the Cicones (*Il.* II 846–847, XVII 73; *Od.* IX 39ff, XXIII 310), the Paeones (*Il.* II 848–850), the Paphlagonians (*Il.* II 851–855), the Halizones (*Il.* II 856–857), the Mysians (*Il.* II 858–861), the Phrygians (*Il.* II 862–863), the Maeones (*Il.* II 864–866), the Carians (*Il.* II 867–875), the Lycians (*Il.* II 876–879), the Cilicians (*Il.* VI 397, 414) and the Phaeacians (in the *Odyssey*). None of these states is Greek.

(2) States that correspond with part of a people are those of the Trojans ruled by king Priam (*Il.* II 816–818), the Trojans ruled by king Pandaros (*Il.* II 824–827), the Dardanians (*Il.* II 819–823) and the Pelasgians (*Il.* II 840–843). These Dardanians are clearly akin to the people called Dardanians, who are located elsewhere,¹ although in the *Iliad* they are sometimes closely connected with the Trojans: Achilles asks Aeneas, the leader of the Dardanians, if he hopes that he will succeed Priam on the throne, and later alludes to the fact that the Trojans gave Aeneas a *temenos* (*Il.* XX 180, 184); in another passage of the *Iliad*, the Trojans are said to honour Aeneas like a god in their state (*Il.* XI 58); and elsewhere the Dardanians enjoy closer relations with the Trojans than the rest of the allies (*Il.* III 456–VII 348=368=VIII 497). Of the Pelasgians, the poet says explicitly that they were composed of tribes who dwelt in the region of Larisa. This Larisa is to be identified for a number of reasons with a city to the north of Mesembria.² It emerges from other evidence that groups of the Pelasgians had dwelt in other areas of the southern Balkans, on some of the Aegean islands, and in parts of north-west Asia Minor.³ The poet's declaration that the

¹ F.Gschnitzer, *Chiron* I (1971) 1, refused to take the toponyms of the 'Catalogue' into consideration on the grounds that they are 'late' and that they do not correspond to polis-states but to non-autonomous settlements on the territory of larger states. These arguments remain to be proved, however.

² M.B.Sakellariou, *Peuples préhelléniques d'origine indo-européenne* (1977) 133, 153–154, 156, 157.

³ M.B.Sakellariou, *op. cit.* 150–230.

Pelasgians to whom he refers were divided into tribes probably reflects the real situation. By contrast, his failure to mention a similar phenomenon for other peoples may in part, at least, be the result of ignorance. As in the case of the states that comprise a people, so the states that comprise part of a people are not Greek.

(3) Each of the following states corresponds with a Greek *ethnos*: that of the Boeotians (*Il.* II 494–510), the Phocians (*Il.* II 517–526), the Locrians (*Il.* II 527–535), the Abantes (*Il.* II 536–545), the Arcadians (*Il.* II 603–614), the Epeians (*Il.* II 615–624), the Cephallenians (*Il.* II 631–637), the Aetolians (*Il.* II 638–644), and the Magnetes (*Il.* II 756–759). These *ethne* are also mentioned in other passages of the *Iliad*.¹

(4) Some states correspond to part of a Greek *ethnos* – namely, the states of those referred to in *Iliad* book II as ‘sons of the Achaeans’, who are said to occupy Argos, Tiryns, Hermione, Asine, Troezen, Eiones, Epidaurus, Aegina and Masses (*Il.* II 559–568). Apart from these, and the subjects of Peleus, whom we shall consider below, there is no Greek group which is specifically Achaean in *Iliad* II. It thus seems that in these two passages the ethnic *Ἀχαιοί* does not have the meaning usually attaching to it in the poems, where it indicates the Greeks as a whole, but is applied to a particular Greek *ethnos*. This is supported by the following observation: in book XI, Nestor tells of hostilities between the Pyliaans and the Epeians; during his narrative the Pyliaans are referred to once as *Ἀχαιοί* (*Il.* XI 759). The Epeians were also Achaeans in the broader sense of the term, however. It follows that the Achaeans who were identified with the Pyliaans but not with the

¹ *Ethne* mentioned in the ‘Catalogue’ that are also referred to in other passages of the Homeric poems: Abantes (*Il.* IV 464), Aetolians (*Il.* V 843, IX 529, 531, 549, 575, 597, XII 218 = 282, XXIII 633), Arcadians (*Il.* VII 134), Boeotians (*Il.* V 710, XIII 685, 700, XV 330), Epeians (*Il.* IV 537, XI 688, 694, 732, 737, 744, XIII 686, 691, XV 519, XXIII 630, 632; *Od.* XIII 275, XV 298, XXIV 431), Thesproti (*Od.* XVI 65, XIV 334, XIX 391), Iones (*Il.* XIII 685), Cephallenians (*Il.* IV 330; *Od.* XX 210, XXIV 355, 378, 429), Locrians (*Il.* XIII 686), Phthians (*Il.* XIII 686). cf. also the ethnic names used of individuals: Θάας Αἰτωλός (*Il.* IV 527), Τυδεὺς Αἰτωλῖος (*Il.* IV 399), Τρῆχον Αἰτωλῖον (*Il.* V 706), Αἰτωλὸς ἀνὴρ (*Od.* XIV 379), Αἰτωλὸς γενεήν (*Od.* XXIII 471), Πρόμαχον Βοιωτίον (*Il.* XIV 476), Πηνέλεως Βοιωτίος (*Od.* XVII 597), Βαθυκλήα... δς... μετέπρεπε Μυρμιδόνεσσι (*Il.* XVI 594–596), Μυρμιδόνων δ' ἔξ εἰμι (*Il.* XXIV 397), Λήθοιο Πελασγοῦ (*Il.* II 843, XVII 288), Τρώων... ἄνδρα κορυστήν (*Il.* XVI 693). cf. F.Gschnitzer, op. cit. 7.

Epeians were not Achaeans in the broad sense, but a particular *ethnos*. The Pylians were a section of this *ethnos*, and the 'sons of the Achaeans' of the north-east Peloponnese were another.

(5) Two Greek *ethne*, the Enienes and the Perrhaebi, had a common leader, Gouneus (*Il. II* 748–755). The poet tells us that the subjects of Peleus had three names: Myrmidons, Hellenes and Achaeans (*Il. II* 681–694). This sounds strange. We are probably dealing with three different *ethne*. The name 'Αχαιοί in this passage has the same, narrow, meaning as that observed above in the case of the 'sons of the Achaeans' of the north-east Peloponnese and of the Achaeans who were identified with the Pylians. The existence of a sub-group of the Achaean *ethnos* in the region assigned by *Iliad II* to the kingdom of Peleus is confirmed by an independent source: the Aenianes remembered that the valley of the Inachus, a tributary of the Spercheius, was once occupied by the 'Ιναχιεῖς and the 'Αχαιοί,¹ or rather the 'Ιναχιεῖς 'Αχαιοί – that is, the Achaeans who dwelt in the valley of the Inachus.² The name of the Hellenes had not yet acquired the extent that it has in Hesiod: it referred to a Greek *ethnos*, or at the most, a group of *ethne*. One trace of these Hellenes in the region in which they are located by *Iliad II* is the name 'Ελλάς, which was until recently used for Spercheius. Finally, the name *Μυρμιδόνες*, which is not known from elsewhere, is the only one used to denote the soldiers of Achilles in the rest of the *Iliad*.³ Of the three elements composing this state, then, the Achaeans constituted a sub-group of an *ethnos*, the Hellenes were a small *ethnos*, or part of a group of tribes, and the Myrmidons were probably an *ethnos*. In modern terminology, we would say that the states led by Gouneus and Peleus were personal unions.

(6) Some of the Greek military contingents are not defined by tribal names, but by names or phrases that connect them with places. The first of these consists of the use of an ethnic deriving from a place name: sons of the Athenians (*Il. II* 546–556), Cretans (*Il. II* 645–652),

¹ Plutarch, *Qu. Gr.* XIII 294 1.

² M.B.Sakellariou, op. cit. 241; idem, in *Aux origines de L'Hellénisme, hommage à H. Van Effenterre* (1984) 176, 177.

³ In the other books, the men of Achilles are referred to only as Myrmidons (*Il. I* 180, 328, VII 126, XVI 12, 164, 200, 269, 596, XIX 299, XXIV 397).

Rhodians (*Il.* II 653–670). In the second, use is made of an additional phrase or adverb, to indicate origins on an island: ‘from Salamis’ (ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος, *Il.* II 556–557), ‘from Syme’ (Σύμηθεν, *Il.* II 671–675). The third and most common formula consists of a description of the country, with the names of settlements, rivers, mountains and shrines, and with no ethnic name at all. This is used of two contingents of Trojan allies (*Il.* II 828–834 and 835–839), both of them from the Troad, and twelve Greek contingents: six of these are from Thessaly (680ff, 695ff, 711ff, 716ff, 729ff, 738ff), three from the Peloponnese (569ff, 581ff, 591ff) and one each from Boeotia (511ff), the Ionian sea (625ff) and the Dodecanese (676ff).

Of the twelve Greek military contingents in *Iliad* II that are not named at all, (A) three are given tribal names in other books, and (B) three more can be identified thanks to a combination of evidence.

(A) The passage of *Iliad* II mentioning the military contingent from Aspledon and Orchomenus refers to the latter city by the epithet *Μινύειος* (511). The same combination of toponym and epithet also occurs in *Odyssey* book XI (284). The epithet *Μινύειος* is connected with a Greek *ethnos*, the Minyans. These may be located from other sources and evidence in the area of Boeotian Orchomenus. This city, and Aspledon, may have belonged to the Minyans even after the invasion by the Boeotians, since they were somewhat removed from the route taken by the Boeotians in their advance. Other evidence suggests that the Minyans once dwelt in Pelasgiotis, Iolcus, Phthiotis, Phocis, Laconia and Triphylia. Since other Greek *ethne* occupy these areas in the Homeric poems, we must assume that the Minyans were their predecessors. — According to the Greek catalogue in *Iliad* II, the forces from Argissa, Orthe, Elone and Oloosson were led by Polypoetes. In book XI of the *Iliad* (128–129), Polypoetes is said to be leader of the Lapiths. The Lapiths, who were also a Greek *ethnos*, may be located from a variety of written sources and indications not only in the area to which they are assigned by the Greek catalogue, but also in Histiaeotis, Achaean Phthiotis, Boeotia, Attica, Troezenia, Sicyonia, Arcadia and Laconia. The Lapiths of northern Thessaly were thus a fragment of a dispersed *ethnos*. Since the areas referred to above were occupied by other Greek *ethne* in the Homeric geography, it seems that the Lapiths had extended over a greater area in former times. — The third Greek

contingent not named in *Iliad* II that is given a name in another book is the group from southern Thessaly which is led by Podarces (II 685ff); this group is identified as Phthians, thanks to the fact that Podarces is referred to in XIII (693) as leader of the Phthians. Unfortunately we cannot infer whether Podarces' subjects were the whole *ethnos* or only part of it.

(B) A combination of evidence enables us to identify sections of Achaeans in various different states. We saw above that a detail in the story related by Nestor in *Iliad* book XI reveals that the Pyliaus of *Iliad* book II and other books were a section of the Greek *ethnos* of the Achaeans, other sections of whom may be located in the state of Diomedes and the state of Peleus, thanks to other evidence in Homer, that we also saw above.¹ From evidence outside Homer, it appears that the Achaeans also dwelt in regions to which the catalogue of book II assigns the kingdoms of Agamemnon (569ff) and of Menelaus (581ff), without naming their populations.

One of the three Greek contingents which are defined in *Iliad* II by an ethnic name derived from a place name, the Athenians,² is also named in the same manner in other passages of the *Iliad* (IV 328, XIII 196, 689, XV 337). Once, however, they bear the ethnic *'Ιάονες*, which was used to describe a Greek *ethnos* including the Athenians, and also a confederacy of polis-states that embraced the polis-state of the Athenians (c. 1000–c. 770/60 B.C.).³ The reference to both *'Αθηναῖοι* and *'Ιάονες* in the *Iliad* perhaps reflects this state of affairs.

The ethnic names *'Αργεῖοι*, *'Ιθακήσιοι*, *Πύλιοι* and possibly *Μυκηναῖοι* are also used in the Homeric poems to indicate communities, related to polis-settlements.⁴ The passages in question are not in *Iliad* II, however, but elsewhere.

One passage speaks of the *demos* of the Argives (*Iliad* VI 159) in the sense of 'territory of the Argives', and another six speak of men being king among the Argives (*Il.* X 33, XIV 94, XIX 122, XIX 124, XXIII 471, *Od.* XV 240).

¹ v. s., pp. 381–382.

² v. s., p. 382.

³ v. s., pp. 325ff, 330; v. i., pp. 411ff, 415ff, 461ff, 463ff.

⁴ cf. F.Gschnitzer, op. cit. 5–6.

Ἴθακήσιοι is used of people who have gathered together for a meeting of the popular assembly (*Od.* II 25=161=229=XIV 443=454), and also of the men who moved against Odysseus after the killing of the suitors (*Od.* XIV 353, 531).

The analogous usages of the ethnic *Πύλιοι* are much more frequent. I merely refer to the passages in which it is used to indicate the soldiers of Nestor (*Il.* VII 133ff, XI 687, 724, XVII 704, XXIII 632ff). We may also note 'through the land of the Pylians' (*Il.* V 545), 'the ἄστυ of the Pylians' (*Od.* XV 216), 'the orator of the Pylians' (*Il.* I 248, IV 293), 'at the assembly of the Pylians' (*Od.* III 31); cf. also Nestor's prayer for himself, his sons and all the Pylians (*Od.* III 54–59). The juxtaposition of the Pylians and the Epeians (*Il.* XI 737, 753), and the Pylians and the Arcadians (*Il.* VII 134) is also revealing, for the Pylians have an ethnic based on the name of a settlement, while the Arcadians and the Epeians have an ethnic based on the name of an *ethnos*.

The only passage in which reference is made to *Μυκηναῖοι*, 'he was amongst the finest minds of the Mycenaeans' (*Il.* XV 643), does not have a political connotation; it is still useful, however, in that it illustrates the use of an ethnic based on the name of a settlement rather than an ethnic based on the name of an *ethnos*.

The passages referred to above, relating to the Argives, the Mycenaeans, the Pylians and the Ithacesians, are significant from another point of view: they apply the ethnic name of a settlement to the subjects of states that had more than one settlement. To these may now be added passages that connect leaders of states that had more than one settlement with a single one of them: 'Nestor... king of Pylos' (*Il.* II 77). 'She ruled over Pylos' (*Od.* XI 285), 'king... of Mycenae' (*Il.* VII 180, XI 46). In the formula 'Lord of golden Mycenae' (*Il.* VII 180), however, Mycenae is the name not of a state but of a city in which there was much gold.

The ethnic names *Ἀργεῖοι*, *Μυκηναῖοι*, and *Πύλιοι* correspond to three more of the seventeen Greek states referred to in *Iliad* II without a tribal name; these are to be added to the category of states denoted in the same book by a name deriving from a place-name. In fact, the *Ἀργεῖοι* are the people referred to in the Greek catalogue in *Iliad* II as occupying Argos and eight more settlements (II 559–568); the *Μυκηναῖοι*, according to the same source, occupied Mycenae and eleven more settlements (569–580); and the *Πύλιοι*, in the same text,

occupied Pylos and another eight settlements (591–602). We also see from the passages that connect kings with only one of the settlements in the state, that the territory in which the king of the Mycenaeans held sway was called Mycenae, and the territory in which the king of the Pylians ruled was called Pylos – that is, both had names derived from the name of a capital-settlement.

The situation with regard to the name *Ἰθακήσιοι* is different: this is not a name that we can apply to an otherwise un-named community, but is used either in place of the name *Κεφαλλῆνες* found in *Iliad* II (569) and elsewhere (*Il.* IV 330, *Od.* XX 210), or to indicate a community narrower than that of the Cephallenians, who were spread over more than one island. The former possibility remains theoretical. The latter finds support in other passages of Homer. In a passage of the *Odyssey* (XXIV 354–355) the two ethnic names are related in such a way that *Κεφαλλῆνες* is a broader term than *Ἰθακήσιοι*. Other passages of the *Odyssey* are clearer in that Ithaca is depicted not as part of a state that also extended over other islands and a section of Acarnania, but as the sole territory of the state. The indications are well known: one herald is enough to summon all the men of the community to a meeting of the assembly, and this takes place immediately (*Od.* II 6ff, VIII 4ff); the people gathered in assembly are called *Ἰθακήσιοι*, not *Κεφαλλῆνες* (*Od.* II 25, 161, 228), and they are explicitly described as inhabitants of Ithaca, and not of other places (*Od.* II 167). There are some passages, however, in which the *Ἰθακήσιοι* are called *Κεφαλλῆνες* (*Od.* XXIV 378, 429).

The *Ἰθακήσιοι* are not simply a sub-group of the *Κεφαλλῆνες*, however. They are also something different. The *Κεφαλλῆνες* have the name of an *ethnos* and were in fact an *ethnos*. The *Ἰθακήσιοι* have a name derived from the name of an island, and are therefore a community based on locality. The same relation existed between the Argives, or the Pylians, which were both communities formed and defined with reference to locality, and the Achaeans: as we have seen, both the Argives and the Pylians were sections of this *ethnos*.¹ The same will have been true of the state of the Mycenaeans. The Ithacesians were a local community, distinct from the *ethnos* of the Cephallenians, to which it belonged by reason of descent, but from

¹ v. s., pp. 381–382.

which it was differentiated by reason of geography; the Argives, the Mycenaeans and the Pylians, too, were local communities, that were distinct from the ethnos community of the Achaeans, which had broken up during the course and as a result of migrations. All these local communities, which were connected with settlements, as we have seen, were thus the offspring of ethnos communities. The Homeric data thus confirm the conclusions reached in the first chapter of this part,¹ which were based on evidence and testimonia later than Homer.

The fact that the world which found expression in the Homeric poems was acquainted with the polis-state emerges from a number of examples of the use of the word *πόλις* to mean 'state'. (a) Odysseus says to Nausicaa: 'I don't know anyone else of the people that own this *πόλις* and land; please show me the *ἄστυ*.' (*Od.* VI 176–178). This draws an explicit distinction between the *ἄστυ* and the *πόλις* and land: Odysseus wants to know where the *ἄστυ* is, while he is standing on the *πόλις* and land.² (b) Eumaeus tells Odysseus that his father was king of two *poleis* on the island of Syrie which had divided everything on the island between them (*Od.* XV 412–413). This is a question not of one king governing two cities, but of two polis-states under one king.³ In fact, the division of the island implies two autonomous communities. To be king of two *poleis* cannot be regarded as a poetic invention. Comparable situations are referred to in *Iliad* II with one king ruling over two different peoples and another ruling over three.⁴ Moreover, we know instances of kings ruling over two polis-states in classical times, from Caria.⁵ Thus, although the story told by Eumaeus is a poetic fiction, the political situation it describes as pertaining on the island of Syrie may well have had a real model, though not necessarily on this island. The situation itself will have been the result either of the unification of two originally independent communities, or of the fragmentation of an originally unified state, which did not, however,

¹ v. s., pp. 302–333, *passim*.

² J.V.Luce, *PRIA* 78 c (1978) 6.

³ F.Gschnitzer, *op. cit.* 13.

⁴ v. s., p. 382.

⁵ F.Gschnitzer, *Gemeinde und Herrschaft* (OeAW, Phil.–Hist. Kl. 235: 3) (1960) 37ff.

break apart at the top level, that of the king.¹ (c) After the slaughter of the suitors, Odysseus observes to Telemachus that they had killed the 'very stay of the polis' (ἔρμα πόλεως) (*Od.* XXIII 121). 'Polis' here must refer not to a settlement but to an autonomous community.² (d) The use of the term πόλις to mean 'autonomous community' will not have been a neologism for the men of the Homeric period, since they themselves used the same term in the sense of 'state territory'.³

The state of the Trojans who lived in the city of Ilium, and the state of the Phaeacians in Scheria both give the impression of polis-states, although they do not take their name from that of the locality ('Ιλιεῖς, Σχεριεῖς), but from the name of a people (Τρῶες, Φαίακες).

Other features that have been advanced as reflections of the polis-state in the Homeric poems⁴ do not constitute proof, partly because they merely demonstrate the existence of a city-settlement, and partly because they illustrate the development of public interests, public justice and state institutions – that is, phenomena that fall within the category of the state, not the narrower one of the polis-state.

It remains to examine the arguments that have been advanced as proof of the idea that the Homeric poems are unaware of the polis-state. (a) Homer describes his heroes with epithets based on the ethnic name of a people or an *ethnos*.⁵ This argument focusses on a small part of the evidence, and not the most definitive. (b) In the Homeric poems, membership of an estate (*Stand*) is more important than membership of a state.⁶ (c) The Homeric poems are unaware of the political institutions characteristic of the polis-state: the popular assemblies and councils of elders do not have the same flavour as the popular assemblies and councils of later periods; there is no allegiance to the state – in its place we find personal loyalty or obligation to the person

¹ v. s., pp. 159–160.

² v. s., p. 186.

³ v. s., p. 205.

⁴ C.S.G.Thomas (v. s., p. 352); J.V.Luce, loc. cit. 2, 5ff, 9. With respect to the arbitration scene in the description of the shield of Achilles, I agree with M.Hammond, op. cit. 159: a scene of this nature does not necessarily imply the functioning of a *polis*.

⁵ v. s., p. 354.

⁶ v. s., p. 354.

of a leader.¹ The observations *b* and *c* demonstrate not the absence of the polis-state, but the low level of development of the state in general in the period depicted in the poems. (*d*) Ithaca is a pre-political society: it does not even have the state mechanisms that we can see in Phaeacia; furthermore, it can survive for twenty years without a king and without a popular assembly.² The situation in both Ithaca and Phaeacia, however, depends on poetic need and poetic licence. The poet was free to attribute to Phaeacia political conditions that were known to him, but he could not do the same in the case of Ithaca, since he was bound by the data in the legend, such as the ten years duration of the Trojan War, and the ten years of Odysseus' wanderings.

To sum up, during this discussion of the situation in the Homeric poems, eight types of state have been listed: (1) a state that coincides with a people; (2) a state that coincides with a sub-group of a people; (3) a state that coincides with a Greek *ethnos*; (4) a state that coincides with a sub-group of a Greek *ethnos*; (5) a personal union of Greek *ethne* or sub-groups of *ethne*; (6) a state consisting of a Greek community defined in terms of locality or localities; (7) a Greek polis-state; (8) a Greek personal union of polis-states.

All the states that are identified with peoples (1) or sections of peoples (2) are outside the Greek world; all the other types of state (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) are exclusively Greek.

The picture of the world outside Greece in the Homeric poems may or may not be a true one. This reservation is necessary for both general and specific reasons: the descriptions in Homer of the non-Greek states are in general much scunter than those of the Greek states; moreover, the leaders of the Trojans and their allies, with few exceptions, have Greek names. Fortunately, this doubt has no consequences for our subject, which is confined to the types of Greek state.

One of these types, the state that coincides with a section of an *ethnos* (4)³ disappeared when it became apparent that the state of a section of the Achaeans under Nestor, and the state of a section of Achaeans under Diomedes are referred to in other passages as the

¹ v. s., p. 355.

² v. s., pp. 358, 369.

³ v. s., p. 380.

Pylions and the Argives respectively, and are thus defined as *poleis*.¹ After this, we reclassified this kind of state in the category of *poleis*.

One other type of state has no historical counterpart: the one that is described as a community, but which has no name, this being replaced by a description of the state with reference to more than one settlement and to geographical features (6a).² We noted, in any event, that some of the examples of this type in *Iliad* II acquire names with the help of evidence from elsewhere in the Homeric poems. All the states in this category were located in areas that changed masters at the end of the Mycenaean period, whereas the communities that are named in *Iliad* II correspond with communities that were still located in the historic period in the place to which they are assigned by the author of the Catalogue. It seems therefore, that he had recourse to describing political communities with reference to a number of geographical features in cases where he did not know their names.

Finally, the poems have no evidence for a type of state that is 'Homeric', nor for a type of state that is recognizably of a 'Mycenaean' type.

We shall now attempt to work back from the reflections of states in the poems to the historical reality.

These reflections fall into four categories:

(A) States that are referred to as communities of the *ethnos* type: Abantes, Aetolians, Arcadians, Boeotians, Epeians, Lapiths, Locrians, Magnetes, Minyans, Phthians and Phocians.

(B) States that are referred to sometimes as *ethne* and sometimes as *poleis*: Achaeans=Argives, Pylions; Iaones=Athenians; Cephallenians=Ithacesians.

(C) Personal unions of *ethne* (or of segments of *ethne*): Aenianes and Perrhaebi; Achaeans, Hellenes and Myrmidons.

(D) Personal union of polis-states: two polis-states on Syrie.

Of the states in the first category, some go back to the Mycenaean period (Abantes, Epeians, Lapiths and Phthians), others are post-

¹ v. s., p. 381.

² v. s., pp. 382-383.

Mycenaean and contemporary with the poems (Boeotians and Magnetes), and others dwelt in the Mycenaean age and later in the places assigned to them by the poems (Aetolians, Arcadians, Locrians, Minyans and Phocians). The Homeric poems thus depict ethnos-states that are contemporary with them and also ethnos-states that are earlier.

The examples of the states in the second category may be divided into different groups. Both components of the pair Ionians–Athenians are post-Mycenaean and contemporary with the composition of the poems: the Confederacy of the Ionians was formed at the same time as its polis-states (one of which was the polis-state of the Athenians) c. 1000 B.C., and was dissolved c. 770/60 B.C.¹ Of the pairs Achaeans–Pylians and Cephallenians–Ithacesians the first component goes back to Mycenaean times, and the second had no historical counterpart in the Homeric age, when there were no *poleis* of Pylos and Ithaca. We have therefore to seek some other explanation for the use of the ethnic names *Πύλιοι* and *Ἰθακήσιοι*. It may reside in one of two hypotheses: either the epic language took the manner of naming polis-states and projected it from its actual environment into the time of the Trojan war, or this manner had begun to be used in the Mycenaean age to designate communities defined with reference to settlements. The former hypothesis seems the more probable in the case of the ethnic *Ἰθακήσιοι*. For the ethnic *Πύλιοι*, both hypotheses seem equally likely. If the name *Πύλιοι* goes back to the Mycenaean age, however, it will have been used alongside the name *Ἀχαιοί*, which will have survived as an anachronism from an earlier period during which the group of Achaeans who occupied Messenia had not lost its character as an *ethnos* and had not yet formed a political society. The problem is different in the case of the pair Achaeans–Argives. A polis-state of the Argives already existed by the Homeric age; it is thus possible that the poet projected this polis-state into the Mycenaean age. In this case the usage would be no different from that of the ethnic *Ἀθηναῖοι*.

The personal union of the Aenianes and Perrhaebi ceased to exist long before the time of Homer. The Aenianes separated from the Perrhaebi about 1200 and arrived in the Aenis of historical times about

¹ v. s., p. 330; v. i., pp. 415ff.

1125 B.C.¹ By contrast, the other personal union, of Achaeans, Hellenes and Myrmidons, may have continued to exist down into Homeric times, irrespective of whether it was formed before or after the Mycenaean period.

The personal union of two polis-states sharing an island seems quite natural after the end of the Mycenaean period, when small groups of migrants or refugees formed small political communities of the polis-state type, which of necessity had small territories.

It is self-evident that none of the states that are referred to as polis-states in a number of passages in Homer were polis-states during the Mycenaean period. On the other hand, we find in the Homeric poems none of the characteristics of the dynastic-territorial state known from the Mycenaean tablets. The types of state that we were able to detect in the poems were real, however. The most common type, the ethnos- or stem-state was very widespread at the time of the composition of the poems, and even more so in the period in which the events portrayed in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are set: the poet will have found many of his *ethne* in the earlier epic material that he used, and will have introduced others from his own environment. The rarest type of state, the polis-state, was post-Mycenaean: the poet transferred it from his own time to the time he was depicting, unaware that he was guilty of an anachronism.

To summarize:

- The Homeric poems do not depict only one type of state.
- The Homeric poems do not depict a 'Homeric' type of state.
- The Homeric poems depict two basic types of state: the ethnos- or stem-state and the polis-state.
- The second type was taken from the poet's own time; this is consistent with the existence at that period of *poleis* in Ionia and Aeolis, as well as in mainland Greece, the home of the states of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.
- The observation that there was no 'Homeric' type of state refutes the hypothesis that the polis-state derived from this type.

¹ M.B.Sakellariou, in *Aux origines de L'Hellénisme, hommage a H. Van Effenterre* (1984) 173-180.

II. DATA RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL POLIS-STATES

Although the situation in Homer examined above contains some useful indications and hints as to the date of the emergence of the polis-state in general, it is only by examining the local situations that we may expect to find indications and hints, or indeed direct evidence, for the foundation dates of the individual polis-states.

During the course of this investigation we shall continue to make use of the most demanding criteria, which we defined at the outset and which we applied in the case of the situation in Homer. These, it will be recalled, were the criteria established by W.G.Runciman at the level of the structures and functions of the state, and by Marx and Engels for the economic and social pre-conditions for the state.¹

However, since the data that we will be examining here are not all gathered in one place, as in the Homeric poems, but are scattered in both time and space, we are obliged also to take into account the following considerations:

(1) The economic and social pre-conditions for the state are, of course, more or less antecedent to the minimal structures or functions of a state. Moreover, the entire body of evidence at our disposal is by its nature such that the economic and social pre-conditions become clear much earlier than those features related to institutions, structures and functions. The economic and social pre-conditions can be reconstructed from (a) memories of the early history of a community preserved in the tradition; (b) the archaeological record; and (c) the study of the later situations. Institutions, structures and functions begin to be attested in inscriptions and other documents at a much later date. It follows that the earliest information about the institutions, structures and functions of a state can usually be regarded as no more than a *terminus ante quem*, giving rise to the conclusion that the creation of a state had already taken place. In contrast, the appearance in our evidence of the economic and social preconditions may be regarded as a *terminus post quem* or a *quo*.

(2) The economic and social pre-conditions fall into not one, but two categories: (a) the division of the original community into two

¹ v. s., pp. 345ff, 371ff.

classes: landowners and landless; (b) the domination of a community over a foreign population. It follows that the starting point of a state will be the date either at which the community began to dominate a foreign population, or at which the community split into two classes; where both phenomena occur, the creation of the state should be made to coincide with whichever of the two occurred first.

(3) It will be recalled, however, that the foundation date of a polis-state is the time at which three constituent elements are found together: a community, a polis-settlement and a state; and that a polis-settlement is not the same thing as a city, but a settlement protected by a citadel. That urbanization was not an indispensable element in ancient Greek states, and that the rise of the city and the emergence of the state did not go hand in hand is clear from the fact that even a community that dwelt in a deme – that is, an unfortified village – could form a state.¹ We have, therefore, to observe where and when a community, a polis-settlement and a state are found together for the first time, irrespective of the order in which these three elements occur.

The grouping of the individual polis-states used in the previous chapter is also used in this one. This has two advantages. Firstly, it allows us to investigate the question whether, and to what extent, there is a relationship between the pattern of formation of the polis-states and a particular chronological period. Secondly, it enables the reader to know the framework within which any particular polis-state is being examined from one or the other point of view, and to move easily from one chapter to the other, without changing the classification.

A. POLIS-STATE FOUNDED BY AN INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY

1. POLIS-STATE FROM A UNITARY COMMUNITY

It has been claimed that the *poleis* founded by the Greeks on the coast of Asia Minor became states when the colonists began to hold sway

¹ v. s., pp. 76, 100–101.

over the natives.¹ The reality is more complex. The Greeks who crossed the Aegean came from regions of mainland Greece where there had been states during the Mycenaean period, and from Attica, where a state existed in the period of the migrations.² But several events intervened between the collapse of the Mycenaean states and the creation of new ones beyond the sea. Along with the states their social supports broke down, as the landowners lost their property and the members of the bureaucracy their positions. The groups of refugees were formed in a hurry and without any account of the former social condition of the participants. They were not leaderless, however. The traditions of some of the Ionic and Aeolic polis-states retained the memory of leaders and kings who also became the founders of local dynasties.³ A group of refugees that arrived in Asia Minor without a leader (or having lost the leader it had?) successfully requested one from the Colophonians.⁴ This kind of organization did not necessarily have a political character, however. Furthermore, the conditions they faced while they were crossing the Aegean and attempting to establish themselves amongst foreign populations will have brought the old social classes closer together. It is in any case quite probable that the old social stratification was not revived amongst the refugees when they settled in their new homes, since the land appears to have been distributed in plots of equal value,⁵ except that the leaders and other pre-eminent champions of the community were naturally given larger and better parcels of land (*τεμένη*). This initial economic equality,

¹ V.Ehrenberg, *Der griechische und der hellenistische Staat* (=A.Gercke, E.Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft* III. 3) (1932) 8 = *Der Staat der Griechen* I (1957) 8 = *The Greek State* (1960) 11 = *L'état grec* (1976) 34.

² Some of these states were of the Mycenaean type (of which we have some knowledge, thanks to the Mycenaean documents in Linear B), and others were ethnos-states (v. s., pp. 303–304, 310ff).

³ For the Ionic cities, see M.B.Sakellariou, *La migration grecque en Ionie* (1958) *passim*. For the Aeolic ones, see mainly: Pindar, *N.* XI 34–36; Hellanicus 4 *FGrH* 32 = *Schol. Pind. N.* XI 43; Strabo IX 2, 3 and 5, XIII 1, 3; Pausanias II 18, 5–8, III 2, 1; *Schol. Pind. N.* loc. cit.

⁴ Pausanias VII 3, 8–9. cf. M.B.Sakellariou, *op. cit.* 221; idem, in *Είλαπίνη, τόμος τιμητικός για τὸν καθηγητὴ Ν. Πλάτωνα* (1988) 473–478.

⁵ The word *κλήρος* (plot) implies that the land was distributed by use of the lot, which in turn suggests that the plots were of equal value.

which was based on a decision taken by the community in accordance, with a very ancient practice, was eroded by the effects of a development, whereby differences in the size of property steadily increased and converted the originally small group of the privileged into a broader, permanent aristocracy, a class, or rather an estate. Slavery remained for a long time at the patriarchal stage. Serfdom resulted after the submission of foreign populations.

The groups of invaders, too, which certainly did not have a political character, were governed by 'kings', who also founded dynasties. It seems, therefore, that those who are referred to as 'kings', whether of groups of invaders or of refugees, were not political rulers but military leaders. They belonged to families of distinction, however. In addition to the leader, each group will have had a council of elders and an assembly in which all the men took part.

After they had established themselves fully, got their land in working order, and acquired a military force of some size, the groups of migrants or refugees conquered further territory and distributed the old inhabitants along with the plots of land, with a view to exploiting their labour. Once the community had become a class ruling over serfs, in addition to the slaves over which they exercised patriarchal authority, it proceeded finally to form a state mechanism. Later, other classes came into being. On the one hand, the community itself was divided into landowners and landless. On the other, metics came to live alongside them, who were also excluded from the ownership of land. In some polis-states, these sooner or later became members of the community, in which case they acquired the right to own land.¹ Few of them, however, were able to make use of this right. The class of metics was increased by new arrivals.²

The new states, created by refugees in the eastern Aegean and by invaders in mainland Greece and some of the islands, did not resemble the Mycenaean states. They belonged to a new type, the polis-state, because those that created them were organized in communities defined

¹ v. s., pp. 117ff.

² We know that new tribes were formed for this purpose at Ephesus (Βεμβινεῖς, Εἰώνομοι, Καρηναῖοι, Τήσιοι), Miletus (Βωρεῖς, Οἰνωπεες) and Cyrene: cf. M.B.Sakellariou, *Ἑλληνικά* 15 (1957) 220ff.

by a polis-settlement.¹ As we have seen, for a settlement to be called a *πόλις* by the ancients, there was only one criterion: it had to be protected by a citadel, which was, properly speaking, a *πόλις*. Large scale, carefully planned monumental buildings, improvements in the lay-out of the settlements, the concentration in them of manufacturing and commercial activities – all these appeared much later in the ancient polis-settlements at varying rates, and with varying results: in some of them, indeed, these features never appeared all together, or to any significant degree.² The settlements built by the invaders and refugees in the last century of the second and the first two centuries of the first millennium B.C. originally had the appearance of a makeshift encampment, and later that of a village. All of them, however, were protected by a citadel and were for that reason called *πόλεις*.

The individual dates relating to these two contemporary and interlocking developments are furnished by archaeological evidence.

Recent discoveries reveal that the Mycenaean kingdoms were severely shaken on two occasions: first at the end of LH (Mycenaean) III B, which is dated to c.1200 B.C., and then at the end of LH (Mycenaean) III C, c.1125 B.C. There are a variety of reasons to suggest that the Dorians were responsible only for the second. Amongst these are the following observations: (a) Greece seems to have been invaded c.1200 B.C. by non-Greeks;³ (b) a few decades later, the Mycenaean world shows signs of recovery; (c) by contrast, after 1125 B.C. there is a precipitate decline in the number, size and construction of the houses, followed by a gradual ekistic and economic decline; (d) there is no evidence for any later break.

After the destructions at the end of LH III C, c. 1125 B.C., only one site was occupied in the Corinthia during the Submycenaean period, that at Corinth. Two more were occupied during the Protogeometric period, from 1050 to 900 B.C., one in modern Corinth and one near the later sanctuary of Isthmia. In the Geometric period, from 900 to 750 B.C., the site of modern Corinth was abandoned, but new settlements

¹ v. s., pp. 124ff.

² v. s., pp. 88–94.

³ M.B.Sakellariou, *Peuples préhelléniques d'origine indo-européenne* (1977) 179ff, 182ff, 211, 216.

were founded at the sites of Mylos tou Khelioti, Galataki, Heraeum and Agioi Theodoroi.¹ The last two became part of the state that was in the process of forming in the Megaris² and will therefore not be considered here. From a combination of other evidence it may be conjectured that in the Corinthia, Petra was also founded during the Submycenaean period, and the settlements Dyo Vouna, Solygeia, Tenea and possibly Cenchreai during the Geometric period.³ It thus emerges quite clearly that the Dorians who invaded the Corinthia initially settled at a single settlement, at Corinth, while the earlier inhabitants of the region, the Lapiths, who had aided the Dorians,⁴ were limited to Petra. Both Corinth and Petra were built on sites protected by natural strongholds, and therefore had from the outset the distinctive feature of the ancient polis-settlement. The definition of Corinth as a polis-settlement cannot be disputed on the grounds that until the beginning of the eighth century it was not a unified settlement, but rather resembled a cluster of neighbouring villages,⁵ and that the Acrocorinth was only fortified later. The Dorians who built the polis of Corinth constituted a community that was sovereign internally, over its members and subjects, and autonomous in its relations with the outside world.

Later two things happened: first the community of the Dorians of Corinth absorbed the community of the Lapiths of Petra; and secondly the state of the Corinthians was formed. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the former event happened at a very early date, before the possible weakening of the bonds of friendship uniting the two communities as a result of the aid given by the Lapiths to the Dorians, and before disputes could arise between these two communities which had common borders. The formation of a state must have been preceded by the subjugation of the pre-Dorian population outside the original area

¹ R.Hope Simpson, O.T.P.K.Dickinson, *A Gazetteer of Aegean Civilization in the Bronze Age I* (1979) 61ff.

² M.B.Sakellariou, in M.B.Sakellariou, N.Faraklas, *Corinthia and Cleonaea (Ancient Greek Cities*, Athens Center of Ekistics, 3) (1971) 61, and in Μ.Β.Σακελλαρίου, Ν.Φαράκλας, *Μεγαρίς, Αιγόσθενα, Ἐρένεια* (same series, 14) (1972) 22, 24.

³ M.B.Sakellariou, in the former work, 45.

⁴ M.B.Sakellariou, loc. cit.

⁵ J.N.Coldstream, *Geometric Greece* (1972) 85.

controlled by the numerically small communities of the Dorians and the Lapiths. The expansion of the now unified community of the Corinthians over the rest of the Corinthia will probably have occurred just before, or at the same time as the foundation, in the Geometric period, of the settlements at Solygeia and Tenea, in both of which Corinthians took part.¹

The same basic data are also found in the case of the original settlements of the Dorians in the Argolis, and similar conclusions may be drawn from them. The invaders had established themselves as early as the Submycenaean period at four sites: Argos, Nauplia, Tiryns and Mycenae (all of them below citadels), and formed four states. During the Protogeometric period, settlements were founded at Lerna and Kazarma. Three more were added in the Geometric period, at Prosymna, Berbati and Dendra.² Lerna, Prosymna, Berbati and Dendra were villages of the Argive polis-state, and Kazarma a village of the polis-state of the Nauplieis. The foundation of these villages will have followed the subjugation of the pre-Dorian population, which, again, will have become possible after the strengthening in both demographic and military terms of the community that settled at Argos. The existence in the state of the Argives of a class comparable with the helots is attested in the sources. Herodotus reports that the *δοῦλοι* of the Argives held the upper hand in the state for some years, taking advantage of the defeat of their masters at Sepeia, about 494 B.C.³ The term *δοῦλοι* has properly been interpreted here to mean 'serfs', on the grounds that while no insurrections of slaves are recorded in ancient Greece, we do know of some rebellions of the helots against the Spartans.⁴ Moreover, Aristotle and Socrates of Argos referring to the

¹ The fact that Syracuse, which was universally recognized as a Corinthian colony, was inhabited from its foundation by colonists from Tenea (Strabo VIII 6, 22) shows that the inhabitants of this village were citizens of the state of the Corinthians. It also proves that Tenea was Corinthian before the foundation of Syracuse, in 733 B.C. The earliest evidence for existence of Tenea, however, consists of Geometric tombs: M.B.Sakellariou, N.Faraklas, *Corinthia-Cleonea* (=Ancient Greek Cities, no. 3, Athens Centre of Ekistics) (1971) App. II, 32. Solygeia was also colonized during the Geometric period: M.B.Sakellariou, N.Faraklas, op. cit., App. II, 26.

² R.Hope Simpson, O.T.P.K.Dickinson, op. cit. 29ff.

³ Herodotus VI 83.

⁴ G.Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde* I (1920) 136 with n 2.

same historical event and to Herodotus statement use the term *περίοικοι* instead of *δοῦλοι*, whereas Pollux and Stephanus Byzantius compared a number of subject populations with the helots, amongst them the *γυμνήται* of Argos.¹ It thus seems likely that the *δοῦλοι* of Herodotus, the *περίοικοι* of Aristotle and Socrates, and the *γυμνήται* of Pollux are the same and all these terms denoted a class of serfs.² The subjugation of this population by the Argives was the basic precondition for the creation of a state mechanism.

As we have seen, the polis-settlements of Epidaurus and Troezen were built during the Geometric period.³ Unfortunately, there is no evidence by which we might date, either directly or indirectly, the foundation of the polis-states related to them. But they will not have been much later than the foundation date of the neighbouring polis-states of the Argives and the Corinthians. The states of the Mycenaeans, of the Tirynthians and of the Nauplieis will also have been organized at the same period.

The same arguments enable us to assign the foundation of the states of the Dryopian communities of Asine and Hermione,⁴ and the Dorian communities of Phlius⁵ and Aegina⁶ to the same period.

As we have seen, the polis-state of Sparta was created by the unification of two earlier kingdoms.⁷ This took place in the joint reign of Agis and Eurypon, which tradition set in the second generation after the conquest of the region by the Dorians.⁸ Archaeological evidence, however, indicates that the area of Sparta was occupied by Dorians

¹ Aristotle, *Pol.* 1303 a 6; Socrates 310 *FGrH* 6 =Plutarch, *De mul. virt.* IV, p. 245 F. Pollux III 83; Stephanus Byzantius, s.v. Χίος.

² E. Kirsten, *Das dorische Kreta, I: Die Insel Kreta im fünften und vierten Jahrhundert* (1942) 94; R.A.Tomlinson, *Argos and the Argives from the End of the Bronze Age to the Roman Occupation* (1972) 97–99. D. Lotze, *Μεταξύ ἐλευθέρων και δούλων* (1959) 53–54, rejects the identification of the *γυμνήτες* with the *δοῦλοι* of Herodotus and the *περίοικοι* of Aristotle and Socrates and maintains that they were lightly armed Argives i. e. Argives of low social class.

³ v. s., p. 307.

⁴ v. s., p. 305.

⁵ v. s., p. 307–308.

⁶ v. s., p. 307.

⁷ v. s., pp. 308–310.

⁸ v. s., p. 309.

during the Protoegeometric period in Laconia¹ the beginning of which has been assigned to 950–900 (or even 850) B.C.² The political unification of the villages³ will, then, have taken place more or less before 800 B.C. A necessary precondition for the conversion of the Spartan community into the core of a political society was the creation of the first perioeci and helots. The earliest perioeci were the inhabitants of Pellana, Selasia and Aegys, which were occupied by the Spartans in the first two or three decades after 800 B.C. and also a group of Spartans which colonized Geronthrae shortly after this date.⁴ The helots included the inhabitants of the fertile territory in the Eurotas valley, to the south of Amyclae, which was occupied during the middle decades of the eighth century.

It has been suggested that the 'rhetra' attributed to Lycurgus marked the birth of the state of the Lacedaemonians.⁵ This document does indeed meet the requirements laid down by Runciman for a state.⁶ The requirement of the specialization of the state authorities is fulfilled by the reference to kings, elders and assembly; the assembly meets not according to the free judgement of the kings and elders, but at regular intervals, and always in the same place. These three organs, working together in accordance with certain rules, constitute 'the authority'. The institutions are permanent, all the more so as the 'rhetra' is sanctified as a Delphic oracle. Finally, the creation alongside the old tribes of the *obai* is a step towards the replacement the old relations based on kinship by relations based on residence in the same area. The 'rhetra' may have antedated the annexation of Amyclae⁷ and *a fortiori* the somewhat later creation of a large class of helots, but came after the

¹ R.Hope Simpson, O.T.P.K.Dickinson, op. cit. 108.

² W.G.Forrest, *A History of Sparta 950–192 B.C.* (1968) 27; A.M. Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece* (1971) 130–131; V.R. d'A. Desborough, *The Greek Dark Ages* (1972) 243; P.Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (1979) 83–90.

³ M.B.Sakellariou, *Ἀρχαιογονωσία* II: 1 (1981) 83–93.

⁴ M.B.Sakellariou, loc. cit.

⁵ V.Ehrenberg, *JHS* 57 (1937) 155 = *Polis und Imperium* I (1965) 93; N.G.L.Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* (1959) 103–104 = 2nd edn (1967) 103–104; M.B.Σακελλαρίου, in *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους* II (1971) 50–52 = *A History of the Hellenic World* II (1975) 58–60; P.Lévêque, *La Pensée*, fasc. 217/218 (1981) 25.

⁶ v. s., pp. 371ff.

⁷ M.B.Σακελλαρίου, *ibidem*.

creation of the first perioeci. Thus, everything points to the conclusion that the state of the Lacedaemonians was formed about 775 B.C.

G.Bokisch dated the foundation of the Spartan state after the capture of Amyclae, arguing that it was at this date that Spartan society acquired a class character.¹ But the Amyclaeans did not form a subordinate class: they were incorporated into the Spartan community. In any event, the difference in date is insignificant.

G.A.Koshelenko is amongst those who concede that the Spartan state was created as the result of the subjugation of the Achaean population, who were converted into helots. He adds, however, that this led to the foundation of a primitive state mechanism, which developed further when the Spartan aristocrats attempted to enslave the mass of the citizens, during the first Messenian war.² This hypothesis must be rejected, however. On the one hand, it is unreasonable to suppose that the Spartan nobles would make any attack on members of their own community while conducting an external war of vital importance: it would be absurd to break the interior front; and it would scarcely be the time to enslave members of the community and appropriate their property, when the entire community was waging war in order to acquire plots of land and helots in Messenia. On the other hand, the silence of the sources on a matter of this importance cannot be regarded as fortuitous, when there are so many clear allusions to other events of a social nature connected with the Messenian wars: the first Messenian war resulted in so great a decline in the birth rate in Sparta, because of the losses to the male population, that the Spartans allowed the helots to beget children with Spartan women; the offspring of these marriages later gave rise to a social problem that was eventually solved by driving them out; between the two Messenian wars Spartan society was torn by civil strife; during the second Messenian war many Spartans lost the plots they had captured in Messenia, and demanded a redistribution of land in Laconia. If what Koshelenko suggests had really happened, would it not have left some trace in the sources?

Thanks to archaeological discoveries, it is possible to follow the

¹ G.Bokish, in J.Hermann, I.Selnow (eds), *Beiträge zur Entstehung des Staates* (1970) 126.

² G.A.Koshelenko, *op. cit.* 41ff.

history of some of the Greek settlements in Ionia. Miletus¹ and Old Smyrna² date from the Submycenaean period (1125–1050), Samos, Teos, Clazomenae, Phocaea and settlements near Kuşadası and Mardogan from the Protogeometric (1050–900),³ and Ephesus, Colophon and Chios from the Geometric period (900–750).⁴ It is conceivable that there will have been other settlements, too, of which traces have not yet been found, among them the settlements that were the forerunners of Ephesus, Colophon and Chios. On the other hand, we cannot be sure whether the two small settlements near Kuşadası and Mardogan were ever the centres of independent communities. Two other polis-settlements, Magnesia ad Maeandrum and Magnesia ad Sipylum, may be dated to the ninth century and no earlier on the grounds that their location, inland from the Ionic and Aeolic *poleis*, suggests that, when the Magnetes arrived, the coastal areas were already occupied by other Greeks.⁵ All the Ionic polis-states seem to have been primary, i.e. not to have been colonized by polis-states. The polis-state of the Athenians and the Confederacy to which it adhered were formed c. 1000 B.C.⁶ Genuine local traditions and other evidence imply that only Miletus, Teos, Old Smyrna, and Phocaea had been founded by groups that came from Attica.⁷ As we have seen, Miletus and Old Smyrna were built before 1050, Teos and Phocaea between 1050 and 900 B.C. Thus the settlements of Miletus and Old Smyrna in any rate antedated the foundation of the Athenian polis-state, those of Teos and Phocaea, if not antedating it, will have, at least, been contemporary with its formation. However, the emergence of polis-states in Ionia and in Aeolis will have been later than the foundation of settlements by the Greek colonists, since it will have resulted from the subjugation of indigenous populations by the Greeks.

We shall now deal with the category of primary polis-states founded

¹ M.B.Sakellariou, in *Proceedings of the Xth International Congress of Archaeology I* (1978) 144–145.

² E.Akurgal, *Alt-Smyrna* (1983) 15ff.

³ J.M.Cook, *AR* (1956–1960) 40; M.B.Sakellariou, *op. cit.* 145–147.

⁴ M.B.Sakellariou, *op. cit.* 146.

⁵ M.B.Sakellariou, *La migration grecque en Ionie* (1958) 343.

⁶ *v. s.*, pp. 325ff; *v. i.*, pp. 411ff.

⁷ M.B.Sakellariou, *op. cit.* 39–76, 174–185, 293–295, 295–297.

by colonists or refugees who came from settled *ethne* or parts of settled *ethne*. As we saw in the previous chapter, this category includes some of the colonies of the Megarian confederacy of 'parts' (*μέρη*) and all those of the *ethnos* of the Achaeans and the *ethnos* of the Locrians.

Megara became a polis-state somewhere between 670 and 650 B.C.¹ The Megarian colonies with a traditional date earlier than 650 B.C. are: Megara Hyblaea (734–728), Selymbria (716/15), Astacus (712/11), Chalcedon (685/4–683/2), and Byzantium (660/59 or 628). The study of ancient chronology for events earlier than the sixth century demonstrates that the majority of them have been pushed too far back. The second of the two dates for the founding of Byzantium seems to be nearer the truth. Astacus was founded at the same time as, if not later than Byzantium. The dates for Selymbria and Chalcedon should be brought down to c. 675 and 650 B.C. respectively. Thus we are left with Megara Hyblaea as the only certain and Chalcedon and Selymbria as the only possible primary polis-states.

The Achaean *ethnos* was organized by 'parts' and not by polis-states, even at the period at which Herodotus was writing.² The dates assigned by ancient tradition to the foundation of the Achaean colonies are much earlier: the lowest, that for Caulonia (675–650 B.C.) is two centuries before Herodotus; and the interval is greater in the case of Metapontium (690–680 B.C.), Croton (708 B.C.) and Sybaris (720 B.C.). And even if these dates are to some degree higher than was really the case, the margins are so great that there are no grounds for doubt that these colonies were sent out by the Achaeans at a time when they did not have polis-states.

In contrast with the situation *vis-à-vis* the Achaean polis-states, we do have a *terminus ante quem* for the Locrian polis-states (sixth century B.C.). The traditional date for Epizephyrian Locri (673 B.C.), however, is so high that here too there is very little likelihood that the colonists emanated from polis-states.

The establishment of each migratory group in its new home will not have been followed immediately by the foundation of a state. Indeed, even if the Megarians, the Achaeans and the Locrians had already acquired a state mechanism, the migratory groups will still have passed

¹ v. i., pp. 320–321.

² v. s., p. 320.

through a phase of classless society, under the same conditions faced earlier by the refugees and colonists who had had experience of the Mycenaean state; and they also underwent the social differentiation that demanded the formation of a state, following processes similar to those that led the refugees and the migrants mentioned above to the same result.¹ This step will have been taken as soon as the groups of newcomers became strong enough to subjugate the native populations and convert them into serfs. The date of the foundation of a colony therefore, is in practice more or less earlier than the foundation of its state.

2. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF DEMES

During the discussion in the previous chapter of the known instances of polis-states deriving from a confederacy of demes reference was made to the relevant chronological evidence. It is re-stated here in their chronological order.

The foundation of the *polis* of the Tegeans is attributed to a mythical person: it is therefore probable that the event dates back to before the historical period.

The polis-settlement of Sicyon will have been founded during the first quarter of the seventh century. This date may be deduced from three different pieces of evidence. (a) As we have seen, the archaeological site of Sicyon is no earlier than the Archaic period.² (b) From the middle of the seventh century there were bronze-workers there.³ (c) At this same period, a tyranny was installed. Tyrannies are known to have emerged as a result of a long period of struggle between aristocrats and middle classes, the rise of the latter being related to the growth of a city. This last fact, therefore, taken together with the second, implies that Sicyon was not merely a polis-settlement but a proto-city. The polis-state of the Sicyonians will have been founded at the same time as the polis-settlement.⁴

¹ v. s., pp. 394ff.

² v. s., p. 306.

³ Ch. Skalet, *Ancient Sicyon with a Prosopographia Sicyonia* (1928) 33–34, 37; A. Griffin, *Sikyon* (1982) 93.

⁴ See also p. 317.

The founding of the polis-settlement of Mantinea and of the polis-state of the Mantineans is to be set either in the sixth century or between 460 and 450 B.C. The polis-settlement of Elis and the polis-state of the Eleans were both founded in 471 B.C. Heraea became a polis-state in the reign of Cleombrotus II in Sparta (380–372 B.C.).¹

3. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF 'PARTS' (MEPH)

Megara is the only known example of the founding of a polis-state by the unification of 'parts' that had earlier had a somewhat looser relationship. The polis-state of the Megarians will have been founded between 670 and 650 B.C. This conclusion is suggested by following considerations. Peiraeum, which gave its name to one of the 'parts' that preceded the polis-state did not exist before the Archaic period,² i.e. before the turn of the eighth to the seventh century. Since it is unlikely that the tradition will have retained the memory of the five 'parts' of the Megaris that united politically in the polis-state of the Megarians, and *a fortiori* of Peiraeum as one of these 'parts', if the interval between the founding of Peiraeum and the founding of the polis-state was a very brief one, we must assume that it covered at least two decades. As for the lower limit of the period during which the formation of the polis-state took place, it must be remembered that Megara succumbed to a tyranny about 640–635 B.C., and also that tyrannies only appeared in polis-states. The polis-state of the Megarians must therefore have been in existence by this date. Let us also remember that tyrannies rose after periods of social and political discord between the aristocrats and other social classes. We should therefore assume that at least one decade elapsed between the founding of the polis-state of the Megarians and the tyranny.

4. POLIS-STATES FROM THE DEMES OF A CONFEDERACY THAT BROKE UP

We saw above that the numerous Arcadian polis-states that took part in the foundation of Megalopolis in 371 B.C. originated in the

¹ v. s., p. 317.

² v. s., p. 321.

dissolution of deme confederacies of which they had been members as demes.¹ There is some evidence to furnish a *terminus post quem* for the transformation into polis-states of the demes that were members of the confederacies of the Maenalians and the Parrhasians. It dates from the fifth or the beginning of the fourth centuries, and takes the form of references to individuals by ethnic names deriving not from a polis-state but from a region: Φόρμις Ἄρκας Μαινάλιος (between 488 and 460 B.C.);² Νικόδαμος Μαινάλιος (second half of the fifth century);³ Ξενοκλῆς Μαινάλιος (fifth or fourth century);⁴ Μαινάλιοι Ἁγίας, Εὐγειτονίδας, Ξενοφῶν (362/1 B.C.);⁵ Δάμαρχος Ἄρκας ἐκ Παρρασίων (a semi-historical, semi-mythical figure);⁶ Ξενίας Παρράσιος (fifth to fourth century);⁷ Καλλιμάχος Παρράσιος (same period).⁸ The ethnic Μαινάλιος also occurs in Thucydides, but without being attributed to a particular person;⁹ Thucydides also located Orestheion in Mainalia.¹⁰ For the Parrhasians, cf. also Παρράσιος στρατός in Pindar,¹¹ Παρρασίους, Μαντινέων ὑπηκόους ὄντας in Thucydides,¹² and εἰς Παρρασίους in Xenophon.¹³ It appears, therefore, that the deme confederacies of the Mainalians and the Parrhasians, at least, disintegrated, and that the demes became polis-states between the beginning of the fourth century and 371 B.C. There is no *terminus post quem* for the other polis-states in Arcadia that had similar origins.

¹ v. s., pp. 321–322.

² Pausanias V 27, 2, V 27,7.

³ Pausanias VI 6, 1, VI 6,3.

⁴ Pausanias VI 9, 2; W.Dittenberger, K.Purgold, *Die Inschriften von Olympia* (1896) no. 164.

⁵ *SGDI* I, no. 1181.

⁶ Pausanias VI 8, 2.

⁷ Xenophon, *Anab.* I 1, 2. Xenias is called *Arkas* in *Anab.* I 2, 1, I 4,7. He is mentioned without ethnic name in *Anab.* I 2, 3, I 3, 7, I 4, 8.

⁸ Xenophon, *Anab.* IV 7, 8.

⁹ Thucydides V 67, 1.

¹⁰ Thucydides V 64, 1.

¹¹ Pindar, *Ol.* IX 144.

¹² Thucydides V 33, 1.

¹³ Xenophon, *Hell.* VII 1, 28.

5. POLIS-STATE FROM A POLIS-SETTLEMENT THAT BROKE AWAY FROM AN ETHNOS-STATE

During the fifth and again during the fourth centuries, a number of cities detached themselves from the Macedonian state and became independent polis-states.

Therme is mentioned by Hecataeus as a 'πόλις of Greek Thracians', that is as a Greek polis-state in Thrace, which suggests that at the time of this source, Therme had broken away from the Macedonian state. The same city appears in the tribute lists of the first Athenian League from 460/59 to 432, and again in 421. In the intervening period it had been ceded by the Athenians to the king of the Macedonians. Strepasa, as a member of the Athenian League, was taxed from 453/2 to 432 and again in 425/4. According to the same source, Aison was an ally of the Athenians from 451/50 to 429/8. Four other Macedonian cities, Othoros, Miltoros, Pharbelos and Chedrolos were members of the League from 436 to 433/2. Methone was a member from 432/1 until at least 414 (the latter date is attested in a passage of Thucydides). Bormiskos and Herakleion are mentioned only in connection with the arrangements for the years 425 and 421 B.C. The new phase of secessions by Macedonian cities began with Arethousa, at the beginning of the fourth century. Arethousa later became a member of the second Athenian League and in the end allied itself with the Chalcidic Confederacy. Anthemous was a member of this confederacy from the beginning of this century until 379 and again from 359 to 348. Pydna and Methone joined the Athenian League in 364 and then returned to Macedonia – the former in 357 and the latter in 354. Apollonia was independent from the 380s until 348, while the evidence for the period at which Tragilus was independent points to the years 363 and 360.¹

B. POLIS-STATES FORMED ALONGSIDE A CONFEDERACY

1. FROM VILLAGE TO POLIS-STATE WITHIN A CONFEDERACY

The transformation of the Boeotian *ethnos* into a confederacy of polis-

¹ U.Kahrstedt, *Hermes* 81 (1953) 85–111.

states had already occurred in the time of Hesiod, about 700 B.C.;¹ the process will have begun earlier, however. From the time that coins began to be minted, they were issued by polis-states; the Boeotian shield is depicted on the obverse, however, and there are other similarities between the issues of different *poleis*. Only Orchomenus seems not to have taken part in this currency agreement.²

The Phocian polis-states and their confederacy appear on the historical horizon after the victory of the Phocians over the Thessalians in 510 B.C.³ The political situation was probably not created at that time, nor during the period of Thessalian supremacy, but earlier,⁴ even though the arguments advanced to support the view that the Phocian Confederacy originated in the Archaic period⁵ are not very strong. One of them is the hypothesis that the Phocians participated in the Pylaeon–Delphic Amphictyony as a confederacy; the evidence for this, however, is expressed in such a way that it may have been as an *ethnos* that they joined.⁶ Similarly, the fact that the Phocians mounted a common defence against the Thessalians certainly implies a central authority, but this also is consistent with an ethnos-state. Finally, the coins of the Phocian Confederacy do not date from the beginning of the sixth century, but are later than the liberation of the Phocians from Thessalian suzerainty.⁷

The existence of a confederacy of polis-states in East Locris is first attested by an inscription dating from the first quarter of the fifth century.⁸ But, as has been stated, the federal organization was ‘decidedly advanced for that time’, and the governments of both the polis-states and of their confederacy were ‘highly developed’.⁹

The same situation prevailed in West Locris. The earliest evidence

¹ Hesiod knows of the *polis*: v. s., p. 161.

² J.A.O.Larsen, op. cit. 29.

³ R.T.Williams, *Silver Coinage of the Phokians* (Royal Num. Soc. 7) (1972) 5–9.

⁴ J.A.O.Larsen, op. cit. 40, 43; A.Giovannini, op. cit. 51ff.

⁵ A.Giovannini, op. cit. 51.

⁶ cf. J.A.O.Larsen, op. cit. 43.

⁷ R.T.Williams, loc. cit.

⁸ *SGHI* I no. 20.

⁹ J.A.O. Larsen, op. cit. 48, 51.

for it comes from three inscriptions, dating from the last quarter of the sixth century and the first quarter of the fifth.¹

The date of the emergence of polis-states within the Thessalian *ethnos* has been the subject of detailed studies, the conclusions of which seem to hold good. The fact that Thessalian victors at the Olympic Games are referred to from the seventh century onwards by ethnic names deriving from the names of settlements has given rise to the hypothesis that the home localities of these men had already become polis-states.² On the other hand, however, (a) the division of Thessaly into tetrarchies and *kleroi* (plots of land) at the end of the sixth century, and (b) the evidence suggesting that the great landowners exercised authority in the polis-settlements at this time, and also at the beginning of the fifth century, imply that there were as yet no polis-states. The earliest indication of the creation of polis-states is the striking of coins, which began about 480 B.C. This is followed by other evidence demonstrating that various *poleis* had magistrates, awarded political rights, *ateleia* and *asylia*, controlled the internal commerce and exacted taxes, and even carried on an independent foreign policy. This evidence enables us to date the rise of the polis-states of Larisa, Pharcadon, Pherae, Skotoussa, Crannon, Gyrtion and Pyrasus to 480 B.C. and the years immediately following; Thetonium and Tricca to the middle of the fifth century; and Atrax, Cierium, Phalanna, Peirasiae and Pharsalus to the beginning of the fourth century. During the fourth century, the central authority was strengthened at the expense of the polis-states,³ and only that of Pherae retained its independence. In other words, the Thessalian Confederacy, with polis-states as its members, was formed after a period during which the polis-states had won their independence from the Thessalian *ethnos*-state.

The Aetolians, in 426 B.C., still dwelt in 'unwalled villages' and were divided into three main tribes and a large number of sub-tribes. Ninety

¹ C.D.Buck, *The Greek Dialects*, no. 57 (= SGHI 24), 58 (= SGHI 34) 59.

² M.Sordi, *La lega Tessala* (1958) 313.

³ Data, discussion and conclusions of: G.Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde* II (1926) 1480-1481; U.Kahrstedt, *NGWG* (1924) 128ff; H.D.Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.* (1935, 1969) 31ff; J.A.O.Larsen, *Greek Federal States* (1968) 12ff; A.Giovannini, *Untersuchungen über die Natur und die Anfänge der bundesstaatlichen Sympolitie in Griechenland* (1971) 63-64.

years later, in 335 B.C., they sent to Alexander ambassadors appointed by their tribes. At the same time, in 322 B.C., they continued to have πόλεις ἀνοχύρους, but also some others ὀχυρότητι διαφερούσας. These last will have included Naupactus and Calydon, which had become polis-states before they entered the confederacy. Archaeological evidence indicates that the settlements at Thermum, Acrae, Lysimacheia, Conopa, Arsinoe, Metropolis, Trichonium and elsewhere were fortified after 207 B.C.¹ It seems, therefore, that the Aetolian Confederacy was formed before all its members became polis-states, and that the process began about the middle of the fourth century at the earliest and had not been completed as the time of Roman interference approached.

By contrast, the development of polis-states in Acarnania, and the evolution of the Acarnanian *ethnos* into a confederacy, seems to have been well advanced by the time of the Peloponnesian War.²

2. THE CONFEDERACY AND THE POLIS-STATES OF THE IONIANS OF ATTICA, EASTERN BOEOTIA AND CENTRAL EUBOEA

We saw above that the first archon of the confederacy of the Ionians, that extended over Attica, and parts of Boeotia and Euboea, is sometimes said to be Medon and sometimes Acastus.³ The former is a mythical and the latter a historical figure.⁴ We have no reason to doubt the trustworthiness of the tradition that Acastus was in fact archon of this state, and that he held office before anyone else. Acastus is dated by Attic historiography to the second half of the eleventh century B.C.⁵ As the dates assigned by the ancient chronographers to events earlier than the sixth century B.C. are frequently too high, we are bound to

¹ M.Sordi, *Acme* 6 (1953) 419–445; J.A.O. Larsen, *op. cit.* 78–80; A. Giovannini, *op. cit.* 60–61.

² Thucydides II 80, 8, II 81, 2, II, 81, 4, II 81, 8, II 82, 1, III 106 and 114; Xenophon, *Hell.* IV 6, 4; *IG IX* 1², 390 = SIG no. 121; J.A.O.Larsen, *op. cit.* 89ff.

³ *v. s.*, p. 328.

⁴ U.von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Hermes* 33 (1898) 127–128; A.Ledl, *Studien zur älteren athenischen Verfassungsgeschichte* (1914) 237; C.Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (1952, 1958) 38–39.

⁵ Castor 250 *FGrH* 4 = Eusebius, *Chron.*, arm. 87 Karst (cf. Eusebius, *Can.*, arm. 176 Karst).

admit the possibility that Acastus ruled c. 1000 B.C., and thus to assume that the Ionian Confederacy and the Athenian polis-state came into existence at that time.

It is unlikely, however, that Attica remained stateless for some while after the end of the Mycenaean period and before the formation of the confederacy round the polis-state of the Athenians. It was not occupied by invading tribes. Although its economy was damaged by the repercussions of the events happening at that time all round it, and part of the population emigrated,¹ there do not seem to have been any changes in social relations. In contrast, there is some evidence that a state was functioning at this time. Cleisthenes is said to have introduced into the Athenian citizen body some elements that can only be regarded as the descendants of groups that took refuge in Attica at the end of the Mycenaean period and afterwards.² If at that time there had been no state in Attica, but the tribal organization had been revived, these newcomers would not have remained outside the community of the Athenians, since this would have been formed afterwards by the fusion of small communities.

Homer is unaware of any settlement of Ionians on Euboea; by contrast, he uses the term Abantes to refer to its inhabitants in general, and to those of some of the cities in particular – Chalcis, Eretria, Histiaea, Cerinthus, Dion, Carystus and Styra.³ During historic times, most of Euboea was occupied by Ionians, while the areas around Carystus and Styra belonged to Dryopes. Athenian traditions relate that groups of refugees, displaced from their homes⁴ after the Trojan War, took refuge in Attica. Archaeological excavations show that during LH III C (1200–1125 B.C.), western Attica regressed demographically, while eastern Attica, by contrast, was more densely settled. It seems, therefore, that the inhabitants of western Attica were compressed into eastern Attica,⁵ perhaps under pressure from the

¹ v. s., pp. 344, 383, 395.

² v. s., p. 139.

³ *Iliad* II 536–545.

⁴ M.B.Sakellariou, *Peuples préhelléniques d'origine indo-européenne* (1977) 273.

⁵ V.R.d'A.Desborough, *The Last Mycenaeans and their Successors* (1964) 69ff, 112–116, 226.

Thracians and Pelasgians who had settled in Boeotia and were making incursions into Attica.¹ The refugees who arrived in Attica found land in the west, but they too were soon obliged to move to the east. Eastern Attica, however, could not sustain the new arrivals as well as the earlier inhabitants. Some of them therefore migrated to Euboea, driving out the Abantes. This occurred within the Protogeometric period (1050–900 B.C.). It was then, in fact, that Chalcis was built,² and Lefkandi reoccupied;³ the former was colonized from Attica⁴ and was Ionian in historic times; the archaeological record precludes the presence of Ionians at the latter before its reoccupation. It seems then that the colonization of Euboea by Ionians from Attica took place within the time-span within which we placed the formation of the confederacy for independent reasons. It cannot be inferred whether the confederacy was formed before or after the foundation of polis-states in Euboea. As we have said on another occasion, this confederacy of polis-states will not have been confined to Attica and a part of Euboea. It will also have included the eastern edge of Boeotia, because only in this way will it have attained some degree of geographical cohesion.⁵ Furthermore, there is evidence that in the eighth century the polis-state of the Eretrians included the area of the Graikoi, which is thought to have been at Tanagra.⁶

From the time of Engels it has been the received view in Marxist historiography that the Athenian state emerged in the Archaic period, following the division of the original community into two basic classes, the landowners and the landless; conflict between these two classes reached a critical level towards the end of the seventh century, and was pacified by the legislation of Solon. This schema is repeated with no significant deviations, by all the modern Marxists, with very few exceptions. The following view, formulated by G.A.Koshelenko, has

¹ M.B.Sakellariou, *La migration grecque en Ionie* (1958) 283–284; idem, *Peuples préhelléniques d'origine indo-européenne* (1977) 179ff.

² S.C.Bakhuizen, *Chalcis-in-Euboea, Iron and Chalcidians abroad* (1976) 5.

³ M.R.Popham, L.H.Sackett, *Excavations at Lefkandi, Euboea, 1964–1966* (1968) 5, 11ff, 22–23, 34; L.H.Sackett, M.R.Popham, *Archaeology* 25 (1972) 8ff.

⁴ M.B.Sakellariou, *REA* 78/79 (1976/1977) 11–21.

⁵ v. s., pp. 329.

⁶ M.B.Sakellariou, in *Gli Eubei in Occidente, 18o Convegno di studi sulla Magna Grecia* (1978) 23–26.

greater originality. He distinguished two stages in the above process, each of which corresponded to a phase during which the exploited population was differently composed: during the first stage, the exploited masses, which originally consisted of slaves of foreign origin, increased in number as a result of the enslavement of members of the sovereign community – that is, Athenian farmers who had fallen into debt. Those who took over their land and made use of their labour as slaves strengthened their privileged position, forming a state, or more accurately, a proto-state. This process reached its peak just before Solon. It was arrested, however, by the increased military role of the farmers, who now served as hoplites, and the greater political influence attendant upon it. Thus, the Solonian legislation forbade the enslaving of fellow citizens. The farmers acquired rights that had earlier been enjoyed by the aristocracy. This produced the kind of community that is characteristic of the polis-state. The second stage will now have followed, when the enslaving of citizens was checked, and the number of imported slaves increased. The community will have invested the entire state machine in order to be able to exploit the slaves.¹ However, the chronological order of events is in conflict with this theory. The middle class farmers did not begin to serve in the army at the time of Solon (beginning of the sixth century), but one and a half centuries earlier, that is, one century before the culmination of the process that it was supposed to have arrested. It is inconsistent to hold that the enslavement of peasant small holders was a growing phenomenon, when the factor that is supposed to have put a stop to it had already been in existence for a century or more.

3. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF DEMES

Herodotus describes the Achaeans of his time as an *ethnos*, not a *koinon* (confederacy)² and the political subdivisions of the Achaeans as μέρη, not πόλεις, to which he gives the following names: Pellene, Aegeira, Aegae, Boura, Helice, Aegium, Rhyes, Patreis, Phareis, Olenus, Dyme and Tritaeis.³ Strabo, who drew on an earlier source,

¹ G.A.Koshelenko, op. cit. 38–40.

² Herodotus VIII 73.

³ Herodotus I 145.

confirms one part of what Herodotus says when he tells us that the polis-states of Aegium, Patrae and Dyme originated in deme confederacies.¹ The use of the term *πόλις* by Strabo and Pausanias to describe the states of Achaea at the time of the settlement of the historical inhabitants of the area and even earlier² is therefore inaccurate. The *μέρη* or deme confederacies of Achaea thus became polis-states and their federal organization a confederacy of polis-states after the time of Herodotus, but before the year 389 B.C., by which time the Achaeans had annexed Calydon and made the Calydonians citizens,³ meaning citizens of the Achaean Confederacy.⁴ Consequently, in those cases where the Achaeans take united action, in the middle of the fifth century,⁵ and perhaps also during the Peloponnesian War,⁶ it should be assumed that they were acting, not as a confederacy of polis-states,⁷ but as an *ethnos*, divided into *μέρη* or confederacies of demes.

C. DISSOLUTION OF CONFEDERACIES INTO POLIS-STATES – SECESSION OF POLIS-STATES FROM CONFEDERACIES

1. DISSOLUTION OF CONFEDERACIES INTO POLIS-STATES

It is possible to assign a date to the dissolution of the Ionian

¹ v. s., p. 316–320.

² Pausanias VIII 6, 1.

³ Xenophon, *Hell.* IV 6, 1. R.Koerner, *Klio* 56 (1974) 461–470 dates the Achaean *poleis* back to the sixth and even to the seventh century B.C. reasoning as follows: (a) Strabo's statement (VIII 3, 2), according to which the polis-states of Aegium, Patrae and Dyme succeeded to 'deme systems' is untrustworthy; (b) when Herodotus is speaking of 'μέρεα' (I 146), he does not mean 'parts', but *poleis*; (c) Thucydides mentions *poleis* in Achaea (V 52, 2). All these arguments are invalid, however: the two first are arbitrary; the third is inaccurate.

⁴ J.A.O.Larsen, op. cit. 85; A.Giovannini, op. cit. 54.

⁵ Thucydides I 111, 3 and 115, 1.

⁶ Thucydides II 9, 2.

⁷ J.A.O.Larsen, op. cit. 80ff, uses the term 'Achaean Confederacy' also for the period before 389 B.C. Similarly, A.Giovannini, op. cit. 54, refers to the 'Achaischer Bund' even though he is speaking of the Classical period. G.Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde* II (1926) 1532ff, more properly uses the term 'Stammbund'; on page 1533, however, *poleis* are classified under this confederacy of tribes.

Confederacy of polis-states that stretched from Attica via eastern Boeotia to part of Euboea. We have seen that the people of Eretria and Chalcis who settled at Al Mina were known to the locals not as Eretrians and Chalcidians, but as Ionians, with reference to their membership of the Ionian Confederacy.¹ It follows that this confederacy existed about 800 B.C. On the other hand, despite the fact that the earliest Greek colonies in the West (Pithecusae and Cumae) were founded by Eretrians, Chalcidians and other Ionians from Euboea and eastern Boeotia, and despite the fact that in the immediately following period there were more Ionian colonies (Naxos, Catane, Leontini, Zancle and Rhegium) than Dorian colonies (Syracuse and Megara Hyblaea), the inhabitants of Italy applied to the Greeks as a whole not the name of the Ionians, but names referring to the Graioi, or Graikoi, who migrated to Cuma from eastern Boeotia in the wake of the Eretrians.² It appears therefore that the Eretrians and the inhabitants of eastern Boeotia who settled at Cuma and other sites in Italy were known by the locals not as Ionians, like their ancestors who had migrated to Syria, but by their particular ethnic names. It follows that the Chalcidians, the Eretrians, the Graikoi and the Cumaeans no longer belonged to the Ionian Confederacy c. 750 B.C.

Useful chronological evidence can also be derived from the history of Athens. The hereditary king of Athens and elected life archon of the Ionian Confederacy was replaced in 752/1 by an archon elected for ten years.³ The first three archons to hold office for the ten year period were from the line of Codrus–Medon,⁴ and were probably elected to the

¹ v. s., p. 327.

² M.B.Sakellariou, loc. cit.

³ Castor 250 *FGrH* 4 = Eusebius, *Chron.*, arm. 88 Karst; Pausanias I 3, 3, IV 13, 7; *Ἐκλογή ἱστοριῶν*, Cramer, *Anecdota Graeca* II (1839) 188; *Souda*, Photius and *Λέξεις ρητορικαί*, Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca* I (1813) 1, s.v. Παρ' ἵππον καὶ κόρη; *Souda*, s.v. Ἴππομένης. The historicity of this change has been contested by some scholars, including F.Jacoby, *Klio* 2 (1902) 434, K.J.Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* I, 2, 2nd edn (1913) 156, A.Ledl, op. cit. 201, 209, 219ff, 243, C.Hignett, op. cit. 43ff, C.S.G.Thomas, *Early Greek Kingship* (1965) 107. Their arguments are not valid, however.

⁴ Castor, loc. cit., refers to four names: Χάρωψ, Αἰσιμίδης, Κλειδικός, Ἴππομένης. cf. Nicolaus Damascenus 90 *FGrH* 49; Pausanias IV 13, 7; *Schol. Aesch.* I 182; *Souda*, Photius and *Λέξεις ρητορικαί*, ll. cc., where Hippomenes is sometimes called king and

office because they were members of the royal family. Despite the fact that they were no longer hereditary kings, they are given the title not of archon, but of king in the best sources,¹ which shows clearly that they were not now archons of the Ionian Confederacy, but 'kings' (elected for a set term) of the Athenians. Consequently, the Ionian Confederacy broke up in the reign of the last Athenian king to hold office for life, who was also the last elected archon of the Ionians: i.e. before 752/1 B.C.²

The view that the Boeotian Confederacy dissolved in 479 B.C., after the Persian Wars,³ is not well founded.⁴ It seems more likely that this confederacy dissolved in 457, after the defeat of the Boeotians at Oenophyta.⁵ The Boeotian polis-states were thus independent only for a decade, until 447. They were independent for a second time between 386, when the confederacy was dissolved by a provision of the King's Peace, and 378, and the liberation of Thebes from Spartan occupation.⁶

The polis-states of the Phocian Confederacy enjoyed a short period of autonomy after 346 B.C., when this confederacy was dissolved, having been defeated in the third Sacred War.⁷

The polis-states of the Achaean Confederacy were independent for

sometimes archon. He is referred to as a private citizen, however, in Aeschines I 182, and Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, fr. 7. cf. Pausanias I 3, 3, where the last Medontid king to hold office is said to be not Hippomenes, but his father Kleidikos. There is no question of not preferring the evidence of Aeschines and Aristotle to that of later writers.

¹ Castor, loc. cit.; Pausanias, loc. cit.; *Schol. Aesch.*, loc. cit.; *Souda*, loc. cit.; Photius, loc. cit.; *Λέξεις ρητορικαί*, loc. cit. – Castor, loc. cit., Eusebius, *Can.*, Abr. 1333 and *Ἐκλογή Ἱστοριῶν*, loc. cit., use the term 'basileus' to describe all the leaders of the Athenian state who were elected for ten years. By contrast, Hippomenes is called 'archon' by Nicolaus Damascenus, loc. cit., Diodorus VII fr. 22. Hippomenes took his place in the lists of the Athenian archontes after the fourth century B.C. (cf. previous note).

² M.B.Sakellariou, *REA* 78/79 (1976/1977) 20–21.

³ K.F.Hermann, *Lehrbuch der griechischen Staatsaltertümer* I 2,6th edn (1913) 254; G.Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde* II (1926) 1413; J.A.O.Larsen, *Greek Federal States* (1968) 32.

⁴ B.Keil, *Griechische Staatsaltertümer*, in A. Gercke, E. Norden, *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft*, 2nd edn, III (1912) 375; M.Sordi, *AeR* 13 (1968) 66; A.Giovannini, op. cit. 47 n 9.

⁵ A.Giovannini, op. cit. 47.

⁶ J.A.O.Larsen, op. cit. 175.

⁷ J.A.O.Larsen, op. cit. 300.

twenty years, between the dissolution of the confederacy about 300 B.C. and its restoration in 281/80.¹

2. SECESSION OF POLIS-STATES FROM CONFEDERACIES

In 519 B.C., the Boeotian Confederacy lost Plataea and Hysiae,² and Thespieae seceded from it during the Persian Wars.³ The Plataeans remained outside the confederacy until the destruction of their polis-settlement in 427 B.C.⁴ During the Corinthian War, Orchomenus allied with the Spartans against the rest of the Boeotians.⁵ Plataea was refounded in 380 B.C. by the Spartans and destroyed for a second time by the Thebans in 374.⁶ During this period, the Plataeans were not members of the Boeotian Confederacy, which was hostile to Sparta.

A SYNOPSIS OF THE CONCLUSIONS

1. Polis-states first came into existence in Attica and Euboea c. 1000 B.C. Later the phenomenon intensified, spread to other areas, and continued to occur until the loss of self determination by the Greeks, though it never covered the whole of the Greek world.

2. The following is the chronology of the creation of those polis-states for which we have data, or indirect evidence. No reference is made to polis-states that were founded by other polis-states.

Eleventh to tenth century: foundation at one and the same time of the Ionian Confederacy in Attica, eastern Boeotia and central Euboea, and of the earliest polis-states federated to it.

Ninth century: earliest polis-states founded by Dorians in the Peloponnese and overseas, and by Ionians, Aeolians and other pre-Dorian Greeks settled in Ionia and Aeolis. The creation of the polis-

¹ J.A.O.Larsen, *op. cit.* 215–216; A. Giovannini, *op. cit.* 53, 71.

² J.A.O.Larsen, *op. cit.* 29–30.

³ J.A.O.Larsen, *op. cit.* 31.

⁴ Thucydides III 68.

⁵ J.A.O.Larsen, *op. cit.* 38–39.

⁶ *v. s.*, p. 331.

state of Asine by Dryopes, and the emergence of the two polis-states of the Magnetes in Asia Minor may also be dated to before 800.

c. 775: emergence of the polis-state of the Lacedaemonians.

c. 770/60: disintegration of the Ionian Confederacy in Attica, eastern Boeotia and central Euboea into independent polis-states (Athens, Chalcis and Eretria).

Before 700: polis-state of Megara Hyblaea.

c. 700: emergence of polis-states within the framework of the Boeotian *ethnos*, and its transformation into a confederacy.

Early seventh century: creation of the polis-states of the Sicyonians, the Sybaritae, the Crotoniatae, the Metapontians, the Caulonians, the Epizephyrian Locrians and the Selymbrians.

Between 670 and 650: foundation of the polis-state of the Megarians (and of the polis-state of the Chalcedonians, if this was established when Megara itself was not yet a polis-state).

Sixth century (or earlier?): founding of polis-states within the *ethnos*-states of the Phocians, the West Locrians and the East Locrians, and transformation at this time of these states into confederacies of polis-states.

End of the sixth, beginning of the fifth centuries: secession of Plataea, Hysiae and Thespieae from the Boeotian Confederacy; foundation of Mantinea and Elis.

Rest of the fifth century: polis-states within the framework of the Acarnanian *ethnos*, and the transformation of it into a confederacy; temporary dissolution of the Boeotian Confederacy; emergence of polis-states within the *ethnos*-state of the Thessalians; temporary secession of cities from the *ethnos*-states of the Macedonians and their transformation into polis-states.

Fourth century: creation of polis-states within the *ethnos*-states of the Aetolians and the Achaeans, and their transformation into Confederacies; foundation of polis-states in Arcadia; temporary withdrawal of polis-settlements from the Macedonian state and their transformation into polis-states; temporary dissolution of the Confederacies of the Boeotians and the Phocians.

300–281: Achaean polis-states independent.

Chapter Three

PRE-CONDITIONS, CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE GENESIS OF POLIS-STATES

THE DEBATE

The views that have been put forward concerning the preconditions, causes and circumstances connected with the rise of the polis-state refer mainly to the earlier instances, in other words to the emergence of the phenomenon; very few of them are diachronically valid or refer to later polis-states.

The present survey has therefore been organized along the same lines to avoid lapsing into repetition and the separation of answers that really belong together.

The answers suggested to the question of the preconditions, causes and circumstances connected with the genesis of the earliest polis-states or the polis-state in general, may be arranged in two groups, depending on whether they suggest factors that are remote, both chronologically and geographically or whether they seek them in the immediate historical conjunctures. The answers in the first group refer exclusively to the genesis of the earliest polis-states; the majority of those in the second group also refer to these early polis-states, but there are also a few dealing with the broader question of the genesis of the polis-state in general.

I. REMOTE FACTORS

1. MYCENAEAN INFLUENCES OR SURVIVALS

V. Ehrenberg's statement (1932=1957=1960=1976) that ethnos-states, and states based on a region that had no city, survived in places where there had

previously been no Mycenaean settlements¹ suggests the corollary that polis-states developed in places where there had been a Mycenaean settlement. This view has been explicitly propounded by A.Heuss, who stressed (1946) the fact that Greek migrants invariably founded polis-states where there had previously been cities, mainly Mycenaean ones.² According to G.Mylonas (1966), every polis-state of the historic period will have corresponded with a Mycenaean state.³

By contrast, M.Hammond (1972) and A.Snodgrass (1980) note that the polis-state differed from the Mycenaean state; the latter also points to the long period of time separating the end of the Mycenaean period from the emergence of the polis-state.⁴

2. EASTERN INFLUENCES

Chr.Dawson was of the view (1957) that the polis-state resulted from the marriage of the oriental sacred city with the Indo-European warrior tribe.⁵ This idea met with the approval of V.Ehrenberg (1960=1976),⁶ but was attacked by E.Lepore (1978),⁷ A.Snodgrass (1980) attributed the genesis of the first Greek polis-states to ideas originating in the East, on the grounds that: the Greeks were recovering from a profound economic, social and demographic recession, and had much to learn from the advanced peoples.⁸ Meanwhile (1977) T.Yuge, in an attempt to account for the speed with which the village community developed into the polis-state, suggested that it was due to the influence of the culturally advanced East.⁹

M.Hammond, in contrast, rejected the idea that the Greek polis-state had an eastern model (1972). In the eastern city 'rule proceeded from the top down

¹ V.Ehrenberg, *Der griechische Staat*, in A.Gercke, E.Norden (eds) *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft III* 3 (1932) 10 = *Die Staat der Griechen I* (1957) 18 = *The Greek State* (1960) 242 = *L'Etat grec* (1976) 54.

² A.Heuss, *AuA* 2 (1946) 40 = in F.Gschnitzer (ed), *Zur griechischen Staatskunde* (1969) 59.

³ G.Mylonas, *Mycenae and the Mycenaean Age* (1966) 211–212.

⁴ M.Hammond, *The City in the Ancient World* (1972) 153, 173; A.Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece* (1980) 31–32.

⁵ Chr.Dawson, *Dynamics of World History* (1957) 152.

⁶ V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1960) 247 = (1976) 41.

⁷ E.Lepore, in R.Bianchi Bandinelli, *Storia e civiltà dei Greci* (1978) 185.

⁸ A.Snodgrass, loc. cit.

⁹ T.Yuge, in *Spartacus: Symposium rebus Spartaci gestis dedicatum 2050 A. 1977* (1981) 61.

and councils or assemblies had no political rights'; in the Greek polis-state 'ultimate sovereignty came to rest with the popular assemblies; also councils had an independent constitutional (legal) standing'.¹

W.G.Runciman stressed (1982) that the eastern examples would have had no effect, had not the accumulation of power within the Greek communities already been advanced.²

II. FACTORS CONNECTED WITH THE HISTORICAL CONJUNCTURE

1. THE FOUNDATION OF THE EARLIEST GREEK POLIS-STATES WAS FACILITATED BY THE PRIOR DISSOLUTION OF THE GREEK ETHNE

B.Keil (1912) and U.Wilcken conjectured that one of the factors in the creation of the earliest greek polis-states on the coast of Asia Minor was the fact that the colonists were a mixture of elements from different *ethne* that had broken up: as a result, traditional structures were dissolved and new ones evolved.³

2. PERMANENT SETTLEMENT

As we have seen, a number of scholars distinguish between the *polis* and the *ethnos*, defining the *ethnos* as a community based on kinship and the *polis* as a community that was formed in a particular place and had a local character.⁴ It is only a small step from this position to attribute the genesis of the polis-state to the conversion of the early group of kinsmen into a group based on locality, and to trace this conversion to the relations created by a long period of cohabitation in a particular place. This step was taken by E.Barker (1918) and F.Gschnitzer (1955).⁵ Others too, however, have considered permanent settlement to be a factor in the creation of the first polis-states: G.Busolt (1920) and V.Ehrenberg (1932=1957=1969=1976).⁶

¹ M.Hammond, loc. cit.

² W.G.Runciman, *CSHS* 24 (1982) 369.

³ B.Keil, op. cit. 304ff; U.Wilcken, *Griechische Geschichte* 5th edn (1943) 56.

⁴ v. s., pp. 36-40.

⁵ E.Barker, *Greek Political Theory* (1918) 26ff = (1947) 27ff = (1970) 28ff; F.Gschnitzer, *WS* 68 (1955) 134ff.

⁶ G.Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde* I (1920) 155; V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1932) 4 = (1957) 11 = (1960) 12 = (1976) 35.

3. THE POLIS-SETTLEMENT ('CITY')

(A) The polis-state is closely connected with the polis-settlement, generally referred to as a 'city': the fact that it derived its name from it is no coincidence. It is not surprising, therefore, that some have seen the 'city'-settlement as a factor in the creation of the polis-state.

U.Wilcken attributed what were according to him the earliest polis-states, in Asia Minor, to the fact that they were founded by colonists who occupied the fortified settlements of the natives.¹

Many other scholars connect the rise of the earliest Greek polis-states with some step of urbanization in mainland Greece. One of these, P.Lévêque, sees (1981) this urbanization in terms of two phenomena: the growth of a settlement and the unification of villages.² C.S.G.Thomas is of the view (1965=1966) that 'it is probable that the city-state as an urban organization may antedate the city-state as a polis'.³

Other scholars, however, have denied any connection between the first polis-states and urbanization. One of them, Ch.G.Starr, stressed (1957, 1961) that, according to the archaeological evidence, the growth of urban organization was much later than the creation of the polis-states.⁴ M.Austin and P.Vidal-Naquet declared that urbanization does not automatically imply the creation of a polis-state, particularly as the former phenomenon was slow to develop, except in Asia Minor and later in the colonies.⁵ This last comment met with the approval of E.Lepore (1978) and A.Snodgrass (1980).⁶

F.Kolb (1984) reverses the order of the two phenomena (political and urban), and is of the opinion that the polis-state influenced the formation of an urban centre. The consolidation of the state mechanism was favourable to the creation of a city, especially since it involved the concentration of the public authorities and public functions. Moreover, there were Greek polis-states that never acquired an urban centre, since the urbanization process depended on other factors, of a demographic and economic nature.⁷

(B) If the polis-settlement influenced the formation of the polis-state,

¹ U.Wilcken, loc. cit.

² P.Lévêque, *PM* fasc. 14 (Jan.–March 1981) 6.

³ C.S.G.Thomas, *Early Greek Kingship* (1965) 15 = *PdP* 21 (1966) 6.

⁴ Ch.G.Starr, *PdP* 12 (1957) 99; idem, *The Origins of Greek Civilization* (1961) 340.

⁵ M.Austin, P.Vidal-Naquet, *Economies et sociétés en Grèce ancienne* (1972) 64.

⁶ E.Lepore, op. cit. 184; A.Snodgrass, loc. cit.

⁷ F.Kolb, *Die Stadt im Altertum* (1984) 66–67.

however, this will have been due to the nature of the settlement and the role it played in the state.

(I) E.Meyer (1893), H.Berve (1931), L.Gernet (1957) and Ch.G.Starr (1961) are amongst those who have noted that the polis-settlement acted as the centre of public life and as an arena that made it easier for people to participate in matters of public interest and also to defend their political rights.¹

(II) M.Weber described the Greek city (1921, 1924) as a settlement occupied by a community of warriors.² This idea was rejected by P.Roussel (1976).³ Others, however, including G.Huxley (1978), have drawn attention to its defensive function.⁴

(III) Allusion is frequently made to the economic character of the ancient 'city'. Three positions may be distinguished:

(1) E.Barker (1918) and others saw the 'city' as the most advanced settlement from an economic and social point of view,⁵ since in it were to be found productive activities of all three sectors, and members of all social classes. H.Berve (1931), L.Gernet (1957=1968), J.Gilissen (1957) and others stressed the fact that the 'city' was a focal point for non-agrarian professions.⁶ The second of these scholars, however, basing his case mainly on the fact that the businessmen and merchants did not acquire political rights before the fall of the aristocracies, declared that economic progress followed rather than preceded the formation of polis-states; in other words, it was not as an economic factor that the polis-state created right.

(2) Ch.G.Starr (1961) did not agree that there was any connection between the polis-settlement and the economy; the polis-settlement was not preceded by any specific economic change.⁷

(3) E.Kirsten described (1956, 1964) the polis-settlement as the single settlement inhabited by the agrarian population of a small area.⁸

¹ E.Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* II (1893) 330 = 2nd, 3rd, 4th edn III (1937) 303; H.Berve, *Griechische Geschichte* I (1931) 176; L.Gernet *RSJB* 8 (1957) 51 = *L'anthropologie de la Grèce antique* (1968) 376; Ch.G.Starr, op.cit. (1961) 339.

² M.Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (1922) 558; idem, *Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1924) xxx.

³ D.Roussel, *Tribu et Cité* (1976) 120–124.

⁴ G.Huxley, in *Στήλη, τόμος εις μνήμην Ν.Κοντολέοντος* (1978) 262.

⁵ E.Barker, op. cit. 19.

⁶ H.Berve, loc. cit.; L.Gernet, op. cit. (1957) 45 = (1968) 373–375; J.Gilissen, *RSJB* 8 (1957) 9.

⁷ Ch.G.Starr, op. cit. 339–340.

⁸ E.Kirsten, *Die griechische Polis als historisch-geographisches Problem des Mittelmeerraums* (Colloquium Geographicum) (1956) 100; idem, *AA* (1964) 893.

(C) Connected with the nature of the polis-settlement is the question of its relationship to the countryside.

(I) The idea that the 'city' stands in opposition to the countryside, with the former economically (and sometimes socially and politically) predominating over the latter, has well known antecedents and supporters outside the studies of the ancient polis-state. It is broadly followed by scholars investigating the Greek *polis*.

(II) Other scholars, by contrast, hold the view that in ancient Greece the 'city' and the countryside formed a unit from the very beginning, and that this situation prevailed for many centuries. W.W.Fowler (1893), E.Barker (1918=1947=1970), V.Ehrenberg (1932=1957=1960=1976), H.Bengtson (1950=1960=1960=1969=1977), L.H.Jeffery (1976), M.I.Finley (1973=1975, 1977=1981), A.Snodgrass (1980) and Cl.Mossé (1984) all claim, with slight differences of expression, that the polis-state was formed by the union of a 'city' and the countryside.¹ L.Gernet observed (1957=1968) that public right in the Greek polis-states made no distinction between an urban and a rural element.²

(III) P.Lévêque combined these two views (1981): urbanization initially led to a distinction between the 'city' and the countryside, with the former holding sway over the latter; later, however, the 'city', as the centre of commercial exchanges, industry and political decision-making, assisted in the development of a community spirit: this led to the creation of a balance between the two and a homogeneous unit was created.³

(IV) The influence of the urban centre has also been noted at the social, familial, legal and state level. L.Gernet, for example, noted (1957=1968) that while the countryside was the seat of the joint family, of remnants of matriarchy, and of collective commercial exchanges, the urban centre was the focus for those who acquired personal property through the booty they won in wars and by brigandage, while the joint families disintegrated and *hetaireiai* were formed to bind not groups but individuals together.⁴

¹ W.W.Fowler, *The City-State of the Greeks and the Romans* (1893) 8ff; E.Barker, op. cit. 24; V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1932) 44 = (1957) 72 = (1960) 95 = (1976) 161; H.Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte* (1950) 72 = 5th edn (1976) 80; L.H.Jeffery, *Archaic Greece* (1976) 39; M.I.Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (1973) 123 = *L'économie antique* (1975) 165; idem, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19 (1977) 307, 319 = *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* (1981) 5, 17; A.Snodgrass, op. cit. 28; Cl.Mossé, *La Grèce archaïque* (1984) 30.

² L.Gernet, op. cit. (1957) 45–50 = (1968) 372–375.

³ P.Lévêque, loc. cit.

⁴ L.Gernet, *RSJB*, VIII, La Ville, 3ème partie (1957) 50–51 = *L'anthropologie de la Grèce antique* (1968) 376–377.

(D) In many cases the polis-settlement is not distinguished from the polis-state. One consequence of this is that some of the views on the place of and reasons for the formation of polis-states also cover the polis-settlements associated with them. Some of the views held, however, relate solely to polis-settlements.

U.Wilcken suggested that Asia Minor was the area in which the first Greek 'cities' made their appearance.¹ This thesis has found wide agreement after the excavation of Old Smyrna, on the site at Bayrakli.

F.Tritsch proposed (1929) the end of the eighth and the beginning of the seventh centuries as the date at which the earliest 'cities' were founded.² As a result, again, of the excavation of Old Smyrna, we know that this polis-settlement was founded in the tenth century, and this date has now been suggested for the formation of the earliest Greek polis-settlements.

The following reasons have been advanced for the development of the first Greek 'cities' after the collapse of the Mycenaean world: W.W.Fowler (1893) and H.D.F.Kitto (1951) invoked the need for defence, which dictated the choice of strong sites;³ Kitto also cited social habits;⁴ F.Tritsch (1929) suggested trading contacts with the East;⁵ Fowler and Tritsch proposed the existence of a shrine;⁶ and many scholars have suggested economic reasons.

Finally, with regard to the sites of the earliest Greek 'cities', three factors have been noted:

F.Tritsch (1929), H.Berve (1931), V.Ehrenberg (1932=1957=1960=1976, 1937=1965), E.Kirsten (1956), L.Gernet (1957=1968), M.Austin and P.Vidal-Naquet (1972=1977), A.Snodgrass (1980), and others have observed that the earliest Greek 'cities' were built on sites where there were strongly defended Mycenaean settlements; the last named, however, added that the Greek 'city' was not the direct successor to the Mycenaean settlement, from which it was separated by a gap of many centuries.⁷

¹ U.Wilcken, op. cit., 5th edn (1943) 56.

² E.Tritsch, *Klio* 22 (1929) 62.

³ W.W.Fowler, loc. cit.; H.D.F.Kitto, *The Greeks* (1951) 68.

⁴ H.D.F.Kitto, loc. cit.

⁵ F.Tritsch, loc. cit.

⁶ W.W.Fowler, op. cit. 44; F.Tritsch, loc. cit.

⁷ F.Tritsch, op. cit. 59; H.Berve, op. cit. 176; V.Ehrenberg, op.cit. (1932) 3 = (1957) 7 = (1960) 10 = (1976) 40; idem, *JHS* 57 (1937) 156 = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 94; E.Kirsten, loc. cit.; L.Gernet, op. cit. (1957) 46 = (1968) 372; M.Austin, P.Vidal-Naquet, op. cit. 65; A.Snodgrass, op. cit. 28.

H.D.F.Kitto (1951) attached great importance to the fact that early Greek 'cities' flourished in areas where communications were relatively easy.¹

Ch.G.Starr (1961) has drawn attention to the fact that the 'cities' tended to be near the sea.²

4. THE ASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE NATIVES

V.Ehrenberg wrote at an early date (1921) that the Greek urban settlement exercised control over the countryside in areas where the hinterland had a mainly barbarian population.³ Later (1957=1960=1976), in the course of stating his view that the earliest polis-states were founded in Ionia, he proclaimed that 'a *polis* is not yet a state, but it may become a state through exercising authority over the barbarians'.⁴

5. WARFARE

Here may be included on the one hand the view that the emergence of the polis-state is to be attributed exclusively to the attainment of domination by a warrior class, and on the other the view that differs from this at three points: (1) it restricts the factor 'war' to the area of defence; (2) it does not regard it as an exclusive factor, but merely one of the most important; (3) it does not speak of a class of warriors, but implies that the entire community was mobilized for purposes of war.

The first of these views was formulated by Max Weber (1924). According to him, advances in military technique led to the formation within the communities, which had not yet divided into classes, of a warrior class, which received special training and carried arms. As a result precisely of their training, arms and organization, this class received economic goods and privileges and thus became the predominant class in the community. The same class created the polis-settlements in which it established itself.⁵ The same view was advocated by J.Hasebroek (1931). He claimed that the state is not the result of class distinctions of any kind, for these are also to be found amongst nomads and semi-nomads, who do not have any state organization. The decisive event in the emergence of a state is the creation of a warrior class after a long period of wars of conquest. The spoils of war are distributed unevenly; the leaders and

¹ H.D.F.Kitto, op. cit. 69.

² Ch.G.Starr, op. cit. 339.

³ V.Ehrenberg, *Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum* (1921) 132.

⁴ V.Ehrenberg, op. cit. (1957) 8 = (1960) 11 = (1976) 34.

⁵ M.Weber, *Aufsätze für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1924) 93-128.

the better warriors receive more and better land and more and better booty. The relations that evolve between the members of the new class, and between them and the other members of the clans, tribes and peoples to which they belong, cause the kinship groups to lose their cohesion and also their principal functions. These functions pass to the state, which is governed by the warriors. More specifically, the polis-state was created by the hoplite class. The increasing importance of this class on the field of battle led to an increase in its importance within the community and the acquisition of citizenship by its members. The polis-state was thus a state of citizens-aristocrats. Hasebroek is clearly using the term 'aristocrats' with a broader meaning than usual, as equivalent to the term 'landowners' (cf. the Marxist expression 'landowners-citizens'). It should be noted that this author concedes that the demographic rise of the middle classes, the accompanying decline of the nobles, and the activity of the tyrants were secondary factors in the emergence of the polis-states.¹

Defence was proposed as one of the main factors in the formation of polis-states by W.W.Fowler (1893), J.B.Bury (1900), B.Keil (1912), G. De Sanctis (1932, 1940), H.D.F.Kitto (1951), G.Maddoli (1970) and P.Lévêque (1981). Of these, B.Keil and G. De Sanctis, who located the event in Asia Minor, held that defence was organized in order to deal with the natives; G.Maddoli, who placed the beginnings of the polis-state in mainland Greece, claimed that the first polis-states were founded by settlements that grew up beneath the protection of citadels, which were built on Mycenaean sites.²

6. ECONOMY

The principles of historical materialism were applied by its inventors also to the emergence of the polis-state. The particular form taken by it in this specific case is determined by the following assumptions: The *polis* is a kind of state; the state, as the tool of a social class, comes into being when a society divides into classes, one of which becomes predominant; the polis-state came into being at the same time as the polis-settlement and under the same economic conditions: consequent upon the division of productive labour into farmers and non-farmers, those in the latter category gathered in a settlement; the same

¹ J.Hasebroek, *Griechische Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (1931) 2, 98, 159–164.

² W.W.Fowler, loc. cit.; J.B.Bury, *A History of Greece* (1900) 72 = 3rd edn (–R.Meiggs) (1953) 56; B.Keil, op. cit. 304ff; G. De Sanctis, *Problemi di Storia antica* (1932) 11; idem, *Storia dei Greci I* (1940) 86–87; H.D.F.Kitto, op. cit. 68; G.Maddoli, *SMEA* 12 (1970) 40–41; P.Lévêque loc. cit.

settlement also became the centre for those landowners who had ceased to work productively and who enjoyed an income derived from the products of the labour of slaves, debtors, tenant farmers, and wage labourers. This interpretation is repeated in the Marxist historiography, at greater or lesser length, or by allusions. However, G.Thomson (1955, 1957), inspired by an idea of F.Engels, criticized the other Marxist historians on the grounds that they 'had not paid sufficient attention to the growth of commodity production as a factor in the emergence of civilization'. He stressed that if this factor is not taken into account 'it becomes impossible to explain what is new in the Greek polis as compared with the older states of the Near East'. He set out his own view as follows: the rise of the polis coincided with the transition from patriarchal slavery to chattel slavery; the patriarchal slave was exploited as a use-value, the chattel slave as an exchange-value, as a commodity. So, in the last resort, it was the growth of commodity production that determined the rise of the polis.¹ Thomson's view was rejected by J.A.Lencman, D.Pipidi, J.Borzak, S.L.Utshenko and E.Welskopf,² but it has met with some acceptance by R.F.Willetts (1965), T.Yuge (1981) and P. Lévêque (1981).³

During the time when he considered the polis-state to be incompatible with aristocracy, and associated the rise of the former with the decline of the latter,⁴ V.Ehrenberg (1929) attributed both phenomena to the economic growth of the seventh century.⁵

Ch.G.Starr originally (1957) recommended moderation in assessing the importance of commerce as a factor in the creation of polis-states, pointing out their small size and restricted economic means.⁶ Later (1961) he wavered between this view and accepting that the economic factors did have some role to play in the genesis of the polis-states.⁷

¹ G.A.Thomson, *Studies in Ancient Greek Society, II: The Greek Philosophers* (1955) 14, and also a report to the conference on 'The rise and characteristic features of the Greek polis', held in Liblice, Czechoslovakia, in 1957. The proceedings of this conference have not been published. We do have an extensive report by J.Pečírka in *VDI* (1958) 1, 230ff, and extracts from Thomson's manuscript quoted by Pečírka in his article in *Γέραç*, *Studies Presented to G. Thomson (= AUCPhH 1)* (1963) 184ff.

² See J.Pečírka, in both his articles.

³ R.F.Willetts, *Ancient Crete* (1965) 5; T.Yuge, loc. cit.; P.Lévêque, loc. cit.

⁴ v. s., pp. 31–32.

⁵ V.Ehrenberg, *Gnomon* 5 (1929) 7.

⁶ Ch.G.Starr, *PdP* 12 (1957) 99.

⁷ Ch.G.Starr, *The Origins of Greek Civilization* (1961) 335, 341.

7. DEMOGRAPHY

A.Snodgrass posited (1980) a close relationship between the rise of the earliest polis-states and the increase in the population, a phenomenon that he attributed to the development of farming from the end of the ninth century onwards.¹

8. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS

The creation of the polis-state has been connected by different authors with (a) the kings, (b) the aristocracies, (c) the non-aristocratic powers.

The first view was expounded by J.B.Bury (1900).²

The second was formulated by V.Ehrenberg (1932=1957=1960=1976, 1937=1965), Ch.G.Starr (1961), D.Kagan (1965); E.Lepore (1978), F.Kolb (1984),³ and is inherent in the views of all those who believe that the polis-state came into being with the rise of the aristocracies.⁴ It was rejected by H.Schaefer (1960).⁵

The third is implied in the earlier position adopted by V.Ehrenberg (1921), according to which the *polis* was the successor to the state of the nobles,⁶ and also in that of H.Berve, who associated the *polis* exclusively with democracy (1931).⁷

Other authors have expressed themselves in more general terms: G.Maddoli, for example, claimed (1970) that the genesis of the *polis* is an expression of the political realities.⁸

9. THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR

W.W.Fowler felt (1893) that one of the factors contributing to the genesis of the polis-state was the 'fame of some religious cult centre'.⁹ Vague sentiments of this nature can also be found in other authors.

¹ A.Snodgrass, loc. cit.

² J.B.Bury, loc. cit.

³ V.Ehrenberg, *Gnomon* 5 (1929) 4; idem, *JHS* 57 (1937) 157 = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 95; Ch.G.Starr, op. cit. 324–337; D.Kagan, *The Great Dialogue* (1965) 17–18; E.Lepore, op. cit. 185–186; F.Kolb, *Die Stadt im Altertum* (1984) 62ff.

⁴ v. s., pp. 30–31.

⁵ H.Schaefer, *ZSS, Röm. Abt.* 77 (1960) 427 = *Probleme der alten Geschichte* (1963) 389.

⁶ v. s., pp. 31ff.

⁷ v. s., p. 33.

⁸ G.Maddoli, op. cit. 40 n 105.

⁹ W.W.Fowler, loc. cit.

The view has recently been propounded by F. de Polignac (1984) that what he calls 'citoyenneté culturelle' was a *conditio sine qua non* for the creation of the polis-state. This was a result of changes in the sphere of cult, particularly in the building of shrines in the urban centres and the countryside, and changes in the role played by these shrines in the rites of passage of the youths and maidens of the community.¹

10. STRENGTHENING OF THE STATE MECHANISM AND LEGAL MACHINERY

E.Meyer (1893) saw the polis-state as the product of the need to strengthen the state mechanism and to enrich the code of justice, and at the same time as one of the main means of satisfying this need.²

11. POLITICAL WILL

We have already had occasion to note that D.Roussel attributed (1976) the polis-state to 'political will', in opposing the idea that this type of state evolved from a pre-political, tribal organization.³

12. SOUL, CHARACTER, GENIUS

The polis-state was seen as a creation of the Greek soul and the Greek perception of life by S.Mazzarino (1947);⁴ of the 'character of the Greeks' by H.D.F.Kitto (1951);⁵ and 'of the Greek genius' by C.Bradford Welles (1956) and M.Hammond (1972).⁶

13. VARIOUS IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS

Along with his view that the first Greek polis-states were founded in Asia Minor by fragments of Greek *ethne*,⁷ B.Keil claimed that the colonists were able to innovate in terms of the state type because they were not bound by their political traditions.⁸

¹ F. de Polignac, *La naissance de la Cité grecque* (1984) passim.

² E.Meyer, op. cit. II (1893) 320 = 2nd, 3rd, 4th edn III (1937) 302-303.

³ v. s., p. 300.

⁴ S.Mazzarino, *Fra Oriente e Occidente* (1947) 207.

⁵ H.D.F.Kitto, op. cit. 69.

⁶ C.Bradford Welles, in *Studi in onore di A.Calderini e R.Paribeni* (1956) 81; M.Hammond, op. cit. 173, 193.

⁷ v. s., p. 336.

⁸ B.Keil, op. cit. 304.

As we have seen, H.Berve originally (1931) dated the rise of the polis-state to the turn of the seventh to the sixth centuries.¹ He added that, in connection with this process, the great movement of the period towards the awakening and liberation of the individual led to the first well-defined and meaningful formation of social life.²

For A.Ferrabino (1929=1937) the polis-state resulted from the experience of the Homeric poems and the ideal of life formed by them.³

According to F.Schachermeyr (1953), the Aegean 'cities' became true polis-states when they adopted a particular spiritual cast, the chief component of which was the principle of personal association, which the Greek migrants brought with them and preserved after they had settled, unlike other peoples, who abandoned it. From this principle emanates the personal, non-transcendental nature of the Greek state.⁴

Ch.G.Starr saw (1957) the polis-state as a reflection of the desire of men to live in closer spiritual bonds.⁵ He later noted (1961) that one of the political principles of the Greek world was a 'largely unconscious sense of general unity'.⁶ At the same time, though in a different publication (1961), he set out at greater length his ideas on the intellectual factors in the polis-state. The cradle of the polis-states was the area that was most advanced in intellectual terms. The development in the direction of the polis-state gathered together at the political level many trends of intellectual, social, religious and economic evolution. The polis-state 'translated in political terms factors that are also to be seen in art and literature: the increasingly conscious analysis of problems, the sudden liberation from tradition, and the absolute restraint of anarchy'. It was 'a reaction of the citizen body as a whole to the serious problems of the age', a reaction that 'manifested itself initially in the feeling of the population of the more advanced – and more disturbed – areas of mainland Greece that they must work together consciously to prevent change from descending into chaos'. It aimed at justice, the rule of law and morality, in the needs of society as a whole, as opposed to those of specific classes.⁷

¹ v. s., p. 340.

² H.Berve, loc. cit.

³ A.Ferrabino, *La dissoluzione della libertà nella Grecia antica* (1929) 8 = 2nd edn (1937) 6ff.

⁴ F.Schachermeyr, *Diogene* 4 (1953) 30–31.

⁵ Ch.G.Starr, *PdP* 12 (1957) 108.

⁶ Ch.G.Starr, *Historia* 10 (1961) 132.

⁷ Ch.G.Starr, *The Origins of Greek Civilization* (1961) 336, 341–342.

14. COMBINATION OF FACTORS

W.G.Runciman (1982) attributed the rise of the polis-state to a combination of factors: population growth, relative stability, the geomorphology of Greece, the accumulation of power, and colonization. In the Greek communities, authority was either concentrated in the hands of a pre-political 'king' who evolved into a monarch (that is, a true king) or a tyrant; or it came to be exercised by collective bodies in which the nobles participated. Runciman, that is to say, disagrees both with those who link the rise of the polis-state with the reinforcing of the authority of the monarch and with those who link it with the decline of the monarchy and the rise of the aristocracy; he considers monarchy and aristocracy to be two contemporary and parallel products of the pre-political community. According to the same scholar, the geomorphology of Greece discouraged the dispersion of population and was therefore favourable to the accumulation of power. In this point, too, Runciman finds himself in opposition to those who, while also taking the geomorphological factor into account, regard it as responsible for the emergence of very small states like the polis-states. As for colonization, Runciman conjectured that its influence was felt in two ways. On the one hand, the decision to send out a colony, and the execution of that decision, will have required the existence of a conscious political organization. On the other, the institutions of the colonies will have exercised some influence on the mother cities.¹

For C.Thomas (1981), city-states, including the Greek *polis*, are prompted, mainly, by 'traditions of political centralization' and the 'relative weakness of all polities in the geographical region where the city-state culture arose'.²

Comments

During this survey of the views expressed on the pre-conditions, causes and circumstances surrounding the genesis of the polis-states,³ we noticed the following:

¹ W.G.Runciman, *CSHS* 24 (1982) 365–369.

² C.S.G.Thomas, in R.Griffeth and C.S.G.Thomas, *The City-state in Five Cultures* (1981) 182.

³ There has also been discussion of the small size of this type of state. V.Ehrenberg, *Die Antike* 3 (1927) 309–320 = *Polis und Imperium* (1965) 68–77 = *Aspects of the Ancient World* (1973) 35–46, made much of the natural fragmentation of the Greek world. Ch.G.Starr, *op. cit.* 338–339 gives only limited importance to this factor, commenting

1. The individual polis-states have not received attention. This circumstance renders the theories formulated invalid until they can be confirmed by an assessment of the entire body of material at our disposal.

2. It is precisely because the specific data have been neglected that the theories propounded are vague and dogmatic.

3. One result of the narrow perspective taken in approaching the problem and of the lack of arguments is the broad spectrum of theories advanced. This problem however, is one for which more than one answer may hold good at one and the same time.

that on the one hand Attica, which was a naturally fragmented area, formed a unified state, while Boeotia, a unified plain, was divided between a large number of polis-states. The following scholars are completely opposed to the idea that the small size of the *poleis* is to be interpreted in terms of the natural fragmentation of Greece: E.Barker, loc. cit., H.D.F.Kitto, loc. cit., and M.Austin, P.Vidal-Naquet, op. cit. 64. The last two justified their position on this by noting that (a) the distribution of the *poleis* does not always correspond with the natural divisions; (b) the *polis* made a late appearance.

A NEW INVESTIGATION

The question of the preconditions, causes and circumstances surrounding the genesis of the polis-states must accordingly be discussed on the broader basis used for the problems examined above (Part Two, chapters 1 and 2). At the same time it should not be forgotten that a *polis* was a state founded by the dominant element of a community which was formed and defined with reference to a polis-settlement. This means that the answers offered must account for the creation of states of this kind;¹ the use of criteria that are not relevant to this description leads inevitably to invalid answers.

It is also imperative to bear in mind that the polis-state was at the same time a state and a kind of state and also that it was frequently preceded by other forms of state. Accordingly we are bound to answer two questions, the first referring generally to the emergence of a state in general, the second asking why this state took the precise form of a polis-state rather than any other.

Here too, we shall examine the individual cases of the formation of polis-states, following the arrangement of the first two chapters of this section.

A. POLIS-STATE FOUNDED BY AN INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY

1. POLIS-STATE FROM A UNITARY COMMUNITY

As we have seen, polis-states were founded by invaders or refugees or colonists in the period between 1125 and 900 B.C. Invaders were responsible for the foundation of some of the Dorian polis-states in the Peloponnese and those of the Magnetes in Crete and Asia Minor; groups of refugees and of colonists founded the polis-states of the Ionians and Aeolians in the eastern Aegean.²

These polis-states are the earliest of all, with the exception, of

¹ v. s., pp. 302, 344.

² v. s., pp. 302ff, 344ff.

course, of the polis-states of the Ionian Confederacy that stretched from Attica to central Euboea.¹ It is therefore for these polis-states that we have to deal, in addition to the general problem concerning the social forces involved in the foundation of polis-states, with the following questions:

— whether the polis-state was an original phenomenon or whether it had models or forerunners;

— whether, and to what extent, the dissolution of the *ethne* contributed to the genesis of the polis-states;

— what was the contribution of the final settling of invaders or refugees or colonists to this same result;

— what was the role of the polis-settlement in the formation of polis-states by communities that arose from groups of invaders or refugees or colonists.

Other problems, too, may be considered from the perspective of this category of polis-states.

(1) Was the *polis* a completely new phenomenon or did it have models or forerunners?

As we have seen, some scholars believe that the Greeks took the idea of the polis-state from the East² and others hold the view that the experience of the East accelerated the transformation of the village into the polis-settlement and of the village community into the polis-state.³ Supporting evidence for the former position has been seen in the argument that the Greeks, being less advanced, were open to new ideas formed in the more advanced societies, and that such societies were to be found in the East.⁴ This argument is invalid for two reasons, however: (a) Societies like those of the Greeks during the period to which this hypothesis dates the foundation of the earliest Greek polis-states are not mature enough to adopt ideas on state organization from peoples more advanced than themselves in this sphere. (b) The Greek polis-states do not resemble the eastern states on which they are

¹ v. s., pp. 325ff, 411ff.

² v. s., p. 422.

³ v. s., p. 422.

⁴ v. s., p. 422.

supposed to be modelled. The Greek polis-state was constructed round a community,¹ while the eastern city-state belonged to its ruler.

The observation that the earliest polis-states in mainland Greece were emanated from settlements that succeeded Mycenaean ones,² and the theory that the polis-states coincided geographically with Mycenaean states³ do not explicitly trace the polis-state back to Mycenaean roots. If the thought should occur, however, that the polis-state had some forerunner in Mycenaean time, two objections may be raised: (a) the polis-state was different from the Mycenaean state; (b) there was no continuity between the two.⁴

The Greek polis-state was therefore an original phenomenon, as was realized by all the scholars who attributed its creation to one or more of the factors relating to the particular historical conjunctures, summarized above.⁵

(2) Was the dissolution of the *ethne*, which were based on kinship, or the fusion of elements from different *ethne* a contributing factor in the creation of the polis-states founded by invaders or refugees?

The fusion in Ionia of groups from *ethne* that had broken up has been regarded by some scholars as the reason for the founding of polis-states in that region, the argument being that the founders of these polis-states were not bound by the structures of the *ethnos* to which they had belonged.⁶ This view may be rebutted by two observations: (a) The breaking up of the *ethne* and the fusion of groups originating from different *ethne* did not bring about the dissolution of their characteristic features. The *ethne* were communities of people; but so were the fragments of them that founded polis-states. Moreover, the citizens of the Ionic polis-states were originally divided into tribes, on the model of the Ionian *ethnos*, many of which were given the names of the old Ionian tribes. The same is true of the Doric polis-states, where the tribe-system of the Dorian *ethnos* was preserved either in its

¹ v. s., pp. 124ff.

² v. s., pp. 421–422.

³ v. s., p. 422.

⁴ v. s., p. 422.

⁵ v. s., pp. 423ff.

⁶ v. s., p. 423.

entirety, or with some modification.¹ (b) Polis-states were founded only by some fragments of migrating *ethne* or mixtures of such fragments. Other fragments of migrating *ethne* formed demes or confederacies of demes.²

These two observations make it clear that the dissolution of *ethne* and the mingling of fragments from different *ethne* were not factors in the founding of polis-states. They merely paved the way.

(3) Nor can the permanent settlement of migratory groups be regarded as a reason for the creation of polis-states.³ This factor did not give rise to uniform results: settled fragments of *ethne* formed not only polis-states, but demes, and deme confederacies, or confederacies of *μέρη*; settled intact *ethne* assumed the political form that was called the *ethnos* state.

(4) What was the role of the polis-settlement – that is, of a settlement protected by a citadel⁴ – in the founding of polis-states by refugees or invaders?⁵

Settlements protected by citadels were not peculiar to polis-states. We may recall the Mycenaean states, and the Greek states formed as confederacies of ‘demes’ or ‘parts’ contemporary with the polis-states. In fact, the settlements of Megara, Pellene, Aegium, Patrae and other centres in Achaea and Arcadia were polis-settlements within the framework of this type of confederacy. Nonetheless, those who have seen in the settlement called *polis* a factor in the rise of the state also called *polis* have conceived of settlement and state in terms of city and city-state. How are matters in reality? Quite simply, all the polis-settlements founded by invaders or refugees or colonists before 800 B.C. became cities at a much later date; Sparta never became one at all.

The polis-settlement was a precondition not for the formation of a polis-state, or any other kind of state, but for something anterior to it the consolidation of the group of invaders or refugees or colonists

¹ M.B.Sakellariou, *Phratries and Tribes in Greek Polis-States* (forthcoming).

² v. s., pp. 316ff, 324ff.

³ This factor was suggested by E.Barker and F.Gschnitzer (v. s., p. 423).

⁴ v. s., pp. 88ff, 156ff.

⁵ v. s., pp.424ff.

Each of these groups needed to secure itself immediately from attacks by their neighbours. It therefore settled below a natural stronghold, to which it soon added man-made fortifications; it then made this settlement the seat of the state authorities, precisely because it was defended. Meanwhile, the polis-settlement had become a point of reference for the founder community.¹

(5) Since every polis-state was founded by the men of a community, it is logical to direct our enquiry to this community; this has not been done, however, by the scholars who have investigated the causes of the creation of the polis-state. We shall naturally concern ourselves here only with those communities descended from groups that migrated between 1125 and 900 B.C. Refugees were compelled to move in order to save themselves from enemies stronger than they were, while invaders and colonists changed their place of habitation without any external pressure, and therefore in an organized manner. Whatever their motives for moving, some groups retained their homogeneity while others mingled, *en route* or at the time that they finally settled, or even at a later date. These conjectures are confirmed by details preserved in some of the ancient traditions, or by other evidence. The traditions surrounding the events preceding the foundation of (a) Clazomenae and (b) Phocaea are particularly clear and authoritative. (a) People from Cleonae and Phliasia, fleeing before the Dorians, arrived in Asia Minor without a leader; having initially settled near Colophon, they then asked for a leader from the Colophonians, who gave them a man called Parphorus; under his leadership, they wandered to various places before finally building Clazomenae.² (b) A group of men exiled from Orchomenus went to Thoricus in Attica; there they joined up with refugees from the Peloponnese who had been displaced by the Dorians, and with some Athenians who wanted to migrate; they all crossed to Asia Minor together under the leadership of an Athenian; after several adventures that can be omitted here, they founded Phocaea and took native wives.³ The two stories agree on the following basic points: a group of men abandons its old home for ever, without a

¹ v. s., pp. 91ff, 304.

² M.B.Sakellariou, *La migration grecque en Ionie* (1958) 221–223.

³ M.B.Sakellariou, *op. cit.* 234–237.

leader; it finds a foreign leader, or unites with another group that has a leader. The phenomenon of the fusion of groups of different origins also occurs in the memories of the events preceding the foundation of Teos: Molossi and Athamanes arrived in Attica; there they united with some Athenians and they all crossed to Asia Minor.¹ Mixed populations are also to be found in other cities in Asia Minor – in Miletus, Priene, Samos, Ephesus, Colophon, Erythrae and Smyrna. We have no evidence, however, for the way in which these populations were formed,² and we cannot tell, therefore, whether they came together during their journeyings from their homes across the Aegean or after the foundation of the polis-states. Although the traditions connected with the foundation of the Aeolic colonies are much scantier than in the case of their Ionic counterparts, they preserve dim memories of the uprooting of their founders, who became refugees. Not all the migrants who went to Asia Minor from Greece were refugees, however. Attica was never conquered by invaders at this period, so the migrants originating from Attica were true colonists. The Dorians were invaders. The Dorian polis-states in the Peloponnese are presented in the surviving traditions as the product of a long desired and planned enterprise that began in a limited region, Doris. These traditions have of course been elaborated to support local political interests, and have undergone changes, as a result of being systematized, and from other causes; but we have no reason to doubt that the groups that founded the primary Dorian settlements in the Corinthia, the Argolis, Laconia and Messenia were invaders. The founders of the two Magnesias in Asia Minor also came from an *ethnos* that was on the move in the eleventh century.

In previous chapters we came to conjecture the conditions under which states were organized by migrants from stateless societies, and also the phases through which those migrants who came from political societies passed from the time that they broke away from these societies to the time they were led to the formation of a state. There is thus no need to repeat that discussion here, except for the conclusion, which may be set out briefly: all these states were formed under one of two

¹ M.B.Sakellariou, *op. cit.* 174–179, 280–282.

² M.B.Sakellariou, *op. cit.* 39–76, 76–91, 93–106, 123–146, 146–172, 186–209, 209–221, 223–234, 254–268, 268–270, 270–273, 277–278, 278–280, 283–290, 291–292, 293–295.

conditions or sometimes a combination of both. One of these was the subjugation of the native population, which was converted as a result into a population of serfs. The other was the operation within the community of processes that led it to divide into classes, and the need for the strongest to exercise control over the weakest.¹

But why polis-states and not another kind of state?

Given the conditions prevailing within the different polis communities at the time, and also their environment — which was essentially formed by other polis communities —, the polis-state was clearly the only kind of state that could arise once the necessary pre-conditions had been created. The polis community may be presumed to have been very successful at administering its affairs under pre-statal conditions, and continued to be so when it began to develop elementary state structures. We are, of course, unable to detect all the reasons for the successful functioning of the polis community. We would not probably be very wide of the mark, however, if we recognize one of them with the fact that the Greeks already had a long tradition of living in non-statal communities, and that they were consequently accustomed to acting in a communal spirit. Those who had previously lived within the framework of an *ethnos* had great experience of a system that consisted of a number of communities of different size, ranging from groups of related families to the *ethnos* itself, with phratries and sometimes, though not always, tribes at intermediate levels. Those who had previously lived in Mycenaean states will have retained some of the pre-statal structures, functions and institutions at a lower level. This much is clear from the fact that after the Mycenaean state in Attica and the society associated with it collapsed the confederacy of polis-states by which they were replaced, which stretched as far as central Euboea, was designated by the ethnic name of the Ionians, and the system of phratries and tribes inherited from a purely tribal past continued in use. Nor did this system disappear after the dissolution of the Ionian Confederacy and the separation from it of the Athenian state.² The *damoi* of the Mycenaean states will also have been communities: they appear as corporations of natural persons; they owned communal land; and they enjoyed some degree of self-administration. The conditions

¹ See pp. 302–316, 394–397.

² v. s., pp. 124ff, 303, 438.

under which the migrations took place and the new societies lived were favourable to the continuation of the community spirit. In fact the migrants took their fate into their own hands, and were imitated in this by their sons and succeeding generations. The polis-state was the kind of state produced by the polis community according to its needs, its means, its experience and its mentality.

Polis communities might also give rise to towns administered by absolute rulers or high priests, as happened in the Near East, and eventually to strong monarchies. The fact that this did not happen suggests that the necessary conditions that might lead to the centralization of authority in the hands of a despot were lacking.

A reversion from polis-communities to groups such as *ethne*, and the creation of ethnos-states was practically impossible. A development of this type would require a regression to primitive economic conditions.

Each independent community of migrants built a settlement beneath a citadel – a polis – in which to dwell and be protected from enemy attack. This community was then redefined: it ceased to be a fragment of an *ethnos*, or a mixture of fragments from different *ethne* and constituted a new group. The unity and self-awareness of this group were forged by the cohabitation of its members, which had two further consequences, each complementing the other: on the one hand, the community became increasingly removed from the *ethnos* or *ethne* from which its component elements originated; on the other, its internal bonds were drawn tighter. These processes took place within the polis-settlement. This was not only the space within which this transformation occurred, and a contributing factor to it, but also the point of reference of the transformed community, which therefore took its name from the name of the settlement. Many communities of this type later welcomed new elements within their ranks – descendants of conquered peoples and new colonists. Expansion of this nature, however, even when it occurred more than once and, on occasion, acquired significant dimensions, did not change the character of the communities nor the fact that each one of them identified itself with reference to a polis-settlement.

We now turn to the polis-states created after the 'Dark Ages' by communities descended from colonists or refugees that set out from

established populations. It will be recalled that they were: a colony of the *ethnos* of the Locrians; one or more colonies of the confederacy of the Megarian 'parts'; and a few more, of which it is not clear whether they were founded by the *ethnos* of the Achaeans or by a deme-confederacy of this *ethnos*.¹

The earliest of these colonial enterprises (which led to the founding of Megara Hyblaea) followed the conquest by the Corinthians of the areas of Heraeum and Peiraeum. It thus seems a reasonable hypothesis that the colonists in question were refugees from these regions.² The other colonies in this category were founded as a result of the scarcity of land at home, arising from the increase in the population.

The founders of each colony had to establish a statal society as soon as they subdued the indigenous populations. But why did these Megarian or Achaean or Locrian migrants not reproduce the type of state that was familiar to them? The answer is presumably the same as that advanced in respect of the earlier migrants and the communities founded by them. The members of the mother community who were obliged to go out and found a colony formed a new community even before they set off, which became sovereign from the moment that it set sail. When it arrived at the place where it ultimately settled, this community was not divided up into villages, but dwelt together in a settlement which could be defended against foes much more numerous than the colonists. An additional consideration will have been the fact that these colonists will have been aware of the success of the earlier polis-states. The community of colonists was in this way transformed with no break of continuity into a community defined by the polis-settlement that it had itself built and the statal society it constituted was a polis-state.

2. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF DEMES

The surviving ancient literature refers to three examples of polis-states

¹ v. s., pp. 315–316.

² M.B.Sakellariou, in *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους* II (1971) 56 = *A History of the Hellenic World* II (1975) 65; idem, in M.B.Σακελλαρίου, Ν.Φαράκλας, *Μεγαρίς, Αἰγόσθενα, Ἐρένεα* (=Ancient Greek cities, 14) (1972) 25; R.P.Legon, *Megara, The Political History of a Greek City-State to 336 B.C.* (1981) 77–78.

that originated in the political unification of the villages of a deme confederacy; namely those of the Mantineans, the Heraeans and the Eleans.¹ To these may be added a hypothetical example: the genesis of the polis-state of the Sicyonians.

The sources relate the manner in which two of the polis-states in this category were founded: the polis-state of the Mantineans was established on the initiative of the Argives;² and the Lacedaemonians dictated the forming of the polis-state of the Heraeans.³ In the case of the foundation of the polis-state of the Eleans, it has been conjectured that it was the work of democratic forces.⁴ This hypothesis is based on three pieces of evidence and an intermediate conclusion. The pieces of evidence are: (a) the fact that the unification of the villages of Elis to form a state and the foundation of the polis-settlement of Elis are dated by the ancient sources to 471 B.C.;⁵ (b) the information that the *Hellanodikai* were once ten in number; (c) the information that each of them was taken from one of the tribes of Elis. These three pieces of evidence have been considered grounds enough for the conclusion that the Eleans copied the system of ten tribes invented by Cleisthenes for the Athenians. And, in its turn, this hypothetical conclusion has been used as the sole basis for the final theory, that only democrats could have introduced a system of ten tribes into Elis. A more careful examination of the sources reveals, however, that the Eleans reached this number of tribes not in 471, but at a later date. Aristodemus of Elis, to whom we are indebted for the information that each of the tribes of Elis elected one of the ten *Hellanodikai*, also states that the *Hellanodikai* ultimately numbered ten, and that the number had differed at earlier dates, having at one point been twelve.⁶ Pausanias gives a full list of the changes in the numbers of *Hellanodikai*, along with the date of each. More specifically, he states that there was only

¹ v. s., pp. 316–320.

² v. s., p. 317.

³ v. s., p. 317.

⁴ G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* III (1897) 149; idem, *Griechische Staatskunde* I (1920) 149. This view was accepted by H. Swoboda, *RE* V 2 (1897) 2393, K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* II 1 2nd edn (1913) 140, E. Meyer, *KIP* II (1967) 250.

⁵ Diodorus XI 54, 1; Strabo VIII 3, 2.

⁶ Aristodemus 414 *FGrH* 2 a, b = Harpocration, s.v. Ἑλληνοδίκαι; *Schol. Pind., Ol.* III 22a.

one *Hellandikes* from the beginning until the Olympiad of 584 B.C., two from 580 to 404 B.C., nine in 400 and 396 B.C., ten from 392 to 372, twelve in 368, eight from 364 to 352, and ten again from 348 B.C., there being no change after that.¹ Further information, of a fragmentary and frequently undated nature, transmitted through scholiasts and lexicographers, may be derived from other authors. A scholion on Pindar indiscriminately relates information derived from Hellanicus, a fifth-century author, and Aristodemus, who was a second-century author, but came from Elis.² Unfortunately, this scholion, in its surviving form, has a lacuna between the phrase 'at first' and the number ἰβ' (twelve); it continues: 'finally ten'. It is therefore certain that the scholiast, and his source before him, were not saying that the first number of the *Hellandikai* was twelve, and it is by no means certain that the final number, ten, came immediately after the number twelve. The statement that according to Aristodemus the number of *Hellandikai* was stabilized at ten is also preserved in Harpocration. He also drew upon Aristotle's *Ῥηλείων Πολιτεία* in which it was stated that there was originally a single *Hellandikes*, then two, and finally nine.³ We also have a statement by Hesychius that there were nine *Hellandikai* in the year 480,⁴ and one by Philostratus that the number ten was established in 348 B.C.⁵ Let us now examine systematically the similarities and differences between all the documents cited above. (a) Aristotle and Pausanias agree on the statement that there was originally one, then two, and then nine *Hellandikai*. (b) Aristodemus, Pausanias and Philostratus agree on the statement that the final number of *Hellandikai* was ten. (c) According to Aristotle, the final number was nine. But his disagreement with Aristodemus, Pausanias and Philostratus is only apparent. These three authors are referring to a number that, according to one of them, Pausanias, was finally established as definitive in 348 B.C. Pausanias himself dates the number nine to 400 and 396. It was at this period that Hippias of Elis composed his *Ὀλυμπιονικῶν ἀναγραφή*, a work drawn upon by

¹ Pausanias V 9, 5.

² v. s., p. 445 n 6.

³ Harpocration, s. v. Ἑλλανοδῖκαι.

⁴ Hesychius, s.v. Ἑλλανοδῖκαι.

⁵ Philostratus, *Vit. Apoll.* III 30.

Aristotle. Aristotle thus appears to have asserted that the final number was nine because that in fact was the final number cited in his source. (d) Hesychius' statement that there were nine *Hellanodikai* at the Olympiad of 480 conflicts with that part of the passage from Pausanias, in which there are said to have been two *Hellanodikai* from 580 to 404, and also the statement of Hippias of Elis that the number nine was a fairly recent one at his time (he lived at the end of the fifth—beginning of the fourth century). Hesychius, however, cannot be regarded as a more authoritative source than Hippias. From what we have observed we may assume that the list of dates and changes in the numbers of the *Hellanodikai* found in Pausanias is trustworthy. According to this list, there were not ten, but two *Hellanodikai* at the date of the foundation of the polis-state of Elis in 471 B.C. This destroys the hypothesis that at this date the Eleans, under the influence of democratic forces, introduced a system of ten tribes in imitation of that constructed by Cleisthenes for the polis-state of the Athenians. Furthermore, it may be regarded as certain that there were no democratic forces in Elis before 471 strong enough to impose their will in political terms. No such forces could have existed in Elis when it was still divided into villages, that is, in a society that did not yet have an urban centre, consequently a significant class of producers who had become independent of agricultural production and had aspirations directed against the landed aristocracy.

Marx considered the emergence of the city to be the result of the concentration in a settlement of those who specialized in secondary production, in trade and in services, as opposed to the farmers, who continued to dwell in the villages. He noted, however, that the ancient city also attracted the owners of large estates and of slaves, who lived on the surplus value of the labour of others, such as thetes, farmers who had fallen into debt, and rural and urban slaves. According to Sombart, the original residents in the urban centre were consumers and these were followed by producers in the secondary sector, merchants and providers of services.¹ By consumers, Sombart meant those who, although of an age to be producers, do not work but consume. L.Gernet, in stressing that the aristocrats congregated in the Greek

¹ W.Sombart, *Der moderne Kapitalismus* II (1902) 194.

cities at an early date, expressed the same view in different terms.¹ Weber's view that the ancient cities were basically centres of consumers² is consistent with the theories of both Marx and Sombart.

Let us now examine how far each of the opposed models – that of Marx and that of Sombart – is compatible with each of the processes which led from a confederacy of demes to a polis-state. The processes under consideration are four.

(1) One of the villages of the confederacy of demes becomes a city; the remainder continue to exist, as villages of the polis-state.

(2) One of the villages of the confederacy of demes becomes a city; the remainder cease to be inhabited.

(3) None of the villages of the confederacy of demes becomes a city; instead, a new settlement is founded that is a city from the very beginning; the old villages continue to exist, as villages of the polis-state.

(4) None of the villages of the confederacy of demes becomes a city; instead, a new settlement is founded that is a city from the very beginning; the old villages cease to be inhabited.

The first process is represented by polis-states that derived from confederacies of demes within the framework of an *ehnos*, which accordingly evolved into confederacies of polis-states;³ but not by confederacies of demes that were transformed into federated polis-states. The second is not yet attested. The third covers the polis-states of the Eleans and of the Sicyonians, and the fourth the polis-state of the Mantineans.

The first of these processes is compatible both with the model of Marx and with that of Sombart, and also with a combination of the two. By contrast, the second and the fourth, in which the entire population abandons the existing villages and congregates in a new settlement, a city, falls outside the compass of both models, which assume a vertical division of the population between town and

¹ L.Gernet, *ll. cc.*

² M.Weber, *Aufsätze zur Social- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (1924) 13. cf. M.I.Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (1973) 124–126, 138–139 = *L'économie antique* (1975) 167–169, 186–187; idem, *CSSH* 19 (1977) 325–326 = *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* (1981) 20–21; idem, *Ancient History* (1985) 89.

³ v. i., pp. 449ff.

countryside. The remaining process, the third, corresponds perfectly to the model of Sombart, but hardly to that of Marx. In this process, the town is a settlement whose original inhabitants came from villages. They might, then, be rich landowners, who became non-productive rentiers, and eventually decided to abandon the villages and congregate in a settlement of their own, which they built on a site that was naturally strong and that could be reinforced by artificial means. It is unthinkable that the craftsmen of one or more villages would settle far away from their clients. On the contrary, a settlement founded by landowners-consumers would naturally acquire further functions. In ancient Greece such a settlement was destined to become at once the capital of the state and its economic centre. This was the case with Sicyon and Elis.

The villages of Sicyonia were founded during the Geometric period, and the polis-settlement of Sicyon was built in the first quarter of the seventh century B.C.¹ The site of Sicyon was chosen for its naturally defensible position. It swiftly acquired the character of a city, too. The polis-state of the Sicyonians included the community of this name and a number of foreign elements. The community had coalesced from Dorian settlers and from elements of the pre-Dorian population. The Dorians retained their ancient division into three tribes, the Hylleis, the Dymanes and the Pamphyloi; the pre-Dorian elements were assigned to a fourth tribe, which was given the name of Aigialeis. We do not know whether the pre-Dorian elements were incorporated into the community before the foundation of the polis-settlement of Sicyon and the polis-state of the Sicyonians or after these events. Theopompus and Menaechmus refer to a social group called *κατωνακοφόροι* and compare them to the Lacedaemonian *ἐπεύνακτοι*.² The *ἐπεύνακτοι* or *ἐπευνάκται* were helots who had acquired a somewhat higher status than the rest by being chosen to cohabit with the widows of citizens who had been killed during the first Messenian war.³ Pollux gives the name *κορυννηφόροι* to this category of the population in Sicyonia, and classifies them amongst those 'between free and slaves', along with the

¹ v. s., pp. 307ff, 405ff.

² Theopompus 115 *FGrH* 176 and Menaechmus 131 *FGrH* 1 = Athenaeus VI 101, 271d.

³ G. Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde* II (1926) 658 n 1; G.L. Huxley, *Early Sparta* (1962) 37.

helots and others.¹ It follows that Pollux is basically in agreement with Theopompus and Menaechmus, and merely omits the particular colouring given by these two, the latter of which was a Sicyonian. The names *κατωνακοφόροι* and *κορυνηφόροι* are descriptive. *Κατωνάκη* was the name for a garment of thick woollen cloth that the Sicyonians, and Peisistratus, compelled certain farmers to wear, so that they would be ashamed to be seen in the town wearing it.² A *κορύνη* was a kind of club. It has been suggested that some of the ancillary elements of the Sicyonian army were armed with them. Some modern scholars, in agreement with the sources, assign the *κορυνηφόροι* or *κατωνακοφόροι* to the ranks of the serfs.³ Other views have been propounded, however. According to one, they were slaves.⁴ According to the other, they were old members of the community of the Sicyonians who had been reduced to the status of thetes, because they had lost their land.⁵ This latter view is supported by two pieces of evidence: (a) Only members of the community served in the army. (b) Serfs or rural slaves would not be in a position to leave their place of work in order to go to town; they would, moreover, have no reason to do so. There would therefore be no reason to prevent them from doing so by compelling them to wear a characteristic garment. Such a measure would make sense only if the people affected had the right to move around the town and could not be prevented from doing so by any legal means. We may concede, therefore, that it is more likely that the *κατωνακοφόροι* or *κορυνηφόροι* were the descendants of middle or small landowners, whose property had reverted to their creditors, but who remained members of the community of the Sicyonians. Unfortunately, we cannot answer the question whether they had been downgraded

¹ Pollux III 83; Stephanus Byzantius, s.v. Χίος.

² Pollux VII 68.

³ G. Busolt, op. cit. 136; W. Whitehead, *LCM* 5 (1980) 175–178; 6 (1981) 209, 211, who also identifies with them the *δοῦλοι* freed by the tyrant Euphron (369–366 B.C.) according to Xenophon, *Hell.* VII 3, 8.

⁴ P. A. Cartledge, *LCM* 6 (1980) 209, who, unlike Whitehead, regarded the *δοῦλοι* of Xenophon as true slaves. cf. also J. Ducat, *DHA* 2 (1976) 359ff.

⁵ D. Lotze, *Μεταξὺ ἐλευθέρων καὶ δούλων* (1959) 54–55; idem, *Chiron* 1 (1971) 95–109; idem, *Antike Abhängigkeitsformen in den griechischen Gebieten ohne Polisstruktur*, in H. Kreissig, F. Kühnert (eds), *Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur der Antike* 25 (1985) 20–28.

economically and socially before the movement of the landowning-consumer elements of the Sicyonian population to the polis-settlement, or whether this happened at the same time as, or after, this movement. The second and the third hypothesis do not necessarily imply that the Sicyonian society was classless before the foundation of the polis-settlement and the rise of the polis-state of the Sicyonians. If, as it seems, Sicyon was founded by landowners-consumers, they will have existed before this event alongside peasants producing for them. Taking into account all the Dorian societies sufficiently known to us, one would presume that these peasants were serfs. Consequently the Sicyonian society will have had a state organization before the formation of a polis-state. The polis-state will simply have replaced an earlier form of state, namely a state of federated demes.

Granted that the rationale on the basis of which the foundation of the polis-settlement of Elis and the polis-state of the Eleans were said to have been the work of democratic forces is not valid,¹ the evidence at our disposal, which is similar to that available for Sicyon, suggests the same pattern. The polis-settlement of Elis will originally have been settled by elements of the community who had detached themselves from production and lived on incomes produced by others, and these same elements transformed the confederacy of demes into a polis-state. It is true that Polybius attests to the fact that at his time many wealthy Eleans lived in the countryside, and indeed that they did not regularly attend the popular assembly.¹ But this evidence is not necessarily valid for a period three centuries earlier. Some of the large landowners may have returned to the countryside in the intervening period for a variety of reasons. That they did not attend the popular assembly indicates some disenchantment at the political level, similar to that of some of the Athenian aristocracy after the fall of the thirty tyrants and the prevalence of popular democracy and popular politics.

The foundation of the polis-settlement of Mantinea and the polis-state of the Mantineans took place at the same time as the abandonment of the five existing villages. As we have seen, this circumstance is incompatible with both the model of Marx and that of Sombart.² The polis-settlement of Mantinea was not occupied by only

¹ Polybius IV 73, 6-10.

² v. s., p. 448.

part of the population of the area – the craftsmen and traders, according to the one model, or the landowners-consumers according to the other – but by the entire population. There is no reason to reject the statement that attributes the initiative to the Argives.¹ But we cannot rest content with it. In fact, we have to concede that the unification of the population into the single settlement of Mantinea, and the creation of the polis-state of the Mantineans could not have been achieved on a lasting basis, if the Mantineans, or at least the most influential of them, had not agreed. We have further to try to establish the motivation for a decision of this nature. This was probably strategic. In fact, the abandonment of the countryside and the concentration of the population in a single settlement protected by a citadel and a defence wall seems to have been dictated by the need to protect the Mantineans from military enterprises of the Spartans. The concentration of the Mantineans in a fortified site created problems for the Spartans, who therefore compelled the Mantineans to abandon the polis-settlement and return to their villages in 385. Considering that the entire population of the region lived in villages before the synoecism, it is hardly probable that there existed a significant class of elements detached from primary production. It would appear likely, then, that the synoecism had been accomplished under an aristocratic regime of archaic temper. As for the social conditions that prevailed during the existence of Mantinea and in the period that followed the return of its population to the original villages, we have the valuable testimony of Xenophon, according to which the owners of landed property were pleased with the later situation since they realized that they were rid of the demagogues and free to enjoy aristocratic governments.²

We know, as we have said, that the foundation of the polis-settlement of Heraea and the polis-state of the Heraeans was the work of the Spartans, but we do not know whether or not the villages were abandoned. In this case, too, however, we are dealing with an event that was dictated by military considerations. A reinforced Heraea would have offered greater resistance to the Eleans, and would also have served the Spartans as a base for military operations against them. Obviously, the Heraean aristocracy agreed with the Spartan initiative.

¹ v. s., pp. 317ff, 445.

² Xenophon, *Hell.* V 2, 7.

Three of the four confederacies of demes under discussion, namely the Sicyonian, the Mantinean and the Elean, acquired statal organization before they gave way to polis-states.¹ This may well have been the case with some other deme confederacies one of which was possibly the Heraean. Otherwise statehood came into being together with the polis-state. When statehood antedated the polis-state, the transition from a confederacy of demes to a polis-state was a transition from a confederacy of semi-independent states to a unitary state, reinforcing the structures of the state. When statehood did not antedate the polis-state, there occurred a transition from a pre-political to a political society.

Why did all these new states take the form of polis-states? As there is no evidence relating to this question even in a single case, we are obliged to have recourse to theoretical considerations. In dealing with the circumstances and causes connected with the creation of polis-states by communities that sprang from groups of migrants we made five points.² Three of them are irrelevant to the present discussion:

(1) Since the polis-state was no longer a new phenomenon when the transformation of confederacies of demes into polis-states took place, we need look no further for the sources of inspiration.

(2) There is no question of the foundation of polis-states being made easier by the fact that the founders were fragments of scattered *ethne*, since the confederacies of demes resulted from the gradual acquisition of autonomy by local communities within *ethne* that did not scatter.

(3) Although the creation of polis-states to replace confederacies of demes is attested from the beginning of the seventh to the beginning of the fourth centuries, the people who founded them had been permanently settled in these sites for many centuries: the Sicyonians from at least about 900 B.C., and the Eleans from at least about 1000 B.C. The Mantineans and the Heraeans belonged to ethnic groups that entered Arcadia about 2000 B.C.

It remains then to discuss two points: the role of the polis-settlement and the role of the community.

(4) The polis-settlements of Sicyon, Mantinea and Elis did not exist before the polis-states of the Sicyonians, Mantineans and Eleans, but

¹ v. s., pp. 316ff, 424ff.

² See pp. 437ff.

were built at the same time as the creation of these polis-states. The creation of the polis-states was therefore not influenced by the prior existence of polis-settlements.

(5) A confederacy of stateless demes will have been founded by deme communities who had decided to unite although retaining a certain degree of self-administration. When such a confederacy of demes acquired a state mechanism, this will have been preceded by steps at the level of the federal stateless community. Similar processes must *a fortiori* be assumed to have been involved in the conversion of a confederacy of communities with a state structure into a polis-state. The communities with which we are now dealing were different from the communities dealt with earlier. They were not descended from groups of invaders or refugees or colonists: consequently they were not formed under conditions leading inevitably to the formation of a unitary and consolidated community. If then, despite this, they too founded polis-states, it corroborates the conclusion drawn from other cases that an independent local community tended normally to create a polis-state. On the other hand, no forces ever emerged within the communities or in the immediate environment that might have led to the formation of different kinds of state. Kingship, which eventually might produce a despotic ruler – a necessary condition for the creation of a personal state – had begun to go into decline, when the first polis-states to derive from confederacies of demes were being founded, and had completely fallen into disuse by the time the rest were established. Ethnos-states were formed in Greece by *ethne* that had not previously disintegrated into demes which will then have come together in deme confederacies. The communities that had experienced independence and tested their abilities looked forward to the continuation and improvement of their self-government. The transition from confederacy of demes to polis-state was in line with this development. The confederacy of demes was an archaic formation; the polis-state a modern one, that had been tested and shown to meet the most advanced requirements. There was no margin for choice.

3. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF 'PARTS' (MEPH)

The polis-state of the Megarians was formed from 'parts' (μέρη)

somewhere between 670 and 650 B.C.¹ The confederacy of 'parts' had possibly the character of a state. The unitary state of the Megarians could only have taken the form of a polis-state. For, as we have already noted, the polis-state was the only form of state suitable for a local community;² and the Megarians constituted such a community at the level of the confederacy embracing five local ones at the level of the 'parts'.

As for the circumstances that led to the political unification of the old 'parts', we may presume some change in their relations. The existence of a federation of 'parts' implies not only legal equality between them, but also some similarity in the sphere of economic activity. As long as this similarity, which was naturally at the level of primary production, continued to exist, and there were therefore no commercial exchanges between the 'parts', there was no reason to abandon the system of 'parts' within the framework of a federation. The moment, however, that the settlement of Megara developed into a centre of secondary productive activity and of commerce and became significantly different from the others, two changes will have taken place. Firstly, the economies of Megara and the villages became complementary and mutually dependent: Megara needed agricultural products to feed its inhabitants who did not produce them, and the villages procured non-agricultural products from Megara. Secondly, Megara acquired greater weight in terms of wealth, demography and influence. The first of these changes brought the city of Megara closer to the villages through common self-interest and therefore voluntarily on both sides. The second change meant that Megara was able to contribute more decisively than any of the other 'parts' to the formation of the polis-state. It did not lead, however, to the political predominance of the city over the villages, and in this it followed the more usual model of the relations between the city and the countryside within the framework of the Greek polis-states. Theognis, who lived in the city of Megara, and was moreover an aristocrat, naturally expressed contempt for some of the inhabitants of the countryside. He wrote that at an earlier time they knew neither law nor justice but wore goatskins

¹ v. s., pp. 315ff, 406.

² v. s., pp. 316ff, 332, 406.

until these were reduced to rags.¹ The context reveals, however, that these people had recently become the politically dominant group, an event referred to in other verses by the poet, which also demonstrate that they had recently acquired wealth;² other ancient sources, moreover, refer to a period of popular democracy in the sixth century.³ It appears, therefore, that the group described by Theognis in the first of the passages mentioned above was not foreign to the community of the Megarians, but a section of it, since it was able to acquire full political rights, and even to become the predominant group for a time. This group lived mainly in the villages – hence the reference to goatskins – but also in the city, where it was possible for non-noble craftsmen and merchants to grow wealthy. The biggest part of the landowning and slave-owning consumers will have been concentrated in the city of Megara, where they enjoyed greater security, protected from both external and internal dangers, and where they could procure the commodities produced by the craftsmen and imported by the merchants.

4. POLIS-STATES FROM THE DEMES OF A CONFEDERACY THAT BROKE UP

This change, unlike the previous two, is attested in the case of a large number of polis-states, all in Arcadia,⁴ and took place somewhere between 400 and 371 B.C.⁵ This concentration of the phenomenon in time and place suggests that the same causes applied in all the individual cases. What these causes were may be conjectured on the following grounds: if a deme confederacy was likely to continue to exist as long as all the deme communities of which it was composed were engaged only in agricultural production, and evolved into a polis-state the moment that one of the deme-settlements became a centre of secondary production and of commerce for the whole territory of the

¹ Theognis 53ff.

² Theognis 43ff, 105ff, 161ff, 183ff, 257ff, 279ff, 283ff, 315ff, 341ff, 355ff, 541–542, 603–604, 845ff, 947–948, 1109ff, 1197ff, 1203ff, 1209–1210.

³ Plutarch, *Qu. Gr.* XVIII, p. 295 C-D, LIX, p. 304 E-F.

⁴ v. s., pp. 321ff, 406ff.

⁵ v. s., p. 407.

confederacy, then its dissolution will have been caused by the simultaneous transformation of all the demes, or a large number of them, into centres of this kind. In fact this will have given rise to opposing interests and to trends towards independence, together with the ability to put them into practice.¹ What kind of social forces lay behind these mutations? Taking into account their advanced chronology one may conjecture that they were connected with developments in craft production and commerce. Since the polis-state was, in the Greek world, the usual form of state for a local community, it was natural that each deme community, when it became independent, should establish a polis-state.

5. POLIS-STATE FROM A POLIS-SETTLEMENT THAT BROKE AWAY FROM AN ETHNOS-STATE

The periods of independence enjoyed by the polis-states that broke away from the Macedonian ethnos-state¹ coincide with periods during which this state was weakened, mainly by internal dynastic strife and external warfare, and during which the Athenians in the fifth century, and the Athenians and the Chalcidic Confederacy in the fourth, grew stronger. The combination of these two factors, however, was not enough to produce secessionary tendencies in these particular polis-settlements of the Macedonian state. There must have been other, internal, factors. More specifically, we must posit the existence of factions desiring to rid these settlements of the political tutelage of the king of the Macedonians and the social forces surrounding him. The motives of these factions will have been economic and social. This hypothesis implies a second: that these polis-settlements had really become cities, that is centres of secondary production and of commerce. This latter hypothesis is confirmed by a number of pieces of independent evidence.² The factions that aimed at making the cities independent, and that from time to time succeeded in this aim, were

¹ v. s., pp. 322ff, 408.

² U.Kahrstedt, *Hermes* 81 (1953) 90ff; M.Chatzipoulos, in *La Béotie antique* (1985) 247-256.

primarily democratic forces, and by extension well-disposed to the Athenians and the Chalcidic Confederacy.

The cities of the Macedonian state had self-governing communities; the transition from the status of municipality to that of independent state was marked by the acquiring of independence by the community, which remained the same as before. Conversely, the return of a polis-state to the status of a city of the Macedonian state was accompanied by the loss of independence by the community in question and its relegation to the rank of self-governing community within the framework of the Macedonian kingdom.

B. POLIS-STATES FORMED ALONGSIDE A CONFEDERACY

1. FROM VILLAGE TO POLIS-STATE WITHIN A CONFEDERACY

The genesis of village communities within *ethne*¹ lies outside the scope of this study; I shall not attempt to offer an interpretation of this phenomenon, therefore, but will proceed immediately to deal with the emergence of polis-states from such an origin.

The village communities tended to gain a greater degree of autonomy, because local problems arose in their ranks and relations between them gave rise to friction, while the administrative apparatus of the *ethnos* was not in a position to cope with this new situation. The village communities took the solving of these problems and the defence of their interests into their own hands, developed and strengthened their own administrative apparatus and at the same time became conscious of their own identity. Other centrifugal forces included the demographic and economic power of the community, the large degree of self-sufficiency, which depended initially on agricultural production and then on the development of other sectors, the progress of culture, and the growth of cultural differences.² A settlement equipped with means of defense strongly helped the community resist pressures by other communities of the same *ethnos* or by the authorities of the

¹ v. s., pp. 324ff, 408ff.

² cf. E.Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* II (1893) 80ff, 323ff = 2nd, 3rd, 4th edn III (1937) 297ff, 302.

ethnos. The communities that were advantaged in these respects swiftly developed into polis-states. The rest either spent a longer period at the level of deme, or became part of a deme confederacy, or fell victim to rulers, in which case they lost their identity as communities. Given the appropriate circumstances, however, not only demes and deme confederacies, but even villages that had come under the sway of an external ruler, might evolve into polis-states.

The centrifugal forces, however, were to some extent balanced by centripetal tendencies. The fact that the *ethnos* had not dispersed, but dwelt without loss of continuity in a particular area, gave it considerable weight in both the moral and the military spheres. The shared traditions and shared cults were not weakened; they set some limits to conflicts and acted as a cohesive force in times of internal crisis or external threat. The apparatus of government at *ethnos* level, i.e. the king – a kind of *Heerkönig*, whether hereditary or elected –, the council of elders, and the assembly of fighting men, could still be of some use: the king and the council as arbitrators of differences between communities, the assembly collaborating with them in the taking of decisions relating to threats from an enemy, when the king acted as commander in chief. The progress of the local communities towards independence was thus matched by the transformation of the *ethnos* into a confederacy of these communities.

We now turn to an examination of the particular circumstances under which the individual polis-states and confederacies were created, in those cases where the relevant evidence exists.

Strong aristocratic families established themselves in some Thessalian villages; they owned large tracts of land that included many more settlements of the same type. The villages that were the seats of the aristocratic families were fortified and at some time became centres of non-agricultural activities which resulted in the concentration in them of craftsmen, merchants and small landowners, all of them people who did not depend economically on the large landowners.¹ At this stage, then, these settlements had the minimum requirement of the

¹ U.Kahrstedt, *NGWG* (1924) 130ff; H.D.Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.* (1935, 1969) 31–48; J.A.O.Larsen, *Federal Greek States* (1968) 13ff, 21, 23, 25; A.Giovannini, *Untersuchungen über die Natur und die Anfänge der bundesstaatlichen Sympolitie in Griechenland* (1971) 63–64.

ancient polis-settlement, defensive protection, and also the feature that in the modern perception is the definitive characteristic of the city – they were distinct from the other settlements from the point of view of productive activity. At the same time the inhabitants of these settlements, with the exception of the aristocratic families, acquired the sentiments and the mentality of consolidated communities. In the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., the leading elements of these communities succeeded in taking their administration into their own hands. The first to be emancipated in this way were the urbanized settlements that belonged to the Scopadae, the Aleuadae and the Echekratidae, who were weakened by wars with external foes. The now independent polis communities became polis-states and the ethnos-state of the Thessalians was transformed into a confederacy.¹

In the fifth century, the Aetolians were still organized along the lines of an ethnos-state, with three federated tribes; thus, the emergence of the polis-states and the associated confederacy occurred later than the rise of statehood amongst the Aetolians. As to the conditions under which the polis-states were formed, the date of these events (fourth century) permits the hypothesis that they were connected with the urbanization of the settlements which became the seats of the polis-states.

Acarmania entered the era of polis-states and the associated confederacy earlier than Aetolia, in the fifth century. It may be presumed that here too these political developments were prompted by conditions related to urbanization, the more so as Acarnania was exposed to influences from Corinth and its colonies in the Ionian Sea. It is also likely that, as in Aetolia and Thessaly, the Acarnanian Confederacy of polis-states was preceded by another kind of state, an ethnos-state involving federated tribes.

The model represented by Thessaly, Aetolia and Acarnania does not fit the circumstances attested or supposed for Boeotia and Phocis.

The Boeotian model is characterized by two features. Firstly, not all the polis-states succeeded individual village communities: some of them encompassed one or more villages in addition to the polis-settlement that housed the government of the state. Secondly, the polis-states and

¹ U.Kahrstedt, *op. cit.*; H.D.Westlake, *op. cit.*; J.A.O.Larsen, *loc.cit.*; A.Giovannini, *loc. cit.*

confederacy emerged much earlier, c. 700 B.C. As a result, one cannot associate these events with urbanization, but only with proto-urbanization, and there is little latitude to presume a phase involving an ethnos-state, between that of the original tribal organization and the Confederacy. According to one hypothesis, the federation of the Boeotian polis-states was prompted by the Thebans.¹

Like Thessaly, Aetolia and Acarnania, all the Phocian polis-states emerged out of individual villages. But the presumed date of emergence of the confederacy, in the early sixth century, if not before it, together with the rural character of Phocis, suggests that the political development should be attributed rather to proto-urban than to urban conditions. As for the problem of whether or not the confederacy of polis-states was preceded by an ethnos-state, no answer is possible given the available evidence.

In both East and West Locris, polis-states were probably limited to one settlement. The questions of the economic pre-conditions, and of whether or not statehood is likely to have emerged at the level of the *ethnos* before the rise of the polis-states, cannot be answered.

2. THE CONFEDERACY AND THE POLIS-STATES OF THE IONIANS OF ATTICA, EASTERN BOEOTIA AND CENTRAL EUBOEA

The Ionians are one of the Greek *ethne* who arrived in Greece at the end of the Early Bronze age, a millennium before the creation of the earliest Greek polis-states. They dispersed to many parts of mainland Greece and did not form a unified state of any kind. Later, the Ionians who settled in Attica presumably came to belong to a state of Mycenaean type. This state had overlain the tribal structures of the Ionians without destroying them. The Ionian division into tribes and phratries survived, amongst other things. It is very probable that the Mycenaean state of Attica, like the one which had Pylos as its capital city, had *damoi* at the lowest level of its administration, the more as the term *demos* survived in classical Attica with a meaning related to the Mycenaean one. As we noted on another occasion, the Pylian *damoi* were corporations of people, owned plots of land and enjoyed some degree of self-administration. The fall or perhaps merely the weakening

¹ A. Giovannini, *op. cit.* 46.

of the *anax* and the system that supported his authority opened the way for a new system of state organization. Some *damoi* or communities with settlements of a polis character developed statal structures. At the same time refugees arrived in Attica from areas that they had abandoned in order to escape death or slavery, with which they were threatened from the invaders of that period.¹ Some of them moved on to Euboea and across the Aegean, occasionally in the company of Athenians,² other remained in Attica. The state of the Athenians was not slow to incorporate a section of the newcomers, assigning them to a new tribe that was called the *Hoplites*, or the 'newcomers'.³ Other polis-states will have been formed by the communities that had established themselves from as early as the Submycenaean period in polis-settlements such as Chalcis, Lefkandi and Old Eretria.⁴ The free inhabitants of non-fortified settlements became part of the larger communities of the polis-states. The possibility may not be excluded, however, that some of the federated states had the character of deme systems. The awareness of their common ethnic origins and the continuing threat from the Boeotians and the Dorians of the Megaris and the Peloponnese, who were trying to conquer Attica (an echo of the Dorian invasion can be detected in the legend of Codrus), obliged these independent communities to collaborate in times of need. They therefore united to form a kind of confederacy called, appropriately 'the Ionians'. The kings of the federal communities recognized the king of the Athenians as head of the confederacy of the Ionians, and gave him the title of archon.⁵

3. POLIS-STATE FROM A CONFEDERACY OF DEMES

The attested instances of this development took place within the *ethnos* of the Achaeans⁶ and are dated to the beginning of the fourth century.⁷ It is to be interpreted in the same way as the transformation into a

¹ v. s., p. 412.

² v. s., p. 413.

³ M.B.Sakellariou, in *Europa Festschrift für E. Grumach* (1967) 294–302.

⁴ v. s., p. 413.

⁵ v. s., pp. 325–329.

⁶ v. s., p. 329.

⁷ v. s., pp. 414–415.

polis-state of the 'parts' of Megara.¹ In the case of Achaea, however, each of the deme confederacies became a polis-state and remained within the framework of the ethnos-state, which at the same time became a confederacy. On the other hand, one may presume that the social agents of these developments in Achaea would be similar to those that promoted polis-states in Arcadia, in the first decades of the fourth century, and in Thessaly at the same time and earlier.² By this step the existing communities at the level of the demes fused into a single one at the level of the corresponding confederacy of demes and each of the latter became a polis-community.

C. DISSOLUTION OF CONFEDERACIES INTO POLIS-STATES – SECESSION OF POLIS-STATES FROM CONFEDERACIES

1. DISSOLUTION OF CONFEDERACIES INTO POLIS-STATES

The Ionian Confederacy that extended over Attica, eastern Boeotia and part of Euboea was undermined by structural, economic and geographical factors. This confederacy will not have had a strong structure. The role of the archon will have been similar to that of the *tagos* in the Thessalian *ethnos* and subsequently the Thessalian Confederacy: that is, it will have been confined to leading the confederate military forces in time of war. The federated states, whether *poleis* or deme systems, will have had considerable autonomy in both the political and the economic sphere. The large area covered by the confederacy and its division into a mainland and an island section led to a loosening of its cohesion and the development of centripetal tendencies. The archaeological record is significant in this respect. The Protogeometric pottery of Euboea has fewer affinities with the Protogeometric pottery of Attica and more with the Protogeometric pottery of Thessaly and the Cyclades.³ This is even more striking in view of the fact that the Attic Protogeometric exercised considerable influence on the pottery of regions outside the boundaries of the

¹ v. s., p. 456.

² v. s., pp. 456, 458ff.

³ M.R.Popham, L.H.Sackett, *Excavations at Lefkandi, Euboea, 1964–1966* (1968) 24.

confederacy, not only in neighbouring Argolis, but in distant Thessaly, Crete, the Dodecanese and Ionia.¹ At the same period, Lefkandi had connections with Cyprus,² while Athens had trade links with Crete.³ Later, in the first half of the ninth century, the Attic Geometric style was influential in Boeotia, Corinthia and the Argolis, but not in Euboea, which belonged, along with Thessaly, Scyros and the northern Cyclades, to a zone that continued to produce ceramic objects in a Sub-protogeometric style.⁴ The spread of Attic influence to this zone during the second half of the ninth century⁵ does not imply that Euboea and Attica came closer together, for the latter had equally close, if not closer, relations with Boeotia, Corinthia, the Argolis and Ionia.⁶ Just how distinct were the interests of Attica and Euboea at this time is clear from the following: (a) they each traded separately with the peoples of the East;⁷ (b) the Athenians did not go to Al Mina, as did the Euboeans; (c) the Euboeans began to imitate a number of pottery types from the Cyclades and Corinth.⁸ The persistence of a number of Attic influences in the pottery of Euboea and the Cyclades in the second half of the eighth century⁹ does not mean a reversal of the trend, since (a) equally strong Attic influences can be detected in Boeotia and Thessaly at the same period,¹⁰ while (b) the pottery of Lefkandi is akin to that of Boeotia¹¹ and (c) the Euboeans continued to copy Corinthian pots;¹² moreover (d) the Athenians did not cooperate with the Euboeans in the West and (e) did not involve themselves in colonization, whereas the Eretrians and the Chalcidians were the leaders in this sphere. The demographic and economic rise of the Euboean polis-states as a result of their economic contacts in the East intensified the centrifugal forces

¹ A.M.Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece* (1971) 55–84.

² M.R.Popham, L.H.Sackett, loc. cit.

³ J.N.Coldstream, *Geometric Greece* (1972) 340.

⁴ J.N.Coldstream, op. cit. 148ff, 165, 341ff, cf. A.M.Snodgrass, op. cit. 71.

⁵ J.N.Coldstream, op. cit. 165ff, 344ff.

⁶ J.N.Coldstream, op. cit. 344ff.

⁷ J.N.Coldstream, op. cit. 348ff.

⁸ J.Boardman, *ABSA* 47 (1952) 2.

⁹ J.N.Coldstream, op. cit. 360ff, 367.

¹⁰ J.N.Coldstream, ll. cc.

¹¹ J.Boardman, op. cit. 3.

¹² J.Boardman, op. cit. 2; A.M.Snodgrass, op. cit. 71ff.

within them. Some distant regions of Attica, too, which were remote and isolated, will have had only poor and intermittent relations with Athens.

The Boeotian Confederacy was dissolved in 457 and 386 B.C. under the pressure of external factors; on both occasions it was reconstituted as soon as this pressure was relieved. The first reconstitution was the work of the oligarchs; the second, in 378 occurred at a time when the democratic forces were in the ascendancy.¹

The Phocian Confederacy was also broken up as a result of external factors, in 346 B.C., and was reconstituted after the external conjuncture had changed.²

The reasons for the dissolution of the Achaean Confederacy, at the end of the fourth century³ are not known.⁴

2. SECESSION OF POLIS-STATES FROM CONFEDERACIES

The withdrawal of Plataea and Hysiae from the Boeotian Confederacy in 519 B.C.⁵ was made possible by the support of a foreign power, Athens.⁶ There must also have been internal factors, however. Some internal factor also lies behind the fact that the Thespeians aligned themselves with the Greeks who resisted the Persians, while the Boeotian Confederacy medized: the Thespeians had a democratic government, while the other polis-states in the Confederacy had aristocratic regimes.⁷ Similarly, in Plataea at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War,⁸ and in Orchomenus in 424,⁹ the aristocrats tended to be federalists, and the democrats secessionists. The situation was different in the latter city when it revolted from the Boeotian

¹ v. s., pp. 331, 417.

² v. s., pp. 331, 417.

³ v. s., pp. 331, 417-418.

⁴ J.A.O.Larsen, *op. cit.* 215, attributed the dissolution of the Achaean League at the end of the fourth century B.C. to practical reasons; A.Giovannini, *op. cit.* 71, to Macedonian pressure.

⁵ v. s., pp. 331, 418.

⁶ Herodotus VI 108.

⁷ J.A.O.Larsen, *op. cit.* 39.

⁸ Thucydides II 2. 2-4, II 71, 1-78, 4.

⁹ Thucydides II 76, 3.

Confederacy and aligned itself with the Spartans.¹ The involvement of the Spartans means that this movement cannot be attributed to the democratic forces; we are thus left with the hypothesis that the revolt of the Orchomenians was due to their old rivalry with the Thebans, who played a dominating role within the Confederacy.

The causes of the separatist tendencies in the Achaean polis-state Pellene are not easy to discern.

SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS

In this chapter we have dealt not with a single problem, as in the two previous ones, but with a nexus of problems, which may be summarized as follows:

I The Conditions and causes

A Of statehood in general.

B Of the form of the polis-state in particular:

1 in the case of polis-states born directly out of unitary communities:

a as independent polis-states;

b as members of a confederacy of polis-states;

2 in the case of polis-states born out of a confederacy of demes or 'parts':

a as independent polis-states;

b as members of a confederacy of polis-states;

3 in the case of polis-states born at the same time as their founders broke away:

a from a confederacy of demes;

b from an ethnos-state;

4 in the case of polis-states detaching themselves from a confederacy of polis-states.

II The social forces

A Landed aristocracy

B Elements engaged in manufacturing and commerce.

¹ Xenophon, *Hell.* III 5, 17.

I

A It is a fact that the definition of 'state' inevitably suggests in general terms the character of the circumstances and causes of a state being established. Thus, if 'state' is conceived in terms of a mechanism instituted by a class with the intention of securing its domination over other classes, the formation of a state presupposes the class stratification of society. In the cases examined in this chapter, we made the following statements:

— The earliest of the polis-states within our field of vision are the Athenian and the Chalcidian, both of them members of a confederacy that extended from Attica to central Euboea. The social forces which created these states were aware of statehood, since they had been incorporated into a state of the Mycenaean type. The causes of the dissolution of the latter are beyond the scope of the present study. It is nevertheless reasonable to suppose that conditions requiring the existence of a state had continued without interruption in this area since the Mycenaean age. One may presume a class division, principally into landowners and landless.

— Everywhere in the Greek commonwealth, possession of land continued to be the sole factor in economic, social and political superiority down to the fifth century B.C. Slaveowning, in addition to being at that time less important than landowning, followed the same cleavages and therefore played a secondary, supplementary role. Class division, into landowners (who were also slaveowners), and landless, arose in two ways: either the men of a conquering community divided plots of land and numbers of serfs (who were not the same as slaves) amongst themselves; or property was transferred from some families to others within the community. The second process took place in Attica much later than the formation of the Athenian state.

— It was only in the absence of a landed aristocracy inside some communities that economic, social and political superiority devolved upon elements engaged in occupations in the secondary or tertiary sectors of the economy. This seems to have happened in settlements in Thessaly and Macedonia which acquired an urban character in Classical times.

B The form of state described by the ancients as *polis* was not planned. It was the natural result of the combination of three factors: a

polis-settlement, a community related to this settlement, and a state connected with this community. Whenever the decision-making element of a unitary community proceeded to institute a state machine, the outcome was a polis-state only if this community had been shaped or reshaped in relation and with reference to a polis-settlement; the transition from a confederacy of demes or 'parts' to a polis-state was connected with the creation of a unitary community out of the local ones around a single polis-settlement. However, only the earliest polis-states were original state forms. The founders of polis-states that followed the first ones were aware of the form of state which was to result. They did not invent a different form of state because accumulated experience had shown it to be very satisfactory. In addition to this positive factor, the polis-state became the typical form of Greek state in Archaic and Classical times, so long as it did not have to wage wars against states of other forms of state, such as the ethnos-state (the Macedonian) or the monarchical state (already prefigured by the Syracusan tyrants).

Some polis-states were federated, however. Before the Hellenistic period, confederacies of polis-states coincided with an ethnos, with the exception of the polis-states in the Chalcidice. Apart from this, and the short-lived Arcadian confederacy (370–363 B.C.) these confederacies seem to have been formed along with their federated polis-states, the two evolving in an interconnected manner; the elements that wielded power in these polis-states were led by some reason or reasons to refrain from acquiring complete sovereignty. These reasons would have included the strength of common traditions, culture and feelings which were shared by the entire *ethnos*; a prolonged external threat directed against it; the existence of one polis-state desirous and capable of imposing itself over the others. In Thessaly (most likely) and in Aetolia and Acarnania (presumably), the simultaneous rise of polis-states and confederacies was promoted under conditions of urbanization and occurred at varying intervals after the transformation of the respective pre-statal *ethne* to ethnos-states. Boeotia, Phocis and East and West Locris reached the stage of polis-states and confederacies earlier than Thessaly, Aetolia and Acarnania (Boeotia c. 700, Phocis and East and West Locris in the early sixth century?). These developments may therefore be associated with conditions of proto-urbanization. Given the date of the rise of the polis-states and confederacy in Boeotia, one

may wonder whether the original tribal organization of the Boeotian ethnos had had time to acquire a statal structure before these events. In contrast, polis-states and confederacies seem to have emerged in Phocis and both East and West Locris late enough to allow the hypothesis that they occurred after a state had been established at the level of the respective *ethne*; but we are not in a position to rule out the opposite.

Sovereign confederacies of demes were transformed into polis-states in Sicyonia in the early seventh century, in Mantinea in the late sixth or early fifth century and in Elis in 471 B.C. In Sicyonia and in Elis a new settlement was founded in addition to the pre-existing ones. It initially attracted landowners-consumers, thus entering an era of proto-urbanization from the outset. With the founding of the *polis* of Mantinea, the pre-existing villages were abandoned by their inhabitants, who were concentrated in the new settlement, also under conditions of proto-urbanization. Proto-urbanization and the polis-state also emerged simultaneously in the Megaris, before the middle of the seventh century; here, unlike the previous cases, no new settlement was founded, and the existing ones continued to be inhabited. Confederacies of demes that were federated to the Achaean *koinon* became polis-states without breaking away from it, however. Presumably, the main settlement of each group of demes attained the level of an urban economy at this time (early fourth century), and outstripped the other settlements in this respect.

It was also in the fourth century that some confederacies of demes in Arcadia were dissolved, the demes becoming independent polis-states, presumably under conditions of urbanization. The same conditions seem to have prevailed in the settlements which seceded from the Macedonian ethnos-state to become independent polis-states in the course of the 2nd half of the fifth and the 1st half of the fourth century.

The dissolution of the confederacy of the Ionian polis-states in Attica, eastern Boeotia and central Euboea was fostered by geographical fragmentation, lack of communications and the development of local networks around several proto-urban centres, each pursuing its own policy in manufacturing and commerce, foreign relations and internal affairs.

In all other cases where confederacies of polis-states were dissolved, the stimulus was supplied by internal separatist movements or foreign intervention, or a combination of both.

II

With the regard to the social forces that founded states (single or federated *poleis*, confederacies of demes or of 'parts'); or transformed earlier states into *poleis*; or led former federal polis-states to complete sovereignty; or raised former federal demes to the rank of polis-states; or succeeded in achieving this for communities that enjoyed only a limited degree of self-administration within the framework of a state – we noticed that these forces consisted either of landowners, or of elements engaged in secondary and tertiary occupations. Landowners are identified or presumed in all the cases of these processes that took place before the Classical period, and in many which occurred during it. Craftsmen and traders are to be postulated as the agents of the following events: (a) the creation of independent polis-states out of the communities of the polis-settlements which had evolved inside the Macedonian kingdom (fifth and early fourth centuries); (b) the creation of polis-states within the ethnos-state of the Thessalians by communities of polis-settlements which got rid of their feudal masters (fifth and early fourth centuries); (c) the secession of the Orchomenians from the Boeotian Confederacy (in 424 B.C.); (d) the formation of polis-states in Arcadia out of single demes, following the dissolution of deme confederacies (early fourth century); (e) the transformation of deme confederacies into polis-states inside the Achaean Confederacy (early fourth century).

Foreign intervention also played a part in the creation of polis-states or the dissolution of confederacies of polis-states, or in the other processes discussed above. It is attested for the foundation of the polis-state of the Mantineans from a deme confederacy, at the initiative of the Argives; of the polis-state of the Heraeans, also from a deme confederacy, at the instigation of the Lacedaemonians; and, conversely, for the dissolution of the Boeotian Confederacy in 386 B.C. dictated by the Lacedaemonians and the Great King; the *dioikismos* of the Mantineans in 385 imposed by the Lacedaemonians; and the dismemberment of the Phocian Confederacy in 346 B.C., at the behest of Philip of Macedon. It may be supposed that the dissolution of the Boeotian Confederacy in 457 and the secessions of Macedonian towns, which were then transformed into independent polis-states, occurred thanks to the encouragement of the Athenians.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

A SYNTHESIS OF CONCLUSIONS AND SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

'Polis-state' is only a concept; but this concept represents the sum of all the features shared by all the individual polis-states of which we have some knowledge. The diversity of the polis-states does not prevent us from forming a consistent overall picture.

The polis-state was born and diffused within the Greek commonwealth. It is the city-state, not the polis-state, that is also to be found in many other civilizations. Not all polis-states further acquired the character of a city-state at some point of their existence.

The first polis-states were created c. 1000 B.C. They were located in Attica and Euboea. This kind of state rapidly gained ground in mainland Greece and the islands, and on the coast of Asia Minor. All the colonies founded after 750 B.C. were polis-states. Societies that were initially organized as confederacies of demes, or of 'parts' sooner or later followed the same evolution. So, too, did the communities that broke away from the kingdom of the Macedonians or from the lands of the Thessalian lords. Philip II of Macedonia dissolved or destroyed several polis-states and created conditions making the foundation of new polis-states impossible without his consent. The polis-states established by him did not enjoy true independence. Alexander and the Hellenistic monarchs further restricted the initiative and prerogatives remaining to the citizens of the *poleis*, whether those founded by them, or older *poleis* brought under their control. The period of the foundation of new, genuinely sovereign polis-states had thus come to an end by the middle of the fourth century B.C. Estimates of the number of polis-states in existence by this time range from five hundred to fifteen hundred.

From the time of its appearance down to the middle of the fourth century B.C., the polis-state repeatedly proved itself to be a type of state far more structured, progressive and successful than any other within the Greek commonwealth. This accounts for the fact that it supplanted all other kinds of state and remained the last Greek creation in the realm of social organization prior to the rise of Philip II. The polis-

states were too weak from every point of view to resist Philip, Alexander, the Hellenistic monarchs, and the Romans. Having been demoted to the rank of client state, each *polis* was condemned eventually to becoming a municipality.

The present study has not been concerned with the history of the polis-state, however: it deals only with its definition and its emergence.

I

Without an exact definition of the polis-state one cannot undertake any study of it. It is, to begin with, indispensable in order to identify individual polis-states wherever and so long they existed and to avoid counting as polis-states entities that were not.

An essential pre-condition for any study relating to the polis-state is that only data assembled from actual polis-states should be taken into consideration, and that this should be drawn from as many polis-states, and from as many periods of their existence, as possible.

Ever since the beginnings of classical scholarship, scholars have, without exception, used the term *polis* to express two concepts: 'city' and 'state' or 'kind of state'. Dissent from the second meaning has been voiced only in recent times, and these views have met with only very limited acceptance. One of them regards the *polis* as a kind of constitution; another considers it to be a kind of 'community'; and a third maintains that the historical reality for which the ancients used the term *polis* cannot be defined by modern scholars.

In this study I have attempted to assemble a much larger body of evidence pertaining to the character of the *polis* than that used hitherto, and to assess it according to the most exacting syllogistic and methodological requirements. The evidence in question consists of (a) ancient testimonia relating to the structures, institutions, functions and various properties of a number of individual *poleis*; (b) reflections of reality in some of the meanings of the term *polis*; and (c) the opinions of ancient authors regarding the *polis* and constitutions, their definitions of the *polis* and of *politai*, and descriptions by them of the power relations within the *polis*.

The ancient testimonia have the same value as the testimony of any eyewitness. All together form a picture of the *polis* which fully corresponds to the modern idea of 'state'. In fact, the *polis* seems to us

to be both the organization of a stratified society, and the mechanism by which a particular social class dominated the others. It was sovereign and possessed a territory within which it exercised its sovereignty and maintained a framework of productive and distributive processes. It had experience of many kinds of constitution known to us from modern and recent history. Its governmental mechanism covered the legislative, judicial and executive realms, and had the means of coercion at its disposal. Its *politai* were no different from the citizens of modern states.

The term *polis* acquired many other meanings, including those of 'citizens', 'popular assembly', 'political rights', 'political life' and 'territory of a state'. All of these presuppose the meaning of 'state'.

The descriptions and definitions by Aristotle of the *polis* and its content, functions, administration and properties contain all the essential features of the 'state'. The philosopher defines *polis* as a perfect and definitive, self-sufficient and most sovereign association. He states that it was governed according to a *politeia* (constitution), and describes the different kinds of *politeia*, which correspond to modern constitutions. He informs us that its governmental mechanism was invested with legislative, judicial and executive power. His definitions of *politai* suggest our concept 'citizens'. Finally, the definition by the Stoics of the *polis* as an organization of people dwelling together and ruled by a common law prefigures one of the modern definitions of the 'state'.

A closer examination of the evidence shows that *polis* meant a kind of 'state'. Scholars are unanimous up to this point; disagreement begins from the moment they attempt to define precisely the features that distinguish the *polis* as a specific form of 'state'. In reviewing the evidence, we found that there was only one feature common to all *poleis*: they were intrinsically connected with a human group, the properties of which are such that it corresponds to the concept of 'community' in the sense of the German *Gemeinschaft*. Historically, this community represented a continuation, through gradual mutations, of certain kinds of pre-statal communities which were in their turn rooted in even earlier communities of a tribal character. As a result, it retained for a long time the archaic structure of a group based on kinship, and ultimately the semblance of such a structure. Other survivals from the past can be seen in the spirit and a number of

functions of the subdivisions of the polis community. This spirit and these functions sustained a solidarity which successfully overcame the dissident tendencies arising from internal social and political conflicts. Externally, the polis community was sharply defined with respect to other entities. Firstly, it severed its bonds with related communities which had followed their own fortunes. Secondly, it turned in on itself in the face of other population groups dwelling in the same territory, such as metics, freedmen, slaves or serfs. Thirdly, it did not coincide precisely even with its own *polis*: (1) The majority of the polis communities were older than their *poleis*, and constituted only a part of them, the *polis* embracing the entire society. (2) The polis community and the polis-state occupied different realms: in the latter there were social and political inequalities, whereas the community never departed from the egalitarian traditions it inherited from the pre-statal community. (3) The community continued to be structured in terms of kinship bonds encompassing phratries and families (eventually also *phylai* at a level superior of that of phratries); conversely, the state introduced into both public and private law the principle of individuality. Though they were different entities, however, the polis-state and the polis community were interconnected. Relations of exclusivity existed between them. Every polis-state was founded, maintained and used by a part of the community. No citizen of the polis-state was not a member of the polis community. Decisions relating to the latter were taken at the level of the polis-state, and executed by means of its machinery. No part of any income received by the state from conquests, booty, the exploitation of slaves, serfs, metics or allies was distributed outside the community. Although the polis-state was dominated by a part of the community, it was the whole community that animated and sustained the state. The community needed the state, and the state needed the community.

It was not only polis-states that were connected with communities, however, but also the states of demes, deme confederacies, confederacies of 'parts', and *ethne*. Furthermore, all ancient communities related to a state are to some degree comparable to the 'nation' of modern states. These observations might to some extent weaken the role of the polis community as the *species specifica* of the polis-state, if it did not differ in many respects both from other ancient communities and from the modern 'nation'.

Firstly, polis communities were formed, or perhaps merely reshaped, in and around polis-settlements. This was also true of the deme communities on which deme-states were founded. The community connected with a 'deme-system' differed from both the preceding two, in that it was not a primary, but a secondary community. The community of an *ethnos* differed from all three in that it was not connected with a settlement. This might also be true of communities of 'parts'. Modern 'nations' were formed under conditions very different from those surrounding any of these ancient communities.

Secondly, in terms of its structures, the polis community was innovative when compared with the other ancient kinds of community, but old-fashioned in comparison with the modern 'nation'. All ancient communities had, in the not-too-remote past, known a phase of pre-political organization which itself had succeeded a tribal phase. The polis community had certainly passed through more stages than the other types of community, but it still retained a large number of archaic structures. Even in the more advanced polis communities the ancient divisions and sub-divisions continued to function or, more significantly, new ones were created according to the old model. They also tried to retain *de jure* some manifestations of the principle of kinship after the principle of territoriality had begun to have its effect. Modern 'nations' rely exclusively on territoriality.

Thirdly, the polis community and its sub-divisions carried out functions far more numerous and varied than those of a modern 'nation', and, moreover, did so far more intensively. The traditional sub-divisions of the community, and their artificially created successors, behaved as groups of kindred families united by common cults and festivals, and were in addition useful to the state as groupings for military and electoral purposes. Even the sum total of associations in a modern society, whether religious, cultural or other, does not cover the entire spectrum of the polis community. Furthermore, the life of the polis community was intense, and there was a high degree of communion between it and its members, as well as between the members themselves. Privacy was limited.

The generally accepted view that identifies the *polis* with the 'city-state' is erroneous. It is based on the view that a polis-settlement was comparable to a city. Yet a polis-settlement did not always have the features of a city and, conversely, cities rarely have the decisive feature

of a polis-settlement. Besides, a city-state is currently considered to be a state in which a city rules over other settlements, even towns, whose inhabitants have no political rights, are socially and juridically inferior, and have obligations towards the sovereign community in the city. It is claimed that this was the case with the rural population of the polis-states. This was exceptional before the Hellenistic period, however. The majority of Greek polis-states had a single settlement, of polis type, in which were concentrated every category of the population, privileged and non-privileged alike. There were also polis-states which had both a polis-settlement and also one or more villages, with all social groups living indiscriminately both inside and outside the polis-settlement. Furthermore, cities evolved from villages at varying intervals before they obtained their independence and thus became city-states, whereas polis-states were mostly formed before their polis-settlement was urbanized — not to speak of the Spartan polis-state, which never acquired an urban settlement. Moreover, city-states were established by communities that included a high proportion of craftsmen, traders, bankers and other professionals from the secondary and tertiary sectors, who had got rid of their feudal masters. With few exceptions, the polis-states were founded by landed aristocracies. Last but not least, the polis-states were based on a community of the kind described above, which in most cases existed before the establishment of the polis-state, whereas the commune of the European city-state was never anterior to the state, but was shaped within it, extended no further than the families of the citizens, and lacked unity. In fact, the citizens of European city-states did not constitute a coherent group: their commune was a federation of professional corporations with conflicting interests, which did not enjoy equal rights; and the citizens themselves felt no attachment to it. It is thus clear that it was only a part of the polis-state that further acquired the character of a city-state, or rather of a kind of city-state; the difference between the two being that in the Greek commonwealth even city-states rested upon a human base that was not comparable to the commune of the European city-state.

II

The term 'polis-state' denotes, in addition to the concept described above, a phenomenon of long duration and wide diffusion in ancient

Greek history. This phenomenon may be studied by means of conclusions drawn from the observation of the essential trends and behaviour of as many individual polis-states as possible.

One of the main issues in the history of the polis-state is the question of its emergence. This embraces three specific problems: 1) whence did the polis-state rise? 2) when and where were polis-states founded? 3) why and how did polis-states come into existence? It is the definition of the *polis* phenomenon that may be expected to identify it at any point of its existence. The task of identification, however, is more delicate when one is faced with the preliminary, formative stages of the phenomenon under study than when dealing with it in its mature form.

1

Polis-states were not the typical product of a single process. They sprang from a variety of different roots, and in a variety of different ways, as a result of the multiplicity of factors involved and the diversity of the ways in which these could be combined. Firstly, the processes involved had not one, but two starting points: the collapse of the Mycenaean state in Attica opened the way for the influential elements in some of the deme communities to establish states; all the other processes ultimately go back to groups of invaders or refugees or colonists. Secondly, some of these groups remained unitary and autonomous throughout the successive phases of their history before, during and after the formation of their polis-states; some groups, which were unitary but connected to others, created federal polis-states; yet others seceded from unitary ethnos-states or from federations. Thirdly, some of the processes involved only one stage, other required more. Fourthly, there was no uniform sequence of stages. (I) A process involving only one stage led directly from a stateless autonomous community to a polis-state. (II) The longer processes followed a variety of patterns: (a) Stateless village communities formed a confederacy of demes which ultimately became a polis-state; in some cases the deme communities, and the confederacy formed by them, adopted state structures prior to the conversion of the confederacy into a polis-state. (b) Stateless village communities formed a confederacy of demes which was ultimately dissolved, each of the communities establishing its own polis-state; there is no evidence for a phase at which the confederacy

formed a state, but this is possible. (c) A stateless community larger than those previously mentioned, and dispersed throughout a number of villages, divided its territory into a number of 'parts', thus creating a confederacy from above. (d) Polis communities that had not detached themselves from their *ethnos* created polis-states, whereas the *ethnos* still retained its cohesion and had authorities who were entrusted with responsibilities that remained outside the competence of the polis-states; as a result, the formation of the polis-states kept pace with the formation of the confederacy uniting them. Secessions of polis-states from the confederacy were exceptional and short-lived. (e) A more complex process is represented by a combination of the first and fourth. As in the first process, stateless village communities formed a confederacy of demes; and, like the polis-states in the fourth process, the confederacies of demes in the fifth constituted a federation. At a later stage, as in the first process, the confederacies of demes became polis-states; at the same time, as in the fourth process, again, polis-states retained their unity within the framework of their *ethnos*, thereby giving birth to a confederacy of polis-states. Here, too, secessions of polis-states from the confederacy were exceptional and short-lived. (f) Under changed circumstances, a stateless *ethnos* became a unitary ethnus-state; subsequently, some of the settlements within this state became towns and their population acquired a degree of municipal administration; a number of these municipalities broke away from the ethnus-state and became sovereign for a time.

Generally speaking, no polis-state was born directly out of an *ethnos*, in that no *ethnos* was transformed directly into a polis-state, or gave rise to a number of polis-states, without the intervention of intermediate stages. In all the cases involving long processes, however, the original communities were the direct offshoots of *ethne*. The genetic relationship between the pre-statal *ethnos* and the polis-states is in some cases confirmed by the retention in the latter of structures and institutions going back to pre-political societies in general, and to specific *ethne* in particular. The triad that is to be found in polis-states, of a basileus (later, elected magistrates), a council and an assembly, is of tribal origin. The term *phratría* derives from an Indo-European word **bhrater* ('brother'), which did not survive in Greek. This, and a number of other indications, suggest that the institution of the phratry goes back to the time of the formation of the Indo-European societies.

The view that the phratries were invented by the Greek polis-states for purposes of administration does not explain why settled societies should conceive of an institution based not on territoriality, but on kinship. Sparta and the Dorian polis-states in Crete were museums of institutional archaisms. Numerous communities in the Dorian and Ionian polis-states retained specific features of their respective *ethne*, and have the appearance of small-scale copies of them. As in the case of the phratries, the hypothesis that the Dorian and Ionian *phylai* were invented by the polis-states for administrative purposes is invalidated by the nature of the *phylai*, which is not consistent with territoriality. When they set forth, the groups of Dorian invaders and of Ionian colonists seem to have been formed in such a way as to include members from all the *phylai*. We know of examples of groups of Greek colonists in historical times that were composed of members of different families, phratries and *phylai*.

2

Since no polis-state could exist without a polis-settlement, a community and a state coming together, the date at which each polis-state was created was the precise time that one of these three elements was added to the other two. In some cases, the last element to make its appearance was statehood, in others the polis-settlement; in every case there was an already existing community which was related either to a polis-settlement, or to a deme, or to a group of demes or 'parts'.

Polis-states came into being over many centuries. The earliest were formed c. 1000 B.C., the latest came into existence about the middle of the fourth century B.C. The chronological limits are narrower in the case of the various types of polis-state, however. Thus, unitary communities deriving from groups of invaders or refugees or colonists (the latter setting forth from countries which did not yet have polis-states) took the decisive step some time between 900 and 670 B.C. Communities of federated demes coalesced into a single community that founded a polis-state some time between the beginning of the seventh and the beginning of the fourth centuries. The only instance known to us of a polis-state succeeding a confederacy of 'parts' seems to be located between 670 and 650 B.C. Instances of a 'deme-system' being dissolved into a number of polis-states occurred in the early

fourth century. All the cases involving the secession of municipalities from an ethnos-state and their promotion to polis-states occurred in the fifth century and the first decades of the fourth. Of the cases of the parallel formation of polis-states and the confederacies embracing them, the earliest goes back to c. 1000 B.C.; others followed in the seventh, sixth, fifth and early fourth centuries. The process in which there was initially a confederacy of 'deme-systems' and eventually a confederacy of polis-states, each of them born out of a 'deme-system', is first attested in the early fourth century. In the last category of processes, the earliest example of the dissolution of a confederacy of polis-states into independent polis-states took place c. 760 B.C., the latest in the early third century; secessions of polis-states from their confederacy occurred between the close of the sixth century and the sixth decade of the fourth century B.C.

A complete chronicle of the rise of polis-states is not possible given the evidence available at present.

3

The question of the factors that caused the polis-state is a composite one. This is due to three main reasons. Firstly, the problems: 'why a state?' and 'why a polis-state?' must inevitably be dealt with separately. Secondly, a distinction has to be drawn between the conditions and the agents of these two events. Thirdly, the different processes leading to the formation of polis-states have to be considered individually. Since all these problems have been noted and taken into account separately in the chapter dealing with the question of causation, it is not only necessary but also useful to proceed here to a synthesis.

Statehood was everywhere and at all times stimulated by situations requiring a system to regulate relations of dominance and subordination. The circumstances surrounding the founding of the *poleis* cover a wide spectrum. (1) The social stratification of Attica in the Archaic period is comparable with that of a Mycenaean state: at the top there was a landed aristocracy, at the bottom, various categories of landless people, and in the middle, a class of small landowners. It would seem, then, that the collapse of the Mycenaean state of Athens did not carry away the social structures. The same pattern may be presumed for the social structure of post-Mycenaean Arcadia which,

like Attica, was scarcely invaded by migrant groups. The landed aristocracy of Attica established a number of states *c.* 1000, as did the landed aristocracy of the communities that migrated from Attica to Euboea. The emergence of post-Mycenaean states in Arcadia cannot be dated, but they too are likely to have been the work of the local landed aristocracies. (2) Although having experience of a state, the colonists from Attica and the refugees from other parts of the Mycenaean cultural area who crossed the Aegean, formed stateless societies in their new homes. The refugees left their homes under conditions in which former class distinctions had disappeared: landlords no longer existed. In their settlements in the Aegean islands and beyond, the refugees distributed amongst themselves shares of land of more or less equal value. The colonists from Attica set forth in order, but the distinction between landlords and landless disappeared since the latter took part in the distribution of land. The communities deriving from colonists or refugees, or both, were able for a while to manage their affairs and to wage war without having a state at their disposal. The need for it was felt within each society by members of a nascent dominant class. Class stratification came about mainly under one of the following two conditions: either a community subjugated a foreign population: or a community broke up into classes as a result of the transfer of landed property from some members of it to some other. In the former case, the entire community became a landed class holding sway over serfs and slaves. In the latter, a minority of large landowners had to impose themselves upon far more numerous landless clients and slaves, and, in addition, to control the small proprietors who formed an intermediate social class. (3) The Greek *ethne* that did not share in the Mycenaean civilization encompassed stateless societies. Within the area they occupied in historical times there is evidence for incipient class division in the states founded by Dorian communities in the Peloponnese and Crete, and also in those founded by the Eleans and the Thessalians. The distribution of land and the subjugation of earlier inhabitants occurred in all cases. However, bearing in mind the small size of the migrating Dorian groups, it may be presumed that they were unable to dominate over serfs until they had increased their military force. Similarly, the colonists that set forth from Megara, Achaia and Locris to Sicily and southern Italy, even if they set forth from political communities, divided the land in lots of equal value, and subjugated the indigenous

populations. It may be presumed that in this case, too, some time elapsed before they proceeded to the latter step, and that meanwhile they had no reason for establishing state mechanisms. (4) Non-sovereign communities, some of them in territories belonging to Thessalian feudal lords, others within the Macedonian kingdom, succeeded in winning their independence. Statehood was a natural consequence of independence. Nevertheless it may be presumed that the influential members of these communities, who seem to have been the elements engaged in industry and trade, dominated a stratified society encompassing free wage-earners and slaves.

The founders of the early polis-states deliberately established states, but they had no idea of the form these states were to take. This particular form of state was the natural product of its specific relation to a specific kind of community. Both this community and its relations with the state have been described above. Any state had the form of a polis-state from the moment that, and so long as, it fulfilled this condition. Those who founded polis-states later than the early ones, or transformed states of other kinds into polis-states, had the model of the polis-state in mind.

The foundation of a polis-state, whether spontaneous or conscious, did not affect the character of the pre-existing polis community. In contrast, the transition from an earlier form of state to a polis-state involved changing the earlier kind of community into a polis community. Each deme had its own community, and a confederacy of demes corresponded with an association of deme communities; thus, the coalescing of a group of federated demes kept pace with the coalescing of the deme communities into a single unitary community, whereas the creation of a polis-state out of each of the demes of a confederacy as it dissolved was accompanied by the dissociation of the deme communities.

Processes leading from a confederacy of demes or of 'parts' to a polis-state can be observed at various times ranging from as early as the beginning of the seventh century to as late as the beginning of the fourth century B.C. Many of the polis-states that originated in this way were fully sovereign; others were members of a confederacy. At the same time that the political step was taken, we may note that in Sicyonia and in Elis a new settlement was added to the old ones, and that this became the capital of the state: in Mantineatis the entire

population of the old settlements moved to a new one; in Megaris (abolition of 'parts'), and Arcadia (dissolution of confederacies of demes and emergence of polis-states out of each deme) and in Achaea (transformation of confederacies of demes into polis-states, which remained members of the *koinon* of the Achaeans) no new settlement was founded. However, all these processes share a common feature: they went hand in hand with proto-urbanization (until the foundation of Elis, in 471) or with urbanization (for Arcadia and Achaea, in the early fourth century). It seems, then, that the form of the *polis* emerged in conjunction with incipient proto-urbanization or, in later times, urbanization. More generally, deme-states and confederacies of demes or of 'parts' were unable to withstand the conditions connected with and resulting from proto-urbanization or, *a fortiori*, from urbanization. In contrast, no polis-state was transformed into another kind of state as a result of internal developments. This implies that the economic conditions, productive forces and power relationships within the polis-state did not evolve to the point where such a transformation became inevitable.

There was an additional factor contributing to the expansion of the form of state described as *polis*. From the time of its emergence this form of state repeatedly demonstrated its superiority to all other contemporary forms of state experienced by the Greeks, particularly in its ability to adapt itself to new conditions. To make the change from a different type of state to a polis-state was thought to be profitable not only by and for the community involved, but also by and for its allies; in contrast, its enemies considered it to be prejudicial to their interests. Thus we see allies urging the formation of polis-states and powerful enemies dictating their dissolution.

As with all the states founded before the Classical period, so in all the cases involving a transition from a different form of state to that of polis-state that occurred in this same period, the initiative came from the landed aristocracies. These were also the agents of proto-urbanization which was connected with the political advance. In Classical times the stimulus to the polis-state came mainly from elements involved in manufacturing and trade and associated with urbanization. Such elements were obviously related to urbanization in Thessaly and Macedonia from the fifth century onwards, and were behind the elevation of the urbanized settlements to polis-states. In

Thessaly these did not break their bonds with the pre-existing Thessalian ethnos-state but became federal members of it, whereas in Macedonia they detached themselves from the Macedonian ethnos-state. Elements of a similar character are to be posited in connection with the dissolution of confederacies of demes into sovereign polis-states in Arcadia, and the transformation of the confederacies of demes federated to the Achaean *koinon* into federal polis-states of this *koinon*.

III

Although I chose to describe the *polis* by the means of definition rather than of the 'ideal type', and although I did not widen the field of study beyond the issue of the emergence of this form of state, I have tried throughout to keep in view, behind the definition of the *polis*, an image of its essence or nature, and, behind its emergence, a comprehensive idea of its subsequent evolution.

The essence of the polis-state encompasses its definition. That the *polis* was a kind of state defined by its particular relation to a particular kind of community is only the central and decisive element of its essence or nature. Other elements include the forces in action within the *polis* and the interplay of these forces. A further set of such elements consists of particularities in the realm of the state machine, in that of functions, prerogatives and missions entrusted to the state, and in the way the ancient Greeks felt and lived it. The forces in action and the interplay between them also affected the evolution of the polis-state after its emergence. It is to be stressed, however, that by the evolution of the polis-state is meant not the sum of the particular histories of polis-states, but a synthesis of the tendencies and achievements common to them all.

Since both the essence or nature and the history of the polis-states are affected by the assessment of the forces in action and the interaction between them, it is worth sketching this issue as a background to the study of the definition and emergence of this particular historical phenomenon.

The *polis* is often described as if it were an organism without constituent parts and opposing tendencies within it. Furthermore, it is

sometimes presented in anthropomorphic terms. Other errors result from projecting onto the *polis* the features, qualities, tendencies, or actions of a section of its population, mainly of the community related to it, or of particular social forces, whether aristocratic or democratic.

After the formation of stratified societies and the establishment of a state in each of them, the state (which did not inevitably take the form of a polis-state from the very beginning) took over the administration of both the community and the society. In the polis-states in particular, the community was not dissolved within the society; it was only integrated into it, and continued to carry out many activities of its own. Thus, in every polis-state actions took place at three levels — that of the society, that of the polis-community, and that of the state — and interactions between them operated in all three directions. The polis community was at the centre of this interplay, however. This was a result of its role as the bearer of the state and as its ultimate *raison d'être*; of its being interwoven with the entire society; and of the fact that it was that section of the society that dominated it through the state mechanism. Scholarship has almost completely ignored the polis community when analysing the polis-state. Consequently, some scholars have wrongly attributed manifestations of the polis community either to the polis-state or to other factors.

Notwithstanding the social and political conflicts between its members, the polis community functioned like a huge family in matters that remained outside the particular interests of the groups constituted within it. Its small size prevented it from splintering and helped to maintain its cohesion. Links based on kinship, whether genuine or fictive, withstood new ties based on cohabitation, except in the case of communities that came to incorporate large numbers of foreign elements. All these and other manifestations of conservatism are just as striking as the rapidity of constitutional change, and the political mobility at the level of the state, or the creativity and innovation at the level of the arts and sciences. It was in fields associated with the community from earlier times that conservatism manifested itself.

Stratified societies were formed within the Greek commonwealth in the first millennium B.C. as a result either of a Greek community's domination over an alien population, or of the cleaving of the community into classes. However, social cleavages sooner or later appeared within communities which had initially comprised a single

social class. Fully fledged societies encompassed a variety of groups defined by a variety of criteria. A line of demarcation ran between the polis community and all outsiders; another separated free people from slaves and serfs; a third differentiated between owners and non-owners of the means of production; and a fourth divided them into citizens and non-citizens. Secondary gradations evolved within the group consisting of owners and in that consisting of the citizens.

The line of demarcation between free and non-free people initially coincided with that between members of the community and outsiders. Whenever and wherever other lines of social demarcation subsequently developed, both the original ones remained fundamental. Within the category of the non-free a number of differences distinguished slaves from serfs. Some light is shed on the origin, the status, the aspirations and other characteristics of the latter by evidence relating to the helots of Sparta, the *klarotai* and *mnoitai* of the Dorian polis-states in Crete, the *penestai* of the Thessalians, the *Mariandynoi* of Heraclea Pontica, and other similar groups. According to this evidence, all these social groups, unlike the slaves, were homogeneous populations. They were descendants of people collectively subjugated. By virtue of certain clauses agreed between them and the conquerors, serfs were protected against being evicted from the plot of land, to which they were attached, and sold as slaves. They were allowed to retain a proportion of the product of their labour and to acquire some money or possessions. Helots aspired continuously to recover their freedom and took up arms against the Spartans; ultimately, the Messenian helots were liberated thanks to the Thebans and re-established a state of their own. In some polis-states, impoverished members of the community were reduced to the status of serf and even to that of slave. The number of slaves increased in polis-states engaged in manufacturing production and services. It is in these polis-states that servile labour played a role, justifying the application to them of the term slave-owning. Slave-owning was not a characteristic feature of the polis-state in general, since it is not found in this sense in all polis-states, and since it was not limited to polis-states.

The frontiers between free and non-free moved beyond those between the polis community and all outsiders as a result of free foreigners being settled within the territory of polis-states. There is a great gap, in terms of difference, separating the few miserable *metanastai* in the

Homeric societies from the numerous metics of Athens, many of whom possessed considerable wealth. Apart from Athens, only a few polis-states had large numbers of metics. These polis-states were the more advanced in terms of production and of human rights. The state protected the liberty and property of the metics. In some polis-states and at some points in time, metics were admitted *en masse* to the citizen body and at the same time to the polis community. Freedmen were assimilated to metics.

The line of demarcation between owners and non-owners of the means of production ran across both the free population and the polis community. This was a result of members of the community having lost their property and, conversely, of metics in some polis-states having acquired non-landed property.

The citizens were a section of the polis community. Citizenship and polis-state evolved in connection with each other. The concepts of citizen and citizenship grew slowly and for some time unconsciously. The citizen body initially encompassed either all the men of the community, or only that part of them which held sway over the rest. The first case is exemplified by Sparta. There, and in some other polis-states, the citizen body retained its initial extent. More commonly, it underwent limitations (under aristocracy), then recovered a part of its original extent (under timocracy), and eventually encompassed all the men of the community (under radical democracy). The tyrants deprived it more or less of its substance. By contrast, kingship coexisted with citizenry: before the fall of kings, aristocrats enjoyed political rights and the regime was an aristocracy headed by a king.

The ancients distinguished within the citizen body an element that occupied a predominant position within the state. They called it *πολίτευμα* or *κύριον τῆς πόλεως* (or *τῶν πόλεων* or *τῆς πολιτείας*). The first term derives from the verb *πολιτεύειν*, which originally meant 'to be a citizen' and later assumed the additional meaning 'to be occupied with public affairs'. The second term is as clear as could be: 'master of the polis'. According to Aristotle, this element coincided under monarchical regimes with the king or the tyrant, under oligarchy with the 'few', under democracy with the 'many'. In modern terms, we may state that the dominant element consisted in democracies of all citizens (i.e. all the men of the polis community), in oligarchies, whether aristocracies or timocracies, with the full citizens (i.e. a section of the

polis community), and in tyrannies with the tyrant himself. Aristotle's view that a king embodied the *politeuma* is not correct, since, as we have noted, kings actually headed aristocracies. The dominant element conducted public affairs either directly or indirectly, by means of magistrates appointed for this purpose. Direct government was represented by tyranny and radical democracy, in which the citizens assigned no real power to the magistrates, but supervised them very closely. In aristocracies, whether royal or republican, and timocracies, the conduct of affairs was entrusted by the dominant element to a narrower circle. Under an aristocracy headed by a king, this circle included the king and a council of elders; under a republican aristocracy or a timocracy, it comprised a council of elders and a number of magistrates.

Tensions arose between the different groups out of a variety of circumstances. Relations between free people and slaves were not prominent: no revolt of slaves has been recorded. Matters were different with the serfs: the Spartans annually declared war against their helots and savagely oppressed them; the helots responded with hatred and rose in revolt on two, or possibly three, occasions. Inside the polis community itself there were struggles between aristocrats and non-aristocrats, rich and poor, citizens and non-citizens, and active and non-active citizens. It has rightly been pointed out that a citizen and a metic running a manufacturing enterprise, or engaged in commerce, did not in fact belong to a single class; the citizen had political rights, the metic did not; hence they were not equal and their interests did not coincide, each feeling solidarity with a different group.

Furthermore, many persons belonged to more than one group. Thus, a free man could simultaneously be an owner of the means of production, a member of the polis community, a citizen and an aristocrat; or an owner of the means of production, a member of the polis community, a citizen, and a non-aristocrat; or an owner of the means of production, a member of the polis community, but not a citizen; or an owner of the means of production, but not a member of the polis community, nor a citizen; or a non-owner of the means of production, but a member of the polis community and a citizen; or a non-owner of the means of production and not a citizen, though a member of the polis community; or a non-owner of the means of

production, an outsider to the polis community and a non-citizen. In some cases, those who belonged to more than one group were exposed to conflicting interests and had to change their loyalties to meet the changing challenges. Such situations particularly arose for persons who were members of the polis community and belonged to opposing groups within it.

In the interactions between the polis community and the polis-state, it is possible to discern the influences of the one upon the other.

The state undertook some of the missions of the pre-political community, such as the coordination of production, the settling of internal affairs, the waging of war and the worship of gods. The state further introduced individual relations between itself and its citizens, whereas the community was structured on collective lines. The collective rights and responsibilities of kinsmen and *phrateres* steadily lost ground as a result of decisions taken at the level of the state. On the other hand, the state left untouched some of the traditional activities of the phratries and tribes, and where it created new administrative units it sometimes allowed the old ones to continue to function at the level of the polis community.

The impact of the polis community upon the polis-state was much more important. The community imbued the state with its spirit. As a result, the polis-state never became a transcendental abstraction. Tendencies within the community found expression at the level of the state. Each community secured its independence, self-determination and survival by means of the state. States were sometimes led to apply policies which served the community. This was above all the case with wars, with the closing or opening of the doors of both the state and the community to resident outsiders, and with the reluctance displayed by polis-states to contribute to the formation of broader states. Unions of two polis communities and of the polis-states related to them were rare and short-lived. The fact that the polis community remained democratic while the state was ruled by oligarchies or by tyrants contributed, in association with the efforts of the social and political forces striving for democracy, to the victory of these latter forces. It also seems to have been responsible for political democracy in the polis-states reaching an extent and depth comparable only to that of pre-statal democracy. It may be claimed that a continuous thread runs

from the pre-political to the political democracy in the Greek polis-states, and that Greek democracy was an entelechy of the polis community. In pre-statal communities the individual members submitted themselves to the collectivity; this was a condition for the survival of the community. In turn, the survival of the community was a condition for the survival of its members: when a community won booty, captured slaves, conquered lands, all the profits from these sources were distributed amongst the men of the community; when the community lost, its members were impoverished; and when it was crushingly defeated, its members were enslaved. The community and its members were mutually dependent. The interdependency of the community and its members continued to operate within the polis-states against the class-struggle. Furthermore, it inspired a new interdependency, this time between the state and its citizens. Both functioned along the same lines and strengthened each other.

Did the polis-settlement to some extent influence the further evolution of the polis-state and of the polis community? This question has so far been posed with respect only to the state, as a result of the fact that the polis community has been overlooked. The answers given are the product of the generally accepted equation of the polis-settlement with the city-settlement.

From the very beginning the polis-settlement had two functions: defensive and administrative. Both can be seen in settlements which were the seats of pre-statal communities. After the formation of a polis-state these functions expanded still further. The primitive, tiny administration of the pre-statal community evolved into a political government that steadily progressed in terms of its structure, responsibilities and effectiveness. The fortifications of the acropolis were reinforced, and the town itself was eventually enclosed within walls. As a result of all these steps, the defence of the community and of the state grew stronger; the independence and self-sufficiency of the community were protected.

Dwelling within the polis-settlement brought the citizens together and promoted political life. Ideas were discussed not only officially at the due time and in the due place, by the assembly, the council (or councils) and the courts, and according to procedures established by law, but also unofficially, between meetings, outside the designated

time and place, wherever and whenever a number of citizens chanced to meet. These informal discussions were not sterile: they helped to ripen public opinion.

Polis-settlements acquired new functions as a result of developments in the fields of craft-production and commerce. In the more progressive areas such developments hardly reached the proto-urban level before 850 B.C. Fully fledged urbanization is connected with the establishment of a regular market c. 600 B.C. Whenever these advances occurred in each particular polis-settlement, they generated revolutionary changes at the levels of both the society and the state, and accelerated the pace of political action. Proto-urban and urban conditions also brought about changes at the level of kinship and of individual mentality and behaviour. In polis-states where part of the population dwelt outside the polis-settlement, some of these changes reached the countryside with varying degrees of rapidity; others spread slowly, and yet others never passed through the gates of the polis-settlement. In matters where the countryside followed the polis-settlement, the original unity between them continued to exist, though it underwent modifications in substance and form. In matters which are by their nature proper to urban conditions, such as, firstly, non-rural productive activities and, secondly, urban practices and mentality, and also public and private buildings, town planning, facilities, entertainments, festivals, and opportunities for education, the gap between town dwellers and country dwellers grew wider and deeper.

IV

It is held that this gap is one of the major symptoms of the decline of the *polis*, the other two being the interruption of the interconnections between citizenship and landowning and citizenship and military service. Yet, as we have seen, the citizen-landowner was not an indispensable feature of the polis-state; it suffices to recall the mass enrollments of metics that occurred in some polis-states in the sixth century, as well as the granting of civic rights to the Athenian thetes, many of whom did not possess a piece of land, in the same century. The discrepancy between town dwellers and country dwellers was one of the cleavages within the polis community, alongside the division into social classes. Like the latter, this distinction undermined the cultural and

spiritual unity of the polis community. We are not yet in a position to deal comprehensively with the decline and end of the polis-state. To pursue this aim, it will be necessary, in addition to collecting a vast quantity of data, to avoid confusing the signs of the decline of the polis-state with signs of the decline of particular polis-states. Otherwise, one is liable to project onto the polis-state manifestations of the decay of other variables (economy, society, political institutions and politics, morals, ideology, creativity, religion etc.) to be found within specific polis-states, especially Athens, and connected with specific circumstances. The issue of the decline and end of the polis-state is much more complex than the issue of its emergence, because many more variables are involved, and because the criteria are more difficult to establish. To determine the point at which a state underwent the transition from the form of the *polis* to another form involves assessing precisely when the accumulation of quantitative changes reached the point at which it produced a qualitative change.

Given the crucial interconnection between polis-state and polis community, however, it is likely that the decline of the polis-state kept pace with the decline of the polis community, and with the loosening of the interplay between them. Moving from the model to historical realities, it may be assumed that each particular polis-state continued to retain this character so long as its community retained its specificity and maintained its traditional place within the state and the social network. If one takes into consideration data relating to former polis-states in Hellenistic and Roman times, one is impressed by how much of the old spirit of the polis-state and the polis community survived. However early they both entered the phase of their decline, most of them were still alive when they lost their independence.

ADDENDUM

Page 339

A date *c.* 750 B.C. is also proposed for the rise of the *polis-state* by Ian Morris in his recently published book *Burial and Ancient Society, the Rise of the Greek City-State* (1987). Morris drew this conclusion from the combination of two arguments. One of them is his own hypothesis that in Attica *c.* 750 B.C. 'agathoi' and 'kakoi' came so close to each other as to be buried in common cemeteries. The other lies in the assumption that such a situation represents the ideology of the polis-state, as equated with its citizens. Both arguments are unfounded. The hypothesis that constitutes the first argument rests upon another hypothesis which in its turn is based on lacunae in the evidence. According to this evidence, Morris claims that the 'agathoi' and the 'kakoi' buried their dead in common cemeteries from 1125 to 1050 B.C., again from 760 to 700 B.C., and definitely from 525 B.C. onwards, whereas between 1050 and 760, and between 700 and 525 B.C. there is no trace of 'kakoi' in cemeteries. However, this statement reflects only the present state of the archaeological record, since very few Attic cemeteries have been extensively excavated and the graves and finds properly published. The greatest part of the evidence taken into account by Ian Morris consists of dispersed and partial information for cemeteries or plots of tombs insufficiently excavated and studied. Moreover, the interpretation of the evidence by Ian Morris as proving that the Athenians had an ideology of community between 1125 and 1050, between 760 and 700, and after 525 B.C., whereas the 'kakoi' were banished from the cemeteries between 1050 and 760 and between 700 and 525 B.C., is in conflict with all we know from literary evidence of social and political conditions in Attica between 594/3 and 527 B.C. (social and constitutional reforms by Solon, Peisistratus' policy towards aristocrats and commoners). So far as the identification of the polis-state with its citizens is concerned, I firstly refer to my criticism of the arguments invoked in its favour (*v.s.*, pp. 94-110) and add that the very notion of 'citizens' does not coincide with any of the notions of 'state', i.e. (i) instrument for domination, (ii) an element dominant over others (except the citizens of direct democracies), and (iii) space within which domination is exercised.

INDICES

1. SUBJECT - INDEX

- Abantes 314, 381, 390, 412
Acacesium 322
Acarnania, Acarnanians 103, 460, 468
Acastus 328, 411
Achaëa, Achaeans 165, 173, 174, 314, 315, 320, 329, 404, 414, 415, 419, 439, 444, 462-463, 465, 469, 470
— Achaeans, Homeric or Prehistoric, 298, 348, 354, 358, 361, 362, 370, 382, 383, 384, 387, 390, 392
— Achaeans, Phthiotic, 164, 166, 383
Acontium 322
Acrae 411
Acragas 120
Aegae 414
Aegean 310, 336
Aegeira 414
Aegina 307, 308, 381, 400
Aegium 89, 317, 329, 414, 415, 439
Aegys, Aegyitis, Aegytae 308, 309, 311, 322, 401
Aemilius Paulus 174
Aenis, Aenianes or Enienes 64, 354, 382, 390, 391
Aeolis, Aeolians 91, 139, 312, 314, 395, 418, 436, 441
Aetolia, Aetolians 104, 165, 361, 381, 390, 391, 460, 468
Agiads 308ff
Agioid Theodoroi 398
Agis 400
Aigeirus 321
Aigialeis 449
Aischylos (king or archon in Athens) 328
aisymnetes 341, 366
Al Mina 327, 416, 464
Alalkomenai 166
Alcetas 66
Alea 318, 321
Aleos 318
Aleuas 205
Aleuadae 460
Alexander the Great 63, 95, 411
Aliphera 322
Allaria 199ff
Aloros 157
Alus 202
Amorgos 98
amphictyonies, Amphictyons 163, 165, 317, 326, 409
amphictyony, Pylaeon-Delphic, 165, 317, 326, 409
Amphipolis 174
Amyclae 309, 312, 401, 402
Amyntas III 103
Anaphe 310
Anavlokhos 313
anax 295
Andros 310
Anthemous 408
Antigonos Doson 165
Antigonos Monophthalmos 170
Antikyra 166
apatouria 311
apetairoi 72
Apollonia 164, 408
Aptera 199ff
Arcades 199ff
Arcadia, Arcadians 159, 173, 312, 314, 319, 321, 322, 344, 364, 381, 383, 390, 391, 406-407, 408, 419, 439, 463, 468, 469
Arcesine 98
Archidamus III 83, 84
Argestaei 174, 175
Argissa 383
Argos, Argolis, Argives 38, 39, 80, 131, 182, 191, 203, 305, 306, 307, 313, 314, 317, 326, 344, 365, 381, 384, 385, 386, 387, 390, 399, 400, 441, 445, 452, 464, 470
aristocracy 145, 149, 467
Arsinoe 411
Artaxerxes III 170
Asea 321
assembly 74, 132, 338, 362, 369ff

- Asia Minor 36, 84, 310, 336, 338, 394, 395,
 423, 424, 427, 440
 Asine 305, 306, 307, 381, 400, 419
 Asopus 331
 Aspledon 383
 Assos 172
 Assyrians 327
 Astacus 404
 astoi 37
 Athamanes 314, 441
 Athens, Athenians 33, 34, 38, 45, 51, 83, 84,
 85, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106,
 107, 117, 118, 119, 121, 123, 128, 139,
 143, 149, 157, 173, 191, 192, 193, 195,
 295, 296, 299, 327, 329, 330, 341, 348,
 353, 382, 384, 390, 403, 412, 414, 419,
 447, 457; cf. Attica
 Athenian League 103, 408
 Atreidae 328
 Attica 34, 89, 157, 170, 303, 314, 326, 330,
 344, 383, 395, 412, 413, 418, 440, 441,
 461ff, 463, 467
 Aulis 329
 authority 288
 autonomous 42, 293, 294
 Axos 199ff
 Azania, Azanes 314, 332, 325

 Bacchiadae 120
 Basileidae 120
 basileus 295, 365, 366
 — of the Ionians 311
 Bayrakli 427
 Berbati 399
 Biannos 199ff
 Blenina 322
 Boeotia, Boeotians 83, 166, 314, 320, 324,
 326, 337, 381, 383, 390, 409, 419, 460,
 461, 462, 464, 468, 470
 Bormiskos 408
 Bottiaeans 102
 Boura 424
 Bryges 166
 Byzantium 103, 404

 Callia 322
 Calydon 411, 415
 Calymna 105, 313
 Cameirus 298, 313

 Caphyeis 174
 Caria, Carians 311, 316, 380, 387
 Carthaginians 55, 171, 282
 Carystus, Carystians 104, 310, 412
 Casos 313
 Catane 416
 Caulonia, Caulonians 315, 404, 419
 Celts 204, 281
 Cenchreai 398
 Ceos 98, 103
 Cephallenians 103, 381, 386, 390
 Cerinthus 412
 Chaladrians 41, 76, 100, 101, 117, 318, 319
 Chalcedon, Chalcedonians 315, 404, 419
 Chalcis, Chalcidians 99, 102, 104, 106, 107,
 326, 327, 329, 330, 412, 413, 416, 419,
 462, 464
 Chalcidice, Chalcidians 83, 101, 317, 457
 Chaones 75, 174
 Charisia 322
 Charops 416
 Chedrolos 408
 Chios, Chians 103, 106, 366, 403
 Chyretiae 202
 Cicones 380
 citizen, citizens 28, 37, 39, 40, 52, 66, 71, 72,
 74, 85, 92, 93, 94, 95, 112, 114, 118, 225,
 230, 231, 232, 234, 235, 237, 246, 247,
 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255,
 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263,
 264, 265, 267, 269, 270, 271, 277, 287,
 288, 289
 citizens-landowners 111ff
 city 158, 424ff, 448
 city-republics, European, 53
 city-states, eastern 55
 clans 294
 classes, social – 266ff, 467
 Clazomenae 403, 440
 Cleisthenes 119, 131, 275, 299, 300, 412, 447
 Cleitor, Cleitorians 321, 332
 Cleombrotus II 317, 406
 Cleonae 440
 Cleonymus 317
 Cnausium 322
 Cnidus 313
 Cnossos 166, 199ff, 313
 Codrus 328, 416
 Colophon, Colophonians 102, 120, 403,

- 395, 440, 441
 community 27, 28, 38, 39, 40ff, 46, 59, 60,
 62, 65, 66, 71, 72, 77, 78, 81, 111, 115,
 116, 124ff, 135, 138ff, 147, 153, 154,
 293, 294, 302ff, 457
 community of citizens-landowners 40
 community-state (Gemeindestaat) 40
 community, village – 294, 457
 confederacies 62, 141, 163, 167, 171, 172,
 173, 174, 185, 198, 232, 324, 330ff, 333,
 415, 457ff
 — of the Acarnanians 171, 411ff
 — of the Achaeans 104, 171, 329, 331ff,
 415, 417ff, 419, 465, 466, 469, 470
 — of the Aetolians 171, 410, 419
 — of the Arcadians 468
 — of the Boeotians 320, 331ff, 408, 417-
 418, 419, 465, 466, 469
 — of the Chalcidians 104, 317, 408
 — of the Cretans 171, 174
 — of the Epirots 171, 174
 — of the Ionians (in Attica, eastern Boeotia,
 and central Euboea) 325, 330, 403ff,
 409, 415ff, 418, 419, 437, 442, 461,
 463ff, 467
 — of the Locrians (East) 409
 — of the Locrians (West) 409
 — of the Messenians 171
 — of the Phocians 171, 331ff, 409, 465, 470
 — of demes (*systemata demon*) 75, 170,
 295, 316, 321, 325, 329, 331, 336, 405ff,
 411ff, 414ff, 444ff, 456ff, 462, 463, 469,
 470
 — of “parts” (μέρη) 404, 406ff, 444, 454ff,
 466, 470
 — of polis-states 324, 330ff, 466, 468
 Conopa 411
 constitution 27, 28, 59, 62, 74, 220, 262ff,
 263, 267, 268ff, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273,
 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 288, 289
 Corcyraeans 83, 103
 Coresia 98
 Corinth, Corinthia, Corinthians 38, 39, 83,
 120, 304, 305, 326, 344, 397, 398, 399,
 400, 418, 441, 444, 460, 464
 Cos 105
 council of elders 74, 295
 countryside 81
 courts 74
 craftsmen 470
 Crannon 410
 Crete, Cretans 91, 96, 97, 98, 123, 146, 166,
 171, 174, 199, 296, 310, 312-313, 336,
 338, 382, 464
 Croesus 65
 Cromi 322
 Croton, Crotoniatae 120, 315, 404, 419
 Crysaoreis 316, 317
 Cuma, in Aeolis, 120, 121
 Cuma, in Campania, 329, 416
 Cyclades 310, 463
 Cydonia 199ff
 Cynosoura 308ff, 321
 Cynuria, Cynurians 309, 322
 Cyprus 80, 207, 310, 464
 Cypselus 304
 Cyrene 28, 80, 84, 118, 365, 366, 396
 Cyzicus, Cyziceni 104, 106, 161, 191, 192
 Danaus 176
 Dardanians 380
 Dasea 322
 Delos 310
 Delphi 65, 96, 99, 173, 330, 331
 deme (damos, demos) 61, 78, 89, 100, 132,
 133, 153, 295, 316, 341, 353, 461
 deme-settlement 153
 deme-state 154
 Demetrius I 170
 democracy 145, 147, 149, 153
 Dendra 399
 Derriopes 166
 Deucalion 100, 117
 dike 31
 Dion 412
 Dionysius I 62, 64, 103, 105, 107
 Dionysius II 185
 Dipaea 322
 Dipoenae 322
 Dodecanese 313, 383, 464
 Dodona 174
 Dolopes 164, 361
 domination 28, 29, 39, 60, 62, 65
 Donoussa 310
 Dorians 38, 39, 91, 125, 131, 136, 151, 165,
 203, 296, 300, 302-303, 304ff, 308, 310,
 313, 320, 326, 336, 344, 398, 399, 436,
 438, 440, 441, 462

- Doris 203, 441
 Dreros 96, 198ff, 295
 Dryopes 305, 307, 310, 314, 412, 419
 Dymanes 296, 303, 449
 Dyme 317, 329, 414, 415
 Dyo Vouna 398
- Echekratidae 460
 Echestratus 308
 Echinus 166
 Egypt 170, 207
 Eion 305
 Eiones 381
 Eleusinians 139
 Eleutherna 199ff
 Elis, Eleans 76, 117, 173, 174, 295, 298, 317,
 318, 319, 381, 406, 419, 445, 448, 451,
 453
 Elone 383
 Elyros 199ff
 Epeians 381, 382, 390
 Ephesus, Ephesians 118, 120, 139, 311, 396,
 403, 441
 Epidaurus, Epidauria, Epidaurians 38, 121,
 166, 172, 203, 306, 307, 308, 381, 400
 Epirots 132, 166, 171, 174
 Epizephyrian Locri 315, 404, 419
 Eretria, Eretrians 101, 102, 104, 106, 327,
 329, 330, 412, 413, 416, 418, 419, 462,
 464
 Erythrae, Erythraeans 101, 102, 104, 106,
 120, 441
 ethnos, ethne 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 49,
 54, 61, 62, 75, 132, 135, 141, 152, 163,
 165, 167, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175,
 185, 274, 280ff, 296, 297, 298, 300, 302,
 303, 304, 305, 316, 333, 336, 379, 381,
 410, 443
 —, Acarnanian 411ff
 —, Boeotian 166
 —, Thessalian 410
 — of the Cretans 202
 ethnos-state 132, 322, 324, 408ff, 419, 457ff,
 466, 468
 Etruscans 55
 Euboea, Euboeans 326, 327, 329, 413, 418,
 461, 462, 463
 Eurypon 400
 Eurypontids 308ff
- Eutaea 321
 Eutresians 322
- Galataki 398
 Gaul 171
 Gela 139
 genos 293, 296, 297, 300
 Geronthrae 309
 Gonnus 202
 Gortyn, Gortynians 97, 199ff, 312
 Gortys (Arcadia) 322
 Gouneus 382
 Gournes 313
 Graikoi 330, 413, 416
 gymnetai 400
 Gyrtion 410
 Gythium 167, 203, 208
- Halicarnassus, Halicarnassians 61, 64, 313,
 314
 Haliéis 102
 Halizones 380
 Hannibal 171
 heliaia 195
 Helice 414
 Helisson 89, 159, G321
 helots 71, 400
 Hellanodikai 445ff
 Hellenes 354, 382, 392
 Hellespont 207
 Heraclea in Pontus 121
 Heracleids 303, 309
 Heraea, Heraeans 76, 317, 318, 319, 406,
 445, 452, 453, 470
 Heraeum, Heraeis 320, 321, 398, 444
 Herakleion 157
 Hermias 104, 105, 107
 Hermione, Hermionis 305, 306, 307, 381,
 400
 Hippomenes 416, 417
 Hierapytna 199ff
 Histiaea, Histiaeans 104, 412
 Histiaeotis 383
 hoplite-*Polis* 337
 Hyblaea Megara, see Megara Hyblaea
 Hylleis 303, 449
 Hypata 203
 hypomeiones 72
 Hysiae, Hysiaeans 331, 418, 465

- Ialysus 156
 Iasaea, Iasians 64, 322
 Idalion, Idalians 64, 181, 192, 199
 Illyrians 63
 Inachus 382
 individualism 144, 147
 Iolcus 383
 Ionia 139, 207, 310ff, 314, 395, 403, 464
 Ionians 38, 91, 125, 136, 151, 165, 300, 314,
 315, 330, 344, 381, 384, 390, 413, 416,
 418, 436, 438, 441, 461
 Iriquois 350
 Istron 199ff
 Italy 171, 207, 342
 Ithaca, Ithacesians 352, 353, 358, 369, 384,
 385, 390

 jus loci 124; see also territoriality
 jus sanguinis 124

 Kadyanda 168
 Kalo Khorio 313
 Karfi 313
 Kato Symi 313
 Kavousi 313
 Kazarma 399
 Keramiatae 316
 Khalavara 313
 Khandia 313
 khora 36, 70, 82; see also territory
 king, kingship 28, 63, 141, 153, 358ff, 396,
 454; see also basileus, monarch
 — Homeric 358ff
 — Macedonian 28
 — Molossian 28
 — Persian 28
 — Sidonian 28
 — Thracian 28
 Kleidikos 416
 Klisidi 313
 Koarendians 64
 koinon: see confederacy
 koinonia 74, 215ff, 269, 270, 278, 279
 kosmoi 105
 Kynourieis (Megara) 320
 Kusadasi 403

 Lacedaemonians 38, 39, 72, 104, 106, 141,
 173, 313, 445, 449, 470

 Laconia 203, 312, 314, 383, 402, 441
 Lamia 203
 land, landowners 31, 32, 113, 117, 120, 124,
 141, 347, 429, 450, 467, 470
 Lapiths 305, 383, 390, 398, 399
 Lappa 199ff
 Larisa 202, 203, 380, 410
 Larisa Kremaste 166
 Lato 199ff
 Laurium 96
 law 31, 32, 52, 141
 league: see confederacies
 Lefkandi 329, 413, 462, 464
 Lemnos 205
 Leontini 416
 Lerna 399
 Leucas 83
 Leuctrum 322
 Libya, Libyans 171, 172, 207
 Ligystine 171
 Limnae 308ff
 Lindus 313
 Locris (East and West), Locrians 120, 166,
 199, 296, 324, 381, 390, 391, 404, 419,
 444, 461, 468, 469
 Lucani 175
 Lycaea 322
 Lycia, Lycians 167, 168, 361, 380
 Lycosoura 322
 Lycurgus 336, 339, 401
 Lygdamis 64
 Lyncestae 166, 167
 Lysimacheia 411
 Lyttos 97, 199ff

 Macaria 322
 Macedonia, Macedonians 61, 62, 63, 75, 90,
 95, 107, 133, 135, 137, 150, 157, 165,
 173, 174, 203, 322, 365, 408, 419, 457ff,
 467, 469, 470
 Maenalus, Maenalians 321, 322, 407
 Maeones 380
 Magna Graecia 315
 magistrates 74
 Magnesia in Thessaly, Magnetes 101, 164,
 171, 312, 313, 314, 379, 381, 390, 418,
 419, 436, 441
 Magnesia ad Maeandrum 403, 441
 Magnesia ad Sipylum 104, 108, 403, 441

- Malea 322
 Malla 199ff
 Mantinea, Mantineans 80, 89, 96, 159, 317,
 319, 321, 344, 406, 419, 445, 448, 451ff,
 453, 469, 470
 Marathon 330
 Mardogan 403
 Massalia 121
 Masses 381
 Maussollus 64, 103
 Medocus I 103
 Medon, Medontids 328, 411, 416, 417
 Megalopolis 321, 332, 406
 Megara, Megaris, Megarians 89, 162, 315,
 320, 321, 326, 366, 398, 404, 406, 419,
 439, 444, 454, 455ff, 462, 469
 Megara Hyblaea 315, 444, 404, 416, 419
 Melos 310
 Mesembria 380
 Mesoa 308
 Mesopotamia 55
 Messene 208
 Messenia, Messenians 314, 336, 402, 441
 Metapontium, Metapontians 315, 404, 419
 Methone 408
 Methydrum 322
 Methymna 103, 106
 metics 37, 39, 72, 127, 260, 264, 270, 288
 Metropolis 411
 Miletus, Milesians 99, 104, 106, 344, 366,
 396, 403, 441
 Miltoros 408
 Minyans 383, 390, 391
 Molossi 61, 62, 64, 66, 75, 137, 314, 323,
 441
 monarch, monarchy 61, 74, 358; see also
 king, kingship
 monarchies, Hellenistic 64, 146, 147
 Moulki 321
 Mycenae, Mycenaean 295, 298, 305, 321,
 353, 371, 384, 386, 387, 399, 400
 Mylos tou Khelioti 398
 Myrmidons 354, 381, 382, 390, 392
 Mysians 380
 Mytilene 120, 176

 Naupactus 95, 411
 Nauplia, Nauplieis 305, 399, 400
 Naxos 416

 Neapolis 106
 neodamodeis 72
 Nicarete 99
 Nicias 83, 84
 Nisaea 321
 non-citizen 260ff, 262ff, 265, 270
 Nonacris 322

 Oenoe 330
 Oibotas 319
 Olenus 414
 oligarchy, oligarchic 74, 153
 Oloosson 383
 Olous 199ff
 Olympia 318
 Olynthus 164
 Onasilos 181
 Opus 120, 121
 Orchomenus, Orchomenians (Arcadia) 104,
 105, 106, 174, 322
 Orchomenus, Orchomenians (Boeotia) 99,
 383, 409, 418, 465, 466, 470
 Oresthasion or Orestheion 321, 407
 Oropus 329
 Orthe 383
 Othoros 408

 Paeones 63, 380
 Pagaie 321
 Paion 325
 Pallantium 321
 Pamphyloi 303, 449
 Panactum 83
 Panionion 311
 Panopeus 158
 Panticapaeum 80
 Paphlagonians 380
 Parhorus 440
 Parorea 322
 Paros 310
 Parrhasia, Parrhasians 321, 322, 407
 parts (μέρη) 320ff, 332, 404, 406ff, 444,
 454ff, 463, 466, 468, 470
 Patara 168
 Patela 313
 Patrae, Patreis 89, 203, 317, 329, 414, 415,
 439
 patriarchal 347
 P(e)iraeis 320

- Peiraeum 444
 Peiraeus 158
 Peirasia 410
 Peisistratus 450
 Pelagonia, Pelagones 166, 174
 Pelasgians 380, 381, 413
 Pelasgiotis 383
 Pella 157, 174
 Pellana 401
 Pellene 331, 414, 439, 466
 Peloponnese 91, 95, 166, 207, 313, 316, 317, 329, 336, 383, 415, 418, 440, 441, 462
 Penthilidae 120
 Peparthos 329
 Peraethis 321
 Perdiccas I 173
 Perdiccas II 102, 157
 perioikoi 37
 personal state 41
 Perrhaebi 164, 354, 382, 390, 391
 Persians 63, 173, 465
 Petra 305, 398
 Phaeacians 352, 353, 354, 358, 361, 366, 367, 370, 377, 378, 380, 388, 389
 Phaestus 313
 Phalanna 410
 Phalces 306
 Pharbelos 408
 Pharcadon 410
 Pharis, Phareis 309, 414
 Pharsalus 166, 410
 Phaselis 103
 Pheidon 365, 366
 Pherae 323, 410
 Pherecles 328
 Phialians 174
 Philip II 63, 83, 95, 104, 107, 173, 323, 470
 Philip V 171
 phiditia 72
 Phlegyans 175
 Phlius, Phliasia, Phliasians 173, 307, 308, 400, 440
 Phocaea, Phocaeans 150, 344, 403, 440
 Phocis, Phocians 164, 166, 173, 324, 381, 383, 390, 391, 419, 460, 461, 470
 Phoenicia, Phoenicians 53, 55, 378
 Phrygians 380
 phratries 125, 296, 301
 Phthia, Phthians 380, 381, 383, 390
 Phthiotis 383
 phylae 37, 125, 131, 296, 299, 301, 303, 311, 396, 438, 449
 Pindus 314
 Pitane 308ff
 Pithecusae 329, 416
 Pittacus 176
 Plataea, Plataeans 331, 418, 465
 polis community: see community
 polis-settlement 80, 81, 86ff, 131, 133, 153, 160, 394, 424ff, 445, 451, 468, 470
 politai, see citizens
 politeia, see constitution
 politeuma 62, 65, 108, 250, 262, 271, 272, 288
 Polyrrhenia 199ff
 Pontus 167
 Poseidonia, Poseidonians 161
 Praesos, Praesians 105, 106, 199ff
 Priansos 199ff
 Priene 441
 Probalinthus 330
 Proseis 322
 Prosymna 399
 Prytanis 308, 309
 prytaneion 345
 Ptoleiderma 322
 Pydna 408
 Pylos, Pylians 353, 358, 382, 384, 385, 386, 387, 390, 461
 Pyrasus 410

 res publica 38
 Rhaucos 199ff
 Rhegium 120, 416
 rhetra 336, 401
 Rhizenians 97
 Rhodes, Rhodians 91, 296, 313, 382
 Rhypes 414
 Rome, Romans 34, 47, 55, 165, 174, 175

 Salamis, Salaminians 139, 177, 383
 Salmakitae 61, 64
 Samos, Samians 102, 106, 139, 311, 403, 441
 Samnitae 175
 Scheria 369
 Sciathos 329
 Scirtonium 322

- Scopadae 460
 Scyros 329, 464
 Selasia 401
 Selymbria, Selymbrians 101, 102, 315, 404, 419
 Sepeia 399
 Serdaioi 161, 191
 serfs 396
 Seuthes II 103
 Sicily 83, 84, 207, 315, 342
 Sicyon, Sicyonia, Sicyonians 38, 65, 306, 383, 405, 419, 448, 449ff, 451
 Sidonians 61, 62, 64
 Sindos 157
 Siphnos, Siphnians 310
 Skotooussa 96, 410
 slaves, slavery 39, 71, 113, 115, 127, 260, 264, 341, 346, 347, 414, 467
 Smyrna 104
 Smyrna, Old 403, 427, 441
 Solon 118, 119, 413, 414
 Solygeia 398, 399
 sophists 145
 Soumateium 321
 sovereignty 239, 288
 Sparta, Spartans 28, 31, 33, 38, 40, 45, 80, 82, 83, 84, 97, 100, 102, 107, 123, 144, 146, 149, 158, 162, 175, 193, 203, 298, 308, 309, 310, 336, 341, 348, 358, 367, 382, 400, 401, 402, 439, 452, 466
 Spercheius 382
 Spiliaridia 313
 Stalians 105
 Stasikypros 181
 state 41, 132, 302ff, 356ff, 374, 467
 state of law 52, 66
 status 66, 67
 Straton 62, 64
 Stratonicea 317
 Stratos 203
 Strepsa 408
 Styra 310, 412
 Sybaris, Sybaritae 118, 139, 191, 315, 404, 419
 Sybrita 199ff
 Syme 383
 sympoliteia 89
 Syracuse, Syracusans 62, 63, 103, 110, 178, 399, 416
 Syrie 159, 160, 175, 387, 390
 system of demes: see confederacy of demes
 Tanagra 329, 413
 Tegea 312, 317, 318, 405
 Temenus 307
 Tenea 398, 399
 Tenos 310
 Teos 118, 366, 403, 441
 territoriality 131: see also jus loci
 territory 36, 45, 80ff, 83, 85, 109, 350, 447ff: see also khora
 Tetrapolis 330, 331
 Teuthis 322
 Thasians 102
 Thebes, Thebans 156, 182, 331, 461, 466
 Thebes, Phthiotic, 166
 Theisoa 322
 Themistocles 96
 Thera 310
 Therme 157, 408
 Thermum 411
 Thespieae 331, 418, 465
 Thesproti 75, 381
 Thessaly, Thessalians 82, 90, 103, 133, 164, 166, 202, 205, 206, 207, 314, 323, 325, 364, 383, 384, 409, 419, 459, 460, 463
 Thessalonice 174
 thetes 447
 Thetonium 410
 Thocnia 322
 Thoricus 440
 Thrace, Thracians 63, 83, 164, 170, 380, 413
 Tiryns, Tirynthians 305, 381, 399, 400
 town-village (Stadttdorf) 40
 traders 470
 Tragilus 408
 Trapezus 322
 tribal origin 37
 tribal societies 296
 tribe-system 438
 tribes: see phylae
 Trichonium 411
 Tricoloni 322
 Tricory(n)thus 330
 Triphylia 383
 Tripodiskos, Tripodiskioi 320, 321
 Tripolis 322
 Tritaeis 414

- trittees 131
 Troezen, Troezenia, Troezenians 306, 307,
 313, 314, 381, 383, 400
 Troy, Trojans 351, 352, 353, 358, 361, 366,
 367, 369, 377, 379, 380, 388
 Trypiti 313
 tyranny, tyrants 74, 149, 153, 429

 union of persons (Personalverband) 38, 40
 urbanization 91, 154, 158, 341, 349, 469

 village 89, 132, 135, 293, 294, 299, 316
 village community 294, 457
 Vrokastro 313

 Xanthos 168

 Zancle 139, 416

 Zeus Chrysaoreus 316
 Zoetium 322

 ἀποκλησία 199
 ἄτιμος 288
 δήμαρχος 365
 δημόσιον 100
 ἐπεύνακτοι 449
 ἴσοι 226
 κατώνακοφόροι 450
 κλήρος 395
 κύριον τῶν πόλεων, τῆς πολιτείας 62, 100,
 108, 272, 278, 288
 κώμη, see village
 λαοὶ ἀγροῖάται 376
 ὅμοιοι 72, 224, 225, 226, 234, 235, 238
 πλῆθος 215ff, 219ff, 229ff, 286, 230

2. INDEX OF ANCIENT AUTHORS

- Aelian 332
 Aelius Aristides 109, 172
 Aeschines 165, 326, 417
 Aeschylus 172, 176, 182, 188, 190, 192, 197,
 205, 328, 368
 Alcaeus 62, 109, 144, 162, 176, 197
 Anacreon 162, 188
 Andocides 97
 Antiphon 163, 204
 Archilochus 144, 145, 187
 Aristodemus of Elis 445, 446
 Aristophanes 45, 163, 190, 191, 194
 Aristotle 21, 59, 62, 65, 72, 74, 92, 96, 97,
 119, 120, 121, 136, 139, 143, 161, 162,
 169, 180, 183, 184, 189, 195, 196, 204,
 205, 206, 207, 213ff, 290, 293, 294, 296,
 305, 316, 320, 327, 328, 399, 400, 417,
 446, 447
 Arrian 63
 Athenaeus 97, 161, 190, 312, 449

 Barbarus 327
 Bekker, Anecdota Graeca 416

 Callinus 144

 Castor 327, 328, 411, 416, 417
 Chamaeleon of Heraclea 190
 Charax 329
 Cicero 326
 Claudius, Casilo 206
 Cleanthes 285
 Clemens 286
 Conon 312
 Corinna 190
 Constantinus Porph. 173
 Cornelius Nepos 96
 Craterus 207
 Cratinus 176
 Creophylus 62, 177

 Demosthenes 108, 109, 161, 164, 169, 173,
 184, 204, 324
 Dexippus 169
 Dicaearchus 169
 Didymus 204
 Dio Chrysostomus 285ff, 161, 286
 Diodorus 63, 118, 120, 161, 170, 173, 174,
 281, 305, 310, 313, 317, 318, 417, 445
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 175
 Diphilus 62

- Dosiadas 97
 Ephorus 62, 180, 306, 307, 317
 Erotionus 161
 Etym. Magn. 305
 Euphron 450
 Euripides 62, 110, 177, 182, 187, 188, 189,
 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 205,
 206, 207
 Eusebius 285ff, 286, 327, 328, 411, 416, 417
 Harpocraton 317, 326, 445
 Hecateus 408
 Hellanicus 197, 326, 446
 Hellenica Oxyrh. 320
 Hephaestion 162
 Heracleides 328
 Herodes 185
 Herodorus 305
 Herodotus 65, 91, 96, 120, 157, 162, 163,
 169, 170, 190, 224, 305, 310, 311, 315,
 320, 325, 331, 372, 399, 400, 404, 414,
 415, 465
 Hesiod 161, 188, 190, 205, 337, 339, 341,
 345, 365, 373, 409
 Hesychius 206, 207, 446
 Hippias of Elis 446, 447
 Hippodamus 266, 272
 Homer 31, 36, 62, 64, 89, 109, 121, 155, 156,
 157, 159, 160, 175, 185, 186, 205, 209,
 316, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 345, 349ff,
 393, 412
 Homeric Hymns 156, 175, 329
 Hyperides 62, 177
 Isocrates 28, 62, 83, 84, 170, 177, 183, 190,
 194, 317
 Julius, Africanus, 319
 Justinus 110, 327
 Lex. Dem. 206
 Livy 166, 174
 Lycurgus 62, 96, 162, 180, 326
 Lysias 207
 Maiandrios 206
 Marmor Parium 327, 328, 329
 Memnon 62, 180, 181
 Menaechmus 449, 450
 Nicolaus Damascenus 120, 204, 305, 416,
 417
 Nicolaus Pergamenus 109
 Parthenius 312
 Pausanias 65, 120, 158, 304, 305, 306, 307,
 308, 309, 312, 313, 315, 317, 318, 319,
 321, 322, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 395,
 407, 415, 416, 417, 445, 446, 447
 Philistus 319
 Philochorus 180, 181, 204, 206, 318, 327,
 329
 Philostratus 175, 319, 446
 Phocylides 161, 196
 Photius 181, 194, 195, 327, 416, 417
 Pindar 156, 176, 188, 190, 196, 205, 206,
 407
 Plato 33, 62, 169, 177, 183, 185, 188, 189,
 190, 194, 195, 196, 197, 204, 206, 207,
 208, 214, 225, 226, 230, 266, 281, 283,
 284ff, 293, 296, 316, 327
 Pliny 312
 Plutarch 64, 143, 156, 161, 162, 180, 181,
 190, 193, 195, 197, 207, 320, 330, 331,
 382
 Pollux 169, 176, 207, 400, 449, 450
 Polyaeus 206
 Polybius 165, 166, 175, 317, 451
 Protagoras 283ff
 Pseudo-Herodes 62, 185
 Pseudo-Scylax 157
 Pseudo-Scymnus 306, 307, 310
 Sappho 144, 175
 Schol. Aesch. 327, 416, 417
 Schol. Apoll. Rhod. 312
 Schol. Aristoph. 162
 Schol. Eurip. 205
 Schol. Hom. 207
 Schol. Pind. 206, 207, 445, 446
 Schol. Plat. 326
 Semonides of Amorgos 144
 Simonides of Ceos 187, 196
 Socrates of Argos 399, 400
 Solon 32, 144, 145, 161, 188, 340, 348
 Sophocles 62, 176, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191,
 193, 194, 197, 328

- Souda 327, 416, 417
 Stephanus Byzantius 216, 319, 329, 400
 Stesichorus 205
 Stobaeus 110, 162, 187, 188, 204, 285, 286
 Stoics 75, 213, 285ff
 Strabo 76, 89, 120, 166, 174, 305, 306, 307,
 312, 313, 315, 316, 317, 318, 320, 326,
 329, 414, 415, 445
 Syncellus 327
- Tatianus 327
 Theognis 96, 144, 145, 162, 175, 190, 197,
 455, 456
- Theophrastus 329
 Theopompus 170, 326, 449, 450
 Thucydides 110, 143, 162, 163, 182, 187,
 190, 224, 310, 316, 318, 324, 329, 331,
 407, 408, 411, 418, 465
 Tyrtaeus 33, 144, 162, 175, 196
- Velleius Paterculus 326, 327
- Xenophanes 161, 190, 197
 Xenophon 157, 163, 169, 193, 224, 317, 331,
 407, 411, 415, 450, 466

3. INDEX OF SCHOLARS

- Aisaka, S. 49
 Akurgal, E. 403
 Ampolo, C. 36, 41, 42, 55, 82, 109, 112, 113,
 150
 Andreev, Y.V. 357
 Asheri, D. 139
 Aubonnet, J. 230, 249, 250, 254, 258
 Audring, G. 375, 376
 Austin, M. 34, 41, 48, 86, 297, 342, 355,
 374, 424, 427, 435
 Aymard, A. 41, 42, 82, 140, 142
- Bacon, Francis 124
 Bakhuizen, S.C. 413
 Barker, E. 36, 38, 39, 44, 54, 132, 137, 140,
 249, 250, 254, 256, 258, 270, 297, 340,
 423, 425, 426, 435, 439
 Bartoletti, V. 357
 Beloch, K.J. 119, 296, 324, 416, 445
 Bengtson, H. 32, 33, 34, 35, 43, 65, 93, 94,
 101, 135, 140, 157, 297, 299, 300, 326,
 327, 337, 426
 Benveniste, E. 155
 Bérard, J. 139
 Berve, H. 31, 32, 33, 38, 46, 53, 57, 77, 80,
 107, 140, 148, 326, 340, 343, 349, 425,
 427, 431, 433
 Boardman, J. 327, 464
 Boethius 331
 Bogaert, R. 98
 Bokisch, G. 402
- Bordes, J. 46, 77, 249, 268, 262
 Borecký, B. 29, 33, 48, 68, 143, 151
 Borzak, J. 430
 Braccesi, L. 119
 Bradford Welles, C. 51, 155, 185, 186, 432
 Braun, E. 256, 258
 Buccellati, G. 55, 93
 Bucher, Karl 158
 Buck, C.D. 318, 410
 Burckhardt, J. 20, 53, 55
 Burn, A.R. 43, 136, 293, 294, 298
 Bury, J.B. 336, 429
 Busolt, G. 34, 37, 41, 48, 86, 119, 120, 121,
 299, 323, 325, 331, 350, 356, 399, 410,
 415, 417, 423, 445, 449, 450
- Calhoun, G. 356
 Carlier, P. 312
 Cartledge, P.A. 308, 401, 450
 Cary, M. 325
 Casewitz, M. 155
 Cassola, F. 311
 Chadwick, H.M. 298
 Chadwick, J. 352
 Chamoux, F. 139
 Chantraine, P. 155
 Chatzopoulos, M. 457
 Cohen, R. 293
 Coldstream, J.N. 327, 398, 464
 Cole, D.R. 156, 157
 Cook, J.M. 337, 403

- Cook, R.M. 338
- Daux, G. 42, 82, 84, 109
- Dawson, Chr. 422, 437
- Defourny, M. 296
- Deger, S. 30, 36, 338, 349, 352, 357
- Demargne, P. 198
- De Sanctis, G. 50, 296, 297, 325, 328, 338, 429
- Desborough, V.R. d'A. 401, 412
- Descat, R. 357, 376
- Dickinson, O.T.P.K. 305, 306, 307, 308, 310, 313, 314, 398, 399, 401
- Dovatur, A.I. 281
- Dunbabin, Th.J. 320, 326, 327
- Ehrenberg, V. 20, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 56, 58, 59, 65, 68, 76, 77, 78, 82, 85, 86, 91, 97, 100, 101, 107, 109, 136, 138, 140, 141, 142, 147, 148, 149, 198, 199, 258, 297, 299, 300, 323, 336, 337, 340, 341, 343, 349, 352, 354, 395, 401, 421, 422, 423, 426, 427, 428, 430, 431, 434, 438
- Engels, F. 121, 158, 341, 345ff, 355, 363, 393, 413, 430
- Errington, R.M. 63
- Fanta, A. 356
- Faraklas, N. 321, 399
- Feldman, A.B. 356, 364, 365, 371, 376
- Ferrabino, A. 433
- Fidio, P. de 356
- Field, C.G. 142
- Finley, M.I. 29, 31, 36, 44, 46, 77, 87, 137, 157, 158, 298, 355, 356, 426, 448
- Finsler, G. 356
- Forrest, W.G. 308, 401
- Fowler, W.W. 20, 23, 34, 38, 54, 86, 132, 138, 149, 293, 294, 298, 426, 427, 429, 431
- Francotte, H. 352
- Fustel de Coulanges 19, 43, 136, 144, 296
- Gaudemet, J. 41, 55, 142, 337, 351
- Gauthier, Ph. 268
- Gawantka, W. 19, 20, 21, 22, 29, 32, 35, 58, 59, 67, 68, 73, 74
- Gelzer, M. 34, 43
- Gernet, L. 43, 425, 426, 427, 447, 448
- Gianelli, G. 297, 326
- Gierke 29
- Gigon, O. 248, 249, 250, 254, 256, 270
- Gilbert, G. 325
- Gilissen, J. 425
- Giovannini, A. 163, 323, 409, 410, 411, 415, 417, 418, 459, 460, 461, 465
- Glötz, G. 27, 43, 48, 56, 60, 68, 142, 151, 156, 293, 325, 335, 350
- Gomme, A.W. 119
- Griffith, G.T. 323
- Gschnitzer, F. 23, 27, 28, 29, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, 48, 53, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 81, 82, 85, 86, 97, 128, 132, 148, 159, 297, 323, 352, 353, 357, 378, 380, 381, 384, 387, 423, 439
- Gwynn, A. 337
- Habicht, F. 82
- Häggl, R. 40
- Halliday, W.R. 320
- Hammond, M. 47, 55, 158, 350, 352, 388, 422, 432
- Hammond, N.G.L. 166, 167, 174, 293, 299, 323, 336, 401
- Hampl, F. 41, 42, 63, 81, 82, 83, 85, 109, 185
- Hanell, K. 320, 326
- Hanfmann, G.M.A. 338
- Harmatta, J. 376
- Hasebroeck, J. 43, 46, 77, 136, 294, 326, 348, 354, 428
- Herder, J.G. 19
- Hermann, K.F. 20, 417
- Heuss, A. 42, 294, 296, 351, 422, 438
- Highnett, C. 118, 139, 326, 327, 328, 411, 416
- Hildenbrand, K. 43, 152
- Hoffmann, W. 351, 357
- Hofmann, J.B. 155
- Hope Simpson, R. 305, 306, 307, 308, 310, 313, 314, 398, 399, 401
- Huxley, G.L. 293, 294, 308, 320, 425, 449
- Jachman, G. 357
- Jacoby, F. 416
- Jeffery, L.H. 40, 42, 426

- Jellinek, G. 29, 32, 35, 58
 Jonas, F. 44, 137
 Jowett, B. 227, 230, 249
- Kaerst, J. 30, 35, 37, 38, 48, 52, 86, 132, 297
 Kagan, D. 32, 35, 54, 86, 135, 337, 431
 Kahlenberg, K. 249
 Karstedt, U. 119, 206, 322, 323, 408, 410, 457, 459, 460
 Kalleris, J. 323
 Kanatsoulis, D. 322
 Kansel, T. 325
 Keil, B. 30, 38, 41, 47, 52, 140, 297, 336, 417, 423, 429, 438
 Kelly, Th. 307
 Kirsten, E. 40, 320, 326, 400, 425, 427
 Kitto, H.D.F. 148, 338, 352, 427, 428, 429, 432, 435
 Koerner, R. 319, 329
 Kolb, F. 36, 93, 294, 424, 431
 Kornemann, E. 41, 326
 Kortüm, F. 38
 Koshelenko, G.A. 112, 115, 116, 124, 150, 348, 402, 413
 Köstler, R. 356
 Kreissig, H. 36, 450
 Krüger, H. 29, 58, 67
 Kühn, E. 20
 Kullmann, W. 221
- Lacey, W.K. 49, 68, 140, 340
 Lanza, D. 31
 Larsen, J.A.O. 41, 42, 49, 82, 199, 297, 331, 354, 409, 410, 411, 415, 418, 459, 460, 465
 Latte, K. 41, 42, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 108, 109
 Ledl, A. 327, 328, 411, 416
 Legon, R.P. 444
 Lençman, J.A. 430
 Lendle, O. 256
 Leper, L.H. 325
 Lepore, E. 31, 47, 422, 424, 431
 Lévêque, P. 31, 41, 47, 49, 142, 151, 243, 299, 337, 338, 354, 401, 424, 426, 429, 430
 Lévy, E. 63, 226, 243, 248, 249, 258, 262
 Longo, O. 41
 Lonis, P. 156
 Lotze, D. 400, 450
- Lübtow, U.v. 29, 35, 58, 67
 Luce, J.V. 350, 351, 387, 388
- Macchiavelli, N. 66
 Maddoli, G. 295, 298, 336, 350, 351, 429
 Mansuelli, G. 357
 Marinatos, Sp. 357
 Marót, K. 357
 Marrou, H. 23, 50, 51
 Marx, Karl 40, 86, 87, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 121, 122, 123, 158, 294, 341, 345, 348, 349, 354, 363, 378, 393, 447, 448, 449, 451
 Marxists 346, 355, 363, 364, 375, 376
 Mazzarino, S. 30, 41, 54, 338, 432
 Meier, Chr. 46, 77
 Mele, A. 354
 Menager, L.R. 155
 Meyer, Eduard 206, 299, 318, 320, 326, 350, 425, 432, 445, 457
 Meyer, Ernst 41
 Micknat, G. 351
 Migeotte, L. 98, 99, 100
 Mill, John Stuart 124
 Momigliano, A. 148, 311
 Mondì, R. 357
 Mone, Fr. 32
 Moretti, L. 319
 Morgan, L.H. 349, 354
 Mossé, Cl. 29, 36, 41, 42, 45, 82, 84, 109, 249, 337, 350, 351, 426
 Müller, R. 43, 281
 Musiolek, P. 36
 Mylonas, G. 422, 438
- Nenci, C. 93
 Neumann, K.J. 296
 Newman, W.L. 95, 216, 227, 249, 250, 254, 256, 258, 269, 270, 281
 Niebuhr, B.J. 20
 Niehbur, B.G. 116
 Nilsson, M.P. 357
 Nörr, D. 29, 32, 45, 46, 52, 59, 77, 80
- Papachatzis, N. 322
 Payne, H. 320
 Pečírka, J. 112, 113, 114, 117
 Pipidi, D. 430
 Pöhlmann, R. 32, 34, 54

- Polignac, F. de 339, 432
 Popham, M.R. 327, 413, 463, 464
 Pugliese Carratelli, G. 30, 32, 48, 295, 298, 342, 338
 Rackham, H. 227, 230, 249, 250, 254, 256, 258
 Rahe, P.A. 44, 137
 Roebuck, C. 311, 327
 Roesch, P. 163
 Ross, W.D. 222
 Roussel, D. 43, 49, 296, 298, 299, 300, 432
 Roussel, P. 136, 230, 425
 Runciman, W.G. 341, 346, 356, 363, 365, 366, 371, 372, 373, 378, 393, 401, 423, 434
 Sackett, L.H. 327, 413, 463, 464
 Sakellariou, M.B. 64, 90, 91, 118, 133, 139, 152, 155, 157, 305, 308, 310, 311, 312, 314, 321, 325, 326, 329, 330, 379, 380, 382, 392, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 401, 403, 412, 413, 416, 417, 439, 440, 441, 444, 462
 Sarkady, J. 326
 Schachermeyr, F. 30, 36, 38, 41, 47, 54, 142, 148, 433
 Schaefer, H. 20, 32, 33, 45, 46, 51, 53, 77, 82, 83, 119, 139, 164, 337, 431
 Schömann, G.F. 95, 250
 Schwartz, E. 206
 Siegfried, W. 280, 282
 Siola R.B. 357
 Skalet, Ch. 405
 Smith, Adam 158
 Snodgrass, A.M. 32, 40, 42, 313, 335, 339, 340, 349, 401, 422, 424, 426, 427, 431, 437, 464
 Solders, S. 326
 Sombart, W. 87, 158, 447, 448, 449
 Sordi, M. 41, 206, 297, 410, 411, 417
 Stadelmann, R. 146
 Starr, Ch. G. 30, 35, 41, 48, 55, 68, 86, 135, 140, 148, 149, 151, 152, 158, 297, 299, 300, 338, 339, 340, 345, 349, 355, 356, 424, 425, 428, 430, 431, 433, 434
 Ste Croix, G.E.M. 46, 93
 Stegman von Pritzwald, K. 357
 Steinmetz, P. 249
 Strunk, Cl. 155
 Suerbaum, W. 46, 77
 Swoboda, H. 445
 Syriopoulos, K. 305, 307, 310, 312, 313
 Szanto, E. 41
 Taeger, F. 40, 53, 140, 146, 149, 297
 Te Riele, G.J. - M.J. 159
 Thomas Aquinas 19
 Thomas, C.S.G. 36, 41, 42, 45, 48, 68, 109, 151, 152, 295, 298, 326, 337, 338, 340, 352, 357, 388, 416, 424, 434
 Thomson, G. A. 113, 347, 430
 Toepfer, J. 328
 Tomlinson, R.A. 400
 Toynbee, A.J. 51, 308, 338
 Tricot, J. 219, 249, 250, 254, 256, 270
 Tritsch, F. 34, 48, 86, 427
 Tritsch, W. 51
 Utshenko, S.L. 113, 430
 Van Effenterre, H. 42, 45, 93, 136, 137, 140, 144, 198, 355ff
 Vidal-Naquet, P. 34, 41, 48, 86, 297, 342, 355, 374, 424, 427, 435
 Vinogradoff, P. 41, 42, 43, 98, 101, 106, 136, 254
 Vischer, W. 20
 Vlachos, C.G. 298, 337, 338, 350, 353, 356
 Volkman, H. 118
 Wade-Gery, H.T. 206
 Walbank, F.W. 41, 42, 82, 297
 Weber, Max 46, 49, 50, 77, 87, 88, 158, 296, 297, 299, 348, 425, 448
 Weil, R. 280
 Welskopf, E. 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 347, 430
 Westermann, W.L. 376
 Westlake, H.D. 410, 459, 460
 Westrup, C.W. 357
 Whitehead, W. 450
 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 135, 296, 320, 325, 326, 354, 411, 450
 Wilcken, U. 336, 423, 424, 427, 438
 Will, E. 32, 93, 141, 341
 Willetts, R.F. 199, 347, 409, 430
 Yuge, T. 347, 422, 430, 437



