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DEPARTMENT OF NEOHELLENIC RESEARCH

– 131 –

Basil C. Gounaris

'See how the Gods Favour Sacrilege'

English Views and Politics on Candia under Siege (1645-1669)

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Athens 2012

'See how the Gods
Favour Sacrilege'

Published with the support of the

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ΙΝΣΤΙΤΟΥΤΟ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΩΝ ΕΡΕΥΝΩΝ
ΕΘΝΙΚΟ ΙΔΡΥΜΑ ΕΡΕΥΝΩΝ
ΛΕΩΦ. ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΥ 48, ΑΘΗΝΑ 116 35
ΤΗΛ. (+30) 210 72 73 554 / 210 72 73 556 – FAX: (+30) 210 72 46 212
E-MAIL: kne@eie.gr

DEPARTMENT OF NEOHELLENIC RESEARCH
INSTITUTE OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH
NATIONAL HELLENIC RESEARCH FOUNDATION
48, VASSILEOS CONSTANTINOU AV., 116 35 ATHENS, GREECE,
TEL. (+30210) 72.73.554 – FAX: 72.46.212,
E-MAIL: kne@eie.gr

ISBN 978-960-9538-15-2

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English Views and Politics on Candia under Siege (1645-1669)

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For old friends

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1. *Preface.*

This book has an unorthodox history. During my sabbatical leave I spent much of my time in London at the National Archives, reading the State Papers. I read numerous volumes from the mid seventeenth to the early nineteenth century in an attempt to familiarize myself with an era which so far had been outside my research interests. I tried to look with fresh eye old issues and was fascinated by the task. My particular concern was to reexamine English sources on early modern Greek history and see if a new approach would have something to add to our knowledge, be it unknown facts or a better understanding of financial and social matters. The famous Cretan War was the first story to catch my attention; not because there was a treasure of evidence. Compared to nineteenth century, dispatches were sparse and the parts on Greek social matters rather limited, almost disappointing. Greeks as people were entirely absent from the ambassadorial correspondence. Crete, on the other hand, was only a war front on a map of diplomatic maneuvering. Yet it was a clear-cut historical chapter never studied before thoroughly from the English perspective.

I misjudged that it would be an easy task for a newcomer in the seventeenth century to present the stance of the English state and its representatives with regard to the war for Candia. I knew that the lengthy Cretan War (1645-69), between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire, had been more than a thorny diplomatic issue or a famous chapter of war history; it was an inspiration and a challenge for Western Europe.

Trapped between their own old wars and the new commercial priorities, Catholics and Protestants alike, had to decide anew how to handle Islam; as crusaders or as merchants. What I did not know then was the incredible complication of the triangular relationship between London, Venice and Constantinople during a most critical period of English history. Daniel Goffman had covered thoroughly the Ottoman front of the English Civil War and the aftermath, until the restoration of monarchy; but there were further unstudied complications afterwards: the making of a royal eastern policy by the restored monarch. The currant trade, on the other hand, had already caused a commercial war between England and Venice before the 1640s, studied masterly by Maria Fusaro; but the question had not been resolved. The same war was repeated in the early 1640s and the peace which followed was uneasy. Currants from the Venetian held Ionian Islands were important for some influential merchants of London who supported the Parliament but cared least for the Cretan troubles of Venice. Thus, the *Serenissima* was dragged willy-nilly in the politics of the English Civil War in an ill-destined venture to play puritan piety against the spirit of capitalism; a fascinating story which I had to follow scene by scene. The restoration of Charles II --it was truly hoped in Venice-- would reverse English foreign policy in the Mediterranean but eventually it did not. Engagements with the Barbary pirates did not escalate into an open naval war. The Christian zeal of the English monarch and the sympathy of the public for the Venetian cause were outweighed by the need to give priority to mercantile and manufacturing interests that required good relations with the Ottoman Empire. It was a bad end of a desperate, almost romantic, story; but was it an unpredictable one? The Senate, after all, thought that supplication

on religious grounds was worthwhile. Evidence testified that it was not and this brought me to the final question: In the making of English mid seventeenth century foreign policy, the War of Candia stands as an almost perfect paradigm of calculated neutrality based on reasonable choices. Was this stance really exceptional in Europe?

Anyway, I was surprised but also enchanted by the multiple aspects of this random topic. In British seventeenth century history there are few things that can't be cross-checked and searched in depth. The State Papers hold all the necessary ambassadorial and consular correspondence. The publications of the Historical Manuscripts Commission made available the rest. In the Calendar of State Papers, now on the Web, I found everything I needed about Venetian diplomatic ventures in London but also valuable reflexions of their manoeuvres in Constantinople. I was tempted but refrained from being dragged into a full-fledged analysis of English global policy or by other international aspects of the Cretan War. Apparently the future of Candia was not the major concern of Cromwell or Charles II and England not the exclusive focus of Venetian diplomacy. Newspapers and other publications made possible an evaluation of the public awareness vis-à-vis the ongoing siege. The English society, after all, was indeed under the influence of stereotypical images of both Islam and Venice which have been studied thoroughly in the recent years. I was joyfully overwhelmed by the sources and the extensive literature available. Recent bibliography on war and religion was inspiring and Molly Greene's arguments for the development of the Christian commercial presence in the Mediterranean fit perfectly in my story.

Obviously re-approaching an overloaded chapter of early modern English history was a complicated challenge. Even more

so since parts of it were not entirely unknown and most of the sources had been read by others earlier on, even in the nineteenth century, but not exploited systematically. I thought worthwhile putting together all the used and unused documentation, published and archival sources, in an attempt to build a balanced picture of the English response to the Cretan War and explain it in the context of politics, diplomacy and ideology.

If this venture proved successful by any measure it was only due to the support of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki which covered my travel costs and residence in Britain and to King's College London, which gave me access to valuable resources. I treasure the friendship of Professor Roderick Beaton, Professor David Ricks and Dr Philip Carabott. Back home my special thanks go to Professor Emeritus Ioannis K. Hassiotis who shared with me his deep knowledge of the Mediterranean world; to Professor Ioannis Psaras who introduced me to Venetian history and archival research long time ago; and to Professor Paschalis Kitromilidis not only for his constant support and trust but also for the liaison with Dr Sonia Anderson. Her critique of this book proved valuable in many aspects. Mr Dimitris Sarmaniotis has been my unfailing agent in London libraries. Mrs Sarah Edwards has contributed valuable comments and corrections. I owe both of them a lot. The National Hellenic Research Foundation and the Onassis Foundation have my appreciation for making this book possible. As always I am indebted to my old friends, in need and in deed, Professor Ioannis D. Stefanidis and Assist. Professor Dimitris Livanios. In times of trouble, outside family, long-standing friendship is the only safe investment, non-liable to any expropriation. They both deserve this dedication.

2. *Currants and Malmsey.*

On Sunday 14 February 1613 Antonio Foscarini, the Venetian Ambassador in London, attended the wedding of Princess Elizabeth, the eldest daughter of James I of England, to Frederick V, the Elector of the Palatinate. After the ceremony and the banquet, the ambassadors were invited to the King's gallery, where he came and spoke with them. While talking about a matter of protocol concerning precedence,[1] King James went on "in terms of great affection" and defended the prestige of the most Serene Republic. He pointed that the Venetians were once "Kings of Cyprus". To Foscarini's comment, that they were still of Candia, the King confirmed, saying "of Crete", as though he meant that one ought to say "Crete" instead of "Candia", the former being "the term better known or more honourable". The Venetian diplomat was impressed by his knowledge and rejoiced by the unexpected flatter.[2] In fact "Candia" was the name but of one Cretan city (the Byzantine Handax or modern Herakleion), the seat of the Venetian Duke of Candia ever after the 4th Crusade. As a result, the Venetian administrative district of Crete became known as "Regno di Candia" (Kingdom of Candia), a name

1. It was brought up the previous day by the Ambassador of the Archduke of Flanders. He had tried to delay the presentation of his Venetian colleague to the King for reasons of precedence, since Venice was only a Republic.

2. See Foscarini to the Doge and Senate, London, 1 Mar. 1613, *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice* (hereafter *CSP*), vol. 12: 1610-1613 (1905), pp. 498-516.

often used in English (as well as in other languages) to refer to the whole island of Crete as well. A man of education in the humanities like King James I was aware of the difference. This large Aegean island was not a *terra incognita* in England – neither for the knowledgeable nor for the laymen-ever since Richard the Lionheart had been forced to take refuge there in 1191, after a storm. Crete –not Candia– was known to Shakespeare and presumably to his audiences but malmsey (malvasie or malvoisie), the sweet Cretan wine, was popular to many more of his compatriots. By 1400 the Venetians alone were importing a thousand casks of such wine from Crete every year, although its consumption or admixture with other wines was considered harmful to health.[3] Only such abundance and popularity might explain the bizarre death of the 1st Duke of Clarence. Trading in the Levant remained brisk during the early Tudors, especially before the French Capitulations (1535), with the English trying to restrict the import of malmsey aboard non-English vessels.[4] In 1522 Censio (or Comio) de Balthasari (or Menesava), son of John, a merchant from Luca, was appointed consul in Crete for life by Henry VIII.[5] Cretan wine remained

3. Jonathan Harris, "More Malmsey, your Grace? The Export of Greek Wine to England in the Later Middle Ages" in L. Brubaker and K. Linardou (eds), *Eat, Drink and be Merry (Luke 12: 19): Food and Wine in Byzantium* (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 250-1; Royal injunction, in favour of two Genoese, keeping tavern in the City, *Memorials of London and London Life: In the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries* (1868), pp. 270-3.

4. Alwyn A. Ruddock, *Italian Merchants and Shipping in Southampton, 1270-1600* (Southampton, 1951), pp. 221-3.

5. William Reginald Lowder, "Candie Wyne. Some Documents Relating to Trade between England and Crete during the Reign of King Henry VIII, *Ellinika*, 12 (1952), 100-1; cf. *Alfred C. Wood, A History of the Levant*

one of the most marketable cargoes carried from the Mediterranean by the merchants of the Turkey and Venice Companies during Elizabethan times, assisted by a small group of Greek-Venetian intermediaries.[6] In 1608 King James was advised to raise the duty on wines imported from Crete, but he did not consent. When the English Ambassador in Venice argued that this refusal was "a further proof to the world of the sincere friendship" of his King, the Doge replied that it was rather "a sign of his prudence". If Cretan wine was too heavily taxed, he counter argued, imports would cease and the English would have to live without it; whereas Venetians would profit even more by selling it at home, where, due to shortage, the duty on wine was heavier.[7] In the early seventeenth century Crete, the renowned cradle of Jupiter, stood prominently not only in King

Company (New York, 1964), p. 2, where an earlier year of appointment (1520) is given.

6. See the proclamation by Queen Elizabeth (Richmond, 5 Apr.) attached to the letter of Giovanni Moro to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 26 Aug. 1583, *CSP, vol. 8: 1581-1591* (1894), pp. 62-7; Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge, 1985), p. 87; S.A. Skilliter, *William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey 1578-1582* (London, 1977), pp. 5-11. For the intermediaries see Maria Fusaro, "*Les Anglais et les Grecs*: Un *réseau de coopération commercial en Méditerranée vénitienne*," *Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, 58/3 (2003), 613-7.

7. Foscarini to the Doge and Senate, London, 9 Sept. 1608, *CSP, vol. 11: 1607-1610* (1904), pp. 164-74. In fact two years later King James promised to remove the tax on sweet wines, among them on the Cretan muscat, after his Admiral, who enjoyed this tax, would be deceased: Correr to the Doge and Senate, London, 28 July 1610, *CSP, vol. 12: 1610-1613* (1905), pp. 16-21. Apparently he was referring to Howard of Effingham, who was an old man then but died only in 1624 at the age of 88.

James's knowledge of ancient history and Sir Walter Raleigh's, *History of the World* but most importantly in English and Scotland wine markets and taverns.[8]

Malmsey imports might have been important for the image of Venetian held Crete in early modern England but was not the only issue affecting the image of the Republic and its relations with London. In terms of trade currants from the Ionian islands of Zante and Cephalonia (both governed by the *Serenissima*) were also extremely lucrative cargoes. Imports of currants had been rising impressively since the 1570s. They leaped from some ten thousand hundredweights just before the turn of the seventeenth century to 14,000 in 1601, 20,000 in 1603, almost to 49,000 in 1610 and to 62,000 1638.[9] It was a clear sign of the popularity they enjoyed among wider social strata and of the growing and increasingly unbalanced Levantine trade. So popular, that they were blamed for causing fevers, consumption and distemper. It also testified to the inability of the Venetians to compete with the English merchants and their Greek partners in legal and illegal transactions, even before the Ottoman invasion of Crete in 1645.[10] The Levant Company –indeed its most influential merchants, the very offspring of the founders– had established a monopoly in currant trade and, by exploiting

8. For Cretan wine in Scotland see Correr to the Doge and Senate, London, 28 Nov. 1608, *CSP, vol. 11: 1607-1610* (1904), pp. 186-94; Sir Walter Raleigh, *The History of the World* (London, 1617), p. 89. Raleigh made clear that "Cretians" and "Candians" were the same people.

9. For the rise of currant production in Zante and Cephalonia see Maria Fusaro, *Uva passa. Una Guerra commerciale tra Venezia e l'Inghilterra (1540-1640)* (Venezia, 1996), p. 104.

10. Fusaro, "*Les Anglais et les Grecs*", pp. 619-22 ; James Mather, "The Turkey Merchants", *History Today*, 61/5 (2011), 29.

local networks, had almost driven out Venetian merchant houses from both islands. The attempts of the Republic to resist by imposing onerous taxes or various forms of navigations acts in the 1600s, 1610s and 1620s did not work out. Overproduction which was a boon became a boomerang. And there was more trouble: The well-armed English vessels were wining Venice in the carrying trade; and the influx of manufactured English cloth in Venetian home markets (as well as in the Levantine) was causing additional anxiety to the most Serene Republic.[11]

Rising competition in the Levant seas was a rather far cry back in England. In the early seventeenth century Italy in general and Venice in particular still filled the English imagination with a picture of a superior, sophisticated society; although, travelers' accounts of Italian manners were turning increasingly unfavourable. The special praise of Venice was due to its defiance of Spanish ambitions in Italy, its staunch antipapal

11. Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 25-27, 38-9, 42-3, 48 (table 1.4.), 63-7; Ralph Davis, "England and the Mediterranean, 1570-1670" in F.J. Fisher (ed.), *Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart England* (London, 1961), pp. 118-21, 136; Richard T. Rapp, "The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution", *The Journal of Economic History*, 35/3 (1975), 508-11. For the English success in Zante and Cephalonia see Maria Fusaro, "Commercial Networks of Cooperation in the Venetian Mediterranean: The English and the Greeks, a Case Study" in D. R. Curto and A. Molho (eds), *Commercial Networks in the Early Modern World*, (Florence, 2002), pp. 121-47. For a detailed presentation of the long-lasting trade war see Fusaro, *Uva passa*, pp. 107 ff.; for the regulation of the currant trade see also Mordecai Epstein, *The English Levant Company* (New York, 1968 1st edn 1908), pp. 109-34.

attitude, supported by King James I himself,[12] and the respective prestige of the Republic in Protestant Europe. This prestige was publicised in England through the translated works of Fra Paolo Sarpi in the 1620s and '30s, especially through the two editions of *The History of the Council of Trent* (1620 and 1629). Such a historical narrative was extremely appealing to the English. The story of the Serene Republic echoed as almost a parallel case to theirs, but such affinity did not imply any kind of political identification, not until the 1640s.[13]

Venice was also regarded as the traditional bulwark of Christian Europe against the infidel Turk.[14] In the early seventeenth

12. W.B. Patterson, *King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 91, 116-7. A contigent of English volunteers joined the Venetians against the Austrians in the siege of Gradisca in 1615 during the Uskok war. An English flotilla also sailed into the Adriatic together with the Dutch: Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (New York, 2003), pp. 36-7.

13. Christopher Hill, *Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution* (Oxford, 1965), pp. 276-8; George B. Parks, "The Decline and Fall of the English Renaissance Admiration of Italy", *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 31/4 (Aug., 1968), 345, 347-52; David C. McPherson, *Shakespeare, Jonson and the Myth of Venice* (London & Toronto, 1990); John Eglin, *Venice Transfigured. The Myth of Venice in British Culture, 1660-1797* (London, 2001), p. 14; John L. Lievsay, *Venetian Phoenix: Paolo Sarpi and some of his English Friends, 1606-1700* (Lawrence, 1973); M. Vester, "Paolo Sarpi and Early Stuart Debates over the Papal Antichrist" in Karl A. Kottman (ed.), *Millenarianism and Messianism in Early Modern European Culture. Catholic Millenarianism: From Savonarola to the Abbé Grégoire* (Dordrecht, 2001), vol. 2, pp. 54-60, 64.

14. The term "Turk" has been used throughout this study, following the sources, to denote the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire in general. The term "Ottoman" was thought preferable whenever reference is made to state institutions, officials and policies.

century England Turks, were still seen by many, perhaps by the majority, as yet another scourge of God to punish Christendom. Maybe the Turk was the very incarnation of Antichrist, as a Greek who had suffered much in their hands, Christopher Angelos, argued in 1619. Captivity, slavery and conversion to Islam was a clear and present danger anywhere the Barbary pirates could reach; and even English coasts were within their grasp. The negative stereotype of the villain, cruel and sodomite Turk and Moor gained appeal and permanence through widely read works, mostly of continental origin, while coffee-drinking was presented as a moral threat, paving the way for Islam. As Englishness was in the making, cultural differences were becoming increasingly important in defining the collective self. Yet, for others, the alleged or real wealth and the absolute rule of the Grand Seignior were more impressive than fearsome. The lack of nobility based on birth and the magnificent courtliness were also admired. Consecutive English monarchs welcomed his delegates in London. Quite a few English adventurers found the world of Islam even tempting, the perfect world for military careers; so tempting as to engage themselves in piracy and slave trade with the Muslims against the Christians. English feelings were clearly complicated by their commercial interests. The multicultural Mediterranean world of profit was fascinating and in the same time frightening. If Venice ever needed English open support, both aspects ought to be considered. The Grand Seignior was no longer –or not only– the bloody and cruel Turk of the Renaissance era.[15] He was also, like Venice, a trade

15. The literature on the image of Islam and the Turks in England is extremely rich. Here have been used C.A. Patrides, "'The Bloody and Cruell Turke': The Background of a Renaissance Commonplace", *Studies*

partner of the Levant Company, indeed much more promising than the Serene Republic. Was a Christian bulwark really that important for the English after all? To fight against whom?

in the Renaissance, 10 (1963), 126-135; Christopher Hill, *Antichrist in Seventeenth-Century England* (London & New York, 1990), pp. 26, 181-2; Nancy Bisaha, *Creating East and West. Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks* (Philadelphia, 2004); Gerald MacLean, *The Rise of the Oriental Travel. English Visitors to the Ottoman Empire, 1580-1720* (New York, 2004) and Margaret Meserve, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought* (Cambridge MA, 2008), pp. 22-64. More extensively have been cited some of the most recent works: two studies by Daniel Vitkus, i.e. his introduction to *Three Turk Plays from Early Modern England* (New York, 2000), pp. 1-45 and his later book *Turning Turk. English Theater and the Multicultural Mediterranean, 1570-1630* (New York, 2003), pp 25-44. Also valuable have been three works by Nabil Matar: *Islam in Britain*, 1558-1685 (Cambridge, 1998), pp 34-49, 110-19, 126-52, 155-67, *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (New York, 1999), pp. 6-11, 19-42, 55-63 and his "Introduction" in Daniel J. Vitkus (ed.), *Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption. Barbary Captivity Narratives from Early Modern England* (New York, 2001), pp. 1-40.

3. *Venice between King and Parliament.*

In the 1640s this triangular relationship was tested seriously. On 8 March 1642, shortly after King Charles I had moved to Oxford, the Directors of the Levant Company convinced the Long Parliament to pass a bill banning the import of currants from Zante and Cephalonia after August of that year. It was not only because their quality was poor. They argued that it was in the public interest to stop the annual flow of forty thousand pounds into a foreign dominion where English merchandise was not consumed, new taxes had been imposed on imported cloth, payments were only in cash, and Englishmen have been met with a "very indifferent reception". They assured the commissioners of the Parliament that, in the face of such an embargo, Venice would lower the duties and the price of currants would drop too. Meanwhile they would have managed to get rid of their accumulated stock, which was sufficient to cover English needs for the next two years. If the Republic insisted, they said, then the Levant Company would turn for currants to the Ottoman-held Morea (the Peloponnese), where new vineyards had been planted. The Parliament was convinced, a bill was passed accordingly and sent to the Upper House and then to the King for his consent.[1]

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1. 8 March 1642, *Journal of the House of Commons (hereafter JHC), vol. 2: 1640-1643* (1802), pp. 471-2; see the letters by Giustiniani to the Doge and Senate, London, 21 and 28 Mar. 1642, *CSP, vol. 26, 1642-1643* (1925), pp. 13-28. Part of the correspondence in Italian may be found in Guglielmo Berchet (ed.), *Cromwell et la Repubblica di Venezia* (Venezia, 1864).

Giovanni Giustiniani, the Venetian Ambassador in England, was alarmed and irritated. In reality the duties the merchants paid were in exchange for the monopoly they enjoyed in carrying direct trade from the islands to England. He had no doubt these gentlemen were motivated by their own sole interest – to reduce their huge stock – and by a pending debt of thirty thousand pounds to their angry creditors in Zante, threatening to seize English ships once they touched the islands.[2] Giustiniani turned for assistance to the Company's customers (as they had done in a similar crisis in 1621) and to Lord Fielding, apparently to William Fielding, 1st Earl of Denbigh, a man loyal to the King to his death, father of Basil Feilding, Charles's Ambassador Extraordinary to Venice (1634-39). He argued that such a bill would decrease the King's income by thirty thousand pounds, English ships carrying cloth to the Levant would return home empty, and the Dutch would turn their attention to that trade. Giustiniani also appealed to Sir Henry Vane, a rising member of the Long Parliament, chief of the Commissioners for Trade, to influence his colleagues and stop the process, but to no avail. It was an unfortunate choice since Vane had introduced the issue to the Parliament himself, full of resent. The bill was read in early July for the second and third time and was approved unanimously without any alterations. An Ordinance of both Houses of Parliament was issued on 26 August 1642. It is doubtful whether at that time the majority of the Levant Company members were supporters of the Parliament. Quite the opposite. Its Governor, Sir Henry Garraway, was to be deprived

2. Overtrading of currants was not a new problem (Brenner, *op.cit.*, pp. 67-8).

of his office the following year.[3] Their claims, however, against Venice had been supported strongly by Samuel Vassal and Thomas Soam, both members of the Parliament (representing London) and of the Company. They were both bitterly opposed to the King and to the Serene Republic because their embezzlement suit against the Benizelos (Benicello), a notable family of Athens, had not been favoured by the Senate.[4] It was no secret that Vassal, a leading figure in colonial trade and the American colonisation, was also motivated by his competitive investment in the export trade to Ragusa and Hungary. In fact, about half of all the Levant Company Members of Parliament were actively involved with the colonial traders, the latter fervently supporting the cause of the Parliament from the outset.[5]

In a society questioning whether the Doge should be the measure for a king's rights, ironically the *veto* of King Charles was the last hope of Venice.[6] As it became clear that he would

3. Robert Brenner, "The Civil War Politics of London's Merchant Community", *Past and Present*, 58 (Feb., 1973), 76-7, 85; cf. *Wood*, *op.cit*., p. 52; For the efforts of the Levant Company to safeguard the monopoly of the currant trade see Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, pp. 87-8.

4. See note 9 and Giustiniani's letters to the Doge and Senate (London, 4 and 10 Apr., 4 and 11 July 1642) in *CSP*, *vol. 26*, *1642-1643* (1925), pp. 29-45, 86-100; cf. Memorial of John Hobson, English merchant, to the Resident of the King of Great Britain with the Republic of Venice in *CPS*, vol.25: 1640-1642 (1924), pp. 141-158, no 196. The particular reference, dating back to 1625, is to Dimitrios and Angelos Benizelos.

5. Zonca to the Doge and Senate, London, 4 Dec. 1637, *CSP*, *vol. 24: 1636-1639* (1923), pp. 328-42; Brenner, "The Civil War Politics", pp. 66 and 76-9.

6. Zera S. Fink, *The Classical Republicans. An Essay in the Recovery of a Pattern of Thought in Seventeenth Century England* (Evaston, 1945), pp. 46 ff.

not consent, some exporters realised the risk undertaken and gave more orders for currants at Zante. In response the Levant Company passed a fresh order in the House of Commons which limited the Ordinance to three years only. Moreover, in the absence of a strong central power, its directors prohibited their factors from importing currants under the threat of losing the liberty to trade and their rights as Company members.[7]

Giustiniani eventually met the King in Oxford where he went in late November to announce his replacement by Contarini. Charles recognised the harm done to his revenue and to trade and reaffirmed that he would never give his consent.[8] But his consent was no longer required. In less than a month the *Savii* informed London that the English would be prohibited from selling their cloth in Venice and its dominions until the decree was withdrawn.[9] In January 1643, after a petition of the Levant Company, Parliament decided that the embargo would not extend to the currants of the Morea for two explicit reasons: The annual exports of considerable quantities of manufactured cloth in the dominions of the Grand Seignior should not be endangered, while duties put on the Peloponnesian currants by the Ottoman Empire were far more reasonable.[10] By March 1643 smuggling of currants had already been reported in London. In July representations were made from Zante and Cephalonia to

7. Giustiniani to the Doge and Senate, London, 5, 19, 26 Sept. 1642, *CSP, vol. 26, 1642-1643* (1925), pp. 110-27, 150-64.

8. Giustiniani to the Doge and Senate, London, 21 Nov. 1642 *CSP, vol. 26, 1642-1643* (1925), pp. 189-204.

9. *Ibid*., pp. 204-21 (The Savii to Agostini, Venice, 16 Dec. 1642).

10. "Ordinance to allow the Importation of Currants from the Turks Dominions", *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660* (1911), p. 375.

Venice. The price of currants had dropped eighty per cent. The *Savii* suggested the Senate consider some reduction of the duties. Every facility should be given to the English in order to remove restrictions upon trading. In January 1644, however, the import of currants to then Royalist held Bristol was encouraged by the King's Secretary of State. Under the circumstances, in mid March, Parliament had to free the transport of currants from the Ionian Islands for six months. Those who opposed the decree suggested instead taking vines from the Morea and planting them in Virginia or in New England. The majority, however, was not convinced.[11] According to the memoirs of Charles's Ambassador to Venice, Gilbert Talbot, the Republic became so sympathetic to the King that, after his defeat at Marston Moor in July of that same year, it offered him assistance with "men, money, Arms or Ammunition". However, the proposal did not reach the King until early in 1645, when Talbot met him at Oxford. The King was surprised for he did not take the Venetians "to be so much our friends as to lend us money". No sooner had Talbot returned to Venice than hostilities broke out with the Turks over Candia.[12] King Charles, by now possessing no more power in England "than as a Duke of Venice", would have to seek assistance elsewhere. Turkey was an option –indeed coined by the same Talbot– which he could not disregard.[13] The new

11. The Senate to Agostini, Venice, 19 Feb. 1644; Agostini to the Doge and Senate, London, 18 Mar. 1644, *CSP, vol. 27: 1643-1647* (1926), pp. 68-85.

12. The first news of a naval battle was published in the *Moderate Intelligencer*, No 13 (22 May 1645).

13. Daniel Goffman, *Britons in the Ottoman Empire, 1642-1660* (Seattle & London, 1998), pp. 69-70.

episode of the trade war had been rather brief; but it confirmed that what King James I allegedly had said, that he esteemed the friendship of the most Serene Republic more than that of any other prince, was no longer valid.[14] Foreign policy had been subjected to the expediencies of the Civil War. Was Giovanni Soranzo, the *Bailo* in Constantinople, justified in fearing that the English "would like the Turks to capture Candia so that they may have free trade there in Muscat"?[15]

In early September 1645, the first detailed news about the Ottoman disembarkation in Crete and the bloody siege of Canea reached London. Their invasion had benefited a sea as calm as no one had seen in the previous fifty years. "See how the Gods favour sacrilege", commented the *Moderate Intelligencer*, well-known for its impartiality and restraint, as more detailed news came in about the casualties and the eventual capture of the city. It was also commented that it was due to the French involvement in the Thirty Year War and the division of Christendom that the Turks had managed to accomplish such deeds.[16] About that time, a leaflet was published entitled the *Blasphemous Manifestation of the Grand Seignior of Constantinople against the Christians*. It encouraged all Christian princes to reconcile and to join forces

14. Giustiniani to the Doge and Senate, 21 Nov. 1642, *CSP, vol. 26, 1642-1643* (1925), pp. 189-204.

15. Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century* (Philadelphia, 1991), p. 132.

16. *Moderate Intelligencer*, No 28 (4 Sept. 1645); No 31 (25 Sept. 1645). During the period 1645-46 news from Crete appeared in the press every week. The *Moderate Intelligencer* was unmatched for its foreign correspondents and connections with parliamentary and army leaders: Joad Raymond, *The Invention of the Newspaper: English Newsbooks, 1641-1649* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 147-8.

"to oppose that cruell enemy that seek to make himself king of the world" (p. 4).[17] Apparently King Charles was not affected by this treatise, if he had read it at all; nor was his Ambassador to the Sublime Port, Sir Sackville Crow. From Goffman's meticulous work we know that in 1646 Crow was engaged in talks with the Porte and convinced them to prevent the lading or embarkation of men and supplies on English ships. Apparently he exploited Ottoman fears of an alliance between the Long Parliament and the *Serenissima* by maximizing the importance of English renegade contribution to the Candia expedition. In addition he exposed his compatriot factors of the Levant Company as smugglers of powder in the service of Venice. It was an irony that in early spring 1646 Parliament, incited by the Company, had denied the Venetian diplomat sent to London, Secretary Suriano, the privilege to troops and ships.[18] In any case the unsaid goal of Crow was to tax these rebel merchants for the benefit of his King. In this he failed, although he caused considerable delays in trade throughout 1646. It was only in January 1647 that he was replaced by Thomas Bendysh. His discharge had been approved by the King, who could not back him without revealing his own disgraceful consent to play the Porte against the Parliament.[19]

17. Cf. Matar, *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen*, p. 163; the full title was *Newes from the Great Turke. A Blasphemous Manifestation of the Grand Seignior of Constantinople, against the Christians; of his Entrance into Christendome, and the Particulars of his Great Armie. As it was sent to a Merchant of Note in London* (London, 1645).

18. Nani to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 3 Apr. 1646, *CSP, vol. 27: 1643-1647* (1926), pp. 250-5. It was in the same year that Parliament sent Edmond Casson as its agent in Algiers.

19. Goffman, *op.cit.*, pp. 71-97; cf. *Moderate Intelligencer*, No 152 (10 Feb. 1648).

By the time Bendysh took over, the fall of Rethymno and the slaughter of numerous Venetians –allegedly perpetrated by three thousand Bulgarians![20]– had been announced dramatically in England: the sea had turned to blood. The future of the whole of Crete was uncertain and yet there were signs of assistance.[21] Bendysh was not to allow English ships to join in on either side. Indeed in August 1647, he ordered all ship captains to remain in port. The Porte could now expect help only from English renegade ships, which, being indistinguishable from Company ships, were confronted reluctantly by the Venetian navy. But in March 1648, when the Venetians commenced the blockade of the Dardanelles, the Turks became so dependent on foreign naval support that they officially sought the assistance of English, Dutch and French ships anchored in Constantinople. A breakthrough was imperative. They all refused but the English went as far as to launch a naval demonstration just beneath the Seraglio port. Whatever they achieved, it did not resolve the issue. The English ships left Constantinople in August but the Porte was soon to return, in late 1648, pressing anew for transportation: The Company ships would not be allowed to leave Ottoman ports unless they cooperated with Captain Pasha.[22]

The Venetians were afraid, if not certain, that under such pressure Bendysh would eventually yield, even though English

20. Most likely it was timariot army recruited in Bulgaria.

21. *Moderate Intelligencer*, No 92 (3 Dec. 1645); No 95 (24 Dec. 1645); No 96 (31 Dec. 1645); No 97 (7 Jan. 1646); No 98 (14 Jan. 1646); No 102 (11 Feb. 1646). *Weekly Account*, No 54 (23 Dec. 1645). Rumours of Polish mobilisation and of Dutch naval support were not substantiated (Setton, *op.cit.*, pp. 131-2).

22. Goffman, *op.cit.*, pp. 119, 147-8, 153.

ship captains were reluctant to serve the Grand Turk. To make things even more complicated, the Company was annoyed by the detention of some of its vessels by the Venetian fleet. By May 1649, after the sea-battle of Old Phocaea won by Giacomo da Riva, it was clear that a considerable number of English ships were coming under Ottoman service, while the Senate was still trying to accommodate Company complaints with assurances of friendship and dramatic appeals to their Christian faith.[23] This time they were lucky. In August it was reported that after they had landed the troops and supplies, the English ships which had sailed from Smyrna to Candia with the *Kapudan* Pasha took their leave, against the wish of the Pasha. The Porte was furious. When Bendysh met the new Grand Vizier, Kara Dev Murad Pasha, the latter broke into violent accusations and demanded not only the refund of the rent paid to the Company ships but indemnity for the whole cost of the expedition. Otherwise he threatened to have him thrown in the notorious dungeon of the Seven Towers. Apparently, by breaking him, he was trying to get a promise of further English assistance.[24] But the Ambassador resisted all the difficulties rigorously. By December 1649 the Levant Company and the Senate had come to terms: the Venetian fleet would permit up to three ships at a time to enter the channel of the Dardanelles. The Company,

23. See the letters by Contarini and Soranzo and the enclosed documents of Apr. 1649, *CSP, vol. 28: 1647-1652* (1927), pp. 93-7. Cf. Goffman, *op.cit.*, pp. 153-54 and Setton, *op.cit.*, pp. 154-7. See also the letter of the Senate to the Ambassador at Munster, Venice, 20 May 1649, *CSP, vol. 28: 1647-1652* (1927), pp. 97-102.

24. *Ibid*, pp. 111-5 (Soranzo to the Doge and Senate, Constantinople, 20 Aug. 1649).

on the other hand, gave its assurance that it would not allow its ships to serve the Porte against the Serene Republic, directly or indirectly, unless they were compelled by force.[25] It was in the same year that Alexander Ross stressed, in the "Caveat" of his English translation of the *Alcoran*, that the Muslims were implacable "enemies of the Cross of Christ", so "Christian Princes were bound to oppose the enemies thereof".[26] Was Oliver Cromwell to be one of them?

25. *Ibid*., pp. 120-4 (Contarini to Salvetti, London, 23 Oct. 1649); see also the letters by Salvetti (and the attachments), London, 4 and 30 Dec. 1649: *Ibid*, pp. 128-31; cf. Goffman, *op.cit*., pp. 154-5. The frequent assistance provided by English merchant ships (*bertoni*) to the Ottoman navy in the late 1640s, especially during the summer campaign of 1649, was well known to the besieged Christian population of Crete, if we judge from Ioakeim Kyprios's book, a long narrative poem in vernacular Greek, called *Struggle*: See verses 3493-3512 and 6245-6654 in Tassos A. Kaplanis (ed.), *Ioakeim Kyprios' Struggle: editio princeps* (Nicosia, 2012). I am grateful to Dr Kaplanis for giving me access to his unpublished work.

26. Matar, *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen*, p. 163.

4. *For Christianity, trade and liberty.*

On 17 February 1650 Thomas Killigrew, the dramatist, was received in Venice with due honours. He had been appointed representative by Charles II, then in exile. In the royal memorandum he submitted to the Senate, lamenting the situation in republican England, Killigrew made special mention of the publication of the *Alcoran*: It was "translated from the Turkish, so that the people may be imbued with Turkish manners, which have much in common with the action of the rebels".[1] His reception by the Senate was a blunder of tactics. It was to be corrected only two years later, in June 1652.[2] Meanwhile the Company asked Parliament to empower Ambassador Bendysh to forbid all English ships from serving against the Ottoman Empire with the Venetian fleet. But at the same time the merchants pressed for a protest against the violation of the capitulations, even for a new naval demonstration up to the "Castles of Constantinople".[3] In March 1650 they wrote to Bendysh that he was suspected of co-operation with the Porte and expressed to him the limits of such friendly services:

> We are sorry to observe how frequently we are subject to the insolency of those people, as in their late inforcement of

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1. See Venice: 14 Feb. 1650, *CSP, vol. 28: 1647-1652* (1927), pp. 135-41. Actually the Quran was translated into English from the French text.

2. Horatio F. Brown, *Venetian Studies* (London, 1887), p. 367. In 1646 Charles I tried to appoint Thomas's brother, Sir William Killigrew, Ambassador to the Porte, but was rejected by the Company (Goffman, *op.cit.*, p. 90).

3. Goffman, *op.cit.*, pp. 155-57, 178.

> our ships to carry soldiers to Candia; but we hope you had not the least hand in that business, and desire you will be very careful to hinder any such design, whether voluntary or compulsive, so scandalous to the Christian profession, and so distasteful to the State of Venice, to whom we have promised to give full satisfaction of our innocency in this point. To this end we have consented that no more than one, two, or three English ships at a time shall be licensed to go up, and all others hindered to follow until the former be returned, by which means no considerable force can be added to the Turks, in case they should compel the ships to their service; and you are to give order to the masters of our ships accordingly.[4]

Whatever was done, Ottoman pressure for English transport did not stop. Nor did Venetian fears, excited regularly by the French, asserting that Bendysh, who had been personally threatened and punched by the *şeyhülislam*, was working for a compromise unfavourable for the *Serenissima*.[5] The Company itself was also suspected of breaking its written word. The merchants and Parliament were frequently urged by the Venetians not to act against the interests of the Serene Republic and of "all Christendom", "displeasing Almighty God" and contrary to "Christian piety and charity".[6] A union of English forces with

4. Levant Company to Bendysh, London, 15 Mar. 1650, *CSP Domestic: Interregnum, 1650* (1876), pp. 17-72.

5. Goffman, *op.cit.*, pp. 181-84. *Wood, op.cit.*, p. 51.

6. The Senate to Morosini, Venice, 3 and 31 Dec. 1650; De la Haye to the Doge and Senate, Peran, 3 Feb. 1651; Morosini to the Doge and Senate, Paris 21 and 28 Feb. 1651; Basadonna to the Doge and Senate, Madrid, 28 Mar. 1651, *CSP, vol. 28: 1647-1652* (1927), pp. 162-5, 168-76.

those of the Turks, they stated, would be "a monstrous thing and absolutely unprecedented; it would be contrary to the piety always displayed by that kingdom and due to the well being of Christendom, to favour the universal enemy".[7] The same anti-Turkish direction was indicated in James Howell's study, *SPQR a Survey of the Signorie of Venice* (1651) accompanied by a *Cohortation to All Christian Princes to Resent her Dangerous Condition at Present*. Howell described Candia vividly and stressed the parallel cases of the two maritime republics.[8] England, however, was not short of religious missions at the time. It was the Levant Company which was short of ships and cargoes.[9]

In May 1652, a month before Killigrew's departure from Venice, Lorenzo Pauluzzi, the new Venetian secretary in England, met Sir Oliver Fleming, the Master of the Ceremonies and Cromwell's cousin, and announced his mission to raise ships and men and to offer the friendship of Venice. Yet without credentials he only incited Fleming's anger: "This republic has no need to court the good will of Venice", said the Master.[10] As a matter of fact his colleague, the Tuscan Resident, Salvetti, had warned Pauluzzi the day before: "If you have nothing but words for this government, I am afraid your coming here will prove utterly useless". Acknowledging officially the Commonwealth was what was really

7. *Ibid*., pp. 176-9 (The Doge to Morosini, Venice, 29 Apr. 1651).

8. See also Z. S. Fink, "King and Doge: A Charter in Anglo-Venetian Political and Literary Relations" in Ilva Cellini and Giorgio Melchiori (eds), *English Studies Today, fourth series: Lectures and Papers Read at the Fifth Conference of the International Association of University Professors of English held at Venice* (Rome, 1966), pp. 221-30.

9. Bernard Capp, *Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648-1660* (Oxford, 1989), p. 70.

10. Brown, *op.cit*., pp. 368-9.

needed. Pauluzzi was ready to ask the Senate for it, especially when Fleming implied that the English might have done "something more" to help against the Turk, being "the enemy of our religion as of yours", had it not been for the diplomatic irregularities. Some days later, as offers of men and ship had started, Fleming went as far as to suggest that at a small cost five to six thousand Irishmen might be shipped to Candia, under the command of some royalist officer kept imprisoned by Parliament.[11] Indeed, as he put it bluntly, "no country was better fitted to afford such help than England was at present with her troops and ships of war".[12] The offer of Irishmen was not unsubstantiated. They had already offered their services to Spain and France and had volunteered, in early 1648, to fight for Venice. That offer, of one thousand men, was made to Ambassador Battista Nani in Paris. It had been arranged by the Sieur de la Valette. The latter had also negotiated the transfer to Crete in October 1648 of four thousand Scottish prisoners who were in the hands of Parliament, but his offer had been declined by the Senate. Another offer of Irishmen had been made by James Butler, Duke of Ormonde. Nani was told that, considering the need of Venice for men and their own need for money, the Catholics in Ireland were disposed to listen to overtures. They thought the "war against the Turk and against the heretic as equally important". The thousand troops were paid and most of them seem to have been dispatched to Crete from Bristol in late October of that year (1648).[13]

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11. Morosini to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 6 Oct. 1648 *CSP*, vol. 28: *1647-1652* (1927), pp. 76-9.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 224-41 (Pauluzzi to Morosini, London, 2-3 and 14 May 1652).

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-56, 60-5, 76-9 (The Senate to Nani, Venice, 8 Feb.

The military power of Charles I had been admired and certainly overestimated in Venice. But that was before the Civil War. The Senate responded to Fleming's advances on 1 June 1652 with caution: Venice rejoiced because it had been afforded "an opening" to express its "affectionate regard for the Parliament" and its "constant bias in favour of the English nation, so renowned through glory in war and prudence in council". But no ambassador was appointed.[14] Pauluzzi did not have an official audience until October, when he made clear that Venice hoped for reciprocal cordial feelings of affection, in the struggle in which she was engaged against Turkish "barbarism". By that time, however, England had to face a far more pressing question, the war with the Dutch. Fleming had warned Pauluzzi that, if the war escalated, they would have to recall English sailors and ships; yet, he boasted, "the mere voice of England might suffice to give the Turks pause".[15] Such reassurances of assistance did not stop throughout the First Dutch War; nor did the Christian rhetoric. But the fact was that, due to the necessities of war, even those ships serving the Venetians – no more than six – were eventually recalled. Pauluzzi warned the chief members of the Levant Company of "the loss to Christendom, trade and all liberty", if these ships were withdrawn. Venice could not afford

1648; Nani to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 10 Mar. 21 April, 30 June 1648; Morosini to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 20 Oct. 1648; the Senate to Nani, Venice, 31 Oct. 1648).

14. *Ibid*., pp. 241-54 (The Senate to the Parliament, Venice, 1 June 1652); Andrew D. Nicholls, *The Jacobean Union: A Reconsideration of British Civil Policies under the Early Stuarts* (Westport, 1999), p. 135.

15. Pauluzzi to Morosini, London, 13 June 1652, *CSP, vol. 28: 1647-1652* (1927), pp. 241-55.

to lose a single sail. An exception could be made but eventually it was not. English affairs in the Mediterranean needed all the help they could get.[16] In fact it was in May 1653 that Cromwell declined a petition by Scottish and Irish poor women begging his assistance to redeem their enslaved husbands in Tripoli.[17] He couldn't care less for the Venetians. If the English were to employ force, suggested the English agent in Leghorn, Charles Longland, they should do so to impose whatever terms they wanted the Turks and thus exclude all other nations from the Levant trade.[18]

For the time being, all Parliament could do for Venice was to express its "lively interest" in the war and sympathy for the bad news;[19] to promise a firm negative stance upon Ottoman appeals for transportation;[20] and to claim that the friendship of Venice was valued more than that of the Turks.[21] Raising Irish troops (up to ten thousand) was suggested anew by Fleming

16. *Ibid*., pp. 275-89 (Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 26 Sept. and Memorial 25 Sept. 1652); pp. 289-302 (Pauluzzi to Sagredo, 4 Oct. 1652, Memorial 20 Oct. 1652); Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 24 Jan. 1653, *CSP, vol. 29: 1653-1654* (1929), pp. 1-15.

17. Nabil Matar, "Introduction: England and Mediterranean Captivity, 1577-1704" in Vitkus (ed.), *Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption*, p. 28.

18. Longland to the Admiralty, Lenghorn, 19 Sept. 1653, *CSP Domestic: Interregnum 1653-4* (1879), pp. 122-79.

19. In August it was announced that the Venetian Ambassador had asked the Porte for peace but had been rejected. "[...] as they say if he brings not with him the keys of Candia, they will not agree": *Several Proceedings in Parliament*, 5 Aug. 1653.

20. Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 17 Jan. 1653, *CSP, vol. 29: 1653-1654* (1929), pp. 1-15.

21. *Ibid*., pp. 50-63 (Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 12 Apr. 1653).

in June 1653 but in December, when Pauluzzi came asking for them, he replied that since there had been no response by Venice, they had been dispatched elsewhere. The Serene Republic would have to wait for the Dutch war to be over and then be the first to profit against the Turk.[22]

Were the English indirectly encouraging a mediation initiative by the Doge to have their war ended?[23] Whatever Fleming had in mind, the Levant Company had other priorities. The merchants rejected the provision of royalist Irishmen and demanded the replacement of Ambassador Bendysh, who had been accredited by the late King.[24] No sooner had the new diplomatic mission departed for Turkey than the Venetians realised that the new Ambassador, Richard Lawrence, was not currying instructions in favour of the *Serenissima*. He was carrying letters announcing "the loving disposition of the government and its wish to cultivate friendship and intercourse with Turkey".[25]

The holy war argument had to be employed again to the Protector. In fact instructions had been given earlier to Pauluzzi, to make use of Cromwell's piety. Although the Protector was not a Catholic, Venetians expected that, as a Christian, he should be hostile to the Turk.[26] His secretary was friendly to

22. *Ibid*., pp. 80-91, 151-163 (Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 14 June and 5 Dec. 1653).

23. Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 2 Mar. 1653, *CSP, vol. 29: 1653-1654* (1929), pp. 31-50.

24. Philip Aubrey, *Mr Secretary Thurloe, Cromwell's Secretary of State 1652-1660* (London, 1990), pp. 55-6; Goffman, *op.cit*., pp. 187-90.

25. Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 12 Sept. and 17 Oct. 1653, *CSP, vol. 29: 1653-1654* (1929), pp. 120-42.

26. *Ibid*., pp. 63-80 (Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 27 May 1653).

Venice and well acquainted with Levantine affairs, having lived there and in fact spent some time in Candia during the war with the Turks.[27] Pauluzzi met Cromwell twice. The first time was shortly after his elevation to the Protectorate. Cromwell thanked Venice for the acknowledgement. He gave a brief speech about the "ancient ties of friendship" and, like many others, called the Serene Republic "the strong bulwark against the most potent enemy of the Christian faith", which he would do his outmost to assist.[28] The second time, after the Dutch war was over, Pauluzzi pressed openly for support in the war. Christendom anticipated "beneficial and generous resolves" from him, for he was "the source of this great power and virtue". Again he was given promises. Meanwhile Cromwell had written to Mehmet IV in person. Following Bendysh's advice, he had forcefully condemned the abuse against English merchants. But obviously it was free trade that topped the list of his priorities. Fleming explained to the Venetians many times that the Levant Company was the greatest obstacle in the way. The Protector often referred to the importance of Candia and the injury to Christendom if it should fall under the Turkish yoke. The merchants, however, opposed any measures offensive to the Turks, to protect their Mediterranean trade. Fleming implied that the Protector and he himself believed that the interests of a few individuals should not take priority over the freedom of trade. And it was in that context only –in the protection of free trade– that England could help the Serene

27. *Ibid*., pp. 151-63 (Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 25 Dec. 1653).

28. *Ibid*., pp. 164-78 (Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 31 Jan., 1654); cf. Brown, *op.cit*., pp. 371-2.

Republic.[29] If not cynical, it was an irony that Venice impersonated the aggressive imperialist commercial ideal that some of the Parliamentarians of the time had in mind.[30]

But the freedom of trade was not threatened only by the Turks. By the time Ambassador Giovanni Sagredo had come from Paris to London in great honours, as a special envoy, it was understood that the Spanish West Indies was most likely to be the next destination of the English fleet, not the Levant.[31] The aggressive colonial traders who shaped the commercial policy of the Commonwealth had set much more ambitious priorities since 1650.[32] At the same time in Venice it was hoped that Cromwell's intention was to send a strong squadron into the Mediterranean to clear it of pirates and intimidate the rival powers, per chance even the Turks:[33] if not the Ottoman fleet itself, then the Tunis pirates who were under Ottoman protection.[34] The Venetians were not alone in such vain hopes but the company was not perhaps

29. *Ibid*., pp. 243-64 (Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 7 Aug. and 5 Sept. 1653); Goffman, *op.cit*., pp. 188-90; cf. SP 97/17, f. 146, where the letter is undated. Apparently "free trade" did not mean a trade free of tariffs; but the hint against chartered companies can not be neglected. Cf. Robert Ashton, "The Parliamentary Agitation for Free Trade in the Opening Years of the Reign of James I", *Past and Present*, 38 (Dec., 1967), 40-55.

30. H.R. Trevor-Roper, "Oliver Cromwell and his Parliaments" in Richard Pares and A.J.P. Taylor (eds.), *Essays presented to Sir Lewis Namier* (London, I956), pp. 15-6; cf. Christopher Hill, *The English Bible and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution* (London, 1994), p. 321.

31. Brown, *op.cit*., 375-7.

32. Brenner, "The Civil War Politics", pp. 101-5.

33. Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 8 May 1654, *CSP, vol. 29: 1653-1654* (1929), pp. 206-17.

34. *Ibid*., pp. 243-53 (Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 22 August 1654).

the best. An astrologer, William Lilly, predicted in 1651 that Palestine would be liberated from the Turks. Others foresaw that Blake's fleet was going to accomplish a Christian mission among the gentiles.[35] As Fleming put it, in spite of "the remonstrances of the Levant Company, the Protector had given orders for the honour of the flag, not forgetting the interests of the most serene republic".[36] Indeed, in April 1655 Robert Blake honoured the flag at the battle of Porto Farina and paved the way for the Venetian victory off the Dardanelle straits in June, although it is doubtful whether he had acted indeed under specific instructions or motivated by his own Christian zeal.[37]

The Levant Company was alarmed. In Constantinople there was no proper representation since the Protector had asked for both ambassadors, Lawrence and Bendysh, to be recalled.[38] Cromwell and the Venetians should not get carried away. In late May four representatives approached Pauluzzi. They announced the good news from the Eastern Mediterranean front and handed him a memorandum for the Senate. The Company expressed its desire to be exempted from two different taxes

35. Hill, *The English Bible*, pp. 310-11; Christopher Hill, *The World Turned upside down. Radical Ideas during the English Revolution* (London, 1972), pp. 97, 224.

36. Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 5 Sept. 1654, *CSP, vol. 29: 1653-1654* (1929), pp. 253-64; Rosso to the Doge and Senate, Naples, 16 Feb. 1655, *CSP, vol. 30: 1655-1656* (1930), pp. 16-24.

37. Julian S. Corbett *England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power within the Straits, 1603-1713* (London, 1904), vol. 1, pp. 271-6, 299-310; R. C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant 1559-1853* (Liverpool, 1952), pp. 153-8; For a more recent assessment of the campaign see Timothy Venning, *Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (London, 1995), pp. 233-4.

38. Goffman, *op.cit.*, pp. 189-90.

imposed on currant exports from Zante and Cephalonia, asked for lower export prices and demanded the cessation of the – mostly unpaid – conscription of its ships in the service of the Venetian navy. Unless they had a state decision in two months for all these matters, they would redirect their complaints to the Protector himself, "who would not deny them his powerful advocacy". Apparently this was not a memorandum but an ultimatum. The merchants demanded that they reap the first fruits of Blake's engagement in the Levant or they would ruin the favourable momentum.[39] In the following months Venice responded positively, since some complaints proved to be sufficiently substantiated. Two thousand ducats were reimbursed to English merchants. The Senate was anxious to revive the Ionian currant trade (against that of the Morea) and, to achieve this, needed to have an English consulate re-established in Zante.[40]

Was Blake's victory in the more accessible Levant seas (and/or ill fortune in the West Indies) actually encouraging a shift of policy and a "good understanding" between the two republics? Could Cromwell disregard for a while his enmity for Spain? This would be more likely if the freshly reported ill treatment of Englishmen by Turkish pirates was confirmed.[41]

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39. Pauluzzi to Sagredo, London, 5 June 1655, *CSP, vol. 30: 1655-1656* (1930), pp. 61-73. One of the taxes was against a due unpaid since 1640. The other was a ten-per-cent tax upon currants, which the Company claimed should be paid by the locals themselves.

40. *Ibid*., pp. 73-114 (The Senate to the *Provveditore* General of the Islands in the Levant.Venice, 30 July, 21 Aug, 4 Sept. 1655); *Ibid*., pp. 131-46 (The Senate to Sagredo, Venice, 3 Nov. 1655).

41. *Ibid*., pp. 101-46 (Pauluzzi to Giustiniani, London, 17 Sept. 1655, Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, London, 1 Oct. 1655; the Senate to Sagredo, Venice, 3 Nov. 1655).

But it did not work out this way. The merchants, having suffered considerably from the on-going war with Spain, were adamant against any venture that might give the slightest excuse to the Turks and ruin their Eastern trade. This they made clear to the Protector.[42] Sagredo did his part as best as he could when he met Cromwell in November 1655. He explained that the Turks were intensifying their attempt to vanquish "the kingdom of Crete, the bulwark of Italy", to breach the gate through which their forces might subdue "the better part of Europe". He stressed that the Venetian defence was "a light set by God before Christendom to show princes that this is the proper time to free so many thousands of Christians from the yoke and to redeem the finest provinces of the world from slavery and chains". And the passionate preaching went on: The zeal of his Highness for the Christian faith; the piety and religion which were the fairest ornaments of his generous soul would kindle the holy fire and sharpen his sword, which could not be more gloriously employed than in defence of the Gospel; his name would be immortal if he sent only a small part of "the great naval forces which God has given to England" to join with that of the Serene Republic to act as a shield in defence of the Christian faith.

The war with Spain, however, was afoot and mercantile priorities were always urgent.[43] Sir Richard Fanshawe, an ardent royalist, then in the Netherlands with Charles II, used his verses to accuse Cromwell regarding his preference for inter-Christian-fighting. But Sagredo quite realistically acknowledged

42. *Ibid*., pp. 131-46 (Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, London, 5 Nov. 1655).

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 131-46 (Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, London, 12 Nov. 1655).

that financial considerations always had a great effect upon the English Government, as traders constituted "the strongest body" with four thousand ships which "plough the waves laden with goods for all the countries of the world".[44] On another occasion Francesco Giavarina, the Venetian Resident in England, asked Fleming at least to issue orders forbidding English ships to fly any flag "except in favour of religion and Christendom". But he did not get the answer he was looking for either.[45] As long as Cromwell was trying to improve his relations with Algiers – his letter to the *divan* showing a familiarity with Islam which would have surprised even the exiled King Charles II[46]– Venice would have to take comfort only in the Latin verses of Payne Fisher's *Epinicion in victoriam navalem Venetum contra Turcos*. The poem was presented to the Ambassador but even that offer was not without expectations of a reward.[47] All Venice could do was to negotiate with the Porte,[48] wait and hope that a pirate act against an English vessel might irritate Cromwell, change the mind of the Turcophile merchants, and force Blake to engage anew.[49]

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44. *Ibid*., pp. 146-61 (Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, London, 10 Dec. 1655); Matar, *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen* , p. 164.

45. *Ibid*., pp. 256-67 (Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 8 Sept. 1656); Goffman, *op.cit*., pp. 192-3.

46. Matar, *Islam in Britain*, p. 82.

47. Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 17 Nov. 1658, *CSP, vol. 30: 1655-1656* (1930), pp. 278-85; Anthony Wood, *Athenae Oxoniensis*, vol. 4 (London, 1820), p. 379. The poem celebrated the victory of the Venetian navy against the Ottoman just in front of the Dardanelle straits, in June 1656.

48. For the 1655-56 negotiations see Paul Rycaut, *The History of the Turkish Empire from the Year 1623 to the Year 1677* (London, 1687), pp. 87-8.

49. Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 17 Aug. and 7 Dec.

Such incidents of piracy did happen in 1657 but no action was taken. Actually, in May, an Algerine messenger was received in London to confirm good relations. He was followed by a renegade Greek, bearing gifts for the Protector.[50] Ironically it was in late May of the same year that Sir John Finch reported from Padua the victory of the Venetian fleet near the island of Chios, earlier that month, and the revived hopes of the Serene Republic to recover Crete.[51] Giavarina, under instructions, met Cromwell again in early December 1657. He complained not only about the transport services still offered to the Turks but also about the trade with them in all sorts of materials required for war. The Protector denied both allegations and put the blame on the Dutch suppliers. But he was frank in explaining why he had declined an active alliance against the Turks to save Crete: He was unable to satisfy Venetian desires, due to the loss his nation would suffer if he sent ships against the Ottoman navy. It would cause the immediate confiscation and spoiling of all English capital scattered in the major ports of the Ottoman Empire, the imprisonment of the English residing in those parts, and the total ruin of the numerous families supported by that trade. One could possibly add that his foreign campaigns and indeed the payment of his army in Flanders depended on the capital he could raise from the City, which was by no means an easy task.

1657, 8 Mar. 1658, *CSP*, *vol. 31: 1657-1659* (1931), pp. 91-106, 135-48, 169-81.

50. Matar, *Turks, Moors and Englishmen*, p. 38.

51. For a presentation and an analysis of this report see Ioannis D. Psaras, "Angliki ekthesi tis epochis to kritikou polemou gia ti navmachia sti Chio (3 Maiou 1657)" [English report on the naval battle of Chios at the time of the Cretan War, 3 May 1657], *Ellinika*, 29/2 (1976), 334-9.

Harming the pirates was his best offer. After all, the glory of the *Serenissima* was the greater for acting alone in defence of all Christendom, remarked Giavarina. The Senate replied bitterly: The English should bear in mind that, if the kingdom of Candia was lost, the Mediterranean would be "a haunt of pirates", to the injury of trade, and of English trade in particular.[52]

Meanwhile Giavarina selected two experienced agents, both veterans of the Civil War, to raise troops on his behalf. The former promised five thousand men, Catholics of whom the government wished "to be rid", but at the same time ambitious to distinguish themselves in a just war. He requested ten pounds sterling for clothing and transport per man. He also promised ships, "as many as they pleased", for 2,700 Spanish dollars a piece per month. The second agent promised three thousand men on similar terms.[53] Indeed news was coming from Secretary Giovanni Battista Ballarino (the Venetian de facto *Bailo* in Constantinople since 1653) that the Turks were on the offensive. They were spreading threats that the English Ambassador would be dismissed unless his ships were prohibited to serve the Venetian fleet.[54] For the time being, Bendysh stood his ground well but, as his dragoman said to Ballarino, "there were cases in which it was impossible to resist the violence of these barbarians".[55]

52. Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 7 December, 1657, *CSP, vol. 31: 1657-1659* (1931), pp. 135-48; Venning, *op.cit*., pp. 230-1.

53. *Ibid*., pp. 149-69 (Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 25 Jan. and 8 Feb. 1658).

54. *Ibid*., pp. 149-57 (Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 12 Jan. 1658).

55. *Ibid*., pp. 157-69 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Constantinople, 17 Feb. 1658).

In April Bendysh was given permission to present himself to the Porte in Adrianople. He met both the Grand Vizier and the Sultan and exchanged complaints. The Englishman protested about the Barbary pirates and the Vizier about assistance provided to Venice. They both claimed Capitulations had been violated.[56] The Venetians rejoiced for the "high tone" employed by Bendysh. But soon there was another major incident, close to the island of Tenos: An Ottoman delegation was found on board an English ship destined for Tunis.[57] To show its regard for the Protector, the Senate ordered the release of the ship, captain and crew, and to detain only the Turks and their goods. Giavarina met Oliver Fleming shortly afterwards. Having heard all the latter's usual reassurances of esteem and concern, Giavarina did not think it worthwhile even to mention the Tenos incident.[58]

In fact such a hint would not have been wise. The Venetian resident had been trying since February to appease the Levant Company, which was pressing for large sums of money due to be paid by the Senate.[59] By October 1658 the amount was estimated to be above fifty thousand ducats. The furious governor of the Company, Alderman Andrew Riccard, announced that orders had been given for the ships to be withdrawn. Giavarina tried to calm him but to no avail. Riccard threatened he would ask the new Protector, Richard Cromwell, for reprisals against

56. *Ibid*., pp. 181-91 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Constantinople, 19 and 28 Apr. 1658).

57. *Ibid*., pp. 206-19 (The Senate to Giavarina, Venice, 5 June 1658).

58. *Ibid*., pp. 228-38 (Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 9 Aug. 1658).

59. *Ibid*., pp. 169-81 (Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 8 Mar. 1658).

Venice if the whole debt were not paid, and he was confident he would get his permission without difficulty. Riccard had been a member of the Council of Trade since 1655 and a chief supporter of Oliver Cromwell in the City. The Resident was aware that all the creditors of Venice, counting on their alleged or true peace with the Barbary infidels, were mustering their complaints to influence Richard Cromwell against the Serene Republic. He was not optimistic about the outcome. This is an irregular government, he wrote, without any order. "As it depends on the people, it will do nothing that may offend them".[60]

Therefore, the meeting Giavarina had with the new Protector was not a surprise. Richard Cromwell was familiar with his father's rhetoric, was in theory always ready to join forces with the Venetians and was probably aware of the rumours reaching London that the starving, besieged defenders of Candia were consuming horses and dogs.[61] The Resident was convinced that, in practice, Richard was no more willing than his father to engage in an open clash with the Turks, unless the provocation and serious damage to English trade was too great. Giavarina suspected that Richard's friendship had been offered in anticipation of official recognition, so badly needed by his regime. The Senate, though, was not convinced and urged him to ask openly for military cooperation.[62] Such approaches were by then pointless.

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60. *Ibid*., pp. 247-57 (Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 4 Oct. 1658). The English denied that there was such an agreement see *ibid*., pp. 279-87, Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Constantinople, 2 Jan. 1659); Venning, *op.cit*., pp. 231, 234.

61. *Mercurius Politicus Comprising the Summ of All Intelligence*, No 445 (2 Dec. 1658).

62. Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 22 Nov. 1658, The

In the Eastern Mediterranean the balance of power appeared to be shifting, In early spring 1659, shortly before Richard's resignation, Captain General Francesco Morosini launched a successful offensive all around the Aegean. The Venetians were encouraged by the prospect of peace between Spain and France. Bendysh assured the Porte that the French and the Spaniards would never join forces with Venice but he was soon proved wrong.[63] His prestige, however, remained undiminished. As England reached the turning point of the restoration of the monarchy, Bendysh, after twelve years in Constantinople, was highly esteemed. Ballarino admitted that his "high spirit" (*generosità*) was the main reason the English had won such a favoured position with the Turks; but the unusual financial favours Bendysh enjoyed made the *Bailo* sceptical.[64] Was an English-Ottoman alliance or rapprochement forthcoming? Was such an alliance possible after all and on what grounds? In 1658 a daring Quaker, Mary Fisher, had tried to convert the Sultan Mehmet IV himself. The same year an account, entitled *The Baptised Turk*, appeared in London. In 1659 the baptism of another Turk, a certain "Isuph Chiaus", named Richard Christophilus in honour of the new Protector, became a public event. The Puritan preacher acknowledged

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Senate to Giavarina, 14 Dec. 1658, *CSP, vol. 31: 1657-1659* (1931), pp. 257-78.

63. Bendysh had been reappointed ambassador by the Company in September 1658 and had established very friendly relation with the Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha Köprülü: Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Constantinople, 18 July 1659, *CSP, vol. 32: 1659-1661* (1931), pp. 37-47.

64. *Ibid*., pp. 120-33 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Constantinople, 6 Mar. 1660); cf. Goffman, *op.cit*., p. 200.

–pretty much like John Knox had done a century before– that Muslims possessed a superior capacity of faith but, all in all, he condemned Islam.[65] Any kind of rapprochement with the Turk was bound to be religiously unjustified; but did English foreign policy indeed require religious justification?

65. *Ibid*., pp. 134-50 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Constantinople, 10 Apr. and 16 May 1660); Matar, *Islam in Britain*, pp. 144-9. Hill, *The English Bible*, pp. 230-1.

5. *A royal arbitration of peace.*

In early June 1660, when the restoration of Charles II was announced in Venice, Ballarino was still sceptical about the personal motives of Bendysh and worried to what extremes the thirst for commercial dominion and dislike of the French might carry him. It was only a few days later that Giavarina, the first of all the foreign diplomats, congratulated the restored monarch, who replied in Italian. He had been encouraged by the Senate to waste no time and ask the new king to dispatch one of the disbanded army units to Crete.[1] Within a month it was reported that the new English Ambassador to the Porte would be Heneage Finch, the Earl of Winchilsea, a friend of General George Monck and of the Crown. Finch was given the appointment at his own request, motivated by the prospect of personal profit, if we are to believe Venetian allegations. He had been in contact with the Resident at least since May, complimenting the Republic endlessly. The King informed the Company of his decision to replace Bendysh and recommended the Earl. The merchants were amazed. There was no precedence for a person of this rank wishing to go to Constantinople. Such an appointment implied greater expense for them but turning down a royal request was not an easy choice. Meanwhile, the Earl, quite sure of his appointment, met the Venetian Resident

1. The Senate to the Resident, Venice, 5 June; Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 10 June; Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 11 June 1660, *CSP, vol. 32: 1659-1661* (1931), pp. 150-63.

to express his regard and to offer his services to the Republic. With news of French and Spanish support for Venice already circulating in London,[2] he suggested the *Serenissima* should disengage itself politically from France. Giavarina was cautious enough to inform the Senate that the Earl was "a young man full of idle talk (*di gran ciancie*), informed about many things, but not very steady, rather inclined to be light and volatile, like the climate of the country". No one thought him suitable for a post which required "mature and sober men", not greedy profit seekers. The Levant merchants bargained for a month, until the King promised to ratify their privileges and to consider further proposals.[3]

Even before Winchilsea received his instructions from the King, Giavarina had expressed his reservations about the actual assistance Venice could expect from the new royal regime of England. Having met various men of importance, among them the Duke of York, he was experienced enough to realise that they would get little more than expressions of sympathy. He wrote:

> I am much afraid of the issue as the interests of trade and the merchants will always prevent assistance for your Serenity, since it does not suit them to offend the Turks. God grant

2. *Mercurius Publicus*, No 32 (30 July 1660). For a complete overview of Spanish foreign policy vis-à-vis the Cretan War, based on archival sources, see I.K. Hassiotis, «I Kriti kai oi Ispanoi sta chronia tis Venetokratias» [Crete and the Spanish during Venetian Occupation], *Pepragmena touTritou Diethnous Kritologikou Synedriou*, vol. 2 (Athens, 1974), pp. 358-65.

3. Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 16 May; 9 and 16 July; 6 Aug. 1660, *CSP, vol. 32: 1659-1661* (1931), pp. 140-50, 163-89; cf. Goffman, *op.cit*., pp. 202-3.

> I may be wrong [...]. Assistance in money the King cannot yet give because he has none himself. He might give ships and men but the above considerations leave no hope.

Instead, Giavarina suggested getting permission to attempt a collection in the kingdom. It would be embarrassing but it was for a good cause and bound to bring in lots of money.[4] Ballarino in Constantinople was by then more relaxed. He had also received from Bendysh assurances of wholehearted royal support although he was still convinced that the English Ambassador had not been far from a secret alliance with the Porte.[5] By December 1660 it was clear that, although there was no imminent English alliance with the Sultan, there was no particular reason for Venetian optimism. Troops and officers – among them Artillery Colonel Bertrand de la Coste – had become available but money had not. Mercenaries could not afford to travel to Zante at their own expense. The King easily agreed not to recall any Englishmen serving Venice but when asked to make a more decisive show of friendship, he replied that he was so occupied with domestic affairs that he could not attend to foreign matters, "not even those of his allies and friends". In fact he did not even read the memorandum he had requested from the Venetian Resident. The Secretary of State suggested

4. *Ibid*., pp. 163-78 (Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 30 July 1660).

5. *Ibid*., pp. 178-89 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 10 Aug. 1660; Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 20 and 27 Aug. 1660). Giavarina also assured the Senate that such an alliance was unlikely to happen, even if it were to be ever possible. Later on he checked this information with the Secretary of State Nicholas, who also declared his ignorance on the matter and anger should such proposals have been the initiative of an English minister: Goffman, *op.cit*., pp. 201-5.

Giavarina wait for the next session of Parliament but when the King was informed of this effective bypass he told the Resident that if the matter was brought before Parliament it would never be settled, for it "was as Turk as the Turk himself". Perhaps he was aware of the complaints against Venice put forward by the Levant Company. He suggested instead speaking with some of his advisers. As he had already expressed his wish to acquire two Venetian gondolas, he preferred to handle the issue on his own and play for time.

In this context Giavarina should not have been surprised when he was informed that, before his departure and despite his friendly overtures and promises, the Earl of Winchilsea had pledged to the Levant Company, his true master and employer, never to do anything at the Porte without their consent and approval, binding himself by written promise to pay ten thousand pounds sterling if he ever violated this agreement. The Resident was also informed that the instructions given to the Ambassador by the Royal Secretariat were to have "at heart the interests of all Christian princes in general", without mentioning any one in particular.[6] But he was unaware that the initial draft asked for special care only for the Prince of Transylvania, then at war with the Ottoman Empire,[7] with no reference to the interests

6. *Ibid*., pp. 178-233 (Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 27 Aug.; 15 and 22 Oct.; 5 and 19 Nov.; 10 Dec. 1660); Steven C. A. Pincus, *Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650–1668* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 240.

7. The Rakoczi family had been related to the Stuarts since 1651, when Henriette Marie, Countess Palatine of Simmern, the grand-daughter of James I and first cousin of Charles II, was married to Sigismund Rakoczi (brother of Giorgi Rakoczi II, Prince of Transylvania), who died in 1652. Giorgi Rakoczi II had begged Cromwell's assistance in 1655 and been an

of Venice. It was only after revision that the special care had been extended to "those that border the Turkish Empire". Yet the "principal charge" assigned by Charles was "to advance our interest and commerce and traffique of our subjects to all port of the dominions of the Grand Signor". Winchilsea was also instructed by his sovereign "to desire the Grand Signor in our name that no English ship may be compelled to serve the Turk against the Christians nor that English vessel (by whatsoever Nation or person fraughted) may be permitted to weare the colours of any foreign prince or state in any of the Grand Signors's ports".[8] The future of Candia had been determined irrevocably. One could argue that the new King was no less a Turk than the Turkey Company. The Quaker missionaries Henry Fell and John Stubs, then active in Cairo and elsewhere in the Muslim Levant, were preaching in the wrong place.[9]

On his way to Constantinople the young Earl called at Algiers in an attempt to confirm the standing peace of 1655. The Algerines, however, refused unless they were permitted to search English vessels and to take off all non-English goods and passengers; otherwise they threatened to start hostilities in six months. Winchilsea was obliged to agree with the humiliating term until the will of the King was known.[10] The Ambassador's

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ally of Sweden at the second Northern War. He was killed in May 1660 fighting against the Ottoman army and was succeeded by Janos Kemeny.

8. SP 97/17, The Winchilsea Instructions, ff. 154r-155v.

9. Matar, *Islam in Britain*, pp. 133-7.

10. Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 11 Feb.; 25 Mar. 1661, *CSP, vol. 32: 1659-1661* (1931), pp. 244-271. See also R.L. Playfair, *The Scourge of Christendom. Annals of British Relations with Algiers prior to the French Conquest* (London, 1884), pp. 79-82; Sonia Anderson, *An English Consul in Turkey. Paul Rycaut at Smyrna, 1667-1678* (Oxford, 1989), p. 27.

troubles did not stop there. At his very first audience with the Grand Vizier in Constantinople he was asked to give orders to Capt. Robert Hudson to proceed with his ship to the arsenal to load ammunition and take on board gunners and other troops destined for Crete. The Earl refused and tried to argue but Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, "though a friend of the English", would not listen to reason. If the Ambassador would not grant ships, they would take them by force. The Ambassador sent his secretary, Anthony Isaacson, to Ballarino (elevated in 1660 to the rank of Grand Chancellor) to express his master's anger at the consent he had been compelled to give, "seeing that in this country it is impossible to contend with the forces of others". To the *Bailo's* astonishment, Isaacson had been instructed to press him for a passport securing the safe passage of the English ship to Canea! Ballarino assented to this demand but refused when the Turks themselves went asking for the same pass, which, he anticipated, would surely be used in the future as a precedent. Indeed Ballarino faced no less of a dilemma than Winchilsea: Should he respond warmly to the confidence expressed by the troubled Earl and offend his official representative to the Porte, the French Ambassador, or risk a letter of complaint to King Charles at this early point? [11] In fact the

Sir Nicholas informed Winchilsea (14 Mar. 1661) that the King was satisfied with this term: Historical Manuscripts Commission (hereafter HMC), *Reports on the Manuscripts of Allan George Finch Esq. of Burley-on-the-Hill, Rutland*, vol. 1 (London, 1913), p. 101.

11. *Ibid*., pp. 244-71 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 24 Feb; 9 Mar. 1661). Cf. SP 97/17, Wichelsea to Nicholas, Pera, 4 March 1661, f. 176r. The English description of the incident reflects the tension but is certainly less dramatic.

question was even more complicated. In the meetings that followed between Winchilsea and Ottoman officials, it looked as if the Porte was considering releasing English slaves and imposing its will on the North Africa pirates to make them confirm peace with England; all this, provided English ships continued doing favours for the Sultan.[12]

The Earl was delivered from this temptation by his King's letter, repeating his initial instructions for neutrality. It was an easy way out for Charles. When, following Giavarina's pressure, the royal letter was dispatched asking the Turks to return the English ship, that vessel had already arrived in Crete unharmed by the Venetians. The Republic thanked him warmly, practically for nothing. From Charles' point of view, perhaps it was more important that his gondolas were finally on their way to London via Leghorn.[13] But the pressure on the Venetians did not cease. Winchilsea went on reassuring them - in all honesty - of his "disgust" at being compelled to satisfy the wishes of the Grand Vizier only to avoid "greater mischief".[14]

To avert this "greater mischief" Venice had to take his words of sympathy at face value and accommodate any complaints coming from currant traders, who were well aware of the Senate's difficulty to negotiate firmly with London. These traders

12. *Ibid*., pp. 252-71 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 26 Mar. 1661).

13. *Ibid*. pp. 271-95 (The Doge to Giavarina, Venice, 23 Apr.; Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 6 May 1661, with attachment Charles's letter to Winchilsea, 23 Apr. 1661; 10 June 1661; The Doge to the resident in Florence, 16 May 1661).

14. *Ibid*. pp 295-309 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 20 June 1661).

not only managed to evade providing transport services to the Venetian navy but they demanded and achieved removal of all irregular charges other than those of the ordinary public duties. The Senate made clear to the *Provveditore* of the three islands, Mocenigo, that the English nation should be well treated and the currant trade encouraged in every possible way.[15] Apparently dining and wining the captains, a method employed in Spring 1660 by Francesco Valier, the administrator of Cephalonia, was not enough.[16] Venice even had to tolerate the profitable arrangement made by six English ships which instead of delivering their goods to Venice, sold them at Algiers, thus causing a considerable loss to the treasury, merchants and artisans of the Republic.[17]

Winchilsea was not misleading Ballarino. He believed that his role should not be confined exclusively to the protection of English commercial interests. He estimated that it was time for his King to venture into the politics of the Ottoman Empire as the French influence was declining. He was sure that war with Germany and Poland was imminent, his prestige was running high and the French ambassador had been disgraced. It was, therefore, the perfect moment for mediation between the Porte and Venice; "an umpirage of peace" that would accomplish the wish of Secretary Nicholas the war to be over, bring honour to

15. See for example *ibid*., pp. 234-43 (the Senate to Giavarina, Venice, 22 Jan. 1661) and the Senate to Giavarina, Venice 2 Sept. 1661, *CSP, vol. 33: 1661-1664* (1932), pp. 35-49.

16. Valier to the Doge and Senate, Cephalonia, 22 Apr. 1660, *CSP, vol. 32: 1659-1661* (1931), pp. 134-40.

17. The Senate to the Ambassadors Extraordinary, Venice, 9 July 1661 and attached petition, *CSP, vol. 33: 1661-1664* (1932), pp. 1-20.

his sovereign, and no fewer prospects to himself.[18] It is obvious from the Earl's letter to the King that he was intrigued by the prospects of Eastern diplomacy but, due to the merchants' dishonesty, he was short of money to fund his enormous needs for information. With his French colleague recovering his influence and tending to take over his job as mediator, the Earl became anxious, especially because he knew that only the old senators of Venice really desired peace with the Turks. Nicholas advised him to follow up any affair that might affect England but to "keep the scale even, that none may encroach or render himself formidable to his neighbours". Was it possible to keep the scale even? If his mediation failed and peace did not prevail in the Mediterranean, obviously the Germans would have an advantage against the Turks, who would be once again engaged in a war on two fronts.[19]

The tough mission to balance the asymmetrical relation between Venice and London was assigned to Ambassadors Angelo Correr and Michiel Morosini, who started official contacts in London in early August 1661. They met the King twice and the Duke of York, Chancellor Edward Hyde, General Monck and others but in general they could not add anything that had not been foreseen, said or done by Resident Giavarina. They received ample assurances of sympathy, good will and

18. He had written the same to the Lord Treasurer when asking for his assistance to get the assignment: HMC *Finch*, vol. 1, p. 119-22; SP 97/17, Winchilsea to Nicholas, Pera, 12 June 1661, ff. 194v-195r.

19. HMC, *Finch*, vol. 1., pp. 122, 131, 141, 147; SP 97/17, Winchilsea to Nicholas, Pera, 4 Sept. 1661, f. 212r. For Winchilsea's financial dispute with the Levant Company from 1661 to 1663, see Goffman, *op.cit*., pp. 205-8.

admiration from everybody. They realised the Chancellor was reluctant to commit himself to anything not in the interest of Levant trade and that General Monck was reluctant to speak at all. They reported the Duke of York's eagerness to be on board a fleet against the infidel, "a compliment" which, however, did not commit him in any way.[20] On the other hand, strong representations by currant merchants about the charges levied as well as open threats to cease trade with Venice were made to them by the Secretary of State. Correr and Morosini acknowledged that the wealth of England "and the entire subsistence of countless persons" depended on trade. They made the King confess frankly that he regretted his inability to do as much as he wished for the Republic because he was not yet well re-established. For the time being he had sent his fleet under the command of Edward Montagu, to the Mediterranean. He expressed the hope that Venice could expect a tougher handling of the pirates. In fact the two Venetian noblemen returned empty handed. Moreover, as the Spanish Ambassador told the Senate's Ambassadors, the English could now claim "great merit with the Turks" for having resisted persistent demands from Venice, avoiding any interruption in their good understanding with the Porte.[21]

Admiral Montagu was not as lucky as Blake had been in the past at Porto Farina. When Giavarina met Charles in late September and was told that he would be forced to make war on the Turk because of the Barbary pirates, he was rather sceptical.

20. The Senate, however, thought it worthwhile to continue inciting the Duke's anti-Turkish zeal.

21. Correr and Morosini to the Doge and Senate, London, 5 and 11 Aug. 1661), *CSP, vol. 33: 1661-1664* (1932), pp. 20-35. See also their detailed report when they returned to Venice in December: *Ibid*., pp. 72-90.

Although it was possible that the rumoured defeat of Montagu in late July might have embittered the English, the problem of Mediterranean piracy was not to be ended so soon. Meanwhile the merry monarch could console himself with the two gondolas (which by that time had been delivered) and worry about the new present he had asked for from the Senate: the narrow and fast type of gondola called *fisolere*.[22] In the same realm of "confidence building measures" Winchilsea asked Ballarino, whom he truly esteemed for his civility, to name his new born child. The child was called "Charles Mark", the Godfathers godfathers being the King and the Senate. The prospect of the mediation was not brought up by either of the two men. The *Bailo* guessed the Earl had become much wiser by then. He only begged him anew not to allow English ships to serve the Turks. The Ambassador promised, speaking, we are told, with such intensity that he was almost weeping.[23]

Was Winchilsea becoming sentimental after his little daughter's death from the plague a few weeks before and the birth of a son shortly afterwards? The fact was that on 30 September,

22. *Ibid*., pp. 35-49 (Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 9, 16, 17, 23, 30 Sept. 1661). The Duke of York told the Resident he would also like gondolas, fortunately at his own cost. For the assault against Algiers see Corbett, *op.cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 23-9.

23. *Ibid*., pp. 49-62 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 6 Oct. 1661). Paul Rycaut thought that Ballarino was "vigilant and subtle". He omitted "no opportunities to advance his own fortunes and with that the benefit of the Republic". Being "jealous, acute and wary" he was "the proper minister for Venice": Rycaut, *op.cit*., pp. 105, 123. For details about his service see Ella-Natalie Rothman, "Between Venice and Istanbul: Trans-imperial Subjects and Cultural Mediation in the Early Modern Mediterranean" (PhD thesis, The University of Michigan, 2006) passim.

after the christening of his baby boy, he wrote to the Secretary of State requesting permission and money to advance the mediation. As he pointed, he had already taken action in that direction in the past and "often".[24] His letter had not yet been received when, on 13 October, on the King's instructions, Sir Edward Nicholas summoned Giavarina and informed him that Ambassador Winchilsea had written to his Majesty offering his mediation to the Serene Republic for an "adjustment" with the Sublime Porte. He was sure the Senate would accept but unaware (rather not convinced at all) whether this proposal was well founded. Nevertheless the King would offer his mediation because of his special regard for Venice. The Resident expressed his appreciation for his Majesty's zeal, thanked the secretary for the offer without, however, committing himself, and promised to inform the Senate accordingly.[25]

Nicholas duly wrote to Constantinople that the Resident was "very cold". He was right. Venice replied politely but negatively less than a month later: As the Turks were "more inflexible than ever and pertinacious in their enhanced pretensions, there is no room to think of anything but defence". An English report from Venice confirmed: The Turks persisted in defence of their honour and would not cease the siege after so many years of fighting. Venice was resolved to fight to the utmost not only for their last colony but also for the defence of the Ionian Islands. The *Serenissima* needed friends indeed, seeking only "the eternal glory", for there was no money left.[26] The Secretary

24. SP 97/17, Winchilsea to Nicholas, Pera, 30 Sept. 1661, f. 200r-v.

25. Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 14 Oct. 1661, *CSP, vol. 33: 1661-1664* (1932), pp. 49-62.

26. *Ibid*., pp. 62-72 (The Senate to Giavarina, Venice, 5 Nov. 1661);

replied to Giavarina that his Majesty had offered his mediation as a proof of his friendship for the Republic, since Ambassador Winchilsea had presented the circumstances as favourable. He understood, however, the difficulties arising from the attitude of the Turks. The Resident concluded the mediation had originated from the Ambassador. The latter was "vain" and had been motivated partly by his good will to Venice but more by his "hope of private advantage", as the Resident had guessed long before his departure to Turkey.[27]

As a matter of fact there were more serious issues pending both for England and Venice. The raids of the Algerine pirates and English countermeasures (real or rumoured) had been the cause of much anxiety to Winchilsea since the summer of 1661. His worry was to represent his King with honour, saving himself and the English nation in Turkey from "*avanias* and other troubles".[28] The appropriate way to do that was to present the English complaints or actions against the Algerines as the outcome of a "breach of league and capitulations".[29]

HMC *Finch*, vol. 1, pp. 159-60, 173; SP 99/45, Barnes to Nicholas, Venice, 21 Aug. 1661, ff. 99r-100v; Meanwhile Winchilsea was forwarding reports that Venice in despair had offered the Kingdom of Candia to France and Spain: SP 99/17, Winchilsea to Nicholas, Pera, 28 Nov. 1661, ff. 239r-240v.

27. Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 14 Jan. 1662, *CSP, vol. 33: 1661-1664* (1932), pp. 91-101. Nicholas informed Winchilsea that he was preparing his commission to mediate, when Giavarina told him that this case was desperate (HMC, *Finch*, vol.1, p. 176).

28. National *avanias*, i.e., an excuse to levy charges on the English nation, were paid from the community treasury, where consular duties were deposited: Maurits H. van den Boogert, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System* (Leiden, 2005), p. 129.

29. SP 97/17, Winchilsea to Nicholas, Pera, 20 Aug. 1661, ff. 208r-209r.

In November, as rumours about damages and injury to civilians by the English fleet the previous July were spreading, the Ambassador was worried for his merchants. He hurried to suggest a speedy settlement between the English and the Berberins but was met with caution rather than anger. The Porte had not yet been notified of the attack by the Pasha of Algiers.[30] The Earl could not relax. In December he travelled to Adrianople to meet the new Grand Vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha and to present him with a letter from the Lord Admiral explaining the unfortunate event – the English had gone to Algiers to ask for reciprocal liberty and security for navigation – and putting all the blame on the Algerine *divan*. Winchilsea also anticipated having the renewed capitulations signed and hoped for improvement on some points. Obviously the Senate had good reasons to worry.[31] On 31 December the Algerine representatives reached Adrianople and presented their case against the English to the Grand Vizier. But they had come too late. Winchilsea had had meetings with all the necessary officials, presented them with small gifts, and made his case convincingly clear. The Algerines were reprehended for insisting on searching English ships. They accepted their blame. A few days later, the capitulations were renewed with additions very beneficial to the merchants. One of them provided, for the first time, for English ships to be exempt from searches by the Captain Pasha.[32]

30. Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 21 Nov. 1661, *CSP, vol. 33: 1661-1664* (1932), pp. 62-72.

31. *Ibid*., pp. 72-101 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 14 Dec. 1661; the Senate to Giavarina, Venice, 14 Jan. 1662).

32. *Ibid*., pp. 101-12 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 2 Feb.

Neither the Ambassador could hide his pride and enthusiasm for his success nor the Venetians their anxiety especially as Winchilsea's next step was to strike a deal with the newly appointed Pasha of Algiers, then residing at Constantinople. Eventually the latter promised to cease searching English ships and asked for an authorised representative to be sent to Algiers to have the treaty ratified. The Earl worried about the possibility that the English fleet might venture an offensive in the Mediterranean which would ruin his diplomacy. His anxiety was the greater for the King was considering taking the profitable trade with this Porte in lead and tin out of the hands of the merchants and keeping it for himself, the Ambassador thus becoming the sole go-between with a considerable share. He would have been even more worried had he heard the Lord Chancellor, speaking to both Houses, indirectly condemn the Dutch policy of appeasement in the Mediterranean and glorify the offensive measures taken by the English fleet against the "Turks", meaning of course, the Algerines. But Winchilsea shouldn't have worried at all. Peace with the Algerines had already been confirmed by Vice Admiral John Lawson in April on the terms agreed by the Ambassador and the Pasha.[33] Before the end of 1662 similar terms were also agreed with Tunis and

1662); HMC, *Finch*, vol. 1, p. 175; SP 97/17, Winchilsea to Nicholas, Adrianople, 13 Jan. 1662, ff. 250r-252v. The merchants were free to accept or to decline checks by Ottoman subjects. See also Anderson, *op.cit*., pp. 29-30.

33. Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 3 Apr. 1662; Vico to the Doge and Senate, Florence, 6 May and 3 June 1662; Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 2 June 1662, *CSP, vol. 33: 1661-1664* (1932), pp. 125-58; cf. *Journal of the House of Lords*: vol. 11: 1660-1666 (1767-1830), pp. 474-7.

Tripoli. The only difference was in the phrasing but it was a very important difference. English ships would not simply be exempt from search. It was written explicitly that they would be free to carry foreign goods and persons without molestation. This was a great advantage for English trade and for the reputation of England, since the Dutch had not yet agreed anything with the Pashas of Tunis and Tripoli.[34]

Given these diplomatic achievements, though not of a permanent character, it is not surprising that the renewed seizure of English ships by the Porte was tolerated by Winchilsea, despite Venetian pressure and the four vestments of cloth of gold presented to his pregnant wife by the *Bailo*. He could not but give the Turks something in return. Having used all possible means of appeasement, through promises and generalities, eventually the English Ambassador (as well as his Dutch colleague) admitted to Padavino, Ballarino's dragoman, that when the Grand Vizier employed violence, it was impossible to refuse. Moreover they suggested that, if English ships met the Venetian fleet, they ought not to be searched, "because the Archipelago was not the Adriatic Sea".[35] One should also not wonder why Winchilsea was instructed by Whitehall "not to meddle in this affair", when he requested permission to incite the ill-feeling of the Ottoman ministers against the Holy Roman Empire[36] or why King Charles showed no interest at

34. *Ibid*., pp. 216-24 (Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 15 Dec. 1662); Corbett, *op.cit*., vol. 2, p. 33.

35. *Ibid*., pp. 101-25, 158-68, 225-8 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 26 Feb., 7 Mar., 22 July 1662; 19 Jan. 1663).

36. *Ibid*., pp. 125-37 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 14 Apr. 1662). The Earl expected that after the defeat of Kemeny by the Ottomans,

all when a Greek-Orthodox monk from Calamata delivered an invitation of six bishops, calling on him to occupy Morea with the assistance of the Maniats and to free those Christians from the Turkish yoke.[37] Unless provoked seriously, England was determined not to offer any excuse for complaints to the Porte. And certainly the Serene Republic could not stand in its way.

In fact the treatment of Venice grew tougher. Apparently encouraged by Giavarina's efforts to keep the currant trade brisk and by promises, initiated in early 1662, of excellent treatment, Andrew Riccard and two other members of the Levant Company visited the Venetian Resident. They thanked him for the removal of the duty on currants – which the Senate had ordered in October 1662 – but at the same time they asked to be relieved of two other burdens, a "certain tenth" and a duty for the ransom of slaves, which, however, were not paid on the value of currants.[38] In April, not being able to turn down the usual demands of the Porte for transportation to Crete, Winchilsea asked Ballarino for arrangements for the immediate release

peace with the Habsburgs would facilitate the establishment of a Spanish Embassy at the Porte as well as an Ottoman final offensive against Crete: SP 97/17, Winchilsea to Nicholas, Pera, 1 Feb. 1662, f. 255r-v.

37. Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 3 Nov. and 15 Dec. 1662, *CSP*, *vol. 33: 1661-1664* (1932), pp. 204-24. A year later Cyprus was also suggested as an easy prize for the English, the defence of island being in decay: SP 97/18, Winchilsea to Bennet, Pera, 21 Nov. 1663, ff. 57r-58r. Cf. Apostolos Vakalopoulos, *Istoria tou Neou Ellinismou* [History of Modern Hellenism], vol. 3 (Thessaloniki, 1968), p. 509 for a similar proposal made by Archbishop of Cyprus Nikiphoros to the Venetians on exactly the same grounds.

38. *Ibid*., pp. 182-93, 225-8 (Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 8 Sept. 1662 and 19 Jan. 1663).

of the English ships, should they met the Venetian squadron. The *Bailo* refused. If he sent a message, he claimed, it would be like setting them a trap. The ambassador exploded:

> I am not surprised at Signor Ballarino disclosing his malign intentions in this because in other matters also he has been against me [...] He would not have me take up mediation for the peace with the republic, and yet the French ambassador before me had this in hand without any difficulty. He does me harm in many ways; I know all about it and by God I will bear it in mind.[39]

Had the *Bailo* read what Giavarina had written about the hot-blooded Earl, when he was chosen for the post in 1660, he would not have been so alarmed. In the following month he had his chance to forward to London additional evidence of the Englishman's greed and occasionally violent character, especially of his machinations to represent both the kings of Portugal and England, exposing himself to bitter comments by Turks and Europeans alike. Meanwhile Ballarino was informed that the English were also endeavouring to secure both free navigation in the Black Sea and Albanian, Greek or other troops for the King of Portugal, then at war with the Dutch.[40] The firm rejection of both requests and his bitterness at the Turks made Winchilsea reconsider his relations with Ballarino.

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39. *Ibid*., pp. 239-44 (Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, London, 1 Apr. 1663).

40. *Ibid*., pp. 250-61 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Adrianople, 14 July, 12 and 16 Aug. 1663). Accusations referred to a scandal concerning the illegal seizure of a cargo of potash from the Black Sea; see also Paul Cernovodeanu, *England's Trade Policy in the Levant 1660-1714* (Bucharest, 1972), pp. 75-82.

He re-approached the *Bailo* with due courtesy during his second journey to Adrianople and discussed with him the delicate tactic of bribery. Thus it was in that city that the Earl bought off the Ottoman officials with two thousand *reals* and managed to have the treaties concerning Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers reaffirmed by the Porte, then at war with the German Emperor, and accordingly adapted.[41]

By December news from London –coming thence via Paris, due to Giavarina's departure– reported that the Grand Seignior had promised to observe the peace that the Barbary corsairs had agreed, while King Charles would not permit his subjects and their ships to serve in the defence of the Republic and the Germans. It was only a few days later, however, that it became known that the Algerines had not accepted the article prohibiting the search of English ships so the King's fleet was making preparations to go after them. Although Sagredo concluded that the English would not run any risk and was full of irony for their mild complaints following the new captures of their ships, things turned out differently, apparently due to the Levant Company complaints.[42] King Charles obtained the consent of the Porte to punish the corsairs of Barbary without exception, since the Sultan disapproved "the breaches of faith" against the English nation. As the *Kaimmakam* had said to the English dragoman, the pirates were born thieves and thieves they would die.[43] By the end of

41. *Ibid*., pp. 265-7 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Adrianople, 24 Oct. 1663); cf. Anderson, *op.cit*., p. 32.

42. *Ibid*., pp. 270-82, 286-9 (Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 4 and 11 Dec. 1663;14 Jan. and 27 Mar. 1664); Pincus, *op.cit*., p. 241.

43. *Ibid*., pp. 276-82 (Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 22 Jan. 1664).

March 1664, Vice-Admiral Lawson had forced them to release nineteen English prizes; he blocked their port and attacked their cruisers successfully until May, when he was forced to go to the assistance of the English guard holding Tangiers, who had been decimated by the Moors.[44] On 22 March a bill was read in the House of Commons to prevent the all too frequent and nonetheless suspicious capture of English ships by the pirates. To discourage surrender, they would be supplied with crews and guns beyond the norm.[45] Apparently it was this spring attack on the Barbary Coast that forced the newly appointed Secretary of State, Sir Henry Bennet, to instruct Winchilsea to put the blame for all troubles on the avarice of the pirates. He was then to explain to the Sultan that the King of England had to be on good terms with all Christian princes and he was to offer mediation between the Porte and Venice as proof of his King's friendship.[46]

At the same time that the Secretary's orders were on their way, Winchilsea was reporting that a proposal by Ballarino to divide Crete had been turned down by the Porte scornfully.[47] Meanwhile relations between the two men had worsened again. The English Ambassador suspected that Ballarino ("a person full of artifice and design") stood in his way because he wanted to conclude a treaty by himself rather than through

44. Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 20 May 1664, *CSP*, vol. *34: 1664-1666* (1933), pp. 13-20; Cf. Corbett, *op.cit*., vol. 2, p. 42.

45. Intelligence from England enclosed in Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 15 Apr. 1664, *CSP*, vol. *34: 1664-1666* (1933), pp. 1-13. See also *JHC*, vol. 8: 1660-1667 (1802), p. 535; Davis, *op.cit*., p. 131.

46. HMC, *Finch*, vol.1, pp. 291-2, 296-7 (Bennet to Winchilsea, London, 23 Dec. 1663). The Earl had argued anew for mediation in his memo dispatched to Bennet in November 1663 by Rycaut.

47. *Idid*., pp. 231-2 (Winchilsea to Bennet, Pera, 1 Jan. 1663).

Winchilsea's mediation. But it was the affair of Tomaso Gobatto (who had conspired with the Earl for the transportation to Venice of the corpse of the deceased Extraordinary Ambassador Giovanni Cappello) that set the two diplomats at each other throats.[48] Perhaps Gobatto, certainly a servant of Cappello according to Rycaut, was the person forwarding false information to the English about a staged treason of Candia, which was to be followed by a treaty surrendering all the fortresses on the island to the Turks. The Senate was upset and advised Ballarino to restore smooth relations with Winchilsea. Jealousies should not come in their way at a time when the Senate itself was giving orders for generous gestures, such as the release of a great quantity of steel, lead and tin in cases which had been captured on an English ship headed for Smyrna. The release was a gesture to satisfy King Charles, who had sent a written request.[49] The *Bailo* complied with the Senate's instructions, to the Earl's great joy, for his power politics had been rewarded.[50]

48. Capello was sent in 1653 to negotiate a treaty and was kept in captivity until his death in November 1662. For his mission see Samuele Romanin, *Storia documentata di Venezia* vol.7 (Venezia, 1858), pp. 421-3; for his death and after-death see Eric Dursteler, "The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps", *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 16 (2001), 18; HMC, *Finch*, vol. 1, pp. 252-3; Rycaut, *op.cit*., p. 124.

49. The Senate to Ballarino, Venice, 19 Apr. 1664, *CSP*, vol. *34: 1664-1666* (1933), pp. 1-13; Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Adrianople, 25 Jan. 1664, *CSP, vol. 33: 1661-1664* (1932), pp. 276-82; SP 97/18, Winchilsea to Bennet, 28 Oct. 1663, ff. 53r-54v.

50. SP 97/18, Winchilsea to Bennet, Pera, 15 Sept. 1664, ff. 98r-99r; Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Adrianople, 23 Aug. 1664, *CSP*, vol. *34: 1664-1666* (1933), pp. 32-8.

6. *Long rigmaroles of words.*

As English-Dutch relations were reaching breaking point for a second time, the war between the Porte and the Emperor came to an end at Vasvar in August 1664. England renewed its treaty with Algiers in November of the same year.[1] Rumours persisted that the Republic had entered into negotiations for a peace – hopefully an honourable one – over Candia[2] in 1665 the Turks, freed officially from their German War, were building their own new fleet –allegedly of one hundred galleys – to be used the following summer (1666) to "swallow up" Crete, as they had threatened in their efforts to intimidate Venice and achieve an easy settlement. Two wars at the same time in the Mediterranean increased the need for ships. The Porte was still in need of English vessels, a threat that kept both Venetian diplomats frustrated and the English on the alert. Apparently irritated by both Ottoman and Venetian pressures for naval assistance, in the course of an argument with his Venetian colleague, Bianchi, the English Resident in Florence said somewhat bluntly that the ongoing purchase of Ionian currants at an annual cost of eight hundred thousand *reals*, without a single one being spent on English products, was all they could expect from his country and this in itself was only due to his King's good will. Had he known the

1. Corbett, *op.cit.*, vol. 2, p. 47.

2. SP 99/46, Gilles Jones to Bennet, Venice, 5 Dec. 1664, f. 40r; Rycaut mentions undue pressure exercised upon Ballarino rather than negotiations (Rycaut, *op.cit.*, p. 165).

reports that the Dutch were hiring Venetian vessels, he would have treated Bianchi worse.

The Porte went as far as to impose a general *embargo* on all Christian vessels, trying to keep them in port by force, with the prospect of seizure. It even entered and won an open clash with the English merchants, who had found a way to export goods from Alexandria via Smyrna, thus evading two thirds of the due tax. This was discovered by Panagiotis (Nikousios), the renowned Greek dragoman of the Porte and of the Habsburg Ambassador, a man trusted by the Grand Vizier.[3] Winchilsea was embittered by the loss and even more so because he had to displease the Porte anew by turning down yet another request of fifteen English merchant ships. The raging Dutch war was presented as a pretext but obviously not without harming his image. He was relieved only by the letters of friendship he received from the chief viziers, to be forwarded to London by his secretary, Paul Rycaut. They contained no matter of importance, he admitted, but at least they were "testimonies of his endeavours to maintain the peace and good correspondence".[4]

3. SP 97/18, Winchilsea to Bennet, Pera, 30 Jan. 1665, f. 114r; 12/22 July 1665, ff. 130r-131v, 136r; 10 Sept. 1665, f. 142r-143v; HMC, *Finch*, vol. 1, pp. 393-4, 412; Sagredo to the Doge and Senate, Paris, 15 May and 23 Oct. 1665; The Senate to Sagredo, Venice, 30 May and 31 Oct. 1665; Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Adrianople, 26 Aug.; Pera, 6,16 and 26 Dec. 1665; Bianchi to the Doge and Senate, Florence, 10 Oct. 1665 *CSP*, vol. *34: 1664-1666* (1933), pp. 108-28, 172-86, 206-18.

4. SP 97/18, Winchilsea to Bennet, Pera, 5/15 Dec. 1665, f.152r-v; Rycaut, *op.cit*. p. 166. For the return trip of his secretary see Sonia P. Anderson, "Paul Rycaut and his Journey from Constantinople to Vienna in 1665-1666", *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, 11/2 (1973), 251-73.

Panagiotis Nikousios, whom the Earl called a "false Greek", apparently due to his fervent devotion to Ottoman state interests, had never been his friend, probably because of his previous efforts, as a dragoman of the Habsburgs, to establish a Spanish Embassy at the Porte.[5] But in 1667 Winchilsea despised the Greek even more since the dragoman worked cunningly (though to no avail) to curtail his ambitious plans of imposing –with the assistance of the Habsburgs– a prince of his influence in Moldavia, Eliasco Voivoda (Iliaş Alexandru).[6] The Earl also came by intelligence that Panagiotis had been assigned by the Grand Vizier, and was in contact with Ballarino, to conclude a peace with Venice. According to his informers the plan failed because the Venetians were not ready to give away the fortress of Souda in exchange for Candia plus a twenty mile zone around it, including the Ottoman built fortress of New Candia.[7] If Ballarino was right to suspect that Winchilsea and the Habsburgs were conspiring against a peace between the Porte and the *Serenissima*, then obviously the Earl had another good reason to dislike him. Even if both men wished peace to prevail in the end, they were unlikely to join forces and sacrifice their personal prestige.[8] Had not French influence been

5. Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 2 Feb. 1662, *CSP, vol. 33: 1661-1664* (1932), pp. 101-12. It was Nikousios who in 1669 negotiated with the Venetians, on behalf of the Ottomans, the surrender of Candia.

6. SP 97/18, Winchilsea to Bennet, Belgrade (outskirts of Constantinople), 20/30 May 1665, ff. 195r-197v. Panagiotis' favourite was George Doukas (1665-66).

7. SP 97/18, Intelligence July-August 1666, ff. 206r-207r.

8. Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 9 Apr. 1666, *CSP*, vol. *34: 1664-1666* (1933), pp. 279-87; 19 Aug. 1666, *CSP*, vol *35: 1666-1668* (1935), pp. 44-62. The French Ambassador was also undermining

checked by England, a treaty would have been more likely to happen. But as France had joined the Dutch against them, the English did their best to undermine the improvement of French capitulations and to keep open any front where French troops were engaged, be they only "the scum of France", as one report recorded.[9] There would be an English mediation or no peace at all. The English Ambassador in Spain, discouraging his Venetian colleague, said that "our wars close at hand turn our thoughts away from distant emergencies".[10] The Venetians should rather pray that the hostilities in Europe were prolonged; it was most likely the best way to keep Christian vessels out of the Ottoman service.

After the treaty of Breda, in July 1667, which ended the second Anglo-Dutch War, Winchilsea was free to resume his mediation efforts, confident that a treaty was bound to be agreed. The Turks were pushing hard, the Vizier was wise and his army well disciplined.[11] Moreover, Giovanni Battista Ballarino died in September 1666, on his way to meet the Grand Vizier at Thebe, where he had been invited to negotiations, and his post was still vacant. Taking Ottoman intelligence at face value, the Earl had been suspecting him of treason against his own

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Ballarino's attempt to negotiate a treaty with the Porte, as dragoman Panagiotis Nikousios confessed later on: Harry Hionides, "Anglikon ypomnima peri tis poliorkias kai ptoseos tou Chandakos" [English memorandum on the siege and fall of Candia], *Kritika Chronika*, 3 (1949), 472-3.

9. *Ibid*., pp. 25-44 (Ballarino to the Doge and Senate, Pera, 29 July 1666); SP 99/46, Harper to Bennet, Venice, 2 July 166, f. 125r-v; 9 July 1666, f. 127r.

10. Zorzi to the Doge and Senate, Madrid, 16 Feb. 1667, *CSP*, vol *35: 1666-1668* (1935), pp. 125-37.

11. HMC, *Finch*, vol.1, p. 460.

nation. Now that the de facto *Bailo* was dead, he expected that his own cousin, Sir John Finch from Florence, or Consul Jones in Venice might convince the Senate that the French had been cheating the Republic. If this was accomplished, he could see no more effective mediator than his own King.[12] The Senate, however, had other plans. In December they wrote to King Charles admitting their desperate position in the weakened fortress of Candia and announcing the despatch of Secretary Giovanni Francesco Marchesini to England (and to France) to raise two to three thousand troops and to hire ships. The present emergency, the Senate wrote, was "beyond comparison". Charles was asked to prove his interest by his actions and thus verify his high position in the hierarchy Christendom.[13]

Marchesini arrived in London only in June but, due an eye infection, was not in a position to start contacts until early July, when he met the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, Sir Henry Bennet, Baron Arlington, who did not mince his words:

> In the last few years England had suffered great losses through the plague, the fire and war. It had scarcely emerged from these and from the immense expenses which it had been necessary to incur [...] We are in good friendship with the Turk and at peace and our trade in the Levant would suffer severe injury [...] This country was situated in the North, far away from the Ottoman Empire.

Baron Arlington was nevertheless courteous in every aspect. As a matter of fact he appreciated Italian culture no less than

12. SP 97/18, Winchilsea to Bennet, Belgrade, 10 Oct. 1667, f. 315r-v; Rycaut, *op.cit.*, p. 188.

13. The Senate to King Charles II, Venice, 23 Dec. 1667, *CSP*, vol *35: 1666-1668* (1935), pp. 198-205.

Italian wine. But his "appearances of assistance", Marchesini pointed out, were not at all "comparable with the excess of courtesy shown". He met with the King the following week only to hear the same motto that "England had just emerged from a costly war" but he was also given an opening: "If the other princes had supplied assistance, he certainly would contribute so much as was permitted to him by the scant means he had at present". Since the French had already committed themselves it looked as if the King of England had pledged himself too.[14]

Marchesini rushed to Sir Henry as soon as it could be arranged, to elaborate on the "gracious promise" of King Charles. But the Secretary was not moved nor was he hesitant in putting the blame on his sovereign's acting on impulse:

> I will not deceive you. The King has given you such an answer following his own natural instinct, and has opened his heart to you about what he would desire to do for the most serene republic. But in wishing to give effect to this desire he will encounter a very great deal of opposition and will find himself obliged to withdraw the promise given, since he proffered it without considering the peace which he has with the Turk and the great trade which this country has in the Levant, or that the crown is weakened by the late war with the Dutch.

The Ambassador explained that Venice did not expect the royal fleet to come to its help; a squadron under any flag would suffice.

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14. *Ibid*., pp. 223-37 (Marchesini to the Doge and Senate, London, 6 and 13 July 1668). For Arlington's cultural connection with the Italian world see Helen Jacobsen, "Luxury, Consumption, Cultural Politics, and the Career of the Earl of Arlington, 1660-1685", *The Historical Journal*, 52/2 (2009), 302-4.

The Dutch had promised to follow. Arlington cut him short. The Dutch would do nothing, he said. It was a trick to expose England to the Ottoman Empire and then take full control of the Levantine trade. Secretary Marchesini had to moderate his requests. The latter asked that English ships be forbidden from carrying Turkish troops to Candia, a favour as easily promised as broken. He also implied that an English mediation would be welcomed, as a new Ambassador to the Porte, Sir Daniel Harvey, had been appointed. The Secretary assured him the King would be delighted at such a prospect.[15]

It was the very same day that, by chance, the Venetian Ambassador met King Charles for a second time. The King was cautious enough to explain that English ships were always forced into Turkish employ by threat of violence and therefore he could guarantee nothing.[16] But, when told about the anticipated Dutch help, he responded positively: "Very good, if the Dutch will succour the Republic, I will do so also". The Venetian was puzzled. Was the King honest or was he trying to find a pretext and cover himself after his earlier promise? Sir Daniel Harvey was a *factor* of the Levant Company and the Director of the East India Company. He was also an intimate friend of Baron Arlington, who had presented him to the King as the right person to succeed Winchilsea. Marchesini guessed that Sir Henry did not want to risk either his career or the Company's interests. This was a probable explanation for his reluctance to commit himself to anything; unless of course he

15. *Ibid*., pp. 223-37 (Marchesini to the Doge and Senate, London, 20 July 1668).

16. See HMC, *Finch*, vol. 1, pp. 495-6, 499, 501-3, 611 for continuous Ottoman demands to use English vessels at Smyrna in 1668.

was trying to relieve his King from having to give a negative response.[17]

Marchesini met Arlington for a third time. He asked him to instruct Harvey accordingly and openly supported mediation. Most importantly, he assured him that the Senate would appreciate such an initiative. The Secretary begged to discuss this at greater length when the newly appointed Ambassador Mocenigo arrived in London. Then Marchesini contacted Harvey but was met with extreme reluctance to take over any mediation that would imply expensive contacts and journeys to Adrianople. The merchants, he said, would not cover the expenses of a cause so indifferent to them and the Turks themselves would not accept mediation without the prospect of gaining profits from it. Marchesini was surprised by Harvey's self-interest and indifference to the glory that he might be able to win in such a venture. It was only with the support of Henry Howard, the Earl of Arundel (recently returned from Turkey and widely travelled in Italy[18]) that he managed to convince the new Ambassador to undertake the mission. Even then Harvey thought it natural to ask the Venetians to cover his own expenses and save himself from the complaints of the English merchants in Constantinople.[19] To ensure that he had been persuaded, Marchesini visited him for a second time and tried to teach him some clever ways to deny English ships to the Turks.

17. Marchesini to the Doge and Senate, London, 20 July 1668, *CSP*, vol *35: 1666-1668* (1935), pp. 223-37.

18. He was the author of *A Relation of a Journey* [...] *from London to Vienna, and thence to Constantinople* (London, 1671).

19. *Ibid*., pp. 223-37 (Marchesini to the Doge and Senate, London, 27 July 1668).

It was during this last meeting that Harvey, who had not received any instructions regarding the mediation from the King, got the wrong impression that the Venetian guidelines on this issue would be waiting for him at Leghorn.[20]

Before leaving London, Marchesini went for a last round of farewell contacts, starting superbly with the King and ending in disaster with Arlington. The latter, putting aside any talk about assistance, suggested that Venice should rather apply for peace and asked about the particular claims of the Turks in Crete. The Secretary replied that the Turks understood "no other argument than force". But Arlington insisted that military assistance was out of the question. The Levant trade was a great obstacle. The English merchants themselves would inform the Turks of everything that was done to satisfy their own private interests. If other princes had promised assistance they either had fewer interests involved than England, or had secret aims. He went on to discredit both the French King and the German Emperor. Marchesini stood his ground with vigour and honour. Arlington concluded that the King might have been favourable but this kind of negotiation was time consuming. Immediate help was not forthcoming, if it was ever to be dispatched.[21] All was in vain. Only the engagement of the Dutch could possibly change the tide.

Meanwhile Sir Daniel Harvey was on his way to Constantinople with multiple instructions: to work for the reaffirmation of the treaties with Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis; to maintain good

20. *Ibid*., pp. 237-48 (Marchesini to the Doge and Senate, London, 3 Aug. 1668).

21. *Ibid*., pp. 248-59 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 31 Aug. 1668).

relations with the Christian ambassadors, especially with England's allies; to serve and protect the Turkey Company, even by improving the existing Capitulations; to inform London about anything that might disturb peace; and, finally, to mediate for a peace between the Grand Seignior and Venice. It was explicitly mentioned that, following Marchesini's assurances, the Venetian Ambassador (Mocenigo) was expected to ask formally for the mediation, "a work of so much advantage to Christendom". In that case Harvey was urged to act hard and skilfully on the Senate's instructions that might be awaiting him at Leghorn. In any case, contrary to what the Venetians had expected, no written orders had been given to deny favours to the Ottoman navy.[22] Indeed at that time Winchilsea and Rycaut at Smyrna were negotiating such services, willy-nilly, and imposing them on ships, even against the will of the crews.[23]

As Harvey was sailing to Tangiers, Ambassador Mocenigo resumed contacts in every direction, from the King and the Duke of York to the State Secretary, but he did not manage to secure anything more than his predecessors. Meanwhile the Senate, apparently having read Marchecini's mid July reports, asked him (18 August) to drop the matter of mediation, having gone too far. Mocenigo rushed to apologise: He had acted prudently since he had only encouraged Harvey to assist the interests of the Republic in general, without committing himself about the peace negotiations. Yet he was ready to dispose of

22. SP 97/19, Instructions for our trusty and well beloved servant Sir Daniel Harvey, 9 Aug. 1668, ff. 27r-28v; see also A. C. Wood, "The English Embassy at Constantinople, 1660-1762", *The English Historical Review*, 40/160 (1925), 543.

23. Anderson, *An English Consul*, pp. 174-8.

this impression, to clear up the ambiguity created by Marchesini and to press openly for English financial assistance. Not that he was unaware of the difficulties:

> But anything that is obtained would be the result of divine inspiration since it is only too true that all respect for religion is subordinated and they are moved solely by interests of state, and this is not strong enough to persuade those who are nearest and most closely united by interest to act.[24]

Then, as the Senate passed to London the news of a forthcoming new Ottoman offensive, an unexpected overture from the Dutch created fresh prospects.[25] Mocenigo met King Charles anew and tried to make the most out of the good intentions expressed by the Dutch. The King was eager to listen to exciting war news but this time he did not get carried away. He was aware that the Dutch would take advantage of whatever he said. If they joined first, he would follow. The Ambassador did his best to get some kind of sound and solid commitment but he only got a royal smile.[26] Then he rushed to the French and the Dutch ambassadors, Colbert and Borel. Yet he was not in a position to assure them of any concrete English plans, merely of the King's disposition. Borel suggested that England and Holland should jointly take the matter to the Porte and declare

24. Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 31 Aug. and 7 Sept. 1668, *CSP*, vol *35: 1666-1668* (1935), pp. 248-78. Money was also refused by Baron Arlington three weeks later (*Ibid.*, pp. 259-78, 21 Sept. 1668) but he was encouraged to ask for ammunition.

25. *Ibid*., pp. 259-95 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 28 Sept. 1668; the Senate to Mocenigo, Venice, 5 Oct. 1668).

26. *Ibid*., pp. 278-95 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 5 Oct. 1668).

"the fixed determination of the Christian powers that the kingdom of Candia should not remain in their hands, to prevent the ports there from becoming perpetual resorts of corsairs and of the common enemies". If the French and Germans joined in this with them, it would be very effective. Mocenigo was excited at the idea. He urged the Dutch to get orders to proceed and started to plan how he would have Harvey's instructions revised.[27] He visited the King, Secretary Arlington and others in an attempt to convince them that the matter was urgent since the Ottoman offensive had not been interrupted for the coming winter. Apparently to buy some time, Arlington asked for a written memo, which Mocenigo produced almost immediately, but it produced no effect. Borel, the Dutch ambassador, had no news either; he had met the King but the issue of Candia had not been brought up. His ardour cooling, he became more reserved and avoided discussing joint action. The issue was in the hands of Ambassador Temple in Holland. Mocenigo felt desperate. Mixed news was coming in: one day the Turks had withdrawn; the next Candia had been surrendered. The treaty with the Algerines had been reaffirmed only under the threat of an English raid. The Grand Seignior had come to Larissa in Central Greece and another Venetian proposal for negotiations was scornfully rejected. The merchants were threatening again to buy currants in the Morea. If only he could get an open statement of support from the King...[28] It was only in early

27. *Loc.cit*. Both reports were written on the same date.

28. *Ibid*., pp. 278-306 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 12, 19, 26 Oct. 1668); Rycaut, *op.cit*., p. 208; Playfair, *op.cit*., pp. 90-8. Since the court moved to Larissa in Thessaly, there had been no news at all coming from the Capital (Anderson, *An English Consul*, p. 233).

November that they met. Charles gave him a "long rigmarole of words and considerations" about everything, nothing more.[29]

It is most unlikely that either the King or Baron Arlington would have changed their minds under any circumstances; by the end of November 1668 this prospect became even more remote. It was only then that the first letters from Ambassador Harvey reached London. He had already communicated with the Resident in Venice, via Consul Sir John Finch at Florence, on his way to Constantinople. He was amazed to have received from the Senate, instead of "illumination" about the expected peace negotiations, its reservation and disapproval of Marchesini's request for mediation. The Senate, he was told, preferred "not to place their affairs in the hands of the ministers of foreign princes". Harvey was said to have been offended and Mocenigo had to make up for the harm done.[30] He dealt with the merchants first and then met the Secretary, Henry Bennet, Baron Arlington. The latter promised to inform the King of the unfortunate misunderstanding and to send new instructions to Harvey and did so soon afterwards.[31] The case was closed in January when Mocenigo met Charles and thanked him for Harvey's new instructions. However, he failed again to make him follow the example of other Christian nations without the commitment of the Dutch. As Arlington explained to him later on, Temple had been very much occupied by other issues he had had to attend to.

29. *Ibid*., pp. 306-23 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 9 Nov. 1668); Setton, *op.cit*., p. 213.

30. *Ibid*., pp. 306-23 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 30 Nov. 1668).

31. *Ibid*., pp. 323-32 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 14 and 21 Dec. 1668).

When Mocenigo suggested that the English Mediterranean squadron hoist the flag of St. Mark and engage in battle, the Secretary "retired behind his usual defence and said that considerations of the Levant trade spoiled everything".[32]

The expectation that a positive response from the Dutch might serve to mobilise the English continued to hold for a little longer due to the new assurances of Ambassador Borel, before his departure from London, and also to those given to Ambassador Temple by the Grand Pensionary of the United Provinces, Johan de Witt. The latter promised to bring the matter before the Assembly General of the Provinces. By late March, however, it had become clear that "the example of the Dutch would not suffice to change the policy of England, the basis of which is delay and the constant study to gain time and in that way to get pretexts and cloaks".[33] Realisation had dawned earlier. In February, after a meeting of the Privy Council, various alternatives of assistance to Venice were discussed and rejected all together. It became clear to Mocenigo that all "hopes of great succours" had vanished and there was not "the slightest assurance even of a little".[34] It became even clearer a month later, when much diplomatic effort was spent to stop the Scottish regiment of George Douglas, the catholic Earl of Dumbarton in the service of the French army since the 1650s, being

32. Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 4 Jan. 1669, *CSP, vol. 36: 1669-1670* (1937), pp. 1-9.

33. *Ibid*., pp. 1-24 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 11 and 18 Jan., 1 and 8 Feb., 15 and 19 Mar. 1669).

34. *Ibid*., pp. 9-23 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 22 Feb. 1669).

transported to Candia as King Louis XIV wished.[35] It was an irony that Winchilsea, on his voyage back to England, was reporting from Malta that the Ottoman Empire was falling apart and that the costly Cretan war was one of the reasons.[36] The timing for intervention looked favourable but it was not. The Queen, who had already expressed her concern for Candia to the Pope, confessed to Mocenigo that King Charles was justified in taking the concerns of the merchants seriously "in order not to hazard an obedience so recently planted and far from being rooted in the hearts of this people towards his royal person".[37]

In late spring the Venetian Ambassador stopped urging the English. The next time he met the King he briefed him on warfare in Candia, especially on the French contribution and heroic deeds, without any further insinuation. His new tactic

35. *Ibid*., pp. 23-34 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 1, 15, 19, 22 Mar. 1669); Matthew Glozier, *Scottish Soldiers in France in the Reign of the Sun King*: *Nursery for Men of Honour* (Leiden, 2004), pp. 44, 120-23, note. 108. Even Douglas pointed to the negative effect that the presence of his men in Crete would have on English Levant trade. Some of his men, including Hugh Mackay of Skourie, a certain Colonel Molisson (who was wounded in action), and Colonel Thomas Anand, joined the French expeditionary force and stayed to the very end. In fact Anand, "an Englishman of courage and of able parts and of intire honesty" was assigned by the Venetians to represent the Christian camp in the final negotiation with the Grand Vizier. The presence of these officers in Candia was brought to Harvey's attention: SP 97/17, Harvey to Bennet, Belgrade, 19 June 1669, f. 102r-v. For Anand see Rycaut, *op.cit*. p. 217; Hionides, *op.cit*., pp. 440-99.

36. Setton, *op.cit*., pp. 218-9.

37. Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 10 and 17 May 1669, *CSP*, *vol. 36: 1669-1670* (1937), pp. 45-62.

was to keep the royal interest alive.[38] He was unaware that this interest was so keen as to have caused an agent to be placed inside Candia. He was Thomas Lynch, the ex-governor of Jamaica, reporting directly to Arlington. In early August, aware that the English fleet was in the Mediterranean, the Senate urged Mocenigo to encourage a diversion along the coast of Algiers. By the time the *ducali* reached him in September, Sir Thomas Allen had already started hostilities but it was too late for the defenders of Candia.[39] In mid-August Mocenigo had already been informed by the French Ambassador that peace between Venice and the Empire was "at hand".[40] Some two weeks later Charles decided to make his move: He appointed Thomas Belasyse, 1st Earl Fauconberg, as ambassador to Venice and instructed him to act as mediator for peace. Lord Arlington also spoke to Mocenigo on the same matter. The fleet, he informed him, was outside Algiers. They had explicit permission to engage with the enemy but he seemed to prefer they didn't. Mocenigo, on the other hand, was wise enough not to get involved in the matter of mediation.[41] Due to

38. *Ibid*., pp. 81-97 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 2 Aug. 1669).

39. *Ibid*., pp. 81-97 (Senate to Mocenigo, Venice, 3 Aug. 1669); Corbett, *op.cit.*, vol. 2, p. 70. For Lynch and his reports see Gareth Morgan, "English State Papers on the Siege of Candia", *Kritika Chronika*, 13 (1959), 312-18. For his service "against the Turk" Lynch was rewarded by the King in 1670 with the considerable amount of £666: *Calendar of Treasury Books*, vol. 3: 1669-1672 (1908), pp. 727 and 785.

40. *Ibid*., pp. 81-97 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 16 Aug. 1669).

41. *Ibid*., pp. 97-123 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 6 Sept. and 11 Oct. 1669). For orders to Allen see The King to the Duke

the strong winds it was only in late October that the surrender of Candia was confirmed.[42] When Mocenigo met King Charles later in November he was still mourning the death of his mother, Henrietta Maria, who had passed away five days after the fall of Candia. The two men exchanged condolences. The King praised Venice for the glory won at a war "against the common enemy of Christendom, which he had not been able to share, to his exceeding regret". Mocenigo turned the conversation to the instruction given to new *Bailo* Alivise Molino at the Porte. He was to show "every respect and observance to his Majesty's Ambassador Harvis". Charles replied that his own ambassador had "general instructions to cultivate the best relations with the ministers of your Serenity and always to advance your interests".[43] A month later in Salonica, his favourite place for hunting, the Sultan promised the renewal of the English Capitulations.[44] Harvey did not live to see them signed officially, but business went on as usual.

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of York, London, 26 June 1669, *CSP Domestic: Charles II, 1668-9* (1894), pp. 350-91. For Allen's expedition, blockade and Muslim slave trade see Adrian Tinniswood, *Pirates of Barbary. Corsairs, Conquests, and Captivity in the 17th-Century Mediterranean* (New York, 2010), pp. 238-9. The possession and the trading of Moorish slaves have been indicated as two of the English concerns of the time which caused Algerian complaints (Matar, "Introduction", p. 10).

42. *Ibid*., pp. 123- 36 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 1 Nov. 1669).

43. *Ibid*., pp. 123- 36 (Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, London, 29 Nov. 1669).

44. Rycaut, *op.cit*. pp. 221-2.

7. *Religion and state interests.*

For those English who expressed deeper interest in the Cretan war there was even more detailed information available. In 1668 a handy single sheet was published by John Overton on *A Description of the Island and City of Candia* by E. G., Serjeant at Arms, with a map of the Eastern Mediterranean. It included a brief note of praise of Venice, limited information about the war but plenty about the products, ports, ancient history, flora and fauna of Crete, as well some ancient stereotypes for the Cretans. It was noted that the women wore "breeches as men do, and boots after the same manner, and their upper Coats no longer then the middle of their Thighs", while "the better sort of people" went after "the Venetian fashion".[1] Those interested in the logistics of the war could read *A True and Perfect List of all the Forces sent by his Most Christian Majesty aboard His Men of Warr and Gallies Upon the Expedition for the Relief of Candia This Present Year 1669* printed in the second half of 1669. Descriptions of the battles were to be found in *An Exact Account of the Late Engagement between the French King's Forces, and those of the*

1. The way Cretans dressed had also caught the interest of George Sandys, who visited the island in 1610. He also remarked that "the better sort of men are appareled like the Venetians and so are the women" but the common women wore only "loose veils on their heads, their breast and shoulders perpetually naked and died by the sun into a loathsome tawny": *Sandys Travailes containing a History of the Original and Present State of the Turkish Empire, their Laws, Government, Policy Military Force, Courts of Justice and Commerce* etc (London, 1658), pp. 176-7.

Grand Seignior before Candia, on the 25th of June 1669 as it came in a letter from the Duke de Navailles, the French General: with a List of the Slain and Wounded. It was a sixteen-page publication which was printed shortly after the French force had left the island. A more detailed work, mostly based on private letters "sent by one in the service of the Republique", was published in 1670: *A Description of Candia in its Ancient and Modern State with an Account of the Siege thereof, begun by the Ottoman Emperour, in the Year 1666, continued in 1667 and 1668, and surrendred the latter end of 1669.* Apart from a thorough description of warfare, it contained twelve pages of information about the island and its people, with all due references to ancient writers and to Sir Walter Raleigh's *History of the World.* Among other things, we learn from this book that if a Cretan woman bit a man "shrewdly" he wouldn't be cured without difficulty (p. 5). The author concluded that the example set by the defenders of Candia "should incite all Christian princes to imitate them in such noble and heroic actions and unanimously to defend their territories against the Sanguinary Turk who is and ever hath declar'd himself to be the common enemy of Christendom" (p. 116). Apparently there was so much interest in the subject that translations were also considered worthwhile, such as *A Journal of the Expedition of Monsieur de la Fueillade for the Relief of Candy written in French (by Way of Letter) by a Gentleman who was a Voluntiere in that Service, and faithfully Englished* (1670).

Yet none of these works could much in praise offered to Venice Jean Gailhard's *The Present State of the Republick of Venice as to the Government, Laws, Forces, Riches, Manners, Customes, Revenue, and Territory of that Common-wealth: With a Relation of the Present War in Candia* printed also in 1669. He admitted that although

the Serene Republic was "well affected" to England, it had not received men, ships and ammunition during the war of Candia "in the proportion desired" but this did not exclude the prospect that the Republic might "upon occasion expect help and protection" from England. After all the *Serenissima* was "very politick, and of all other states of Italy, caring least for the Pope" (pp. 187-8). While inviting Christian princes to oppose unanimously "the enemy of the Christian name", Gailhard also had to respond to those concerned with the interests of the Levant trade. So he argued that the Turks were no less interested in this trade than the English or the Dutch and they wouldn't spoil business simply to take revenge (pp. 221-4). On the other hand, if Candia were taken, trade would certainly suffer even more, he claimed, repeating one by one Giavarina's arguments put before Cromwell more than ten years earlier (pp. 233-4).

At first sight, the popular image of the Turk seemed to have not changed at all since the days of the Renaissance; at least not to the better. Despite the impression made by the christening of "Isuph Chiaus" (allegedly the offspring of Duke Cornaro of Negroponte, who proved a turncoat adventurer), the general view remained the same: Islam (or the *Turks* in general) was a very real threat in terms of both Christian theory and navigation of the seas.[2]

Of course there were individuals with a fairly good knowledge of the Ottoman Empire. They were influenced to a greater or lesser degree by their empirical data or English political theory of the time, and were not necessarily prejudiced against the Ottoman Turks. One such example was Paul Rycaut, who

2. Winchilsea revealed that Isuph Chiaus was an imposter: SP 97/17, Winchilsea to Nicholas, Pera, 20 May 1662, f. 276r.

consciously made efforts to treat them with impartiality, without necessarily being Turcophile.[3] Commenting on the failure of the Venetians to recapture Crete in 1647, he concluded: "But God [...] was not satisfied for the sins of Christendom as to judge it worthy to be delivered from the scourges of its Grand Oppressor".[4] Ambassador Bendysh in times of trouble had the impression he was among barbarians. Winchilsea considered the Turks "impertinent" and felt, if not disgusted, at least superior in diplomatic abilities.[5] He called a Muslim religious scholar (who had spiritually influenced Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha and convinced him to demolish Christian churches) an "enthusiast". This man, he commented, was "as inveterate and pernitious to Christian profession as the Presbyterian and Scotchkirkman to the rites of our church and religion". He concluded, "thus we may see what disorders and confusion hypocrisy and Puritanism introduce in all places where they gain a superiority". Like Rycaut, there was no question that the Earl was ever during his sojourn in Constantinople on the side of the Turks. It was, if nothing else, a matter of personal and cultural prestige.

The same was true for people in Britain, not only for preachers, poets and astrologers or for women rallying for the release of their enslaved husbands, but also for some key figures, even

3. Anderson, *An English Consul*, pp. 242-5; cf. Linda T. Darling, "Ottoman Politics through British Eyes: Paul Rycaut's The Present State of the Ottoman Empire", *Journal of World History*, 5/1 (1994), 71-97; Asli Çirakman, "From Tyranny to Despotism: The Enlightenment's Unenlightened Image of the Turks", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 33/1 (Feb., 2001), 49-68.

4. Rycaut, *op.cit*., p. 74.

5. HMC, *Finch*, vol. 1, p. 518.

if the latter were careful most of the time in how they expressed their feelings. If nothing else, warfare between Christians and Muslims left little option for a truly neutral stance for Catholics, Puritans or Anglicans. At least this was what the Senate thought and Sir Oliver Fleming had confessed: The Turk "is as much the enemy of our religion as of yours". It would be unfair to challenge Oliver Cromwell's concern for the Christian religion or to doubt his words when he called the Turks the "most potent enemy of the Christian faith", even though it is far fetched to argue, on the other hand, that his policy of non-intervention was dictated exclusively by some Puritan theory of providence and predestination. God could also act through human agents or advisors.[6] The Rump Parliament considered Venetians better friends than the Turks and this was true as long as business did not require active manifestations of friendship. The Duke of York, a Catholic, was in a position to speak more freely about the shame all Christian princes shared at having left the Republic unassisted, or even to declare his eagerness to be on board a fleet against the infidel. No one expected him to do so after all. The case of the Catholic Queen of England, Catherine of Braganza, a Portuguese princess, was very similar. She was influenced by the Pope but she had a realistic approach to politics. Charles II himself was excited by events in Candia. Apparently familiarised with the rich and detailed Venetian cartography of the island, he kept asking for details about the defence of the renowned bastion of St. Andrew.[7] In 1663 he went on board a ship to hear

6. Christopher Hill, *God's Englishman. Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution* (London, 1972), pp. 219-32.

7. For the mapping of Venetian fortifications in Crete see: Heleni Porfyriou, "The Cartography of Crete in the First Half of the 17th Century: A

an amazing story of some Quakers who had overpowered their Algerian captors. He could not be less excited with the idea of his own fleet pursuing the pirates.[8]

Unlike royal figure, in the aftermath of the English Civil War and of the Thirty Year War, restless veterans like Hugh Mackay, Molisson, Colonel Thomas Anand, and the famous Captain James Scot, captured in 1666 in Candia and ransomed in Smyrna, were free to fight wherever there was a promise of substantial salary and glory.[9] Under an Islamic siege, Crete was a natural destination for their kind, be they Catholics or Protestants, Scots, Irish or English, crusaders, mercenaries or both; provided they were not the head of an army whose large size was likely to embarrass their neutral kings, they were free to fight where they chose. Outside this circle of veterans and their devoted brothers in arms Venice had little chance of finding organised support. It has been argued that the noble diplomats who had served or travelled in Italy in general and in Venice in particular were not a particularly powerful pressure group, if they were a group at all.[10] Sir Gilbert Talbot, the Earls of Arundel and Denbigh, all courted seriously by the *Serenissima*,

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Collective Work of a Generation of Engineers", George Tolias and Dimitris Loupis (eds), *Eastern Mediterranean Cartographies*, INR/NHRF *Tetradia Ergasias* 25/26 (Athens, 2004), pp. 65-92.

8. Matar, "Introduction", p. 5.

9. Anderson, *An English Consul*, p. 196; see also Andreas Flick, "'The Court at Celle... is completely French'. Huguenot Soldiers in the Duchy of Brunswick-Lüneburg" in Matthew Glozier and David Onnekink (eds), *War, Religion and Service: Huguenot Soldiering, 1685-1713* (Aldershot, 2007), p. 210.

10. John Walter Stoye, *English Travelers abroad 1604-1667* (New York, 1968), pp. 133-74.

were not in a position to contribute in any substantial way to the Venetian cause. But again, one should not doubt on which side they stood.

Every Englishman, from King (or Lord Protector) to the last ignorant peasant of England, living inside or outside England, with the notable exception of the *renegados*, supported the Christian cause of Venice, maybe any Christian cause around the world. At least this was what Venetian diplomats and the Senate believed or hoped, as they ventured to involve England in their cause. Even though it was admitted by English kings that there was a special bond between the two states, they never elaborated on that. Apparently they were embarrassed to emphasise in front of Catholics their anti-Popish attitude. Nor was the issue ever brought up by the Venetian delegates. After all they were in search of Irish fighters. In the days of Cromwell Venice also refrained from asserting any special liaison based on their republican regime. The Senate was wise enough not to offer unrestricted official recognition to the parliamentary England. In fact both countries were aware that this "special relation" was overestimated. Venetians were friends, as Charles I had said, but not such good friends as to lend us money. So, from 1645 to 1669, as we have seen, Venetian arguments, put to both Protestants and Catholics, focused almost exclusively on the defence of the Christian faith in general. As Rycaut pointed out when the siege started, Venice expected that help from the Christian princes

> would have been granted as it was once in the time of the Holy War; or that those whom the Declaration of a common Crusade, or Devotion, or sense of Religion could not move, yet at least the consideration of their countries

> defence, or the maintenance of a Bulwark of Christendom, might persuade to wage arms against the Turk as a Common Enemy.[11]

England, at open war against the Muslim pirates, certainly fell within the category of states with such considerations. Although it didn't produce the desired effect to start with, the Senate pursued the same approach for 24 years. The freedom of trade and the loss of liberty, especially the latter, were only rarely mentioned by both diplomats and writers. The issue of prestige or ranking among Christian nations was invoked more often, implying that the English ought to invest something tangible if they were really competing with France or Spain for world supremacy. Does this evidence suggest that the Venetians were running short of political instinct?

Although the English fleet was in a position to seriously affect the course of events in Crete, it is doubtful whether the Senate ever expected a major intervention from England as their formal ally, although it was mentioned a few times that an English victory over the Turks at sea would be easy. Even when, in 1669, the Venetians did ask for a whole squadron to join their fleet, they did not really expect such a favour. The pressure for recruitment in the British Isles was far from constant. Since mercenaries were no longer crusaders, English soldiers of fortune were a luxury Venice did not have the means to afford it. In fact the Senate – and even more so its delegates in London – acknowledged all the difficulties: England was far away from the Mediterranean and commercial interest in the Ottoman Empire topped the list both of its foreign and domestic priorities.

11. Rycaut, *op.cit*., p. 61.

Interests of trade would always stand between the two states.

Traders were admittedly the back-bone of the English nation. This is why the Venetians focused their pressure for almost thirty years on two points: Since they did not expect – nor did they wish — to restrict the English presence in the Levant, they tried to limit to a minimum the valuable and fairly safe transport services offered by English vessels to the Ottoman army. Secondly, they strived to keep English trade in their dominions as brisk as possible, most notably the currant trade. If maritime trade continued with minimum disruption, then in addition to the duty revenues, Venice would have a better chance to employ strong English ships frequenting its harbours for its own military effort.[12] Thus they were ready to oblige the Levant Company whenever their assistance was requested. Of course it was the fervent wish of Venice that England become seriously engaged in a lengthy naval war along the coasts of Barbary. All the Senate could do was to hope that frequent seizures of trade ships would irritate the English. Alberico Gentili, a protestant Italian Jurist and Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford University, had argued, in the late 16th century, that England should not break with the Turks as long as they were quite. Confession by itself, although crucial for inter-state relations, was not a legitimate reason of war. More serious manifestations of enmity were required to justify war and, for Gentili, the continuous seizure of cargoes was certainly one of them.[13]

12. For the dependence of the Venetian navy on Dutch and English ships for military use before and during the Cretan War see David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 85-6.

13. Peter Schröder, "Taming the Fox and the Lion-Some Aspects of

Meanwhile, the *Serenissima* invested its best diplomatic efforts in the "more Christian" courts of Europe.

Before turning to the English point of view, which is the main concern of this study, it is useful to review in brief why, unlike the English, the French King Louis XIV decided to take his chances on the side of both the Holy Roman Emperor in 1664 and Venice in 1665 and 1668-69 against the Ottoman Empire. Excluding the possibility that he was influenced by the overwhelming hostility to Islam of French "public opinion", it would seem that his choice was determined both by his will to assist the Holy See – and thus improve his prestige as *Rex Christianissimus* – and by Colbert's anxiety to have the Capitulations renewed by the Porte. The considerable fall in French trade in the Ottoman Empire (compared to English and Dutch achievements), the rapid decline of the French diplomatic position in Constantinople, the on-going clash with the Barbary pirates and the disruptive role of the French knights of Malta, all these were reasons to favour an aggressive come-back attempt, so aggressive as to overshadow the fact that French merchant vessels were also pressed into the service to the Ottoman navy.[14] But exercising military pressure did not work out for the French monarch. The French nobility failed to defend Candia

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the Sixteenth-Century Debate on Inter-State Relations" in Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder (eds), *War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe* (Farnham, 2010), pp. 91-2. See also the classic work of Franklin L. Baumer, "England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom", *American Historical Review*, 50 (1944-45), 29-31.

14. For such an incident see Goffman, *op.cit*., p. 152. For the clash between the Knights of Malta and Louis XIV over the services offered by French ships to the Turks see Peter Earl, *Corsairs of Malta and Barbary* (London, 1970), pp. 110-2.

and the French capitulations were not granted until 1673.[15] In any case, as indicated above, contrary to appearances French policy in the 1660s was not determined solely by the religious factor. The same has been argued for Spain. Catholicism might have been an influence but it did not determine the interests of that monarchy either.[16]

However, the continuing presence of religion in European politics long after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) has been established. Secularisation of foreign policy and of warfare was an incomplete process which went on for most part of the seventeenth century and certainly long after the end of the Thirty Year War, allegedly fought on exclusive religious grounds.[17] What did change was the incorporation of the religious factor within a wider concept of a state foreign policy. It has been argued that this was the case in England's two Dutch wars, although it is hard to decide whether religious ideology was in fact a primary element of English policy towards the United Provinces.[18] In any case, according to Baumer's conclusion, the Common Corps of Christendom, was throughout the 17th cen-

15. *Philip McCluskey, "Commerce before Crusade? France, the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary Pirates (1661–1669)", French History, 23/1 (2009), 1-21.* Cf. Paul Walden Bamford, "The Knights of Malta and the King of France, 1665-1700", *French Historical Studies*, 3/4 (1964), 429-53, especially pp. 448-50.

16. Christopher Storrs, "The Role of Religion in Spanish Foreign Policy in the Reign of Carlos II 1665-1700" in David Onnekink (ed.), *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648-1713* (Farnham, 2009), pp. 25-46.

17. Andrew C. Thompson, "After Westphalia: Remodeling a Religious Foreign Policy" in Onnekink (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 66-7.

18. See also Jonathan Israel's review of Pincus book in *The Journal of Modern History*, 71/3 (1999), 679-80; Thompson, *op.cit.*, pp. 53-4.

tury a reality. Therefore the Venetians were not entirely unrealistic in invoking Cromwell's or the Charles', be it father's or son's, Christian feelings.[19] Moreover, it could be argued, following Molly Greene's stimulating analysis, that in the Mediterranean borderland world, dominated by piracy and irregular diplomatic relations, the inability to implement a state trade policy maximized the importance of religion as a tool in pursuit of profit. Not only for the French but also for the English, Christian religion was a steady point of reference facilitating cooperation with a rising Greek-Orthodox mercantile class of the Archipelago and/or the Ionian and the exclusion of Muslims from Mediterranean trade.[20] Nevertheless, it can't be said that the sufferings of the Cretans or any other Greek islanders ever mattered or were mentioned in particular.

However much political or religious ideas such as tyranny, oppression, Catholicism or Christendom influenced the politics of Cromwell and of English kings in the seventeenth century, there were undoubtedly more important issues of concern in the making of English foreign policy. The significance of the fragile Levantine trade was one of them. As mentioned earlier in this study and as has been established by many scholars, the English were beating the Venetians in the carrying trade, the currant import trade, and the woollen manufactured goods export trade.[21] Competition with the Dutch, however, in the

19. Baumer, *op.cit*., p. 48.

20. Molly Greene, "Beyond the Northern Invasion: The Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century", *Past and Present*, 174/1 (2002), 45-6. For an extensive analysis see by the same author *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants. A Maritime History of the Mediterranean* (Princeton, 2010).

21. The two standard references are the work of Richard T. Rapp,

carrying trade in general and in the seaborne trade to the Ottoman Empire in particular was not that easily won.[22] According to Davis, imports from Spain, Portugal and the Mediterranean to London in the 1660s represented some thirty per cent of the total value of imports in that port. Exports from London to the same destinations represented close to fifty per cent. Currants from the Ionian Islands alone represented 26 per cent of the total imports average in 1620s and 1630s and 18 per cent in the 1660s.[23] During the course of the century imports of currants doubled but their value dropped to half due to the single-crop system of cultivation and the resulting overproduction. According to Brenner, the value of Levantine imports (currants included) in 1634, 1663 and 1669 represented 25, 13 and 16 per cent of the English import trade respectively. In any case the trade deficit was negative and this was a fact not only for the Levant trade in general or for the case of Venice, as some complained,

"The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony", already mentioned and the two papers by Domenico Sella, "Crisis and Transformation in Venetian Trade" and "The Rise and Fall of the Venetian Woollen Industry" in B. Pullan (ed.), *Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (London, 1968), pp. 88-105 and 106-26.

22. Marie-Christine Engels, *Merchants, Interlopers, Seamen and Corsairs: the "Flemish" community in Livorno and Genoa (1615-1635)* (Amsterdam, 1997), p. 80; Gijs Rommelse, *The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667): Raison d'état, Mercantilism and Maritime Strife* (Hilversum, 2006), pp. 138 ff.; David Ormrod, *The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, 1650-1770* (Cambridge 2003), pp. 62-3.

23. Ralph Davis, "English Foreign Trade 1660-1700" in W.E. Minchinton (ed.), *The Growth of English Overseas Trade* (London, 1969), pp. 96-7; Ralph Davis, "English Imports from the Middle East, 1580-1750" in M.A. Cook (ed.), *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present* (Oxford, 1978), p. 202.

but for Italy as a whole. An unbalanced commercial venture of this size would not have been pursued and maintained by the Levant Company –in an almost "anarchic era" for the Mediterranean Sea– without state support and strong vessels. In spite of the deficit, it was generally acknowledged that the Italian routes were important for English shipping for the excellent opportunities they provided for the transport of goods.[24]

The influence on English foreign policy of the Levant Company lobby– especially of the currant traders –through connections with both the Houses of Lords and Commons was acknowledged since the 1620s. By the 1640s the members of the Company had been integrated in a tight web of family and political relations which exceeded by far the geographical limits of the Mediterranean trade.[25] As has been presented, the way the Civil War escalated in England combined with the sharp disputes between Venice and some of the leading Levant traders in the context of a long standing competition shaped an inflexible, neutral policy towards Venice. This was hardened by Venetian favours offered to both Charles I and II. It was a desperate and miscalculated attempt to play the economic interests of the crown against those of Parliament and thus to overcome the 1643-4 embargo on currants. Although relations were soon smoothed, even more so when the monarchy was

24. Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, pp. 29, 46-7; Gigliola Pagano de Divitiis, *English Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Italy*, translated by Stephen Parkin (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 126-33, 140-4.

25. Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, pp. 73 and 88. To understand the nature of their influence, see in particular Richard Grassby, "English Merchant Capitalism in the Late Seventeenth Century. The Composition of Business Fortunes", *Past and Present*, 46 (Feb. 1970), 87-107.

restored, the anti-Venetian attitude of the traders dominated Parliament. It was taken for granted from that point on by everybody, Cromwell, King Charles II and their foreign ministers. Needless to say, putting the blame for Turcophilia on the Company and on Parliament was a most convenient alibi. English leaders, deeply concerned with the fragile balance of power in domestic affairs, could then demonstrate freely the varying degrees of their true rather than pretended Christian compassion and their disgust for the *Alcoran*. Charles II and Queen Catherine, short of capital themselves, admitted in all frankness that they were not sufficiently well re-established as to challenge Parliament. At the same time they could do business in Constantinople through Winchilsea, just as Charles I had carried out his personal diplomacy through the clandestine services of Sackville Crow.

It would be unrealistic to believe that traders were less passionate Christians than diplomats and noblemen. Merchants, captains and crews were reluctant (if not embarrassed) to cooperate fully with the Turks at the expense of the Venetian war effort; especially if this was to their own detriment or was to become publically known. Mistrusted by the Ottomans, sometimes they even clashed with the officials openly or fought vigorously to defend cargoes of Venetian interest.[26] But they

26. An English ship, *Midleton*, carrying supplies for the Venetian fleet, was attacked in May 1656 off the Dardanelles by an Ottoman fleet of 22 galleys. When the English were overwhelmed, they set fire to their ship and jumped overboard. Most of the men were drown or captured. Only two of them escaped: *Les voyages de Jean Struys en Moscovie, en Tartarie, en Perse, aux Indes & en plusieurs autres païs étrangères* (Amstredam, 1681), pp. 70-1. For the position of the merchants in particular see Linda Darling,

were certainly tougher than diplomats in their bargaining with Christians and Muslims alike, though perhaps no tougher than the Venetians had been with them in the 1620s. They asked the Venetians for lower duties, less taxes, less burdens, better services, prompt payments, less involvement in military transportation, passes to escape naval blockades, even more imports of English goods by the Republic. They employed relentlessly and successfully all means available to improve their conditions of trade with the *Serenissima*: embargo or the threat of embargo, pressure or threat of pressure on the Lord Protector, persistent demands to the Resident, the threat to withdraw their ships from the Venetian navy, start trading currants in the Peloponnese, or plant vines in Virginia. Naturally between continuous warfare and the piracy which caused tremendous losses, the salvation of the Cretans was not high in the priorities of the Levant Company. The English would employ force only if it benefited their Levant trade. This was feasible only in the case of the Barbary pirates; rather loosely related to the Porte, they could be easily punished by the English or the French without harming relations with the Ottoman Empire. No less easily they could be employed by the Turks against the Christians in a lucrative war of attrition or be denounced by the Porte, if circumstances so required.[27]

"Mediterranean Borderlands : Early English Merchants in the Levant" in Eugenia Kermeli and Oktay Özel, *The Ottoman Empire. Myths, Realities and 'Black Holes'* (Istanbul, 2006), pp.181-8.

27. Hostility, however, against the Barbary States should not be overestimated, given the continuous English efforts to make terms with them: Ken Parker, "Reading 'Barbary' in Early Modern England 1550-1685" in Matthew Birchwood and Matthew Dimmock (eds), *Cultural Encounters*

This tough handling of Venice by the merchants went hand in hand with a protracted policy of playing for time, as clearly practised consistently by English officials. In addition to encouragement, moral support and admiration, they did not cease to offer hope for (or threat of) a wider armed engagement against the Turks. By presenting the ample and experienced military forces, the naval power, and the renewed diplomatic potential of England, they kept Venetian hopes alive. The wars with Spain, France and the United Provinces, the plague and the 1666 Fire of London, the expectation of a Dutch involvement, all were used as excuses to delay payment of their dues to the Christian cause. From time to time, pirate attacks against English ships and naval engagements with the Algerines and other pirates made such an outcome –conflict with the Turks– more plausible and asserted English prestige. As indicated above, however, although such assurances kept the wheels of diplomacy spinning, year after year, they were not to be taken at their face value.

International prestige, especially after the Restoration, was a different matter, going far beyond mere words. In the absence of the will for war, nothing could be more prestigious in Mediterranean politics than mediation between Christians and Muslims. Naturally, royal mediation was a noble task suitable for high-ranking diplomats like Ambassador Winchilsea, a young Earl with an enormous appetite for high politics and big business in the Balkans. In a strange way, the English delegates in the Ottoman Empire, like Winchilsea, were incarnations of the dynamics and dilemmas of a national foreign policy in the

between East and West 1453-1699 (Newcastle-upon-Tyne), pp. 77-97.

making, dynamics and dilemmas which were more evident at the periphery than were in the nation's centre, in London. They were in the pay of the Company but were or should be loyal to their sovereign. They despised the Turks but had to gain their respect and be familiar with their customs. They were aware of the economic and military potential of England, experienced the international competition in influence within the Ottoman Empire and yet had to live and manoeuvre within the standards and expectations set by the Company. Preserving, renewing and enhancing the Capitulations came first. The protection of trade topped the list of instructions to any ambassador. Mediation was not a priority, at least not until the appointment of Sir Harvey at the very end. In any case, arbitration required neutrality. This was consistent with the English general position of objecting to the rise of any single power in Europe. But neutrality was more easily declared than maintained and gun-boat diplomacy was becoming increasingly tempting. Naval clashes outside or inside the port of Algiers, the employment of English ships by Turks and Venetians, and the presence of English and Scots inside Candia were not signs of neutrality. English ambassadors at the Porte were afraid of what Venice was longing for, the escalation of naval warfare. The Sublime Porte, on the other hand, expected them to furnish generously what they had explicit instructions not to yield, unless threatened. Was umpiring possible for any diplomat under such restrictions?

Mediation also required information, costly and frequent contacts with Ottoman officials. It meant detaching Venice from the French sphere of influence and winning its trust. These could not be achieved for nothing and nothing was all that London could risk and the Company was ready to sacrifice for

Venice. Harvey, reluctant to burden the factors, even suggested the Venetians cover the cost of his mediation journey. Much like Bendysh, he probably had little vision outside the logic of lucrative trade. Winchilsea, on the other hand, was too ambitious to understand the existing limitations of English foreign policy. He believed that even trade should be subordinated to matters of State[28] though State Secretary Arlington was more apt to draw a definite line between the two. Nevertheless, it was not the lack of intelligence or experience that undermined the pursuit of an effective and coherent English policy in the war of Candia.

The Senate and the Porte were unwilling to compromise in a way that would spoil their heavy investment in valour and prestige, not to mention in capital and human lives. England wanted peace to prevail if not to indirectly a popular and defensive cause of a Christian state against the infidels, certainly to take the pressure off Company ships and facilitate the continuation of a trade which involved "numerous families" back home. But peace by itself was not going to end the problem of free trade; this was the task of the navy. Nor was war over Crete necessarily creating only losses. Because of the warfare Venice was not in a position to defend its interests. Thus, under Company pressure and threats, the import trade in Ionian currants was becoming more profitable. Some argued that the export deficit in trade with Venice was against English "public interest"; it was only due to royal favour that so much money was spent abroad on currants. Therefore, they claimed, even more pressure had to be placed on the Venetians to consume more English manufactured goods.

28. HMC, *Finch*, vol. 1, p. xiii.

Profit was also sought in other ways. In wartime the carrying trade, in the service of Christians and Muslims alike, became extremely lucrative and some risky and debatable activities, suitable only for the most ruthless, even more so. This conclusion can also be drawn from the 1664 law against yielding-up. But when captains and crews were not paid promptly or sufficiently, then they rallied against their employers and demanded English representatives or the royal navy to back their demands for restitution.

Ambassador Winchilsea argued that an effective mediation would strengthen royal prestige internationally but, at the same time, pacification in Crete was bound to cause problems to the German Emperor, an outcome which was not desirable. The Venetians hoped that Algerin attacks might convince Cromwell or Charles II to espouse the cause of Candia on ideological grounds familiar and important to them. They were aware, however, that the other wars raging in the Mediterranean demanded all of England's attention and power. Defending English interests against Catholics or even against Protestants could also be a legitimate cause. Geopolitical considerations could or ought to be vested with appropriate ideologies to assume the form of an integrated state policy. But the Crusades were over; Islam was not necessarily or always a primary target. It was a partner but not a friend. Soranzo, the *Bailo*, believed that the English were so cynical that they would like the Turks to capture Candia just to enjoy lower duties on the wine trade. Even if he was right, an alliance with the Ottoman Empire against Venice was never mentioned as an option by the English, nor was private desire ever expressed for indirect support. To the extent that there was a public sphere in early modern England expressing an interest

in Mediterranean affairs, the open or even the passive support of Islamic aggressiveness was out of the question; it would have created a scandal, as the Levant Company itself acknowledged.[29]

Ambassador Mocenigo, in his despair, trusted only divine inspiration might change English minds. In that country, he concluded, religion had been subordinated in all respects to the interests of state. Was he right? Were state interests in this affair easy to recognise or had some individual interest taken on the form of public interests? Determining and defending English state interests during the war of Candia was a matter of timing and priorities changing at different times over a period of thirty years and under different circumstances. The English factor was *de facto* a part of the Cretan war puzzle. Yet state interest could not be defined uniformly in terms of geopolitical interests, economy, domestic politics, foreign diplomacy, centre *vs* periphery, not even on the individual level, if we think of the different *personae* presented on different occasions by Charles I and II. Some people even thought, Winchilsea wrote, that in Turkey there were "no matters of state to be employed in but only merchandising and the protection of traders".[30] England should not interfere in the affairs of the infidels. Giavarina noted once that the government of Republican England was "irregular" and could not go against the will of the people;[31] this "irregularity" did not stop after

29. Jerome Friedman, *The Battle of the Frogs and Fairford's Flies. Miracles and the Pulp Press during the English Revolution* (New York, 1993), pp. 144-7.

30. HMC, *Finch*, vol. 1, p. xiii.

31. It has been argued that Italian representatives understood republic

the restoration of the monarchy, as King Charles II himself confessed. Therefore, in the Mediterranean theatre there were many interests, one gaining priority over the others, but not necessarily clashing with each other. In other words it can not be argued that Candia would have been defended by the English if priorities or the timing had been different. In spite of widespread anti-Islamic feelings and Christian solidarity, Puritan ethics and devotion to the freedom of trade, the need of the elite for prestige and the greed of few powerful and well-connected merchants (able to disguise their own private ventures as public interest), and in spite of the growing complexities of world diplomacy, there was, after all, a common understanding: State interest, whatever and whenever it was, should be determined by reason, not by religious enthusiasm or ambition for personal glory. Christendom, and holy war in its defence, was the concern of politicians. Choices had to be rational and "cautious pragmatism" was a principle not only of the Interregnum;[32] in post-Restoration England it was also shared by the King, even against his own Christian zeal. In a state where the political culture was debatable, ethnic identities incompatible, and the sense of Britishness still tormented by competing sub-traditions, the Reason of economic figures could not be disregarded; perhaps, for the time being, it was the only undisputable reason.[33] If this was so, then setting the

only as a city state. Cromwellian England did not fit exactly what they had in mind: Marco Barducci, *Oliver Cromwell: Negli scritti italiani del Seicento* (Firenze, 2005).

32. Cf. Venning, *op.cit*., p. 231.

33. Colin Kidd, "Protestantism, Constitutionalism and British Identity under the later Stuarts" in Brendan Bradshaw and Peter Roberts (eds),

defence of Venetian-held Candia within the scope of English state interest at any time and from any angle simply did not make sense.

British Consciousness and Identity. The Making of Britain, 1533-1707 (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 321-42. For the importance of ethnic theology on the formation of British identities in the seventeenth century, see, by the same author, *British Identities before Nationalism. Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World 1600-1800* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 34-8.

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Περίληψη

«Δες πώς οι Θεοί ευνοούν την ιεροσυλία!»: Αγγλικές απόψεις και πολιτικές για τον Κρητικό Πόλεμο (1645-1669)

Η μελέτη αυτή επιχειρεί να εξετάσει συνολικά τη βρετανική στάση κατά τον Κρητικό Πόλεμο (1645-1669). Η σταδιακή κατάκτηση της βενετοκρατούμενης Κρήτης από τους Οθωμανούς και η πολυετής πολιορκία του Χάνδακα συγκλόνισαν την Ευρώπη, που εξακολουθούσε να ταλανίζεται ανάμεσα στα σταυροφορικά όνειρα και τη σκληρή διπλωματία. Η Βενετία θα μπορούσε να ελπίζει σ' ένα θαύμα, μόνον αν μια κρίσιμη μάζα ιδεολόγων της Δύσης τασσόταν αποφασιστικά και έμπρακτα εναντίον της Πύλης. Η Βρετανία ήταν η χώρα που μπορούσε να γύρει τη ζυγαριά σ' έναν θαλάσσιο αγώνα. Είχε τις απαραίτητες ναυτικές δυνάμεις για να το κάνει. Διατηρούσε εξάλλου μια «ειδική σχέση» με τη Γαληνότατη Δημοκρατία, λόγω της αντίστασης των Βενετών στη Ρώμη και την Ισπανία και, δευτερευόντως, του αγώνα τους εναντίον της κοινής ισλαμικής πειρατικής απειλής. Όμως το ζήτημα δεν ήταν τόσο απλό και οι περιστάσεις το έκαναν πολυπλοκότερο.

Υποστηρίζεται εξαρχής ότι η «ειδική σχέση» της Βενετίας με το Λονδίνο, στο πλαίσιο μιας διάχυτης απέχθειας προς το Ισλάμ, ήταν μόνον η μία όψη του νομίσματος. Η άλλη ήταν ο σκληρός εμπορικός πόλεμος της σταφίδας των Ιονίων νήσων και γενικότερα ο ανταγωνισμός για το διαμετακομιστικό εμπόριο.

Στη δεκαετία του 1640, πριν από την οθωμανική επίθεση, οι οικονομικές σχέσεις με τη Βενετία ήταν εξαιρετικά τεταμένες. Ενώ η Αγγλία κατρακυλούσε στον εμφύλιο πόλεμο, οι Βενετσιάνοι επιχείρησαν να εκμεταλλευτούν την εσωτερική της κρίση. Με δεδομένα τη στήριξη των εμπόρων στο Κοινοβούλιο και την τιμή της σταφίδας να κατακρημνίζεται, στράφηκαν προς τον Κάρολο, σε μια εποχή που ο άγγλος βασιλιάς αναζητούσε τη βοήθεια των Οθωμανών, για να φορολογήσει τους πράκτορες της Levant Company. Η συγκυρία ήταν ατυχέστατη. Συνέπεσε με την έναρξη της οθωμανικής εισβολής στην Κρήτη και των συνακόλουθων πιέσεων προς την Εταιρεία να χορηγεί στην Πύλη μεταφορικά μέσα. Αν ενέδιδε, τα πλοία της θα έβρισκαν αντιμέτωπο το βενετικό στόλο. Στην αντίθετη περίπτωση, θα πλήττονταν τα οικονομικά της συμφέροντα.

Οι ιδεολογικοί παράμετροι του ζητήματος δεν ήταν αμελητέες, ειδικά μετά την επικράτηση του Oliver Cromwell, ενός μαχητή της πίστης. Γι' αυτό η Γαληνότατη επένδυσε σημαντική διπλωματική προσπάθεια, ώστε να πετύχει, αν όχι την ανοιχτή ναυτική υποστήριξη ή την προσέλκυση μισθοφόρων, τουλάχιστον τη συστηματική άρνηση μεταφορικών εξυπηρετήσεων στους Οθωμανούς. Τα επιχειρήματά της ήταν θρησκευτικά. Το χρέος των Άγγλων και η αποστολή του Λόρδου Προστάτη ήταν προς τη Χριστιανοσύνη όχι προς τη Βενετία. Οι περιστασιακές αψιμαχίες του αγγλικού ναυτικού με τους αλγερινούς πειρατές και οι αόριστες υποσχέσεις του Cromwell και των συνεργατών του ενθάρρυναν τους Βενετούς. Στην πράξη, βέβαια, γνώριζαν –μερικές φορές οι Άγγλοι τους το έλεγαν ωμά—πως τα εμπορικά συμφέροντα υπερίσχυαν. Το μεγαλείο τους έγκειτο ακριβώς στο μοναχικό τους αγώνα. Έλπιζαν πάντως πως με τις συνεχείς οχλήσεις θα περιορίζονταν κάπως οι αναπόφευκτες δεσμεύσεις αγγλικών εμπορικών πλοίων.

Από την άλλη, βέβαια, η Levant Company, μπορούσε να ζητά και να παίρνει από τη Δημοκρατία όλο και περισσότερα οικονομικά ανταλλάγματα.

Μέχρι την παλινόρθωση της μοναρχίας (1660) το αναμενόμενο θαύμα, η ενεργητικότερη εμπλοκή του αγγλικού ναυτικού εναντίον των πειρατών, δεν είχε συμβεί. Αντίθετα οι πιθανότητες να γίνουν οι άγγλοι έμποροι ενδοτικότεροι προς τους Οθωμανούς αυξάνονταν. Ο Κάρολος Β΄ δεν επρόκειτο να αλλάξει τις ισορροπίες στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο. Οι Βενετοί το κατάλαβαν εγκαίρως. Δεν είχε την πολιτική ισχύ, για να παραβλέψει το μεγάλο οικονομικό κόστος. Ο νέος άγγλος πρεσβευτής, ευγενής περιωπής, απεστάλη με οδηγίες ουδετερότητας. Όμως σύντομα το σκηνικό περιπλέχθηκε, λόγω αφενός της επιθυμίας του να ασκήσει ουσιαστική διπλωματία, αναδεικνύοντας τη χώρα του σε ειρηνευτή, αφετέρου της ταραγμένης σχέσης του με τον βενετό *Bailo* στην Κωνσταντινούπολη αλλά και με τους Οθωμανούς. Εξάλλου, το έργο του εμποδιζόταν από τα επαναλαμβανόμενα επεισόδια προσβολής αγγλικών πλοίων από τους Αλγερινούς. Η παραδοσιακή διπλωματία αδυνατούσε να τα καταστείλει και η Πύλη να τους συνετίσει. Στο μεταξύ η Levant Company δεν έπαυε να πιέζει τη Βενετία για διευκολύνσεις και αυτή με τη σειρά της να επανέρχεται στο Λονδίνο για βοήθεια, καθώς ο κλοιός γύρω από τον Χάνδακα έσφιγγε. Βασιλική οικογένεια και υπουργοί, άλλοτε από ειλικρινή συμπάθεια κι άλλοτε από αμηχανία, δεν ήταν ποτέ εντελώς αρνητικοί. Σε κάθε χρονική στιγμή είχαν άπειρους και πειστικούς λόγους, για να αναβάλουν την εμπλοκή τους, αλλά δεν ήθελαν να απολέσουν οριστικά τη δυνατότητα μιας ειρηνικής παρέμβασης· αρκεί να μην απαιτούσε ιδιαίτερη διπλωματία και έξοδα. Ό,τι άλλο υπαινίσσονταν πως θα μπορούσαν να προσφέρουν στη Γαληνότατη, ήταν εύσχημα ψέματα. Όλα πήραν τέλος, όταν ο Χάνδακας έπεσε.

Στο τελευταίο μέρος της εργασίας επιχειρείται η ανασυγκρότηση της εικόνας του Κρητικού Πολέμου, της Βενετίας και του Ισλάμ στην Αγγλία της εποχής εκείνης, ώστε να σταθμιστεί σε ποιο βαθμό η θρησκεία μπορούσε να επηρεάσει τη λήψη πολιτικών αποφάσεων. Η σύντομη απάντηση είναι πως, μολονότι η αντιπάθεια προς τους Τούρκους ήταν ειλικρινής και διαδεδομένη σε όλα τα στρώματα, μολονότι τέτοιου είδους ιδεολογικά ζητήματα έπαιζαν γενικώς ρόλο στις αποφάσεις –όχι αναγκαστικά τις αγγλικές– ωστόσο η σωτηρία της Κρήτης προς όφελος της Βενετίας αποτελούσε μια αλτρουιστική επιλογή, που δεν ήταν ποτέ ούτε μπορούσε να είναι στις προτεραιότητες του Λονδίνου.

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1. The place names Venice, Candia and Crete have not been included.

ΤΟ ΒΙΒΛΙΟ ΤΟΥ ΒΑΣΙΛΗ ΓΟΥΝΑΡΗ, *'SEE HOW THE GODS FAVOUR SACRILEGE': ENGLISH VIEWS AND POLITICS ON CANDIA UNDER SIEGE (1645-1669)*, ΣΕΛΙΔΟΠΟΙΗΘΗΚΕ ΑΠΟ ΤΗΝ ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΑ ΣΙΜΩΝΕΤΑΤΟΥ ΣΤΗ ΜΗΧΑΝΟΓΡΑΦΗΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΤΜΗΜΑΤΟΣ ΝΕΟΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΩΝ ΕΡΕΥΝΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΙΝΣΤΙΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΩΝ ΕΡΕΥΝΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΕΘΝΙΚΟΥ ΙΔΡΥΜΑΤΟΣ ΕΡΕΥΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΥΠΩΘΗΚΕ ΑΠΟ *Αφοί* ΠΑΠΑΔΑΚΗ «ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΑΓΡΑ» ΕΠΕ, ΓΡΑΦΙΚΕΣ ΤΕΧΝΕΣ, ΤΟ 2012, ΣΕ 350 ΑΝΤΙΤΥΠΑ

ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙ ΤΟ ΕΚΑΤΟΣΤΟ ΤΡΙΑΚΟΣΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΜΑ ΤΟΥ ΤΜΗΜΑΤΟΣ ΝΕΟΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΩΝ ΕΡΕΥΝΩΝ

THE BOOK OF BASIL GOUNARIS, *'SEE HOW THE GODS FAVOUR SACRILEGE': ENGLISH VIEWS AND POLITICS ON CANDIA UNDER SIEGE (1645-1669)*, WAS PAGINATED BY CONSTANTINA SIMONETATOU AT THE DEPARTMENT OF NEOHELLENIC RESEARCH, INSTITUTE OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH, NATIONAL HELLENIC RESEARCH FOUNDATION; THE BOOK WAS PRINTED IN 350 COPIES BY PAPADAKIS BROS PRINTING ARTS IN 2012

IT IS THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST PUBLICATION OF THE THE DEPARTMENT OF NEOHELLENIC RESEARCH